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Abstract ,
*
This thesis describes the efforts of Russia’s central gov­
ernment, local governments (zemstvos) and various social institu­
tions to modernize peasant agriculture during the period 1906-17.
The focus is on the micro-economic dynamics of the development 
program, on the interaction between various types of extension 
workers and peasant farmers.
After a short discussion of Russia’s economic backwardness 
at the beginning of the 20th century, the thesis examines the 
nature of rural society and the technological characteristics of 
peasant agriculture.
The agricultural development program which evolved after 
1906 is divided into three inter-related branches: land reform, 
social agronomy and cooperation. The land reform (consisting of 
resettlement, increased gentry land sales to the peasantry, 
privatization of peasant allotments and consolidation of strips 
into consolidated farmsteads) is examined in terms of quantita­
tive results and social dynamics. We look at the strategies of 
the cadres pushing through the reform, the reaction of the peas­
antry and the effects of the reform on peasant farming. Social 
agronomy (mass agronomic education) was an innovative program 
administered jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
zemstvos; We examine in detail the work of local agronomists, 
their lifestyle and their effect on peasant society. Agricultural 
cooperation (agricultural societies, credit cooperatives, dairy 
cooperatives, etc.) experienced rapid growth during this time; we 
examine the role of cooperatives in providing farm credit, mar­
keting services, farm supplies and agronomic advice to peasant 
farmers.
Finally, the thesis describes the significant impact of the 
agricultural development program on agricultural technology and 
Russia’s agricultural progress. The expansion of the farming 
sector in turn affected Russia’s economy as a whole. In order to 
reinforce the hypothesis that the agricultural development pro­
gram was directly responsible for a large part of Russia’s agri­
cultural expansion, we employ regression analysis on a database 
consisting of variables such as crop yields, land tenure, urbani­
zation, etc. across 42 provinces of European Russia. The conclu­
sion is that, in spite of its short life, the agricultural devel­
opment program of 1906-17 succeeded in considerably improving the 
state of Russian agriculture.
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INTRODUCTION »
The Stolypin Reform
When Piotr Stolypin was appointed Prime Minister of Russia 
in the summer of 1906 there was little to indicate that his term 
of office would last any longer than that of his two predeces­
sors, Witte and Goremykin, both of whom had lasted less than a 
year. Russia was reeling from the revolution of 1905. Industry 
was paralyzed by strikes. In the countryside, the peasant jac­
querie was raging at full force. In the Duma, the newly-created 
parliament, the majority was calling for the resignation of the 
Tsar’s ministers and for the expropriation of gentry lands. But 
instead of being swept aside by these tumultuous forces, Stolypin 
held on to his post and became the architect of Russia’s post- 
1905 order. In retrospect, Stolypin’s accession to power in 1906 
appears an important turning point in Russian history. The main 
reason for this enduring historical reputation is the agrarian 
reform he engineered -- the so-called Stolypin Reform.
The cornerstone of the Stolypin Reform was the decree of 9 
November 1906, which undermined the peasant commune by encourag­
ing the peasant farmer to claim his land in private tenure and 
consolidate his multiple strips into a single plot of land..
Having committed itself to the creation of a new type of peasant 
farmer, Stolypin’s government soon found itself improvizing a 
whole variety of economic modernization measures which took it 
far beyond the initial legal and political aims of the land
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reform. It began to pour funds into programs such as agricultural 
extension and credit cooperation which on the surface had nothing 
to do with the decree of 9 November 1906, but had everything to 
do with encouraging the rise of a prosperous class of yeoman 
farmers. With the Stolypin Reform, for the first time we can 
speak of a modern program of agricultural development -- namely 
of a conscious effort by government and social organizations to 
accelerate rural economic progress with a program that was both 
massive in scope and micro-economic in orientation.
The effects of the reform were prodigious. It would not be 
an exaggeration to say that 9 November 1906 set in motion a 
transformation of rural society that was already fairly well 
advanced by 1917. We see the effects first of all in land tenure: 
In this brief decade, gentry landowners sold off over one fifth 
of their land -- 11 million desiatins; by 1916, gentry-managed 
farms accounted for just 11% of the arable land in European 
Russia. Peasant agriculture, by contrast, not only expanded 
rapidly, but changed in character. The old peasant commune, with 
its village settlements, strip farming, and periodic redivisions 
of land, was rapidly disappearing. By 1916, about half of the 
peasantry in European Russia -- almost 8 million households -- 
held their land as private property. Among these newly-entitled 
landowners, there were about 1.8 million fully consolidated and 
independent farms. Peasant demand for either privatization or 
consolidation was so voracious that the government was managing 
to act on less than half the petitions submitted. The private 
family farm, preferably situated on a consolidated plot of land, 
was emerging as the future unit of modern Russian agriculture.
Science and modern technology were also making their way 
into the Russian countryside during the Stolypin Reform. A new 
type of government employee appeared in the village at this time: 
the agronomist. In 1905 there were a few hundred agronomists in 
all of Russia and these were based mostly in the towns. By 1914, 
this number had grown to about 10,000. Agronomists had an impact 
on even the darkest villages in the depths of the countryside. 
They organized country fairs, lectures, courses, demonstration 
fields, seed-cleaning campaigns, cooperatives and a variety of 
other initiatives, playing a crucial role in getting peasant 
farmers to abandon age-old cultivation techniques and adopt 
modern European technologies. Along with agronomists, there arose 
a number of local institutions such as farm supply depots, 
machine rental stations, agricultural societies and so on. All of 
these helped in the giant task of disseminating better tools, 
livestock breeds and production techniques to the mass of peasant 
f armers.
Finally, the period of the Stolypin Reform witnessed the 
flowering of the rural cooperative movement, which grew from a 
fragile and largely superficial network in 1905 to a major force 
in the national economy on the eve of the revolution. Thanks to 
cooperation, the peasant economy in just a few years developed a 
powerful banking system, which included nearly half the rural 
population and had assets of almost a billion rubles by 1916. 
Agricultural cooperatives also developed a strong position in 
rural trade, encouraging the commercialization of the peasant 
economy and standing to gain a virtual monopoly in certain 
activities such as butter-making and the provision of farm
supplies. The rapid pace of cooperative development was due to 
the rationality of cooperation as an idea, as well as to the 
vigor and commercialization of peasant farming at this time. Also 
playing a crucial role in the success of the cooperative movement 
was a large group of government and private entrepreneurs who 
propagated the idea of cooperation among the peasantry.
These three parallel programs —  land reform, agricultural 
extension and cooperation -- were linked by more than just the 
common use of government funds. They complemented and reinforced 
each other on the village level. There is substantial statistical 
evidence that the same broad group of peasantry -- probably about 
half of the peasant households -- made use of both land reform 
and agronomic aid and cooperation. Consolidation of land tenure 
was generally undertaken by the more prosperous or in any case 
the more entrepreneurial among the peasants. The majority of the 
membership of the agricultural and credit cooperatives was made 
up of the stronger, more commercialized peasant farmers. Agrono­
mists, meanwhile, relied on agricultural pioneers -- peasants 
with a certain financial soundness and entrepreneurial flair —  
to introduce technological improvements. The same broad group of 
peasants were involved in all three initiatives. For the peasant 
farmer this made sense. The process of commercialization led the 
peasant farmer to cooperation and an interest in agronomic im­
provements. Departure from the peasant commune left the farmer 
independent and insecure, and drove him to seek the advice of the 
agronomist and try to maximize his cash income through membership 
in a cooperative. In the development of land reform, agronomy and 
cooperation we see the rise of the new Russian farmer. The common
factors were the qualities of entrepreneurial initiative, open­
ness to new ideas and attentitiveness to the needs of the market.
With the successful expansion of land reform, agronomic aid 
and cooperation, it is not surprising that virtually all indica­
tors of Russian agricultural production rose steeply at this time 
in spite of the fact that the Stolypin Reform was soon cut 
short by the forces of war and revolution. Gross agricultural 
production jumped some 47% over the decade. Russia’s animal hus­
bandry, which had been declining for several decades, turned 
upwards. While domestic food consumption rose, Russia’s 
agricultural exports rose as well, especially in higher-value 
products such as butter, meat, eggs and sugar. The introduction 
of new crop rotations was indicated by the increased cultivation 
of non-grain crops such as clover and potatoes, by a decrease in 
fallow lands and by an increase in crop yields. Employment of 
modern equipment, artificial fertilizers and improved seed 
varieties also rose steeply during this period, though admittedly 
from low base points. Rural incomes, as measured by cash savings, 
livestock ownership, landownership or agricultural production per 
capita all rose sharply. Rural Russia was experiencing a renais­
sance .
Clearly the Stolypin Reform is important for the student of 
Russian history. In scope and ambition, the reform went far 
beyond programs initiated by Minister of Agriculture P.D. Kiselev 
in the 1840’s, for example. The Stolypin Reform gives a glimpse 
of the Tsarist regime at the apex of its administrative 
development -- a far from decadent eleventh hour. Tsarist policy 
at this time, like Stolypin himself, represented a curious
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mixture of traditional and modern elements —  a bridge between 
the 18th and the 20th centuries. The Stolypin government balanced 
the suppression of the 1905 revolution with a sophisticated 
program of economic development, conservatism with modernization, 
paternalistic administration with a liberation of local 
initiative. All this added up to an example of remarkably good 
government, a fact which should not be obscured by the shadow of 
the 1917 revolution.
Apart from its administrative significance and impressive 
economic achievements, the Stolypin Reform was important in a 
sociological sense. It laid the foundation for a rural middle 
class, both in the form of the new peasant farmers who arose as a 
result of the reform and in the form of the professionals —  
agronomists, surveyors, book-keepers, etc. —  who serviced them. 
Critics could argue that the benefits the peasantry received from 
the Stolypin Reform were not sufficient and that the Government 
was merely trying to gloss over awkward issues of class struggle 
and political representation. But such a point of view is 
inaccurate. The progress of Russian agriculture at this time was 
strong enough to withstand the severe strain of war, while the 
rural population remained loyal to the established order up to 
the end of the Tsarist regime. It was not the rural social 
structure that broke down on the eve of February 1917, but rather 
the transportation system, urban society and political system. 
Stolypin’s structure in the countryside held firm until the last 
moment when the world came down around it.
The significance of the Stolypin Reform goes beyond its 
importance to the study of the late Russian Empire. The reform is
an effective model of agricultural development and modernization 
of peasant society, reaching beyond its own particular time and 
circumstances. Many aspects of the Stolypin model of agricultural 
development were adopted wholesale by the Soviet government 
during the New Economic Policy of the 1920’s. The Stolypin model 
is relevant even today, in many developing countries and even in 
the contemporary USSR. Now that the Stalinist model of 
agricultural development (i.e. collectivization as implemented in 
the USSR, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, etc.) is being discredited, 
perhaps we will see another Russian model of agricultural 
development -- the Stolypin model -- take its place.
The Stolypin model of agricultural development is 
interesting in two ways: as a model of government administration 
and as a model of agricultural production. With respect to the 
first aspect -- government administration -- Stolypin’s 
government was not content to take either a conservatively 
paternalistic stance towards the countryside (similar to the one 
adopted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the late 19th 
century) or a laissez faire stance towards capitalist 
development. It was an interventionist regime, actively seeking 
to promote economic development and social modernization. Yet the 
key to the Stolypin administrative model is that it was based on 
the devolution of administrative responsibilities and the 
encouragement of local self-reliance. Government policy consisted 
of doling out funds for various development initiatives, 
educating the farmers and disseminating the latest agricultural 
technologies. Under no circumstance did government officials 
impose their own views on how production should be organized. The
goal was to awaken the activism of local entrepreneurs, widen ,
their understanding of economic alternatives and then allow local 
people to decide what needed to be done and how.
The government consistently avoided a doctrinaire approach 
to agricultural development. St. Petersburg may have favored 
breaking up the peasant commune and the creation of consolidated 
family farms, but it was perfectly willing to strengthen communal 
tenure by carrying out "group land settlement" or by encouraging 
communal improvement of crop rotations. Every region, indeed 
every village, was encouraged to follow the development course it 
had chosen for itself. The Ministry of Agriculture was willing to 
subsidize numerous endeavors: land consolidation in
Ekaterinoslav, market gardening in Tambov, communal grass-sowing 
in Moscow, handicrafts in Viatka or cooperative butter-making in 
Tobolsk. The Stolypin government’s decentralized administrative 
style ensured that not only would the resulting agricultural 
program be well adapted to the needs of each particular locality, 
but that it would achieve maximum impact on rural society. The 
mobilization of local initiative, manpower and financial 
resources guaranteed a far greater effect than if the 
agricultural program were funded and administered solely by the 
central government. It was this aspect of Stolypin’s 
administrative style that made development self-sustaining and 
allowed it to continue despite the assasination of Stolypin 
himself and even the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
The evolution of the Stolypin Reform can be broken down into 
four successive stages: (1) dislocation, (2) differentiation, (3)
development and (4) self-perpetuation. The first stage -- dislo-
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cation -- was necessary because the traditionalism and inertia of 
peasant society had to be eliminated before any kind of mass 
change could take hold of the rural society. One of the main 
reasons why the Stolypin Reform was so successful was that 
conditions in the countryside were favorable to it. Thanks to the 
development of market relations in the 1890’s, the revolution of 
1905 and the Stolypin land reform itself, the process of 
dislocation was well-advanced in the countryside and peasant 
Russia was ripe for change. The second stage -- differentiation 
-- underlay the whole concept of the Stolypin Reform. Once the 
rigidity of traditionalism was broken, peasant society could 
undergo a specialization of labor. The best farmers could 
specialize in farming and grow prosperous on the land; 
handicraftsmen could sell their land altogether and focus on 
their crafts; those who were incapable or unwilling to make a 
living in the countryside could also sell their land and move to 
the city. The third stage —  development -- involved the 
organization of various subsidiary enterprises such as 
cooperatives or the agronomic network to help the newly- 
specialized peasant enterprises prosper. The final stage -- 
self-perpetuation -- began to take shape once the reform was 
fairly well advanced. The fact that innovation and development 
became self-perpetuating, based on the self-reliance of the local 
population, was a sign of success and historical impact.
It can be argued that the four stages of dislocation, dif­
ferentiation, development and self-perpetuation mirror the evolu­
tion of economic change in general. That’s true. But the fact 
remains that the Stolypin Reform, aiming to accelerate and
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occasionally guide the evolution of the peasant economy, was 
successful precisely because it reflected the logic of the real 
world. Not every agricultural development program succeeds in 
doing so.
The other interesting aspect of the Stolypin Reform is as a 
model of agricultural production. A government-led agricultural 
development policy may be very economical and astute, but it will 
produce few results if the soil isn’t right for it. The soil for 
the Stolypin Reform was the family farm operating in the context 
of a market economy. The model of the commercialized family farm 
remains a good one today. In an age when American agriculture is 
struggling with overproduction, excessively high input costs, 
heavy indebtedness, low employment and the pollution of 
groundwater, many observers are looking to "low-input sustainable 
agriculture" for a solution —  i.e. resucitating the small family 
farm and returning to organic fertilizers and crop rotations, all 
of which were strongly encouraged by the Stolypin Reform. Soviet 
agriculture, meanwhile, long having taken American mechanized 
agribusiness as its model, is currently seeking to overhaul its 
inefficient system of large-scale collectivized agriculture. In 
the opinion of this author, the architects of Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
program of perestroika would do well to borrow heavily from 
Russia’s first experiment with de-collectivization and 
privatization eight decades ago.
The reason why the commercialized family farm is such an 
effective unit of production is that it minimizes input costs and 
maximizes both the industriousness of farm labor and the 
entrepreneurial initiative of farm management. The result is
usuallly a higher yield per unit of land than what a large,
highly-mechanized operation relying on hired labor could produce.
These advantages ensured that in both Europe and Russia at the
turn of the century, the commercialized family farm would edge
out both large, semi-feudal latifundia on the one hand and tiny,
self-sufficient peasant farms on the other. A contemporary
example of the superiority of the small family farm can be found
in the flourishing community of Amish farmers in Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania; this county, with its thousands of Amish
and Mennonite farms, is the most productive non-irrigated county
in the United States, despite the fact that the Amish shun
1
tractors and most types of artificial fertilizers. Another 
contemporary example of the advantages of the family farm can be 
found in the Chinese agricultural reforms of 1979-87. In this 
case, decollectivization of land tenure and the liberation of 
market forces immediately led to a rise in productivity and gross 
output. The Stolypin Reform aimed to construct just such a 
foundation of commercialized family farming in Russia at the 
beginning of the century. The reform involved both a process of 
de-collectivization (dissolution of the peasant commune) and the 
commercialization of traditional peasant agriculture. Economies 
of scale were achieved by binding farmers together into credit, 
marketing or processing cooperatives. It was, as we shall see, a 
recipe for extraordinary dynamism in the agricultural sector.
The Methodology of this Thesis
The Stolypin Reform has received substantial attention in
Western and Soviet scholarship, but there have been surprisingly
few studies of Russian agricultural development that were both
detailed and comprehensive.
For the Stolypin Reform proper, there are several excellent
works, including those of George Yaney, Dorothy Atkinson and
Judith Pallot. Yaney does not go into the problems of peasant
society and peasant economy, but examines the reform from the
point of view the central government, as an example of
2
administrative decentralization and pragmatism. Pallot and
Atkinson take a more detailed and peasant-oriented approach
towards the reform, the former examining specific regional case
studies from a geographic point of view and the latter examining
the relevant national statistics in the context of the social
3
resilience of the peasant land commune. Robinson, in his
sociological study of the Russian peasantry, devotes a chapter to
the reform and argues that it generally failed to alleviate the
4
poverty and political hostility of the peasantry. Mosse, in his 
short review, also expresses the view that the Stolypin Reform
5
did not succeed in tackling the main problems of peasant Russia.
From the economic point of view, many scholars have written on
the subject of whether the Stolypin Reform had a positive impact
on Russian agriculture and the Russian economy. Pavlovsky, and to
a certain extent Dubrovsky and Volin, argue that the reform had a
6
substantial impact in modernizing peasant agriculture.
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Gershenkron sees the reform in terms of liberating the peasant
agricultural sector to serve as a resevoir of labor and capital
7
for the fast-growing industrial sector. Among general
economists, Kahan and Crisp, argue that the reform had a
beneficial impact on economic development, while Gatrell
8
expresses a more negative point of view. A slew of general
economic histories also mention the Stolypin Reform in their
9
review of Russian economic development.
With reference to Tsarist administration and the problems of
economic and social development at the turn of the century, we
have several works: Macey, Yaney and Hennesey have examined the
Tsarist government’s response to the "Agrarian Question", while
Weissman and Sternheimer have focused on the structural dynamics
10
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Concerning the Ministry of
Agriculture, we have only Yaney’s short piece and Krivoshein’s
11
biography of his father, the Minister of Agriculture 1908-15.
Soviet scholars such as Avrekh, Startsev and Diakin have produced
some thoroughly-researched works, mostly centered around the
question of whether the Tsarist government was the instrument of
the landed gentry, the bourgeoisie or a relatively classless and
12
independent institution. Stolypin himself, as a political
leader and as a man, has been the subject of several books,
notably those of Tokmakoff, Conroy, Hosking, Levin and 
13
Zenkovsky. To date, there have been no Soviet biographies of 
Stolypin.
The Russian peasantry and peasant society have probably 
received the most attention of any topic connected with this 
dissertation. Among Western texts, there have been a series of
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works, beggining with those of Robinson and Maynard in the 1930’s
14
and ending with those of Shanin and Bideleux more recently.
Soviet scholarship has also given a lot of attention to the
peasantry both at the turn of the century and during the 
15
Revolution. We even have several works examining the role of
16
peasants as soldiers and as revolutionaries. The theories of
agricultural economists such as A.V. Chayanov, have been examined
by Jasny, Shanin, Millar, Durrenberger, Solomon, Figurovskaia and 
17
Harrison. There are also a number of good regional studies of
peasant society at this time: Treadgold, Tiukavkin and Skliarov
with respect to Siberia, Edelman with respect to the southwestern
Ukraine, Koch with respect to the Volga Germans, McNeal with
18
respect to the cossacks, and so on.
The social and economic situation of the gentry has been
discussed in the works of Anfimov, Kovalchenko and Manning, while
the activities of the zemstvos (mostly from a purely political
standpoint) are covered by Chermenskii, Emmons, Haimson, Fallows 
19
and Katkov. Concerning pre-revolutionary cooperatives there are
Ph.D. dissertations by Baker and Salzman and a book by Kabanov on
20
the cooperative movement during the revolution. Regarding the
activity of social agronomists, there is nothing except the work
of Kompaneets, which is more a history of science than a socio-
21
logical or economic work.
The preceding survey of the literature makes clear that 
there is a need for a new examination of the Stolypin Reform. 
Western and Soviet scholarship has been very specialized with 
respect to the Stolypin Reform: these works focus either on the 
dynamics of the central government and gloss over the main social
-18-
phenomena, or they focus on rural social structures while >
neglecting the larger economic trends, or they focus on the 
economic trends and pass over the dynamics of society at its 
grassroots. Therefore, I believe that there is a need for an 
examination of the Stolypin Reform from the village perspective, 
but with a comprehensive perspective, including both economic, 
social and administrative dynamics -- in other words, a thorough 
examination of Russian agricultural development in the period 
1906-17. Though in no way do I wish to minimize the importance of 
Stolypin himself, in this thesis I will bypass both him and all 
his ministerial colleagues and concentrate on the local forces 
shaping the development of peasant agriculture. The focus of this 
dissertation will be neither the formulation of agricultural 
policy and the conflicts involved therein, nor the political 
maneuverings of bureaucrats, zemstvos and socialists on the 
national stage, but the formulation of local development 
strategies and the maneuverings of agronomists, land settlement 
agents and peasant leaders to determine the fate of specific 
villages. I will be examining county agronomists rather than the 
zemstvo boards or the Ministry of Agriculture, the land captains 
and the third element rather than the governors and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, the peasants themselves rather than the 
programs of the various peasant and socialist political parties.
Fortunately, we are endowed with a significant volume of 
records, eyewitness accounts and statistical data from that 
distant time. This allows us to pick up the records, the 
historical detritus so to speak, to sift through them and 
identify the contours and trends of society in this period. Both
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the Ministry of Agriculture, the Central Statistical Committee 
and the zemstvos collected detailed records of what was happening 
in peasant Russia at the time. The concerns and opinions of the 
various regions were aired in local periodicals such as Iugo- 
Vostochnyi Khoziain and Khutorianin. while a national overview of 
Russian agriculture could be found in such publications as The 
Russian Cooperator, Agronomicheskii Zhurnal and Trudy 
Imperatorskogo Volnogo Ekonomicheskogo Obshestva. Russian 
academic life at this time was blessed with a multitude of wise 
and prescient minds, many of whom applied themselves to an 
examination of peasant agriculture. We have the writings not just 
of many agricultural analysts such as Chayanov, Makarov, Chuprov 
and Chelintsev, but also of many first rate economists such as 
Kondratiev, Tugan-Baranovsky and Prokopovich.
Much of the original material on the Stolypin reform comes
from the 1920’s. The time lag allowed many eyewitnesses and
participants in the reform to assess it in a detached and broad-
based way. Antsiferov, Prokopovich and Bilimovich wrote
impressive studies of the reform from exile, while Lyashchenko,
Kheisin, Fabrikant, Karpov and others did so from within the
Soviet Union. Many of these works were based directly on research
the writers had carried out before the revolution. Chayanov’s
seminal book on social agronomy, for instance, is a compilation
of lectures presented at the Petrovsky Agricultural Academy in
the period 1913-17. Totomiantz’ book on cooperatives in Russia
and Makarov’s study of peasant society, were also based on their
22
pre-revolutionary lectures. In addition, in the 1920’s, 
detailed studies of pre-revolutionary agricultural development
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were carried out by the Peoples Commissariat of Agriculture, as »
well as by scores of periodicals such as Agronom and Puti 
Selskogo Khoziaistva. The reason why the Stolypin reform 
interested Soviet analysts in the 1920’s so much, was not only 
its historical proximity, but also its relevance to the 
agriculture of the NEP period. The young Soviet state faced much 
the same kinds of problems with respect to peasant agriculture as 
its Tsarist antecedent and it is not surprising that most of its 
agronomists, scholars, and Ministry of Agriculture staff were 
carried over from the pre-revolutionary period. The analyses of 
the Stolypin reform performed in this period are remarkably sober 
and free of political prejudices -- policy-makers had to be 
pragmatic in their borrowings from the past -- and this makes 
them some of the most interesting works extant.
The voluminous quantity of observations, analyses and 
eyewitness accounts from the period of the Stolypin reform 
provides us with ample opportunities to identify the historical 
trends of the time. Like an archeologist sifting through the 
wreckage of some ancient civilization, picking on the fragments 
of some household implements or jewelry to make generalizations 
about the civilization as a whole, we can use the various records 
of pre-revolutionary Russia to construct a picture of that 
civilization. The volume and multiplicity of such data allows for 
such deductive conclusions to be much stronger than would be the 
case with most other historical periods. In addition, a 
substantial amount of statistical data allows us to draw 
inductive conclusions. With the help of the data of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the Central Statistical Committee we can
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arrive at a fairly detailed statistical protrait of Russian
agriculture and peasant society during our period. The margin of
error in the various statistical surveys at this time was
necessarily quite large -- one analyst at the time calculated
that peasant farmers routinely under-reported the assets and 
23
income by 10%. The problem of peasant under-reporting (which
was often balanced out by over-reporting on the part of local
officials), combined with problems in the collection of data made
for an especially large margin of error in Russian agricultural 
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statistics. Nonetheless, the plethora of statistical data 
facilitates the historian’s task in evaluating the economic and
social condition of rural Russia at this time.
In this dissertation, I have taken the opportunity to 
supplement the deductive reasoning that is most historians’ stock 
in trade with inductive reasoning based on the statistical data 
of the period. All too often, historians rely only on anecdotal 
accounts or the opinions of qualified observers to prove that a 
particular phenomenon was taking place. Similarly, historians are 
often content to assume that if two events occured side by side
-- say the Stolypin land reform and a rise in agricultural 
production -- it means there was a causal relationship between 
the two. This may be true, but it should be reinforced with other 
methods of inquiry, such as local surveys showing the 
relationship at the grassroots. The consensus of observers and 
analysts that consolidated farms had a beneficial effect on 
agricultural production, for instance, could be buttressed with 
the results of the thorough survey of 24,000 consolidated farms 
carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1913. In addition,
I believe that such conclusions can be supported statistically on 
another level. Consequently, in Chapter 10 and the Appendix, I 
have collected statistics on agricultural production, land 
tenure, extension services, transportation, literacy, etc. in 42 
provinces of European Russia (I am calling this the Klebnikov 
database) and worked out the statistical correlation between the 
various factors on the provincial level. Of course the 
impossibility of precisely identifying the importance of each 
factor influencing the agriculture of any given region means that 
such inferences cannot be definitive. They can only be indicative 
in a very broad sense. But even so, they provide a valuable 
opportunity to supplement a review of the verbal records of this 
period with quantitative evaluations.
I have taken the opportunity to reproduce many of the 
observations and arguments of contemporaries verbatim, since I 
believe this conveys better the character of the time. The 
translations are my own. Occasionally, I have taken the liberty 
to condense overly wordy passages into a more readable form, 
without ommitting any important qualifications and elaborations. 
The way some Russian terms are translated into English reflects 
the assumptions and opinions of the translator, and there are 
some key terms whose translation should be mentioned here.
Though the protagonist of this thesis was usually refered to 
in the literature of the time as the peasant (krestianin), I 
refer to him as the "peasant farmer." This is a combination of 
two different concepts. The peasantry was a legal category in 
Tsarist Russia, an estate which included not only
agriculturalists, but also a minority of urban-dwellers. For our
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purposes, the peasant is assumed to be a resident of the 
countryside, a figure little changed from the feudal era, closely 
tied to the village commune, using traditional technologies and 
producing goods predominantly for his own consumption rather than 
the market. The term farmer, on the other hand, conjurs up images 
of an independent producer, working his own private plot or a 
leasehold, and managing a highly commercialized enterprise. The 
reason I combine the concepts of peasant and farmer is that 
Russian agriculture was undergoing a period of transition at the 
beginning of the century. The peasantry as a group was no longer 
self-sufficient or tradition-bound enough for us to speak of just 
"peasants". Nor was the transition well enough advanced for us to 
refer simply to "farmers".
An even more difficult term is "khoziaistvo", in the sense
of the independent production unit of peasant agriculture. I
believe the term "economy” is deceptive since it usually conjurs
up images wider in scope than just the individual peasant family.
The term "household” could be widened to include production, but
it already has a Russian equivalent (dvor). I have chosen
therefore to employ a term taken from contemporary agricultural
theory: "farming system". There is a certain irony here, since
the term "farming system" grew out of Western rural development
specialists’ rediscovery of the work of A.V. Chayanov and his
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analysis of the Russian peasant economy. I believe the term 
farming system best reflects the integrated nature of peasant 
farmers’ production, consumption, demographic and cultural 
patterns.
I use the term "technology" quite broadly, to refer to the
"mode of production” in marxian terminology. It encompasses not 
so much the equipment used by peasant farmers, but their 
production techniques -- their crop rotations, methods of animal 
husbandry, work habits and so on. ’’Modern" technology of course 
is a relative concept and refers to the methods employed by the 
most advanced farmers of the time in places like Denmark, Belgium 
or the United States. The main subject of this thesis is the 
dissemination of modern technology to the peasant farmers;
Russian agronomists sometimes refered to it as "razprostranennie 
znannii” , meant to raise the "kultura” of the peasant farmer, 
though the dissemination of technology clearly depends not just 
on education and demonstrations, but also on the construction of 
effective institutions and market conditions.
When I speak of agronomy and agronomists, I am refering to 
what the Russians usually called social agronomy (obshestvennaia 
agronomiia), the active dissemination of new technologies to the 
farmers as distinct from their development in the laboratories, 
institutes and experimental stations. I have translated the term 
"uchastokovyi agronom” as county agronomist. Though strictly 
speaking an "uchastok” is a bailiwick, stylistic expediency and 
the similarity of the "uchastok” agronomist to the American 
county agent has led me to use the word county with respect to 
the area of operations of both agronomists and land captains. The 
Stolypin reform, as mentioned above, is taken to encompass not 
just the land reform arising out of the decree of 9 November 
1906, but also the cooperative movement and the social agronomic 
programs encouraged by Stolypin’s government. A key element of 
the Stolypin reform —  "samodeiatelnost" -- is perhaps the most
difficult word to translate. Often stressed in the literature of >
¥
the time, "samodeiatelnost" can be taken to mean self-help, 
though that was usually refered to as "samopomosch". The concept 
is broader than self-help since it implies qualities of local 
responsibility, initiative and independence. Accordingly, I have 
decided to use the imperfect English equivalent of "local self- 
reliance" .
Having covered some of the problems involved with the
translation into English, it remains to be noted the limitations
to the subject matter of this thesis. The discussion will concern
the 50 provinces of European Russia and Western Siberia. Excluded
are Finland, the Baltic States, the Polish provinces,
Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Eastern Siberia. I have already
mentioned that I will give only cursory mention to Stolypin
himself and to the wider events on the national stage. The focus
will be on peasant agriculture and the measures undertaken to
modernize it. Lack of space prevents extensive coverage of
several topics intimately related to peasant agriculture, namely
gentry agriculture, the peasant handicrafts industry, peasant
employment in industry, the colonization of lands beyond the
Urals, and the intricacies of the stratification of peasant
society at the time. Many of these topics have been covered by
Western or Soviet historians, and those that haven’t --peasant
handicrafts, for instance -- could easily constitute a book by 
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themselves.
Chapter 1 of this thesis will examine the economic, 
demographic and technological roots of Russia’s agricultural 
backwardness at the beginning of the century. Chapter 2 will
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focus on rural society —  the peasant commune, the gentry, the »
clergy, the land captains and the third element -- and the degree 
to which each impeded the development of a modern economy and 
modern attitudes among the peasantry. Chapters 3 and 4 will look 
at the implementation of the Stolypin land reform and its effect 
on rural society and the rural economy. Chapters 5 and 6 are 
devoted to the Ministry of Agriculture, the zemstvos and social 
agronomy, examining the development of the agronomic network, 
various strategies of agricultural extension work, and the 
reaction of the peasantry to these programs. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
deal with rural cooperatives: the rise of the cooperative 
movement in the villages, the attitude of various government 
organs to the cooperatives and the effect of cooperation on 
credit, farm supplies, marketing and the dissemination of new 
technologies in the peasant economy. Chapter 10, using the 
Klebnikov database, attempts to identify the statistical 
correlation between agricultural improvements and various factors 
such as land reform, agronomic aid, cooperation, urbanization, 
literacy, etc. Chapter 11, concludes by giving a broad overview 
of Russian agricultural progress in the period 1906-17 and of the 
effect that this had on the nation’s economy.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE IMPERATIVE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter we will examine the economic roots of the 
backwardness of peasant agriculture. To many educated observers 
of the time, the fact that peasant agriculture was underdeveloped 
was self-evident -- they had only to look at the sophisticated 
farming systems in countries as diverse as Denmark and the United 
States to see how farms could be run. Partly through a considera­
tion of these models and partly through their own experiments in 
adapting various new techniques, educated farmers and agricultur­
al observers had a good conception of what the modernization of 
Russian agriculture would entail. The path of progress for the 
Russian farmer, technologically at least, was clear. For each 
agricultural problem there existed a tested solution and agricul­
tural development meant the mass implementation of these solu­
tions in all their regional variation. Before we undertake to 
describe the problems of Russian agriculture and their potential 
resolution, however, we must first consider the importance of 
agriculture to Russia’s economy.
Agriculture and Russia * s Economic Development
At the turn of the century, Russia was a giant both mili­
tarily and geographically, but with an economy (gross national 
product) that lagged far behind the more advanced powers. Had 
government ministers drawn up a table outlining the crude differ­
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ences between Russia and the other great powers, they would have
1
seen something like this:
»
Economic Characteristics of the Great Powers. 1900
GNP
(millions of 
1960 US dollars)
GNP per 
capita (1960 
US dollars) 
1,019
% of 
population 
in cities
U.S.A.: 77,426
Britain: 36,273
Germany: 35,800
Russia: 32,000
France: 23,500
881
639
248
604
41.5%
78.0%
56.1%
13.5%
41.2%
The striking difference between Russia and the other great 
powers consisted in its low labor productivity (GNP per capita), 
its low level of urbanization and, implicitly, its reliance on 
agriculture. The figures above could be used to support the view 
that what Russia needed at the beginning of the century was not 
agricultural development but industrialization. If modernization 
were equated with the substitution of industry for agriculture as 
the driving force in the economy and the migration of the bulk of 
the rural population into the cities, the optimal economic 
development policy would seem to be one which encouraged such a 
transfer of resources as quickly as possible. Industrial growth 
had to be given top priority, with agriculture playing a 
subsidiary role as a pool of raw materials, capital and labor.
This had been the rationale of Finance Minister Serge Witte, 
who supervised Russia’s industrialization drive in the 1890’s.
For Witte, the spearhead of Russia’s economic development was the 
construction of railroads. Railroads could be built relatively
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quickly and would lead to the development of a variety of related 
industries such as mining and steel-making. Industrialization not 
only led to rapid economic growth, but as Witte reported to the
2
Tsar in 1899, it ensured Russia’s sovereignty as a great power.
On the other side of the political spectrum, Piotr Maslov —  an 
economist and Social Democrat —  argued that only industrializa­
tion could raise the productivity of Russian labor: MIn Russia, 
one of two things must happen: either the development of the
manufacturing industry with the proletarianization of a certain
portion of the population, or complete backwardness and even a
3
decline in the productive forces of the country." Agriculture 
too was supposed to benefit from industrialization. Industry 
would draw off the surplus rural population, automatically rais­
ing labor productivity (and incomes) in the agricultural sector. 
The growing urban population would need more food and raw materi­
als, driving up agricultural prices (and farm incomes). Farmers 
could then presumably use this higher income stream to invest in 
machinery, fertilizers and other technological improvements.
It is hardly disputable that industrialization was a 
necessity for Russia at the turn of the century, but it is 
equally clear that the growth of the Russian economy (and of 
industry as well) was dependent on the continued prosperity and 
progress of the agricultural sector. Peasants migrating into 
towns had to be drawn by the greater opportunities in the urban 
economy, rather than driven by the desperate conditions in the 
countryside. With 87% of the Russian people living in the coun­
tryside in 1897, the impoverishment of the agricultural sector 
would create such a mass of human misery that no amount of indus-
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trial development would be able to alleviate it in any ,
foreseeable future. Writing shortly after the disastrous famine
of 1921-22, a Soviet agricultural economist, A.O. Frabrikant,
observed: "Peasant agriculture is not just the foundation, but
literally the backbone of our economic life. The question of
agricultural development is in the most direct sense a question
4
of life or death for our country.” With agriculture directly
accounting for almost half of the Russia’s GNP, the country’s
economic welfare still depended on the harvest. Even relatively
modest growth in agriculture affected the national economy more
than all but the most spectacular gains in industry. As a
populist pamphleteer put it in 1902, it was absurd to think that
"a population of 130 million can go out onto the road of economic
5
development through one gate —  through the factory.”
The industries and cities of Russia were interested in 
agricultural progress since they relied on the agricultural 
sector for food and raw materials, and productivity gains in the 
agricultural sector would lead to a fall in the cost of industri­
al inputs. The development of the rural economy also meant the 
development of a vast domestic market for industry. With Russia’s 
manufactures generally uncompetitive in Europe and with the Asian
markets underdeveloped, it was Russia’s domestic market that
6
fueled the growth of industry. The agricultural sector was al­
ready paying for much of Russia’s industrialization. Since the 
transportation of agricultural products accounted for a major 
portion of the revenues of the railroad network, it was 
agricultural trade which justified railroad construction 
financially. The agricultural equipment industry, meanwhile, was
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one of the largest consumers of Russia’s iron and steel and it is 
reasonable to assume that the peasantry was the largest consumer 
of many manufactured consumer goods.
The welfare of the agricultural sector directly affected the
fiscal and monetary policies of the central government. Insofar
as the peasantry represented the largest block of taxpayers and
insofar as rising peasant incomes expanded the tax base, the
government had a direct financial interest in agricultural
development. Agricultural production was also crucial to Russia’s
monetary policy. Since agricultural products accounted for 67% of
the value of Russia’s exports, it was agricultural production
which allowed the country to maintain a gold standard and earn
enough foreign currency to import the industrial and agricultural
7
equipment necessary for the country’s economic development.
Technological Stagnation in Russia’s Agriculture
At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia was hovering on
the brink of an agricultural crisis. The problem was that land
productivity growth was being outstripped by population growth.
While rural population had roughly doubled in the forty years
since the Emancipation of the serfs in 1861, crop yields had
8
risen only about 50%. A number of Western historians have argued
that since all the main indicators of Russian agriculture were
rising in the late 19th century, the conventional view of
9
Russia’s peasant economy being in crisis is wrong. The problem
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with peasant agriculture, however, was not that it was failing to » 
expand, but that this expansion was based excessively on the 
extension of cultivation and thus was not self-sustaining in the 
long run.
First let us consider Russia’s agricultural backwardness
compared to the more advanced countries at the turn of the
century. Russia rivaled the United States as the world’s largest
grain producer and the world’s largest exporter of grain, but the
majority of the farming population was still mired in poverty
(very low production per capita compared with Europe and North
America). Russia’s agricultural surplus resulted from the great
number of farmers, rather than from their efficiency. The
individual peasant farmer produced very close to the margin of
subsistence, struggling to grow enough food to survive, let alone
produce a large marketable surplus. The essential process of
specialization of labor, which usually accompanies the
introduction of a market economy, had yet to take place in much
of rural Russia: most peasant households still grew a whole
variety of crops (grain for personal consumption, fodder crops,
industrial crops for the market, etc.) and manufactured a good
portion of their non-agricultural products (farm implements,
furniture, clothes, etc.), instead of concentrating on what they
were best able to produce. As a result, the productivity of both
land (crop yields) and labor (gross production per capita) was
much lower than that of the more advanced countries. Both the
large volume and the technological backwardness of Russia’s
10
agricultural production is illustrated in the table below.
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Field Crops in Russia and Selected Other Countries
Average Crop Production, 1901-1905 (in millions of quintals) 
Sugar
Rye Wheat Oats Barley Maize Beet Potato
Russia: 220.1 161.1 128.2 70.9 11.6 78,9 264.2
U.S.A.: 7.7 179. 7 126.5 28.4 582.5 18.9 71.5
Germany: 81.6 34.9 71.7 31.2 - - — 439.3
France: 14.8 89.1 44.0 9.2 6.2 67.3 122.7
Belgium: 5.4 3.7 6.0 1.0 — 16.5 22.8
Denmark: 4.4 1.0 6.6 5.2 — 4.0 6.5
Average Crop Yields, 1901-1905 (quintals per hectar) 
Sugar
Rye Wheat Oats Barley Maize Beet Potato
Belgium: 21.3 22.9 23.2 27.1 -- 299.9 156.4
Denmark: 17.2 27.2 15.8 20.0 — 267.9 120.0
Germany: 15.6 19.0 16.9 18.5 - - — 133.9
France: 10.6 13.6 11.4 12.8 12.2 255 .1 82.8
U.S.A.: 10.0 9.3 11.1 14.5 15.7 206. 7 59. 7
Eur. Russia: 7.4 6.9 7.1 7.6 8.4 147.5 65.9
Why was Russia so far behind other countries in agricultural
productivity? The question was extensively researched and debated
11
in Russia at the time. Given the huge agricultural surplus 
produced by the country as a whole, one would expect that the 
reason for the low crop yields lay in the fact that the Russian 
farmer did not need to produce very much from his land since he 
had plenty of it. Ironically for a country as large as Russia, we 
find that one of the most acute problems was the often-mentioned 
land hunger (malozemelie) of the peasantry. The land hunger was a 
result of the rapid growth of Russia’s population, which had 
risen from 65 million in 1865 to about 130 million forty years
-34-
later, the vast majority of the increment accruing to peasant
society. Peasant landownership, meanwhile, had grown relatively
little and the average size of the peasant allotment consequently
had shrunk from 2.5 desiatins per capita in 1861 to 1.3 desiatins 
12
in 1901. While the average peasant farm was a little over 10
desiatins, the standard allotment provided under the Homestead
Act in the United States was 160 acres (60 desiatins). The
peasants reacted to their shrinking allotment size by purchasing
or renting an extra 50 million desiatins (equivalent to 36% of
total allotment land), though as we shall see below, this brought
13
its own problems in the form of debt and high rental costs.
Land hunger -- though historically a useful concept in some 
ways, as we shall see below —  is not a good starting point in 
examining Russia’s agricultural underdevelopment. Land hunger is 
a relative concept: 30 acres may have been insufficient for the 
Russian farmer with his wasteful methods, but it was more than 
enough to propel a Danish dairy farmer to prosperity. In other 
words, the more sophisticated the farming system and the more 
intensive the production technique, the smaller the optimal size 
of the farm. Thus, the Russian peasant farmer could just as 
easily satisfy his land hunger by improving production as by 
expanding his land tenure. In any case, even if the peasantry 
expropriated all gentry lands and intensively cleared the lands 
of all Russia, its ownership of arable land would only rise by 
about a third; the addition to the amount of cultivated land 
would be even smaller -- the peasants would gain respite from 
rental payments on the 20 million desiatins they were already 
cultivating and they would gain access to another 10 million
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desiatins of land cultivated by non-peasant farmers. This was a »
temporary paliative, which was hardly worth it considering the
loss of advanced gentry farms which served as models of
agricultural technology and the chaos that it would produce in
14
the nation’s banking system. The crucial issue for the 
peasantry was to increase the productivity of the land —  only in 
this way could the mass of peasant farmers expect to raise their 
standard of living.
In the late 19th century, gross crop production had grown
steadily, roughly doubling between 1861 and the end of the
century. This was due mostly to the expansion of cultivation to
the virgin territories of Southern Russia, since even the growth
of national crop yield averages at this time was in large part a
reflection of the higher yields achieved on these rich new soils.
Meanwhile, in most of the older agricultural regions of peasant
Russia, farming was technologically stagnant. The predominant
peasant farming system —  the three-field crop rotation -- was
similar to the one that had existed for centuries, both in Russia
and in Europe. Under this system, each field went through a
three-year cycle: two years under grain and one year fallow. At
any given moment, then, at least a third of the arable land in
European Russia lay uncultivated. This contrasted with only 6% in
15
Germany and 3% in Belgium. Under the three-field system, 
livestock survived in a primitive state, without pedigree and 
with scant winter feed (the peasants raised few fodder crops or 
much else besides grain). The village herd was left to fend for 
itself, grazing the communal pasture, the fallow land and the 
stubble left over from the harvest.
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With population pressure forcing the peasant to produce more »
food and with agricultural technology stagnating, the peasant 
farmer was left with only one way out —  to expand cultivation.
He did so in the most ruthless manner, trying to eke out a har­
vest from every available plot of land. This was intensification 
of production of a predatory and desperate nature -- the peasant 
would sell his cow or his horse to free land that would have gone 
for raising fodder crops; he would plow up marginal lands such as 
ravines and forests; he may have even put the fallow field under 
the plow, risking soil exhaustion and crop failure. Monotonous 
grain cultivation and the lack of crop diversification, mean-
16
while, left the harvest vulnerable to pests and crop failure.
It led to what one writer, Mozzhukhin, called "the frightful,
17
weed-choked condition of our fields". The same thing was hap­
pening in the non-black earth region: predatory flax cultivation
was producing both soil exhaustion and a "dangerous crisis in
18
animal husbandry". A secular decline in flax yields at this
19
time was also noticed in the provinces of Smolensk and Pskov.
Peasant agricultural production continued to expand 
throughout the late 19th century, but it was not difficult to see 
that the supply of new lands would soon run out. (The growth was 
already slowing rapidly by 1901) However, the expansion of peas­
ant cultivation meant that the statistics on gross production and 
crop yields showed little sign of trouble and the looming agri-
20
cultural crisis showed up only in the data on animal husbandry.
While rural population was growing at a fast clip and the area 
under cultivation expanded rapidly as well, the number of horses 
and cows increased hardly at all between 1877 and 1905 and may
-37-
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even have declined.
To appreciate the significance of this phenomenon, one must
understand the importance of livestock to farmers at this time.
Both horses and dairy cattle were indicative of an improvement in
agricultural technology: more horses meant more mechanization,
while more dairy cattle meant higher value-added production, more
22
manuring of fields and better crop rotations. Furthermore,
livestock was the peasant’s proverbial savings account. A horse
or a cow was his margin of safety against famine. If the harvest
was disastrous, the peasant could always slaughter the beast, eat
the meat and the fodder, and grow food grains on the land he had
used to raise fodder. Declining livestock numbers were a direct
result of the steady impoverishment of the villages and the
increasing desperation of peasant farmers to plow up any
available land, specifically pastures and communal grazing lands.
In the land-hungry provinces of Kiev and Podolia, for instance,
one observer found that only river banks and ravines remained as
23
permanent pastures. A Soviet agricultural economist of the
24
1920*s, Lubny-Gertsyk, described the process:
The continual expansion of cultivated land at the expense of 
pastures... led to a defficiency in the fodder necessary to feed 
the cattle; the result... was a shortage of manure and low crop 
yields... increasingly frequent crop failures, and as a result, 
acute famines on the basis of the chronic under-eating of a large 
part of the Russian peasantry. And inside the commune, the result 
was eternal arguments, eternal struggles for land rights, 
ceaseless repartitions... and a psychology of poverty, 
suppressing all personal initiative and enterprise.
The decline in animal husbandry was especially dangerous in
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the northern black earth and central agricultural regions, where
rural overpopulation was acute and the natural fertility of the
25
soil wasn’t high enough to obviate the need for manuring.
Was the Small Family Farm Doomed?
The sorry state of most peasant farming led some analysts to 
conclude that peasant agriculture was historically doomed. Social 
democrats like Maslov and Lenin, for instance, argued that peas­
ant farms were bound to be replaced by large-scale mechanized 
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agriculture. They regarded peasant agriculture as inherently
obsolete and looked to the United States as a model of future
development. Only large farms, these social democrats argued,
could afford to invest in new machinery, buildings, livestock and
other inputs necessary to improve production. Agricultural
economists noted that in Russia, large farms used more advanced
production methods and were more commercialized and profit-
27
oriented than small peasant farms. Russian peasant agriculture 
did not induce much hope for these pessimists. Instead of 
becoming more mechanized and concentrated, peasant agriculture 
continued to use traditional technologies on ever more fragmented 
landholdings. Progress along this path could lead at best to a 
"Chinese model" -- very high yields on very small family-owned 
plots -- a model that was quite intensive, but failed to produce 
either commercialization or profitability. At best, under this
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scenario, agricultural production would be able to keep pace with
population growth; at worst the country would be subjected to
periodic famines. In any case, rural living standards would fail
to rise, while the national economy would suffer from a lack of
28
capital accumulation.
This point of view was vigorously opposed by agricultural
economists like Chuprov, Kaufman, Chayanov and Makarov, who
argued that peasant agriculture was not fatally flawed and indeed
had the potential of gaining economic superiority over large-
29
scale mechanized farming. Rather than revolutionary
transformation, these analysts argued, peasant agriculture needed
only a certain amount of reform and modernization in order to
become fully competitive. According to this view, the root of the
problem was not small-scale production per se, but the ignorance
30
and technological backwardness of the producers.
The roots of small farming’s superiority over large-scale
agriculture lay in its greater degree of overall land-
productivity (peasant farmers tended to bring a greater
proportion of their land under cultivation than large gentry
31
landowners) and in its greater intensiveness of labor. 
Agricultural production could not be centralized and standardized 
in the same way as, say, steel production. Radical mechanization 
of farming and concentration of land ownership when three 
quarters of the population lived off the land could actually 
cause massive rural unemployment and a decline in farm 
production. To support their argument, Russian agricultural 
economists often pointed not to the United States, but to Europe. 
The development of intensive farming systems, relying on dairy
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production and root crops, had allowed the countries of Europe to
escape the Malthusian problem of overpopulation and feed their
32
rapidly growing populations in the 18th and 19th centuries. At
the turn of the century, the average size of farms throughout
Europe was declining, especially in those areas that were the
33
most productive and technologically dynamic. Russian 
agricultural economists noted that when the British government 
sought to arrest the relative decline of British agriculture and 
the growth of unemployment in the cities, it enacted the 1907
34
Small Holdings and Allotments Act to encourage small farming.
The small family farm was a remarkably resilient organism, 
that had prospered both in commercially depressed periods and in 
times of vigorous commercial expansion. Since agricultural tech­
nology had yet to give machinery and chemicals the dominance they 
exercise today, labor was still a major factor. For the family 
farm, not only was labor free (at least in cash terms), it was 
also likely to be more meticulous than hired labor, since the 
peasant family was working directly in its own self-interest. The 
labor-intensiveness of small farming meant that it could easily 
outproduce large-scale agriculture in areas such as dairy, flax, 
potato and vegetable production, which demanded an enormous 
amount of work and could not be easily mechanized. The low level 
of capitalization on a small farm meant that it was much more 
flexible than a large-scale farm; small farms could change their 
farming system quickly to exploit the market openings neglected 
by their more mechanized counterparts. The superior productivity 
of small farming, combined with its value as employer of a great 
portion of the population, made it the ideal form of production
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in the agricultural sector. The economist, N.P. Oganovsky, 
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wrote:
Capitalist farming [large-scale and mechanized] cannot feed as 
large a quantity of population, nor can it rationally employ such 
a mass of second or third-rate labor (women, children, elderly). 
If all agriculture were to become capitalist, the countryside 
would be empty and would produce far less bread and meat, while 
the cities would groan from a shortage of food and an excess 
population with nowhere to go. From a national economic point of 
view, family farming, capable of maximizing the productivity of 
land and the employment of family labor, constitutes the best 
foundation for the development of [the nation’s] productive 
forces...
The proponents of small farming were by no means calling for 
the conservation of the peasant family farm as it had existed for 
centuries. The peasant farm that would conquer the future, 
according to this view, was not the traditional peasant household 
with its natural economy, but a strongly commercialized,
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technologically sophisticated and forward-looking operation.
Nor did the small farm advocates deny that certain functions, 
such as agricultural research, marketing and the purchase of farm 
supplies, had to be carried out on a large scale in order to be 
economical. The necessary economies of scale could be achieved if 
these operations were undertaken either by cooperatives or, 
sometimes, by the state. In 1911, K.S. Ashin, an agricultural 
economist, cautioned that Russian agronomists shouldn’t idealize 
the European farmer as the paragon of individualism” , but rather 
take a closer look at European agriculture and notice the crucial 
role played by social agronomy and cooperation. Ashin pointed out 
that in the most advanced European countries, the state organized
-42-
agronomic research and agricultural extension services, while »
access to cheap credit, marketing services or farm supplies,
normally difficult for the small farmer, were gained through 
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cooperatives. Ashin even went as far as attributing all agri­
cultural progress to the development of social agronomy and 
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cooperation:
Take away from countries such as Denmark, Belgium, Bavaria,
Italy, their rural cooperatives, take away their social agronomy 
and you will find that without them small farming will disappear. 
In the place of phenomenal production there will be... a desert. 
The higher the country’s culture and the more intensive its 
agricultural production, the deeper and more powerful is the 
influence of [cooperatives and social agronomy] on small 
farming.
Cooperation was a crucial part of the argument defending
peasant agriculture. Only through cooperation, could peasant
farming be modernized and thus preserved. This view was most
forcefully propounded by the great Russian agronomist, A.V
Chayanov, who in his writings during the period 1912-27,
consistently championed both peasant agriculture and cooperation.
"Progressive modernization of peasant agriculture is
inconceivable without cooperatives, just as modern industry is
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inconceivable without capitalism,” he argued. For Chayanov,
peasant farms, united into cooperatives, were the most efficient
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form of agricultural production.
It is our deepest conviction that the ideal unit of agricultural 
production is neither a large latifundia nor the individual 
peasant farm, but a new type of farm organization in which the 
organizational plan is divided into sections, each of which is
-43-
organized on a scale optimal for it. In other words, the ideal 
seems to us to be a peasant family farm which has singled out 
from its original plan all those sections in which large-scale 
production has indisputable advantages and has organized these... 
into cooperatives.
Virtually all Russian agricultural analysts agreed with 
Chayanov on the benefits of agricultural cooperation. The term 
cooperation was not taken to mean cooperation of production, in a 
manner similar to Soviet collectivized agriculture. Most produc­
tion would still be organized on the level of the individual 
farmer and his family. Agricultural cooperatives would merely 
support the farmer by offering him better services. A Soviet
agricultural analyst, A.O. Fabrikant, was to comment in the early 
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1920’s:
If for the larger farm cooperation is merely advantageous, then 
for the small farm it represents a vital pillar of support. 
Precisely the characteristics that make the small farm 
exceptional -- its greater flexibility and incomparably higher 
capacity for work -- demand some kind of natural reinforcement. 
In other words, the small farm has the capacity for greater 
intensification, but the cooperative represents the missing link 
which develops the small farm’s unexploited potential.
The main reason why small farming, specifically peasant 
farming, could flourish at the beginning of the 20th century was 
that agricultural technology, properly employed, favored the 
small enterprise. It was technological progress that would make 
peasant farming viable and would justify such a large number of 
small farms on the Russian land mass.
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The Path of Progress: Animal Husbandry. Crons and Farm Equipment
We have seen that the livestock crisis was the most acute 
problem in Russian agriculture. Since the livestock crisis was 
only a reflection of the growing problems in field cultivation 
(obsolete crop rotations, low crop yields), its resolution could 
only be resolved indirectly -- through improvement in field 
cultivation. What was the model farming system to which all 
Russian farmers had to strive? With a few exceptions, opinion on 
such technological questions was fairly well united. Agronomists 
arrived at their models by aggregating the experience of differ­
ent kinds of European and American farms, as well as of their own 
research stations. The path of technological progress could also 
be identified by looking at the more advanced provinces of Russia 
and seeing how they had evolved beyond the national norm. What 
kind of lessons did Iaroslavl or Moscow have for the non-black 
earth region? What could Poltava or Ekaterinoslav teach other
black earth provinces? To a certain extent the evolution of
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Russian agriculture could be grasped geographically.
The technological imperatives of the day demanded that
Russian farmers improve their animal husbandry and their crop
rotations. The two were intimately linked. Livestock not only
added to the assets of the farm, it was crucial in raising the
fertility of the soil. Russian farmers could raise soil fertility
by applying artificial fertilizers, potentially doubling crop 
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yields. But since most of Russia’s artificial fertilizer was 
imported, it was too expensive to use beyond a small area such as
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the farmer’s market garden. As late as 1907, the average Russian ,
farmer applied 48 pounds of fertilizer for every 100 desiatins,
compared with 2,794 pounds in Britain, 5,460 pounds in Germany
44
and 8,911 pounds in Belgium. To advocate that the Russian 
farmer should apply artificial fertilizer at the same rate as his 
Belgian counterpart would mean making agricultural progress 
hostage to the development of industry. Therefore, the most 
practical way of raising soil fertility was through increased 
application of manure, an excellent fertilizer which was in many 
ways superior to artificial fertilizer. Manure did not have to be 
carefully mixed in terms of its chemical content —  since it 
contained a wide array of nutrients, manure was an inherently 
balanced additive. It also improved the organic richness of the 
soil, since it contained a mass of micro-organisms, which chemi­
cal fertilizers did not. If it was mixed with straw, manure 
significantly improved soil texture, which the application of 
chemical fertilizers did not accomplish.
Better crop rotations, meanwhile, could also improve soil 
fertility. Row crops (potatoes, sugar beet, corn) provided the 
soil with a refreshing variation from the monotonous procession
of sod-forming grain crops, while grass hays such as clover and
45
alfalfa naturally replenished the soil’s nitrogen content.
Improved crop rotations also increased the amount of produce the 
farmer could get from his arable land. English farmers had dis­
covered this in the 18th century, when they substituted the 
three-field crop rotation (grain-grain-fallow) with the Norfolk
system (grain-grain-turnips-clover); continental countries like
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Germany, France and Denmark followed suit in the 19th century.
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The new crop rotation not only included higher yielding root
crops (potatoes, sugar beet, turnips, etc), but allowed the
farmer to raise a harvest from land which would have lain fallow
under the old system.
What could be done to improve Russia’s animal husbandry?
Since raising the pedigree of the animals through better breeding
was a lengthy and expensive process, the most practical way of
attacking the animal husbandry problems was through improving
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livestock feed. Except for Western Siberia and some northern
provinces which were blessed with exceptionally rich natural
meadows, most of Russian farmland could provide little fodder for
livestock, which had to survive the long winter months in a
near-famished state. It ought to be noted that because of the
nation’s short growing season and the long period during which
cattle had to be kept stalled, keeping livestock well-fed was
more of a challenge in Russia than in any other European country.
The fodder question was the single most important issue facing
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the Russian farmer. And the resolution of the fodder question 
meant improving crop rotations.
Thus, the Russian farming system had to evolve from a grain 
or flax monoculture into a system of mixed farming, with more 
grass and root crops and improved animal husbandry. All these 
elements -- flax, potatoes, grass and commercialized animal 
husbandry -- produced maximum returns when they were integrated 
together. In this case, they amounted to a radical overhaul of 
the peasant farming system. The farm budget changed, new build­
ings had to be constructed, new talents acquired. The work sched­
ule would also have to change -- gone were the dreary months of
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winter idleness. The diversified crop rotations (with different ,
crops maturing at different times and requiring a different 
degree of processing) drew the labor out during the year (in the 
case of dairy farming, the work proceeded year-round).
The main revenue-earners were the higher quality grains such 
as wheat and barley, dairy products, flax and perhaps potatoes.
Rye and oats were still cultivated, the former mainly for 
personal consumption and the latter for livestock fodder. The 
beauty of this new farming system was that it represented a 
remarkably efficient closed cycle. Almost nothing was wasted.
Flax was grown commercially mainly for its fibrous stem, but the 
seeds could be processed into a high-protein cattle feed (linseed 
cake). Potatoes were a high-yield crop, which could either be 
consumed at home, sold for starch or alcohol processing, or fed 
to livestock. Milk could be sold daily in the local market or 
processed into butter, in which case the skimmed milk byproduct 
could be consumed at home or fed to livestock. When the animals 
were slaughtered, their flesh went into the family pot, while 
their hides could be sold for leather and their bones processed 
into glue or fertilizer.
In order for the system to achieve its maximum efficiency, 
it was essential to raise animal husbandry from a system of open 
grazing to a system of stall feeding. That meant that the farm 
had to produce an abundant supply of nutritious fodder: mainly 
oats and clover or alfalfa, but also farm byproducts such as 
linseed cake, sugarbeet leaves and the leftover potatoes. Once 
the complexities of a multifield crop rotation were mastered, 
stall feeding easily paid for itself. Stall feeding minimized the
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need to set land aside for pastures, ensured a properly-balanced
diet for the animals and facilitated the collection of their
manure. Despite the intensiveness of this system of production,
the soil would retain all its natural fertility. Cow and pig
manure returned a great deal of the soil nutrients that had been
extracted in the form of fodder crops. The grass hays raised as
fodder crops, meanwhile, would automatically replenish the soil’s
nitrogen content. Sometimes soil fertility could even be raised
through better crop rotations, but the mere fact that fallow
lands could now be cultivated without exhausting the soil was
already a great achievement.
In the non-black earth region neither the soil nor the
climate were good enough for self-sufficiency in grain-
production. Many peasant farmers had to buy grain on the market
and for this they needed cash. The main cash crop here was flax,
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virtually all of which (93%) was marketed. Russia’s flax had
been exported as far back as the days of Ivan the Terrible, when
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it was sold to the English Navy to make ropes. Flax could be 
grown either for its fiber (which could be used for fine cloth, 
household linens, carpets, ropes, twines, etc.) or for its seeds 
(linseed oil was used for paints, oilcloth, leather processing 
and livestock fodder). In Russia, most flax production was for 
fiber. While flax fiber was being phased out of European agricul­
ture in the 19th century, driven out by the competition of im­
ported cotton and jute, in Russia it continued to flourish. By
the beginning of the 20th century, Russia accounted for almost
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two thirds of the world’s production of flax fiber. Flax was a 
highly labor-intensive crop and could be grown economically on
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very small plots. It was a relatively fragile plant, vulnerable »y
to weeds and hence required meticulous cultivation. But the real 
labor in flax fiber production came after the harvest; the proc­
esses of threshing, retching, drying and crushing the flax fiber
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took up more than half the total annual labor on the crop. It
should be noted that there was great unexploited employment
potential in the field of flax processing, since only 25% of
Russia’s flax crop was processed by peasant cottage industry, 14%
was processed by Russian industry and 61% was exported unproc- 
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essed. Thus flax was the ideal peasant crop in the non-black 
earth region —  not only was it highly marketable, it was also 
labor-intensive and required lengthy processing (production could 
thus take up much of the winter slack time).
Another very profitable area for peasant agriculture was the 
cultivation of root crops such as sugar beet and potato. Both 
produced enormous yields per acre, though they required a lot of 
work and could easily exhaust the soil. In terms of desiatins 
under cultivation, sugar beet was only just beginning to catch on 
at the beginning of the century, mostly in the provinces of 
Kursk, Kiev, and Volhynia. Beets could be processed into sugar, 
molasses, alcohol and yeast, and produced a byproduct of mush and 
leaves which was excellent cattle fodder. Potato was far more 
widespread as a crop, though still underdeveloped. Potato was 
also an industrial crop in the sense that it was often processed 
into alcohol, starch, glue, etc. The virtue of the crop was that 
it was resilient, kept well through the winter and, above all, 
abundant. The agronomist D.N. Prianishnikov declared, "Raising 
potatoes and other root crops is equivalent to harvesting three
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bushels where before you could only get one." For this reason »
potatoes were an excellent crop for small farms; in Germany, for
instance, the smaller the farm, the more land it was likely to
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have under potatoes.
This was the picture of a modernized farming system in the
non-black earth region painted by virtually all Russian agrono-
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mists at the time. Even the black earth region, where the soil
was rich enough not to need extensive manuring, could benefit
from the elimination of the wasteful three-field crop rotation
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and the greater production of fodder crops. In addition, farm­
ers in Southern Russia could benefit by further diversifying
their farming systems to include fruit, vegetables, poultry-
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farming and drought-resistant crops such as sunflowers.
In addition, Russian peasant farmers could improve their 
productivity through better methods of cultivation —  better 
techniques in plowing, sowing and harvesting. In the black earth 
region, soil fertility could be enhanced if the fields were 
plowed deeper in order to turn over more of the top-soil. The 
stubble after the harvest had to be plowed under (instead of 
given to the cattle for grazing) and winter wheat had to be 
planted early in the fall. The sowing season had to start earlier 
and the seed-grain had to be cleaned so as to remove chaff and 
weed seeds. All of these improvements demanded better management 
and better labor techniques, but they also demanded better equip­
ment. For southern Russia especially, the question of mechaniza­
tion was of paramount importance.
Russian agriculture at the beginning of the 20th century was 
undergoing what might be called the first stage of mechanization.
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As in the rest of the world at the time, power machinery -- 
whether steam engines or gas-driven tractors —  though highly 
visible, was of marginal importance compared to more basic tech­
nologies such as improved plows and horse-drawn reapers. Mechani­
zation consisted of replacing human labor with animal labor, hand
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power with horse power. Better equipment could increase the
tempo of work, reduce the drudgery of farm labor and produce
better quality results. Since Russia had an abundance of labor
and a low level of capitalization, it was preferable to introduce
equipment that was relatively labor-intensive, cheap, durable and
simple to operate.
The first major improvement was usually the replacement of
the old wooden plow (sokha) with a metal one (pluga). Whereas the
northern peasant could get by with scratching the earth with his
wooden plow, in the South, where the rich top soil often reached
a depth of four feet, the peasant needed a plow that would cut
deep, slide smoothly and turn over the soil evenly, all without
necessitating increased draft power. Only the metal plow could do
this. It was 50% faster than a wooden plow and produced better
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results to boot.
For the sowing season, the peasant farmer traditionally
relied on the simple broadcast method. If he were to use a seed
drill, he would cut down on his use of seed-grain and sow the
field more evenly. The result was usually a crop-yield improve-
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ment of 25% or more. The farmer could benefit even more by 
cleaning his seeds before spreading them in the fields. Otherwise 
he would not only sow a large proportion of infertile seeds, but 
he would also unwittingly plant weeds along with his crops. (The
weeds would then be harvested along with the crop, resulting in a 
poor quality farm product, while the weed’s seed would go into 
the next spring’s sowing, repeating the cycle.) The employment of
a simple seed-cleaning machine, therefore, could do much to
improve peasant production. After sowing, the peasant would 
commonly drag a harrow through the fields. Here he could benefit 
from replacing the home-made wooden harrow with a more durable 
and efficient metal one.
The great bulk of farm labor was employed at harvest time.
Up to three quarters of the manhours of the year were spent in 
this short, exhausting period. If the harvest was cut by sickle, 
the work was time-consuming and grueling, since it had to be done 
in a difficult stooped position. Scythes improved matters, though 
the work was still slow and the process of gathering and binding
the crop took up a lot of time. The introduction of a simple
reaper, similar to the one invented by Cyrus McCormick in the 
1830’s, could speed up the harvest many times over, while reduc­
ing the labor requirement. One man with a modern reaper-binder
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could accomplish 36 times more work than a man with a sickle.
The introduction of threshing and winnowing machines, run by 
hand- or horse-power, could improve the quality of the marketable 
product while cutting down on the time spent processing the grain 
after the harvest was brought in.
Mechanization of agriculture inexorably led to its 
commercialization. Most of these farm machines paid for them­
selves if they were used on a relatively large plot of land -- 20 
desiatins or more. At the same time, the purchase (and upkeep) of 
complex machinery required a substantial cash outlay. The farmer
therefore had to maximize his cash revenues. This led observers 
to conclude that once the farmer began to purchase modern machin­
ery, he was in a sense committed to the market. There was no
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going back to a natural economy.
Did this mean that mechanization would make the small family 
farm obsolete? Not necessarily. Mechanization in fact could 
bolster the viability of the family farm, not only by improving 
efficiency and bolstering farm revenue, but also by making the 
family farm more independent by obviating the need to hire labor 
or work animals during the rush period. With respect to those 
machines which were economical only on a relatively large plot of 
land, peasant farmers could either buy them cooperatively or buy 
them independently and later rent them out. With the spread of 
mechanization in Russian agriculture, both practices became very 
popular. As we will see in later chapters, machine rental sta­
tions -- a form of cooperative machine use -- numbered in the 
thousands on the eve of the revolution, while according to some
surveys, up to one third of peasant farms rented machinery from
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their neighbors.
Such was the path of technological progress as it appeared 
to Russian farmers at the beginning of the 20th century. The path 
was clear, but in order to pursue it, Russia’s peasant farmers 
needed capital to invest in new production techniques.
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Low Capital Accumulation and Investment
Broadly speaking, the lack of technological progress in 
peasant farming was the result of both economic and cultural 
factors. The economic cause of the Russian peasant’s technologi­
cal backwardness can be stated simply as a shortage of profits 
which could be reinvested into the farm system. The cultural 
factors consisted of a lack of technical knowledge, obsolete 
social institutions and a pre-capitalist value system, which made 
the peasant farmer either incapable or unwilling to generate such 
profits. These will be considered in the next chapter and indeed 
in most of the rest of the thesis, since the Stolypin reform 
correctly assessed cultural factors to be the crux of the problem 
and made them the focus of its development efforts. Here we will 
focus on the economic causes for low capital accumulation: low 
labor productivity, unfavorable market conditions and appropria­
tion of much of the surplus capital by government agents and 
middlemen.
Low labor productivity was both a cause and a result of 
Russian agriculture’s technological backwardness. Given the 
wasteful farming methods prevailing at the time, the decline in 
land-use per capita meant that the Russian countryside was 
increasingly burdened with a large labor surplus. The 1901 
Commission on the Impoverishment of the Central Provinces found 
that under the existing technological conditions only about 15 
million hands were needed to bring in the crops in central 
Russia. The real size of the adult peasant population was over
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three times that number. Even taking into account the effect of »
handicrafts and non-farm employment, the Commission found that
over half of the rural adult population constituted a labor 
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surplus. At the same time, the Department of Tax Collection
estimated the labor surplus to be as high as 68% in the central
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black earth region. Some agricultural economists believed that
even these figures were too conservative and stated flatly that
3/4 of the rural labor force was surplus labor, without any
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productive use in either agriculture or industry. The labor
surplus led to falling agricultural wages up to 1905; falling
wages lowered the standard of living of the peasantry and dis-
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couraged the mechanization of agriculture.
The under-employment of the agricultural labor force meant a 
low level of labor productivity, and consequently a profit margin 
which was either minimal (with the household just breaking even 
on a primitive level) or negative (increasing indebtedness).
Producing such a small profit, the farmer didn’t have the means 
to invest in technological improvements and, living on the edge 
of survival, he was hardly eager to take risks. If peasant agri­
culture remained technologically stagnant while the supply of 
available farmland increased little if at all, rural population 
growth would cause agricultural labor productivity to decline.
That would be a big problem, warned the agricultural economist,
N.P. Oganovsky. "Sooner or later, the decline of peasant labor 
productivity leads to the impoverishment of peasant farming, and
this impoverishment leads to decline of the productive forces of
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the nation as a whole."
Another factor in the peasant’s low accumulation of capital
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was the unfavorable price structure relating agricultural goods >
to manufactured goods. This was largely a function of Russia’s
low level of industrialization. Because Russia’s urban market was
still relatively small and because the rapid expansion of world
agricultural production depressed prices in the export markets,
prices for virtually all agricultural products in Russia were
falling consistently throughout the latter half of the 19th
century, only recovering after 1896. Meanwhile, the low levels of
industrialization in Russia meant that prices for manufactured
products, whether sewing machines or metal plows, remained high.
Government tax and trade policy compounded the problem. Prices
for many necessary consumer products such as matches, kerosene,
salt, sugar and alcohol were raised by a hefty excise tax imposed
by the government, while the prices for imported agricultural
machinery (due to the underdevelopment of Russia’s farm marchin-
ery industry, most modern farm equipment had to be imported
before 1905) were raised by a steep import tariff. The excise tax
meant that after paying a high price for the consumer products
indispensible to him, the peasant had little cash left over to
buy much else, while the tariff on imported machinery made it
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even more inaccessible to the majority of farmers.
Low prices for agricultural goods limited the amount of 
operating profit the peasant farmer could produce. But even this 
surplus was then substantially reduced after the taxman, the 
rentier landlord, the money lender and the grain merchant all 
took their share. In other words, a great portion of the value of 
peasant farm production flowed out of the villages and was never 
reinvested in production.
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The peasant farmer suffered from the underdevelopment of
Russia’s credit and marketing networks. With transportation often
difficult and time-consuming and with the peasant’s produce
passing through as many as eight middlemen, naturally the price
paid to the farmer for his produce was a fraction of the price
ultimately paid by the end consumer. Similarly, the primitive
state of Russia’s rural credit markets meant that the field was
dominated by loansharks and money lenders who charged as much as
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40% interest (at a time of zero inflation). Since the peasant 
farmer needed credit, not only to rent land but to cover family 
expenditures until the harvest was sold, high interest costs were 
bound to cut into peasant incomes.
A substantial amount of the peasant’s cash also went to
paying for land. According to the settlement of 1861, the
peasants had to pay for most of the land they had received. At
the beginning of the 20th century, the peasants were paying 100
million rubles annually in installment payments and according to
one estmate, by 1907, they had payed a total of 2.5 billion
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rubles for the land they got in the 1861 settlement. But as we 
saw earlier, the land provided by the 1861 settlement was 
increasingly proving inadequate in maintaining peasant living 
standards. Land hunger had driven peasant farmers to purchase 
some 25 million desiatins of land in European Russia at an 
average of 90 rubles per desiatin -- a steep price that often was 
less a product of the income that could be gotten from the land 
than from the peasant farmer’s increasing desperation to feed his 
family in any way possible. One of the most alarming aspects of 
the agricultural situation at the turn of the century was the
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steep rise in land prices: the average price for a desiatin sold
by the Peasants Land Bank rose from 49 rubles in 1896 to 107
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rubles in 1902. The debt owed to commercial banks and the 
Peasant Land Bank increased with every year; by 1912 the peasants 
were paying an estimated 195 million rubles annually in
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installments, interest and commissions for land purchases. This
amount dwarfed even the burdensome debt payments from the
settlement of 1861. On the eve of the war, total peasant
indebtedness for land purchases had increased to at least 1.5
billion rubles, an amount that was over a third of the yearly
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cash income produced by the whole agricultural sector. In
addition to land purchases, approximately 20-25 million desiatins
of land were rented by the peasants each year, at a price of
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about 10 rubles per desiatin.
Debt-financed capital expenditure is not necessarily a bad
course of action. In this case, the expenditure of 500 million
rubles or so annually allowed the peasants to cultivate at least
50 million extra desiatins of land and alleviate the land hunger
at least to some extent. But this was a poor man’s progress.
Rental prices for instance sometimes exceeded the revenue to be
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squeezed out of a given plot of land. In such cases, the
peasant would rent the land anyway because he needed to cover the
consumption needs of his family at any cost. With the price of
land outrunning the increase in land-productivity, the peasant
was destined to fall deeper into debt; land- and labor-
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productivity, instead of rising, would decline. True, the 
extension of peasant cultivation to 50 million desiatins of new 
land since 1861 did allow peasant farmers to raise their labor
-59-
productivity, but without land-productivity growth it did nothing 
to alleviate agricultural backwardness or rural poverty. In this 
light, the 500 million rubles spent annually by peasants on 
purchasing or renting extra land appears to have been a waste of 
money which could have been better spent on improved equipment, 
seeds, livestock and storage facilities.
Many of the problems behind the low accumulation of capital 
in the peasant economy could have been solved by the development 
of industry. Greater employment opportunities in the industrial 
sector could have eliminated some of the surplus labor in the 
countryside and thus raised rural labor productivity. The devel­
opment of the farm machinery industry could have lowered the 
price for these products, making them more widely accessible to 
the farming population. The expansion of the railroad network 
would have increased the accessibility of Russia’s domestic and 
export markets to the peasant farmer, cutting down on the number 
of middlemen in agricultural trade and integrating the nation’s 
credit markets. The growth of the urban population, meanwhile, 
would have raised the domestic demand for food and raw materials, 
raising the price for agricultural products.
Russian economists had become aware of these factors from 
reading von Thunen’s influential work, The Isolated State. which 
had been published in 1826. Von Thunen found that the closer a 
farm was to an urban market, the higher the prices it could get 
for its produce and the more intensive the farm’s production. 
Russian economists noticed that farms on the periphery were 
burdened with high transportation costs, which resulted in low 
prices for agricultural goods and high prices for urban manufac-
-60-
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tures —  in other words, in unfavorable terms of trade. The »
same factor that affected produce markets also affected capital
markets. Russian economists found that well-developed areas had
greater access to credit and capital, but it was the periphery
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that needed the money most and found it scarcest. A real life
example of these effects could be found in the case of Western
Siberia, which was transformed from a primitive hinterland into a
flourishing regional economy by the construction of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad in the 1890’s. The dispersion of Russia’s
population and the underdevelopment of its railroad network can
80
be seen in the table below.
Population Density and the Railroad Network. 1912
Britain
Germany
France
European Russia 
United States
Population 
per 100 sq. 
kilometers 
178 
120 
74 
26 
12
Kilometers 
of railroads 
per 100 sq. 
kilometers 
12 
12 
9 
1 
4
Kilometers 
of railroads 
per 1, 000 of 
population 
8 
9 
13 
4 
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The point that should be stressed here is that there was no 
reason for agricultural development to wait for the development 
of industry. There was plenty that could be done within the 
agricultural sector itself, which would improve the efficiency 
and revenues of peasant farmers, and ultimately help speed indus­
trial development as well. The effects of peasant overpopulation 
and land hunger could be mitigated by raising land-productivity 
through land reform or agricultural extension work. A land reform
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that eliminated the peasantry’s wasteful methods of strip farming 
could raise crop yields and labor productivity, while the priva­
tization of land would provide an incentive for farmers to con­
serve the fertility of the soil and allow those peasants who 
wanted to abandon farming to sell their plots. Agricultural 
extension work, meanwhile, could provide peasant farmers with 
knowledge necessary to improve their farming systems and raise 
their incomes. If Russian farmers were convinced to adopt western 
techniques there was every reason to believe that they could 
produce European-type crop yields. The high price of the credit 
received from merchants and moneylenders, meanwhile, could be 
combatted through the successful development of a network of 
credit cooperatives. The problem of middlemen and the price 
structure -- the low price paid to the farmer for his produce and 
the high price he had to pay for farm supplies -- could also be 
mitigated through the organization of cooperative processing, 
marketing and purchasing.
If all these measures were successfully applied to the 
peasantry, Russia would witness a veritable transformation of the 
rural economy. Peasant farmers would become wealthy, the demand 
for domestically-manufactured consumer goods and farm equipment 
would rise, larger harvests would be produced with greater 
efficiency and Russia’s cities would receive a mass of cheap food 
and raw materials. This was an alluring picture indeed and the 
government soon decided to try and help it materialize. But 
before this transformation could come about, there was one cru­
cial group that needed to be convinced: the peasantry itself. 
Before the government could hope to see any great institutional
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or economic change, it had to encourage the transformation of 
peasant culture. It is to the cultural environment of peasant 
agriculture that we turn to next.
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CHAPTER TWO 
RURAL LIFE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Before any mass technological change could take root in 
Russia’s rural economy, rural society had to undergo a cultural 
change. Specifically, the mentality of peasant farmers had to 
change. In place of the traditional peasant with all his faults 
and peculiarities, there had to appear a new peasant farmer, who 
would be receptive to change, both technological and economic.
Good quality management is crucial to the success of any
economic enterprise. The "human factor" is decisive in farming as
in any other activity. The Russian farmer at the beginning of the
century was both a worker and a manager. As a worker, he needed
the health and strength to cope with the gruelling work; he
needed to be industrious, diligent and persevering. The more
commercialized and sophisticated the farming system, however, the
more the farmer’s qualities as a manager began to overshadow his
1
brawn and endurance as a worker. Farm management was crucial. 
Carelessness with machinery or with livestock could result in 
devastating losses. Lateness in planting and harvesting could be 
equally disastrous. The margin of error for the peasant farmer 
was very small. The peasant farm manager had to have more than 
just a "feeling" for the land, more than just an intuitive 
knowledge of his soil, crops and animals. Increasingly he had to 
be innovative enough to think of ways to improve his production, 
decisive enough to decide on a plan for his farm system, and 
self-disciplined enough to execute it properly. Specifically
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speaking, the peasant farmer needed at least: literacy, in order »
to keep up with developments in agricultural technology;
mathematical skills, in order to keep accounts; and enough
culture to be able to appreciate the value of the improvements he 
2
heard about.
In this chapter, we will try to delve into the psychology of 
the peasant farmer, by examining the social environment in which 
he operated. We will begin by looking at the structure of the 
peasant village and how it may have affected its members, and end 
by looking at the influence of various non-peasants with whom the 
peasantry shared the Russian countryside. The latter, as we shall 
see, had to play a crucial role in the process of cultural change 
in peasant society. The nature of peasant society at the turn of 
the century, the position of the gentry and the structure of 
rural administration at this time have been subject to extensive 
research and debate in Western historiography. The aim of this 
chapter is to describe only briefly some of the social elements 
in rural Russia who would prove important in the Stolypin Reform.
The Russian Village
The social and financial structure of peasant Russia at the 
turn of the century is an important and complex topic. Peasant 
budgets alone were the subject of voluminous research by 
sociologists and economists before the revolution and by 
historians since then. The research is complicated by the 
fragmented nature of the statistical data and by the huge
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regional variations in the peasant economy. However, it is
necessary to present here at least a rough estimate of the
average peasant enterprise and of how the average peasant family
lived, in order that we may provide a perspective for the rest of
the dissertation.
In 1897, 79 million peasants were registered in European
Russia. They were settled in about 500,000 little hamlets and
villages at the beginning of the 20th century, each containing an
average of about 158 inhabitants, though southern villages tended
to be much larger than northern ones. As a rule, about four
villages made up a commune, the lowest rung on Russia’s
administrative and juridical ladder; there were about 120,000
3
communes in European Russia. Russian villages at the turn of the
century usually had no telephones or electricity, while postal
service came once a month if the roads were good. The chief
landmarks of rural society were the local church and perhaps the
neighboring gentry estate. If the village was large and
prosperous, you could find a shop, a tavern or tea room, a small
school, a boot-maker, a blacksmith or some other artisan’s
workshop, and only very rarely some consumer or credit
cooperative. But to foreign travellers, most Russian villages
4
produced an impression of squalor and poverty. Peasant houses
were made of wood in the North and of stucco and straw in the
South. Predictably, fires were a major problem. Over the course
of only one year, for example, Kiev province reported 3,000
village fires, destroying 13,000 buildings and causing 1.5
5
million rubles in damage. Unfortunately for the Russian peasant, 
cement, brick and tin sheet were still rare commodities.
- 66-
In European Russia in 1905, there were 12 million peasant
households, each containing an average of about seven people and
6
owning an average of 10.3 desiatins of land. The assets of the
average peasant household included the house and barns, farm
equipment, 1-2 horses, 2-3 cows, personal possesions and some
7
cash savings or stored produce. The asset value of the peasant’s
10.3 desiatins of land, however, was only theoretical, since he
had virtually no legal right to sell it. The cash revenue of the
peasant household from agriculture, handicrafts and other
earnings varied from 500 rubles in Moscow province to slightly
over 200 rubles in Vologda; cash revenues typically made up
almost half the total value of the production of a peasant
household at the beginning of the 20th century, the rest of the
production usually going directly for the consumption of the
8
family and the livestock. Most of the peasant’s cash revenue
went to pay for necessary consumer goods such as food, vodka and
textiles, to pay various taxes and redemption payments, and to
pay rent for extra plots of land and interest on loans. Whatever
cash the peasant had left over, he could invest back in the farm.
What could he buy? The average price for one desiatin of land in
1904 was 99 rubles; a metal plow could cost anywhere from 6 to 25
rubles; complex farm machines such as reapers, seed drills and
winnowing machines cost from 50 to 200 rubles; a horse bought in
February cost 47 rubles, an average cow bought at the same time
9
cost 65 rubles.
Peasant society followed the religious calender with its 
great fasts and feast days, and the weddings and funerals 
celebrated in church. Market day was also a big event, usually on
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Sundays in the central village of the township (volost). Migrant
traders and religious missionaries would sell their wares and
bring news from the outside world. Market day was a day for both
commerce and merry-making. Apart from such extraordinary events,
peasant life was dictated by farming and the seasons of the year.
The growing season was very short: four or five months in the
very North and eight months in the Southern provinces on the 
10
Black Sea. During the height of the work season the peasant
family usually moved out to a makeshift camp in the fields. The
frantic rush of the work season was followed by long months of
idleness for the majority who did not engage in handicrafts
production or take a job in town.
Apart from the family, the most important institution in
peasant society was the commune. All the peasant lands that had
been granted under the 1861 settlement belonged not to
individuals or to families, but the commune. All heads of
households had the right to vote in this democratic institution,
and it decided questions of economic policy, the redistribution
of lands between families and various minor juridical questions.
The commune was a point of great controversy for Russian thinkers
at the turn of the century. As one historian remarked at the
time: "the commune is a critical point on which all the
peculiarity of Russian scientific and political thought are
11
reflected with extraordinary clarity and intestity..." All 
observers were aware that with the development of capitalism in 
the national economy, the peasant commune was approaching a 
fateful moment of decision. The coexistence of private property 
with the peasant commune represented a "knot that cannot be
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untied through half-baked decision," as one neo-populist activist 
12
declared. Private property and communal tenure were destined to
clash and "one of them must ultimately push out and destroy the
other," wrote the historian Kachorovsky at the beginning of the 
13
century. At the time, it was still unclear which way society 
would go: towards greater collectivism and "socialization" or 
towards the triumph of private property and capitalism
Even the intelligentsia was divided on the issue. Neo­
populists like Kacharovsky supported the commune mainly out of 
their resitance to capitalism, "not because the commune is the 
highest and ultimate form, so to speak, but because it is the
lesser of two evils, the closest step to complete
14
socialization," Opponents of the commune regarded it as
reactionary and pointed to the institution’s deleterious economic
effects, to its alleged encouragement of overpopulation, strip
farming and obsolete crop rotations. Many liberals criticized the
commune’s constraints on the mobility of labor and managerial
initiative, while communal redivisions were acknowledged to
15
discourage improvements in the cultivation of land. On the
other side of the political spectrum, Lenin argued that by tying
the peasants to the land, the commune perpetuated "non-economic
16
compulsion" (feudalism) and low crop yields. "The problem is
not the development of capitalism, but the lack of capitalism,"
17
he declared. In any case, Lenin argued, the peasants were
increasingly bypassing the commune, cultivating rented lands
outside the organization, while the commune’s supposed
egalitarianism was being destroyed by increasing social
18
stratification within the peasantry. Even the neo-populists
-69-
admitted that traditional peasant society and specifically the
commune were threatened, not least by the mounting poverty of
19
peasant farmers.
77% of peasant households in European Russia lived in
repartitional communes, with land being periodically redivided
between households. The rest —  mostly in the western provinces
20
-- held their land under hereditary tenure. Both forms of land
tenure tended to perpetuate strip farming, hereditary land tenure
especially, since here the boundaries were fixed and thus
extremely hard to rationalize. Strip farming was an inevitable
consequence of the strict egalitarianism of peasant society. In
the repartitional commune, each family was supposed to receive a
quantity of land proportional to the number of workers or mouths
it had to feed. Instead of giving each household one plot of land
of a particular size, peasant custom demanded that each field --
whether good farmland or bad, near to the village or far —  be
divided into strips and that each household get its fair share.
The result of communal tenure in both cases was that the
peasant’s land was fragmented into a multitude of tiny strips. In
the non-black earth region, where land fertility was highly
variable, the number of strips commonly reached a hundred or 
21
more. In the South, the problem was more the large size of the
villages, meaning that the strips were further apart from each
22
other, some as many as ten kilometers from the village. It can 
only be imagined what an appalling waste of time was involved in 
in getting from the house to the field and from one strip to 
another. Not surprisingly, the most remote plots were often left 
unmanured, cultivated only superficially and occasionally not
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cultivated at all. Another problem with strip farming was the
shape of the strips themselves. Often they were no more than a
few yards wide, hardly enough room to turn a plow. The boundaries
between strips were marked by ditches. These boundaries
represented an enormous waste of land, taking up as much as 10%
of the village land by one estimate. In addition, they became
24
fertile breeding grounds for weeds and pests.
The other drawback of communal tenure was that while
cultivation was done individually by each peasant household, the
small size of the strips made any individual crop rotation or
work schedule impractical. Crop rotations and the time of
planting were decided by the village assembly once a year. An
enterprising peasant farmer could not decide individually to skip
the fallow year or raise two-year grass hays, for instance, since
the village livestock had the right to graze the stubble and the
fallow lands and would be sure to eat the crop. When a change of
crop rotation required a two thirds majority of the village,
tradition ruled. I t ’s no surprise that peasant farmers developed
an attitude that one observer characterized as: "What’s the use
of thinking up some new type of project; do it the way our elders
25
do -- they’re no stupider than we." Animal husbandry suffered
since the farmer’s cattle had to be left with the rest of the
village herd, dependent on the particular commune’s standard of
grazing and breeding. Not surprisingly, Russian cattle appeared
26
scrawny and ill-fed to foreign observers.
What peasant farmers did with the manure of their livestock 
was an even more striking example of their ignorance or 
unwillingness to make the effort to farm correctly. In stead of
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spreading the manure on their fields or their kitchen gardens, i
27 *
peasant farmers sometimes just threw it away. Annette Meakin,
an English anthropologist travelling around Russia shortly before
28
1905, was told by a German shopkeeper in Kharkov:
It is scandalous! What do you think the Russian peasants do with 
the manure from their cattle sheds? They cart it into the river! 
It never enters their heads to use it for their fields as the 
[German] colonists do. Why, the soil round here is so rich, that 
if they only worked it properly, they would choke with their own 
wealth.
In general, communal tenure discouraged individual
enterprise and industriousness. The peasant farmer had little
incentive to fertilize or clear his land, since it was likely to
pass to someone else in the village-wide repartition several
29
years down the road. Neither could he implement any ambitious 
schemes for a more efficient crop rotation or system of animal 
husbandry, unless of course, he was influential enough to 
convince the whole village to try the experiment with him.
Peasant Attitudes
The communal institutional structure determined that village 
life would be collectivist, egalitarian, tradition-bound and 
suspicious of new people and ideas. The collective ownership of 
resources and a tradition of collective decision-making easily 
led to an "impoverishment of the commons". Resources that
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belonged to everyone effectively belonged to no one. To one
peasant observer this pervasive irresponsibility was most evident
in the public works that occasionally had to be performed in the 
30
village:
The commune will have to do something collectively -- to even out 
a road, fix a bridge, harvest the grass from the village pasture, 
etc. -- and despite the fact that every household has an interest 
in this work, it is a rare commune in which all the workers will 
turn out for this kind of work. Usually each household will send 
out some little boy or girl who w on’t be able to much anyway, and 
even that’s good. Those who arrive at work first see such lack of 
interest and lose their enthusiasm, executing their work in a 
slap-dash manner. And instead of a piece of good work, the result 
is only a mess.
The commune clearly had an enormous influence on the way 
peasant farmers behaved. But there were some striking peasant
characteristics that can not be explained through the influence
of the commune alone. Chief among these, was the peasant farmer’s 
baffling resistance to capital accumulation. The concept of 
accumulation of wealth for its own sake was largely a foreign one
to the peasant. Spurning the quest for profitability, indeed even
for commercialization, the peasant farmer seemed content to hover 
just above a level of primitive self-sufficiency.
Agronomists, foremost among them Chayanov, tried to explain 
the baffling phenomenon of why peasants were not impelled to
31
maximize their profits as assumed by classical economic theory. 
Beginning with his publications in 1912, Chayanov began to work 
out his theory of the peasant economy. Since the peasant was both 
landowner, manager and worker, many of the accounting terms 
essential to classical economic analysis, such as rent, labor
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costs and profit, were inapplicable to the peasant economy. The »
peasant economy functioned according to its own logic and system
of values. The peasant farmer sought not efficiency or
profitability, but a stable standard of living over time. The
break-even point was not the equilibrium between costs and
revenues, but the minimum needed to feed the household. Below
this minimum, the peasant farmer was willing to work or rent land
even if the economic return on his investment was negative. Once
the break-even point was reached, on the other hand, the peasant
farmer would not undertake extra work unless the "drudgery” of
the extra work was necessitated by the self-defined wants of the 
32
family. It followed that if the wants of the peasant family
were not very high, the peasant farmer would have little
incentive to progress beyond a level of primitive self-
sufficiency. This fact was noted by one of the speakers at the
33
Ekaterinoslav Agronomic Congress in 1910:
The reason for the survival of traditional methods of production 
is not only the ignorance of new technologies, but most commonly 
the absence of any significant incentives to increase the 
profitability on the farm, since the primitive and modest needs 
of the family are easily satisfied with the normal small income 
produced with the old, traditional technologies... The very 
principle of modern farming and the production of the maximum 
quantity of products with the best possible quality seems 
completely alien and superfluous for the average peasant... The 
whole question essentially boils down to the fact that the 
present low standard of peasant agriculture is completely related 
to the low standard of living in the Russian village...
No doubt the non-acquisitive mindset of the peasant farmer 
was reinforced by the peasantry’s deeply Christian culture, which
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emphasized man’s transitory stay on earth and the fleeting nature
of all earthly wealth. Another side of the same phenomenon was
the peasant conception of time. The peasant conception of time
was very different from the modern emphasis on the importance of
punctuality and generally of the opportunity cost of time ("time
is money” ). To observers of the peasantry at the beginning of the
20th century, the peasant farmer’s lax attitude towards time
appeared simply as laziness. The peasant farmer simply was not
willing to work hard unless the very survival of his family was
at stake. The agricultural economist Chuprov concluded that only
a long-term cultural evolution would change the work habits of
the Russian peasant. "In order for there to be a change in the
intensiveness of labour, a certain more or less continuous period
of time must pass. If a nation or a people found itself... under
conditions that encouraged industriousness, then laziness would
34
survive long after the conditions causing it are eliminated."
It was not only the peasant-as-consumer and peasant-as-
worker who had to change. The peasant-as-manager had to undergo a
significant change as well. One of the most fundamental
characteristics constraining the peasant’s evolution into a
modern farmer was his lack of rationality (as we understand it).
35
Chayanov remarked:
The usual form of peasant thinking is empirical in character, 
typified by the common popular rules of thumb like "Red sunset —  
tomorrow will be windy" or "St. Georges day has come -- it’s time 
to put the animals out to pasture." The peasant mind mechanically 
combines two observations or beliefs into a constant relationship 
without bothering to rationalize or explain this relationship, 
regarding it as an empirically-proven law. The century-old 
experience of peasant life has made this array of cultural norms
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(zhiteiskikh navykov) unchanging and tightly integrated. It is a 
collection of separate assertions, which lacks any pragmatic 
flexibility and is completely unsubject to logical 
systematization.
Another increasingly obsolete attitude was the peasant
farmer’s attitude towards the land he worked. As we have seen,
the growing overpopulation in the countryside meant that the
solution to rural poverty was not to give the peasant more land,
but to make him a better farmer. But as Professor Kaufman of
Moscow University remarked in 1908, peasant farmers still
gravitated to the extension of farming, rather than its 
36
improvement:
Our Motherland is only just emerging from the era of the 
colonization and settlement of the country... and all the work 
habits of the Russian peasant farmer are carried over from this 
period. When the land became exhausted, the peasant habitually 
abandoned one field and went to another; when a whole region 
became overcrowded... he went to "new places" -- to free and 
fertile lands. And this was completely rational, while there 
were enough "new places" and unbroken fertile soils. Now it is 
completely different. The "free lands" that remain in Siberia are 
not as attractive. In the older regions, the land inherited from 
the ancestors produces nothing but grief and deprivation. But the 
farming habits of our peasant have survived... These habits push 
the peasant outward as before, when the time has long come for 
him to direct his efforts inward. They push him to "cultivate 
more", when what is needed is to "cultivate better." The result 
is that if the peasant [has money], he will use it in the age-old 
customary way: not to improve his farm, but to expand it, to buy 
land, to rent more land, even under the most burdensome 
conditions...
This preference for expansion rather than improvement of 
cultivation was noticed by an American agronomist, Louis Guy 
Michael, who was hired to help improve the cultivation of maize
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in Bessarabia province; Michael found that the peasant farmers in »
his area were much more interested in acquiring more land than in
increasing their production by using better seeds and cultivation 
37
techniques. The state of the Russian peasantry at this time can
only be described as one of technological demoralization. One
peasant writer noticed that peasant farmers had little confidence
in their ability to produce greater yields. In the black earth
regions they complained that they had too little land —  "However
much you try, however much you toil, from a small beginning only
little will result." In the non-black earth provinces peasants
complained of the bad quality of the soil —  "No matter what you
do, the crop will be bad anyway." As a result, instead of
focusing on how to improve yields on the lands they had, the
peasants spent their time trying to expand their cultivation by
renting extra land or bring marginal soils of bad quality under
the plow (despite the fact that these lands didn’t justify the
expenditure or labor and materiel). They hankered after the
well-maintained fields of the neighboring landlord or else made
plans to find profitable employment outside of agriculture. In
short, the peasant farmer did everything except apply himself to
38
improving production on his own lands.
The Subversion of Tradition
The agricultural economist N.P. Makarov noted that since the 
peasant economy was so tightly integrated, a change in one of the 
many inter-related elements could easily set off a chain
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reaction. In order for the agriculture of a given region to 
become commercialized, for instance, it was not necessary for 
every peasant farm to become market-oriented. All that was neces­
sary was the commercialization of some significant proportion of 
these farms. The rest would follow suit soon enough. If enough 
local peasants worked for wages, even the peasant family farm 
would become aware of labor (opportunity) costs and include these 
in its decision-making process. With the development of local 
credit (and interest rates), even the peasant who didn’t take out 
any loans, would become aware of the concept of a return on 
investment. With the development of a land market, even a 
peasant who didn’t buy or sell any land would start thinking of
39
land as a commercial resource whose return had to be maximized.
In the same way, a change in some aspect of traditional 
peasant life could act as a catalyst to subvert the whole tradi­
tional order. By the end of the 19th century, this subversion was 
already well on its way. The change was a result of industriali­
zation and the peasantry’s increasing contacts with the cities. 
Part of this transformation was driven by changes in peasant 
demand. This was a kind of subversion of tradition from within 
the village. Sons and sometimes daughters left to work in the 
factory for months or years at a time and returned with "ideas” . 
The cultural links with the city resulted in increased consumer 
expectations, as Bernard Pares reported from his travels in 
Riazan province. "Several of [the peasants] have been to Moscow, 
and now wear better clothes, which are imitated by the * stay-at- 
homes.’ Some of the 'go-aways’ do well and get rich, but others 
become spendthrifts and exercise a bad influence on the
-78-
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‘stay-at-homes’ when they return." As manufactured goods »
gradually replaced village handicrafts, the peasants found they
needed more cash. That of course meant that agricultural
production had to become more commercialized.
Cultural links with the city produced not just consumer-
driven economic change, they changed the peasant’s attitude
towards his work. The traditional agricultural economy
increasingly was showing signs of strain. The knowledge and
authority of the traditional village elites no longer seemed
relevant to the changing conditions of life. As rural society
found itself in a state of flux, the elders tended to become
resentful and reactionary, while the youth turned for advice to
various outside authorities who had begun appearing in the
countryside: doctors, teachers, agronomists, etc. A much larger
41
proportion of the younger generation were literate. Educated in
state, zemstvo or church schools, the youth were often eager to
start a new life. In this they often ran into the opposition of
the elders, who were critical of young people for not following
the old ways. "The younger generation now all laugh at the bogies
and goblins in which their elders still believe," noted Pares of
42
his travels through Tver province. Sometimes, the better- 
educated young peasants found village life too primitive and 
oppressive and left for the cities permanently. This "brain 
drain" to the cities did little for the progress of peasant 
farming. Those who stayed in the village, however, became 
increasingly conscious of their social and technological 
backwardness and found ever more reasons to be dissatisfied with 
their lot. An agronomist noted this in a provincial newspaper in
-79-
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1911 : »
Whoever is familiar with rural life, whoever has looked into what 
is happening now in the villages, cannot avoid noticing that at 
this time a massive change is taking place in the conditions of 
rural life throughout all of Russia. In the contemporary village 
a whole string of new questions has arisen. The customs, tradi­
tions and work methods of grandfathers and great-grandfathers are 
gradually either being condemned or radically altered. A portion 
of the population has boldly begun to live in the new way, but 
unfortunately they do not always understand why and are not 
always conscious of the consequences. Even if they don’t quite 
understand [what’s going on], everybody clearly feels that the 
ancestral customs and norms are now impossible, since they do not 
provide enough income to survive. It is necessary to adopt some 
new system of farming. But which? This is the question: "How is 
one to live and farm in the future so that the farm would produce 
enough income?"
To find their way out of the baffling problems posed by 
encroaching modernity, many peasants turned to the very people 
who symbolized and caused a large part of the rural 
transformation that was taking place. They turned to the non­
peasants -- gentry, clergy, intelligentsia, government 
functionaries -- who had a wider experience of the world. Though 
these outsiders to peasant society were few in numbers and were 
not necessarily very popular in the village, they played a 
crucial role in helping the peasants understand and deal with the 
changing world. Since peasant Russia was a relatively illiterate 
and parochial society, it relied almost wholly on personal 
contact to receive information of the outside world. And, in the 
parlance of the time, the outsiders to peasant society were the 
culture bearers (kulturtraeger) . They served as a channel 
conducting information from the outside world down to the village
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on the one hand and reporting on rural conditions to the city on »
*
the other.
Agricultural development may rest on the individual actions 
of farmers motivated by their own self-interest, but the diffu­
sion of improved agricultural technology can be accelerated 
through conscious social effort. Much of the world’s agricultural 
progress has resulted from the introduction of new crops:
Europeans benefited from potatoes, maize, cassava and rubber 
introduced from the Americas, while the New World benefited from 
the sugar, wheat and domestic livestock introduced by European 
settlers. Diffusion of improved agricultural technology is a 
question of improving the information flow to make market 
incentives work better. Development policy, therefore, does not 
mean forcing farmers to adapt a new technology, but giving them 
the financial and informational wherewithal to improve their 
production.
Many different types of people appeared as outsiders to
peasant Russia. As Chayanov noted with respect to the
dissemination of agricultural technology, numerous people besides
agronomists participated in Russia’s program of agricultural
development and all of them had to be considered in the
44
discussion of Russian social agronomy. Initially, the role of 
the outsider was played by figures who were part of rural 
society: monks, priests, merchants, educated gentlemen and, most 
importantly, peasants who had travelled outside the locality. As 
the government began to expand its reach into rural Russia, the 
role of the outsider became professionalized and a new breed of 
outsiders appeared: land captains, scribes, doctors, teachers and
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agronomists. ,
All of these outsiders, from monks to doctors, were mission­
aries of culture, bearing the seeds of science and the urban 
enlightenment to the "dark" rural masses. At the turn of the 
century such enlightenment was sorely needed among the peasantry 
-- it was only with the help of these new ideas that the peasants 
could pull themselves out of poverty and at the same time defend 
themselves against the economic forces that were encroaching upon 
their traditional way of life. As we shall see in the following 
survey of the various non-peasant members of rural society, the 
professionalization of the enlightening mission was not well 
enough advanced in Russia at the beginning of the century to 
constitute a genuine program of rural or agricultural 
development.
Gentlemen and Clergy
It had long been hoped that gentry farms would provide the
kind of demonstration effect needed to disseminate agricultural
progress. After all, ”130,000 centers of culture” must certainly
have some effect on the peasant masses. The problem was that
before the Stolypin Reform, most gentry estates were not in fact
"centers of culture” and those that were technologically
progressive had only a limited demonstration value for
45
neighboring peasant smallholdings. At the beginning of the 
century, gentry agriculture was more often part of the problem
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rather than the solution, though after 1905 this began to change
and gentry farmers began to exert a modestly progressive effect
on the development of peasant agriculture.
In the late 19th century, only a minority of gentry farmers
worked their own land; most leased it out to tenant farmers from
the neighboring village, who then pursued their own inefficient
46
farming techniques. If the estate owner did decide to manage
his own land, the prevailing economic conditions of the time
militated against abandonment of traditional technologies. Low
agricultural wages, tight credit and high prices for agricultural
machinery discouraged agricultural mechanization or any other
substantial investment in changing the farming system. A soft
market for agricultural goods in fact discouraged gentry farmers
from trying their own hand at managing the land. It was much
simpler for the gentry to rent or even sell their land at prices
inflated by peasant land hunger. Pressed by a heavy debt load and
the long depression in agricultural prices in the late 19th
century, gentry landowners increasing went bankrupt or were
47
forced by the banks to sell much of their land.
The old gentry latifundia, slowly being whittled down by
market forces anyway, received a mighty push during the rural
48
revolts of 1905-7. Faced with the prospect of tenants burning
down the manor house or expropriating the land by force, many of
the old-style landlords prefered to sell out to the Peasant Land
Bank. The period of the Stolypin reform witnessed a heavy wave of
gentry land sales. In the period 1905-16, gentry landownership
declined by 21% and by 1916 gentry-managed farms accounted for
49
just 11% of Russia’s arable land. The long shakeout of gentry
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agriculture had eliminated the less efficient landowners. The >v
remaining gentry farmers increasingly began farming in a new way,
with modern machines and overseers trained in agricultural
schools. These estates were run on capitalist lines, with an
emphasis on cutting costs, keeping accounts, starting food
processing factories, and so on. This was evident especially in
the wheat and sugar beet areas of Southern Russia and the 
50
Ukraine. As a result of the shake-out of gentry agriculture, 
the average gentry estate became more efficient, and several
51
indices such as crop yields rose impressively during 1906-16.
Thus, on the eve of the war, gentry agriculture perhaps for
the first time was really serving as a beneficial influence on
the peasantry. It is probably no accident that provinces like
Poltava and Moscow, with substantial gentry landownership, proved
to be the most economically progressive areas of rural Russia.
Soviet observers like Shestakov saw gentry farmers as pioneering
agricultural commercialization and technological modernization;
the more prosperous and energetic of the peasantry saw this
example and themselves began to change to more complex farming
52
methods, argued Shestakov. Two experts on peasant agriculture,
A.V. Chayanov and N.P. Makarov, also viewed gentry farms as
53
important technological models for the nation’s agriculture.
Certainly, gentry farmers were much more commercialized than
their peasant counterparts: while gentry farmers worked just 11%
of the cultivated land in 1916, they accounted for 22% of the
54
grain put on the market. But even if gentry farms were now more 
"progressive" than ever, their general effectiveness as a model 
to peasant farmers was limited by two characteristics: first they
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were relatively few in number and second, gentry farms were too t
different in size and character for the average peasant farmer to 
regard them as a relevent model for his own enterprise. But 
Shestakov is probably right in that progressive gentry estates 
did have a positive influence on peasant agriculture. The more 
activist gentry farmers also benefited peasant farmers by helping 
organize agricultural societies and cooperatives.
In rural Russia at the turn of the century, the other rem­
nant of a bygone era which could potentially prove to be a bene­
ficial outside influence on peasant farming were the monasteries.
In 1905, there were 757 monasteries in Russia as a whole; church
55
lands amounted to about 2.5 million desiatins. As far as the
scale of their landownership is concerned, this was not very
much, considering the size of the Russian territory and the fact
that most of these church lands seem to have been located in the
56
North, where only a small percentage of the land was arable. As
with gentry agriculture, the cliche that monasteries perpetuated
only feudal social relations and medieval technology is not
completely correct. This we see from casual mentions in accounts
of agronomists and other observers from the intelligentsia who
could never be considered propagandists for the progressive
influence of monasteries. Even Soviet writers of the 1920’s
occasionally give us a glimpse of a curiously anomalous picture:
that monasteries sometimes represented agents of modernization.
There is an account, for instance, of the dairy farming of the
Solovetskii monastery (Archangel province) whose cows produced
812-947 gallons of milk annually, more than twice the regional 
57
average.
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Village priests also played an occassional role in ,
agricultural development. The Holy Synod, for instance, 
encouraged local priests to organize and manage cooperatives in 
their parish. Cooperatives were seen as improving the welfare of
the community and organizing the peasants on the basis of
58
"Christian reciprocity". In the 1880’s, leading cooperative 
activists had argued that the clergy were potentially the most
important part of the "rural intelligentsia" in terms of
59
organizing cooperatives. During the Stolypin reform, as we
shall see in Chapter 7, the rural clergy did in fact play an
important role in the cooperative movement. A survey of credit
cooperatives in Perm province, for instance, showed that 11% had
60
been started by members of the clergy. A national survey of
agricultural societies, meanwhile, showed that 9% had been
started by the clergy and that the clergy accounted for 13% of
61
the chairmen of those organizations.
The State and Agricultural Development
In a free-market economy such as the United States 
agricultural development for the most part had occured 
spontaneously, through the mechanism of the market. Given the 
right legal-political environment (with legislation such as the 
1862 Homestead Act in the U.S.), it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that over several decades Russia would have produced its 
own Cyrus McCormicks and John Deers, peddling their improved 
agricultural technology around the country; Russian railroad
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companies may have even begun to act like their U.S. 
counterparts, encouraging settlement, agricultural development 
and commercialization in order to increase their own cargo 
freightage. But at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia did 
not have the luxury of waiting several decades for agricultural 
development to occur. The State, as the conscious instrument of 
society, had to step in to force the pace of economic evolution 
in agriculture, just as it had done with railroad construction 
during the 1890’s. Rather than relying on the more progressive 
peasants, the monasteries or the gentry farmers to spread their 
influence to the mass of Russia’s farmers, the State had to 
develop a professional system of agricultural extension.
There were many examples around the world of the State 
encouraging the diffusion of improved agricultural technology. In 
most countries of the developed world, the State had already 
assumed responsibility for basic education, a development which 
was important for agricultural progress. Agricultural research, 
usually too expensive to be carried out by individual farmers, 
was also a task naturally suited to the public realm. Government 
propaganda and extension agents were commonly used to encourage 
the farming population to take the risk of implementing new 
technologies. Finally, in many of the countries of Europe, the 
government had taken upon itself the initial capitalization and 
management of risky start-up ventures such as farm supply depots 
and local credit cooperatives (witness the credit cooperatives in 
Germany and the agricultural depot network in France, both of 
which functioned with a great deal of state support). 
Unfortunately, until the implementation of the Stolypin reform,
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there were few examples of the Russian government taking up such
responsibilities on any meaningful scale. The best indicator was
the budget of the Agriculture Department of the Ministry of
Agriculture —  responsible for extension service —  which was
62
only 4 million rubles as late as 1907. The government was
willing to spend massive amounts of money for famine relief, but
was unwilling to finance the modernization of Russian farming.
Above all, pre-Stolypin Russia lacked a network of professional
agricultural extension agents. One agricultural historian 
63
noted:
In virtually every country the question of disseminating 
agricultural knowledge is given top priority... We know that with 
us this is far from so... The experience of America has shown 
that despite the work of the experimental stations and the broad 
development of agricultural educational institutions, and despite 
the growing dissemination of agricultural literature, the mass of 
farmers can only be effectively influenced through the live 
exchange of ideas.
The most important government agents who were based in the
depths of the countryside were the land captains. This official,
introduced into the countryside in 1889, combined the functions
of a justice of the peace and a policeman. Numbering 2,582 in 49
provinces of European Russia, land captains presided over their
bailiwicks (uchastok), each containing an average of 46 villages
64
and a population of about 35,000. The land captain was given a 
broad responsibility to maintain order in peasant society and the 
power to arrange matters as he saw fit. He had the authority to 
adjudicate legal disputes and impose fines or jail terms; he 
nominated the candidates for township (volost) administration,
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effectively running it himself; he could review and cancel the »
decisions of any peasant assembly, indeed he could cancel the
65
plans to assemble at all. Clearly, this was a figure with a lot 
of power in local affairs. But since the land captain was ulti­
mately judged according to his ability to keep the peace and 
guard the prosperity of his bailiwick, and since one of the best 
ways to do this was through encouraging local agricultural devel­
opment, it would be surprising if some land captains did not try 
their hand at this tricky task. In fact, some land captains did 
take pride in their achievements in helping develop their re­
gion’s economy, but the backround of the land captains and the
nature of their functions meant that their usefulness in this
66
field was innately limited.
One of the main problems of the land captains as agents of
agricultural development was the fact that they tended to be
identified too closely with the gentry and with oppressive
governmental tutelage. Even after the implementation of the
decree of 5 October 1906, which gave equal opportunity to all
classes to serve in government posts, the great majority of land
67
captains tended to come from gentry origins. Even those land 
captains who were of non-gentry origin were likely to reflect 
local gentry interests merely by virtue of their selection proc­
ess. Chosen by the governor and the district marshal of the 
nobility and ratified by the district congress of the nobility, 
the land captain was a bold man if he took the peasant side 
against gentry interests.
If the land captain was likely to be a gentleman and a 
newcomer to the area, he also lacked any special technical train-
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ing which would have given him an inherent value in rural socie- »
*
ty. He was not required to have any knowledge either in agronomy
or in the intricacies of economic management; he tended to have a
68
military educational backround. In fact, land captains were
hard pressed to show a higher educational backround at all. An
MVD report to the State Council in 1903-4 apparently pointed out
that 68% of land captains had no higher education at all and 19%
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had not even had secondary education. Furthermore, the evidence 
points to the fact that land captains were neither a particularly 
popular nor a particularly motivated bunch. Boredom and demorali­
zation made for high mobility -- one land captain was to recall 
that the average length of stay was little more than a year —  
and this made it difficult for them to get properly acquainted
with the population of their bailiwick and reinforced the impres-
70
sion that their authority was exercised arbitrarily.
The organization that should have been supervising 
agricultural development at this time —  the Ministry of 
Agriculture -- unfortunately was still an obscure ministry labor­
ing in the shadow of heavyweights such as the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The number of agronomists 
employed by the Ministry of Agriculture totaled a few score in 
1905. Its funding of local agricultural projects amounted to less 
than a million rubles. As Professor Kaufman remarked, the history
of Russian agronomy before 1905 was "the history of the absence 
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of agronomy." Measures which might have seemed bold in the
chancelleries of St. Petersburg passed virtually unnoticed in
Russia’s villages -- "isolated measures that didn’t affect the
72
mass of farmers," as one analyst remarked. One respected agri-
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cultural economist complained: "This government found money for »
everything it wanted: the army, the fleet, the railroads and
subsidies to the nobility, but it didn’t find money when it was
most needed for the peasantry. There was no money either for
education or for resettlement or for expanding the Peasants Land
73
Bank or for the improvement of peasant farming."
The local governments —  the zemstvos —  were another
institution one would have expected to undertake serious
agricultural development projects. After all, the development of
the local economy was one of the mandates written into the 1864
statute on the zemstvos. By the end of \he century, the zemstvos
were sending doctors to the village to encourage public hygiene,
teachers to spread literacy and statisticians to study the
peasant economy, but the zemstvo agronomic program failed to take
root. In 1904, for instance, one third of the districts of Euro-
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pean Russia could not claim to have a single agronomist. As
late as 1910, one agricultural correspondent argued that an
agronomic network with "three agronomists serving a district
75
twice the size of Belgium or Holland" was "farcical". In addi­
tion, before 1905, very little was known about the dynamics of
the peasant economy, making it difficult even for trained spe-
76
cialists to intervene effectively. In any case, to hope for a 
mass effect from such an ill-funded and thinly-staffed organiza­
tion as the pre-Stolypin system of zemstvo agronomy was wishful 
thinking.
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Agricultural Development as a Victim of Social Strife »
The urgent need for agricultural development in peasant
Russia must have been obvious to anyone who had had a chance to
compare the condition of Russian villages with that of Western
European villages. Why, then, was Russia so dilatory in
addressing this task? Part of the explanation was myopia on the
part of the ruling and educated classes, but much of the problem
lay in the political stalemate paralyzing the country. The
central government, for instance, was highly distrustful of the
zemstvos and even more distrustful of the left-leaning
individuals the zemstvos sent out to the villages as teachers,
doctors and statisticians. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the provincial governors stifled zemstvo rural development
programs with regulations and strict supervision. Before 1906,
for instance, if an agronomist wished to give a series of
lectures in a peasant village, he had to receive permission from
77
the governor’s office. All new organizations, such as agricul­
tural cooperatives, had to be approved (with some hassle and
78
delay) by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Not only bureaucrats, but conservative landowners as well 
were skeptical of the zemstvos sending agronomists to the village 
like apostles of progress. In a semi-autobiographical novel 
written by a former land captain from central Russia, these 
attitudes are expemplified by a local marshal of the nobility.
What do we need agronomists for, asks the marshal. The landowners 
all remember how statisticians were sent out to the countryside 
in the 1890’s and how all of them turned out to be socialists,
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"working for the revolution on the taxpayers’ money." The gentry
pay the bulk of the zemstvo taxes and what do they get back?
Nothing. Furthermore, he argues, "words w o n ’t change the peasant
-- only strong, even harsh authority will." Agrarian reform
shouldn’t be implemented gradually, he argues, but radically,
like Peter the Great’s reforms, making a clean break with the 
79
past. This was probably not an uncommon attitude in Russia at
the turn of the century.
But the zemstvos and the rural intelligentsia must also be
held to account. Some zemstvos focused on the public health and
education programs and looked warily on agricultural extension
80
work as a complicated and unfamiliar task. The political objec­
tions were even stronger. This was especially true with respect 
to the third element, the staff of the zemstvos. Since the mem­
bers of the third element generally did not own any land, they 
were much more likely to advocate an extreme form of socialism 
involving the compulsory expropriation of all private property 
and they in fact proved more resiliently revolutionary in 1905 
than the gentry liberals who dominated the zemstvo assemblies. 
Even after the defeat of the 1905 revolution, many members of the 
third element refused to participate in any projects of agricul­
tural development, fearing to be seen as upholding the existing
81
political order. Some adhered to a populist philosophy and 
resented St. Petersburg’s moves to break up the peasant commune, 
while others felt generally hostile to the central government and 
refused to cooperate with it. One economist, writing in 1911, 
went to great lengths to reassure agronomists that they needn’t 
feel as if they’re helping the "reaction" or exhibiting servility
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in helping develop the Russian economy. Agronomists should coop- »
erate with the government developing agriculture, he argued,
since they were just bringing "science" and "culture" to the
Russian village -- a development which would serve their politi-
82
cal aims in good time.
Apart from the political antagonisms separating many of the
main players, Russia’s agricultural development was constrained
by basic prejudices concerning the peasantry. Many educated
people in Russia still doubted whether the peasantry’s farming
methods could be changed at all. The peasant character was
perceived as lazy, irrational, and hidebound. The "dumb peasant
theory" ruled. That this was indeed the prevailing attitude at
this time is indicated by the tone of the early agronomic
writings. As late as 1906, agricultural economists like Professor
A.A. Kaufman felt it necessary to argue that yes, peasant
agriculture should be improved and yes, peasant farmers were
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intelligent enough to change. Even agronomists initially en­
tered the countryside under the impression that the peasantry was
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a dark and uniformly uncultured mass. Many Slavophiles and 
ultra-conservatives probably didn’t even want peasant agriculture 
to change, fearing the corruption of the virtues of traditional 
peasant society. One observer noted the controversy over agronom­
ic aid to the peasantry, pointing out that "there were advocates
and apologists, but there were even more people who considered
85
[agronomic aid] not serious and even harmful..." Perhaps the 
worst offenders with regard to the "dumb peasant theory" were to 
be found on the left. Social Democrats like Piotr Maslov and 
Maxim Gorky regarded the peasantry as hopelessly brutal and
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ignorant and welcomed the day when peasants would be supplanted *
86 * 
on the land by capitalist farmers or proletarians. One left-
wing observer, no doubt bitter over the peasantry’s confounding
87
unwillingness to become marxist revolutionaries, wrote:
Never and nowhere has the peasantry played the role of a histori­
cal catalyst, determining the character and direction of great 
socio-political changes. Sometimes, through its participation, 
the peasantry defined the limits [of historical changes], usually 
influncing events through its historical inertia...
For their part, the peasants had no great love for the 
people who were bringing them enlightenment. Throughout the ages, 
outsiders appearing in the village usually meant the imposition 
of alien laws, new taxes, or worse. Predictably, altruism on the 
part of outsiders was greeted with deep skepticism and even 
hostility. During the famous "movement to the people" in 1874, 
when hundreds of young intellectuals trooped out to the 
countryside to spread a gospel based on science and populist 
socialism, the villagers commonly drove the well-meaning 
intruders out of town or reported them to the police. The peasant 
attitude towards the gentry and government functionaries was 
probably even more hostile, judging by what happened in 1905,
when hundreds of gentry manors were put to the torch and land
captains were forced to flee to the cities.
Even the zemstvos, though ostensibly organs of self govern­
ment, were regarded as alien and exploitative bodies lodged 
within rural society. Greater zemstvo activism in the field of 
rural development required higher tax rates and since almost all 
the zemstvos received the bulk of their revenue taxing land and
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forests, higher tax rates occasionally sparked full-scale peasant » 
88 * 
rebellion. Zemstvo agronomists, however capable and well-mean­
ing, often fell victim to the distrust and class strife that 
pervaded the Russian countryside in 1905. One former agronomist,
K. Savchenko, writing after the revolution, described how peas-
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ants regarded zemstvo agronomists:
The former agronomic higher school was a gentry school. It was 
foreign to the working peasantry... The graduates of this school 
came not from the working population, but from the ranks of the 
landowners, storekeepers, government functionaries and other 
inter-class people (raznochintsy). In any case, they weren’t 
peasants and they knew the peasantry only from their books... So 
the agronomist, foreign in appearance and in thinking, would 
arrive in the village and visit the peasants. He would begin to 
preach logic and rationality, but in a language that was incom­
prehensible to the peasants. The book which he thrust into the 
peasant’s hands was written in the same language -- and its pages 
made good rolling paper for cigarettes. After the agronomist 
left, the peasant would scratch his head, thinking that the 
gentleman had come to him with some sort of dubious intentions. 
Not for nothing did the peasant’s father and grandfather warn him 
about gentry philanthropy. No, there was something wrong here. 
They were probably trying to hoodwink him in some way.
This kind of attitude was widespread with regard to all the 
rural intelligentsia and all government functionaries, no matter 
how useful they might have been to rural society. Their differ­
ence of backround, education and employment was sufficient to 
make them aliens in peasant Russia. One land captain remembered 
how selflessly the local functionaries and intelligentsia worked
to improve peasant life, and how cynically the peasantry reacted 
90
to them:
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For this, the population paid them back by taking any occasion to ♦
soak them for all they were worth. "And who shouldn’t we soak, if *
not you? After all, you receive a salary," the peasant women
would tell some teacher at the market...
Clearly local government functionaries and the rural intel­
ligentsia had to cross a wide gulf of distrust before they could 
hope to influence the peasantry. Yet, their influence was crucial
to the success of Russia’s agricultural development. One analyst
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wrote in a local newspaper in 1910:
The attempt to stimulate our local economy and put rural life in 
order will soon entail a heightened demand for various types of 
intelligentsia. The "domestic demand" for intelligentsia is insa­
tiable... Any attempts at introducing culture will necessitate 
the employment of a mass of intelligentsia. We need agronomists, 
doctors, engineers, veterinarians, teachers, medical assistants, 
midwives, etc. If Russia, like Italy, up to now has had a surplus 
of intelligentsia... then at the present time, with the attempts 
at "Europeanization", our demand for intelligentsia will be so 
voracious that in the near future we will experience a distinct 
shortage of supply.
The Future
By 1905, all the necessary elements for a successful agri­
cultural development program were in place. The peasant economy 
had undergone intensive scrutiny for over a decade. Both the 
zemstvos and the Ministry of Agriculture had gained experience in 
administering pilot projects of agricultural development.
Russia’s farmers were fortunate that the agricultural development 
program after 1905 would be undertaken by such a pragmatic 
institution as the Ministry of Agriculture. This ministry had the 
good sense to realize its own limitations. When its mission and
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funding were radically expanded during the Stolypin Reform, the 
Ministry of Agriculture delegated much of the agricultural 
development program to local administrators and to local 
institutions such as zemstvos, agricultural societies and 
cooperatives, which had both the manpower and the knowledge to 
cope with the task. The success of the Ministry of Agriculture 
can be directly attributed to its success in harnessing the 
initiative of several energetic rural classes.
One of the key groups was the landed gentry, which 
controlled the zemstvos and imbued these organizations with its 
sense of duty and activism. The gentry at the turn of the century 
had good reasons to feel uneasy: The centuries-old system of 
serfdom had been abolished, gentry landholding was declining 
rapidly and, to make matters worse, the gentry was losing its 
hold on the government in St. Petersburg, which was increasingly 
staffed with a technocratic elite that had little in common with 
the landowning elite. The zemstvos provided the provincial gentry 
with a political platform from which they could advance their 
interests. As administrative institutions, the zemstvos also gave 
the gentry an opportunity to influence the economy and society 
without feeling like cogs in a national bureaucratic machine. 
Reading zemstvo chronicles such as Veselovsky’s for example, one 
gets the impression that provincial zemstvo representatives 
thought of themselves as statesmen of national stature (similar 
to English parliamentarians in the 17th and 18th centuries) and 
that various zemstvos vied with each other for the honor of being 
considered the most progressive, the most responsible and the 
most effective institution in the country.
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The dynamism of the zemstvos also came from harnessing the »
ambitions and energy of another social group, the so-called third 
element. These were the professionally-educated employees of 
peasant or mixed class backround, employed as doctors, teachers, 
statiatisticians and agronomists. And they fulfilled their duties 
not only with a missionary zeal common to all "civilizers" of 
that age, but also with an enthusiasm sharpened by a sublimation 
of their radical political ambitions. Whether they were employees 
of the zemstvos or of various St. Petersburg ministries didn’t 
much matter —  they constituted a clearly-defined, cohesive 
social group with a very definite idea of how to develop peasant 
society. Members of the third element not only worked to develop 
peasant society by performing their official duties, but in their 
spare time, they often organized cooperatives, helped formulate 
local petitions and performed a variety of other tasks that 
promoted the welfare of their area.
The participation of both the gentry and the third element
made the zemstvos into very effective institutions of local
government. F.V. Schlippe, a former civil servant who had worked
extensively in both government and the zemstvos, noted that the
Latter tended to be much more dynamic and highly motivated than
the organs of the central government. Zemstvo personnel were
idealistic, self-sacrificing and worked long hours, Schlippe
remarked; their democratic and open style of government provided
a stark contrast to the "careerism" and "mindless obedience" of
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the St. Petersburg bureaucracy. The zemstvos also tended to be 
pragmatic, action-oriented institutions, with less bureaucracy 
("flatter" organizations, to use modern business terminology)
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than the giant St. Petersburg ministries.
The success of the Stolypin Reform and of the Ministry of 
Agriculture would be due not only to the judicious use of the 
zemstvos and the two classes that were active in those 
institutions, but also to the energy released by another rising 
class: entrepreneurial peasant farmers. The land reform that 
began in 1906 gave these people the chance to win independence 
from the peasant commune and acquire more land, while a broad 
program of agricultural extension gave them the opportunity to 
expand their economy. It was on the labor and innovation of these 
peasant entrepreneurs that Russia’s agricultural development 
would depend.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STOLYPIN LAND REFORM
Many agronomists spoke of the need for a "psychological
push" before peasant farmers would be willing to change their
1
farming system and their way of life. It is possible that the 
lack of such a "psychological push" accounted for the continual 
failure of various agricultural intiatives to develop into mass 
technological change before 1905. With respect to rural society 
and the government’s agricultural policy, the differences between 
the period preceding 1905 and the period following are so great 
that one must conclude that in this year the necessary psycholog­
ical push materialized. The revolution of 1905 shook Russian 
society to its roots. One can only speculate on the effect the 
revolution had on the peasantry, but at the very least, 1905 must 
have shattered the peaceful continuity of the peasants’ tradi­
tional way of life and proved to them their capacity to dramati­
cally change their environment. For the rural intelligentsia, who 
generally played an important role in spurring on the revolution, 
1905 was a surprising assertion of power; the revolution may have 
been lost, but the rural intelligentsia had discovered that they 
had the ability to go beyond encouraging long-term, incremental 
progress and could engineer immediate and massive changes in the 
status quo. For the landed gentry, meanwhile, 1905 conjured up 
the spectre of the destruction and expropriation of their proper­
ty; the extent of the peasant uprising, unrivaled since the end 
of the 18th century, was enough to jar even the most complacent
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nobleman into some sort of remedial action. The government, too, »
saw its power totter and was galvanized to take urgent action to 
first suppress the peasant rebellion and then restructure peasant 
society in order to prevent a recurrence.
But the psychological shock of 1905 only went so far in 
galvanizing rural society. It left rural Russia in a state of 
uncertainty and flux. The second and equally important 
psychological push came from the enactment of the Stolypin land 
reform. This reform —  motivated by a clear vision of the future: 
a nation of prosperous yeoman farmers —  served as the spearhead 
for all the other elements of Russia’s agricultural development 
program. In this chapter we will examine how the reform was 
implemented, how the peasantry reacted and what results were 
achieved.
The Roots of the Stolypin Reform
No great historical event lacks antecedents, however limited 
in comparison, and it is true that land reform and a program of 
agricultural development were topics of extensive discussion and 
debate in Russia before 1905. The famine of 1891 was an important 
turning point, since it exposed for the first time that something 
really was wrong with Russia’s system of peasant agriculture.
Both St. Petersburg and the zemstvos were goaded into action. 
Statisticians were sent out to study the peasant economy, some 
zemstvos hired agronomists, many scholarly books were written and
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laws were passed allowing for the creation of rural cooperatives. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the condition of peasant 
agriculture was worrying enough for the government to convene 
three well-publicized commissions: one to study the 
"impoverishment" of the central provinces, another to review the 
legal structure of peasant society and finally the largest, the 
Special Commission on the Needs of Agriculture, to review all 
questions related to agricultural development. No doubt many 
liberals and reformers hoped that this flurry of activity 
presaged a package of reforms on the scale of the Great Reforms 
of Alexander II.
But the government's new vigor came too late. Reform was
overtaken by revolution. As Russia was suffering humiliation at
the hands of the Japanese in 1905, the country rose in
insurrection at home. The peasant rebellion forced the
government’s hand on the matter of rural reform, convincing all
but the most reactionary of Slavophiles that the socio-economic
structure of rural Russia had to be overhauled. The policy of
upholding the peasant commune, long the cornerstone of Tsarist
rural policy, had to go. Overcrowded and poverty-stricken,
increasingly subjected to both market forces and socialist
propaganda, the peasant commune had become a volatile
organization, demanding some kind of decisive resolution of its
woes. "Either the Stolypin agrarian reform or revolutionary-
peasant nationalization —  only these two options are economical-
2
ly feasible," wrote Lenin in 1908. The two schools of thought 
that had consistently defended the peasant commune, the Slavo­
philes and the populists, began to accept the view that the
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commune had to be allowed to wither away. Most Slavophiles were
shaken in their support for the commune when they witnessed the
revolutionary tendencies of that institution in 1905. The more
pragmatic populists (most of Russia’s agronomists, for example),
once they were saddled with the responsibility of rural economic
development, also weakened in their support for the commune when
they realized that the institution often constrained the growth
3
of agricultural productivity.
St. Petersburg had been moving towards abandoning its
support for the peasant commune even before 1905. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs had recognized the technological disadvantages
of communal repartitions in 1893 and had decreed that a minimum
of 12 years should pass between repartitions; the various
national commisions studying the state of peasant agriculture in
1899-1904 concluded that any repartitions at all did not serve
4
the cause of agricultural progress. As early as March 12, 1903, 
the government had decreed the end of collective responsibility 
(krugovaia poruka) for land redemption payments (for the 1861 
settlement) and taxes, thus eliminating one of the primary rea­
sons for the commune’s existence. On November 3, 1905 it was 
announced that land redemption payments were to be phased out 
altogether by 1907. The final decision to cease support for the 
peasant commune came with the decree of 9 November, 1906. This 
decree allowed peasant farmers to chose whether they wanted to 
stay in the commune or claim their land as private property or 
consolidate all their strips into a single private plot of land. 
The decree represented a massive change in rural policy, since it 
envisioned the abandonment of the collectivism and fragmentation
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of traditional village agriculture and the creation of a network 
of consolidated homesteads on the American or Swedish model.
If the revolution of 1905 had determined that the structure
of peasant Russia had to change, the decree of 9 November 1906
set out the broad parameters for this change. In the spring of
1906, St. Petersburg had flirted briefly with the idea of
expropriating gentry lands (with compensation), but the dismissal
of the advocate of such an expropriation, the Minister of
Agriculture Kutler, effectively killed the proposal. Russia was
going to protect private property rights and embark on the path
of peasant-capitalist development, "a wager on the sober and
strong” of the village, as Stolypin explained it in his famous
address to Duma in 1907. Sometime later, Lenin would see the
Stolypin land reform as Russia’s complete committment to
capitalist economic development: "The agrarian question in Russia
is a question of a sharp break with the old, mediaeval
agriculture -- both gentry and communal-peasant -- a break which
has become absolutely necessary due to the extreme backwardness
of this system of agriculture and the extreme incongruity between
5
it and the whole economic system, which has become capitalist." 
Though the government would take some steps to help the peasantry 
acquire more land, the main focus of agricultural policy was the 
intensification of agriculture, in other words the improvement of 
peasant farming on the lands already under cultivation.
The enactment of the land reform was accompanied by a whole 
package of other measures. The activities of the Peasant Land 
Bank were expanded in 1906, making it easier for peasants to buy 
gentry lands on relatively easy credit. Most of the Ministry of
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Internal Affairs’ restrictions on peasant migration to Siberia
were voided. In 1905, the Ministry of Agriculture had been
reorganized —  it was now given the added responsibility of
resettling peasant farmers beyond the Urals —  and tremendous new
resources were put at its disposal. In the nine years between
1905 and 1914, the budget of the Ministry was to increase almost
fivefold, from 32 million rubles to 146 million, the fastest rate
6
of growth of any ministry. On the district and provincial lev­
els, new land settlement commissions were established under the 
Ministry, charged with the task of ironing out some of the more 
costly inefficiencies of peasant land tenure. One by one, the 
model statutes of various types of rural cooperatives were re­
written, making those organizations more accessible and attrac­
tive to peasant farmers.
Stolypin’s government decided early on not to try to direct 
this agricultural development purely from St. Petersburg; as far 
back as 1902, when the Special Commission on the Needs of 
Agriculture included numerous zemstvo representatives from around 
the country, the cooperation of the zemstvos had been considered 
vital to the success of any program of agricultural development. 
With the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ 
Council for the Affairs of the Local Economy and the creation of 
the new parliament —  the Duma —  the workings of the central and 
local governments became more integrated. The new Minister of 
Agriculture, Krivoshein, was a pragmatic son of a merchant family 
and naturally leaned towards an alliance with the zemstvos, while 
Prime Minister Stolypin understood that his reforms depended on 
the government’s "close cooperation" with the zemstvos, who "have
-106-
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always been responsive to popular needs.” The zemstvos were 
given the responsibility for organizing an extensive program of 
agronomic aid. With the help of matching grants which the govern­
ment began to distribute in February 1910, zemstvo expenditures
on agricultural extension services increased eight-fold in the
8
nine years between 1905 and 1914.
Clearly, the massive upheaval of the revolution of 1905 was 
being answered by a program of rural reform on an equally large 
scale. The decree of 9 November 1906 signaled the beginning of an 
offensive of major proportions.
Resettlement and Land Purchases
Though the main focus of the government’s agricultural 
program may have been the intensification and increased 
productivity of peasant farming, significant measures were also 
taken to increase peasant landownership. Measures such as 
increasing the sale of gentry lands or encouraging peasant 
resettlement to Western Siberia were relatively simple to execute 
and represented a politically wise concession to the peasantry’s 
land hunger. Both resettlement and the operation of the Peasant 
Land Bank played an important part in the first years of the 
Stolypin Reform, acting as a crucial pressure valve for peasant 
discontent.
The peasantry had been steadily buying up gentry lands ever 
since 1861, but the pace of land purchases increased during the 
Stolypin Reform. The revolution of 1905 had pushed gentry
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landowners into a veritable panic of land-selling. The peasants 
hesitated for a few years, presumably awaiting a full "black 
redistribution," but then proceeded to snatch up all the land on 
the market. The process was facilitated by the expansion of the 
Peasant Land Bank in 1906. The Bank was now allowed to financial­
ly guarantee land purchases outside its auspices and, with re­
spect to lands in its own account, it was allowed to loan the 
peasants the full purchase price with loans at a very low 4.5% 
interest a maturity of up to 55 years; since the bank had to pay 
gentry sellers closer to market rates —  5 or 6% —  it operated 
at a financial deficit. Government subsidies to the Peasant Land
Bank reached 145 million rubles on the eve of the war —  a mas-
9
sive subsidy of peasant land purchases. The results were impres­
sive. In the 10 years between 1906 and 1916, the Bank’s sales to
the peasantry averaged almost a million desiatines a year, almost
10
three times the average yearly sales in the period 1883-1905;
gentry landholding in European Russia declined by 21% or 11.2
million desiatines (see below). With the help of the Bank’s
operations and other aspects of the land reform, the nature of
landholding in European Russia changed significantly during the
11
Stolypin Reform, as can be seen in the following table.
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Land Tenure in the 50 European provinces (thous. of desiatines)
1905 % 1916 %
Peasant Lands
communal: 100,701 40.5% 72,037 29.0%
hereditary or privatized: 22,977 9.3% 38,897 15.7%
cossack lands: 14,689 5.9% 14,689 5.9%
consolidated (allotment): -- 0.0% 12,744 5.1%
Land Purchased by Peasants
private or consolidated: 13,209 5.3% 17,271 7.0%
communes and associations: 11,609 4.7% 17,008 6.8%
Peasant Land Bank reserve: 276 0.1% 2,622 1.1%
Other Lands
gentry: 53,169 21.4% 41,973 16.9%
merchants and townsmen: 23,969 9.6% 25,007 10.0%
church and monasteries: 2,612 1 .1% 2,612 1.1%
State and Udel lands (arable): 5.179 2.1% 3.530 1.4%
Total: 248,390 100.0% 248,390 100.0%
The table above is a rough estimate, since comprehensive 
figures for landholding after 1905 do not exist. Most of the land 
mentioned was arable land; the State and imperial family owned 
over 100 million desiatines of forest and swampland in addition 
to the 5 million arable desiatines listed in the table above. 
However approximate the nature of the data, the table gives a 
good impression of the significant changes taking place in 
Russian landownership. Gentry landownership declined 21% to 
constitute just 17% of the total in 1916. All types of peasant 
landholding expanded from 66% of the total in 1905 to 70% in 
1916. Of the peasant lands, the proportion owned by peasant 
communes or associations (as opposed to cossack lands and 
hereditary or consolidated plots) declined from 69% of all 
peasant lands to 51%. The landownership of merchants and townsmen 
expanded, while the quantity of arable land owned by the State 
and imperial family shrank.
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The other major change taking place at this time was the
increased settlement of lands beyond the Urals. At the beginning
of the 20th century, as the peasantry in European Russia was
struggling with poverty, overpopulation and violence, word began
to filter through that in Western Siberia a man could make a
decent life for himself. The land was fertile and abundant and
the region was far enough away to be relatively insulated from
the cycle of revolution and repression that had taken hold of
European Russia. Previous to 1906, peasant resettlement to
Siberia had been constrained by the collective responsibility
system of the commune, by the strict regulation of migration by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (peasant families had to get the
land captain’s approval to travel to Siberia) and by the lack of
12
surveyed properties and infrastructure. In 1906, all these 
constraints were lifted. The decree of 9 November, 1906 allowed 
the Russian peasantry unprecedented mobility in chosing where 
they wanted to live. Resettlement became the responsiblity of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the funds expended to resettle peas­
ant farmers rose to 25 million rubles in 1910, up from just 3
13
million rubles seven years previously. Siberia witnessed a
massive new wave of peasant settlers. The figures can be seen in
14
the table below.
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Number of Peasants Migrating to non-European Russia. 1901-1916
Number of
Year Peasants Resettling
1901 88,964
1902 81,921
1903 94,289
1904 40,001
1905 38,760
1906 139,064
1907 427,339
1908 664,777
1909 619,320
1910 316,163
1911 189,791
1912 201,027
1913 240,978
1914 241,874
1915 27,651
1916 10,898
The largest group of settlers arrived in the first years of
the Stolypin Reform -- the number of migrants in 1908 was 17
times larger than it had been three years earlier. Many
government decision-makers had previously thought that allowing
more than 200,000 settlers a year to cross the Urals would
produce starvation and disaster, yet the migration proved to be
15
very successfully managed. The magnitude of this initial emmi- 
gration wave was probably due to the violence then prevailing in 
European Russia and to the release of pent-up demand for reset­
tlement after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Wartime, both 
during the Russo-Japanese War and during World War I, produced a 
sharp decline in migration. But a strong secular trend is indis­
putable. The yearly average of migrants increased from 68,787 in 
the 1901-1905 period, to 433,333 in the following five year 
period and settled at 218,418 in the four year period 1911-1914.
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Taking into account the fact that every year an average of 19% of 
the settlers returned, the net number of migrants in the years 
1906-1914 was almost 2.5 million peasants.
The increased emmigration of peasants from European Russia 
(either to Siberia, to the towns or abroad) and the extension of 
peasant land tenure through the mediation of the Peasant Land 
Bank all contributed to alleviating peasant land hunger during 
the Stolypin Reform. (We shall consider all these factors in 
greater detail in Chapter 11.) These measures were popular and 
relatively easy to implement, but they alone would not be 
sufficient to solve Russia’s rural underdevelopment. The 
government had to attack the source of the problem —  the low 
productivity of peasant farming. It was in adressing the 
efficiency of peasant agriculture through carrying out land 
settlement measures that the Stolypin land reform made its 
greatest impact.
The Mechanism of Land Settlement
The Stolypin program of land settlement (zemleustroistvo) 
consisted of three levels of reform. The first and most basic 
level was the privatization of peasant allotments. The second 
level was group land settlement, or cossomation as it’s sometimes 
called: the land could still be communally-owned, but the strips 
of land were widened or the boundaries between villages were 
rationalized. The final and most complex level of reform was
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consolidation: the creation of private family farms on a single
plot of land, either in the shape of the otrub. whereby the
peasant continued to live in the village and keep his land in two
or three different parcels or in the shape of the khutor, whereby
the peasant moved all his buildings onto one, contiguous plot of
land. Privatization of existing peasant allotments may have been
an ideologically-attractive option and one relatively easy to
execute, but by itself it was generally insufficient to change
the peasant farming system. Consolidation, however, not only
broke with all tradition, but also went a long way towards
relieving peasant land hunger. F.V. Schlippe, an employee of the
Ministry of Agriculture who witnessed a number of consolidation
16
projects, was to remark:
Divided into a multitude of thin strips, a communal allotment 
always gave the impression of insufficiency and land shortage.
But very often, this was nothing but an optical illusion. When 
all these separate strips were consolidated, the result was a 
plot which always seemed a lot larger than the peasant had ex­
pected. Characteristically, after the measurement was completed, 
it was common to hear the peasant exclaim: "Look how much land I 
have!"
If all of Russia’s fragmented peasant farms could be 
consolidated and the countryside transformed into a nation of 
independent small-holders similar to American farmers, it was 
reasonable to expect that the problem of peasant land hunger 
would lose its urgency and Russian agriculture would witness a 
great boost in productivity. The thinking behind the decree of 9 
November 1906 may have been sound, but St. Petersburg initially 
had no administrative network to put this very ambitious land
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reform into effect. The Ministry of Agriculture had been 
reorganized for this purpose, but for several years its budget 
remained too small to undertake the reform on a mass scale; the 
newly formed land settlement commissions, meanwhile, took several 
years to organize on a wide scale. By default, the government 
initially had to turn to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its 
primary representative in the Russian village —  the land 
captain.
That the land captains should play an important role in the
initial stages of the reform was dictated as much by their
numbers as by their qualifications. There were over 2,500 land
captains in European Russia; the executive members of the land
settlement commissions (the workhorses of those organizations),
on the other hand, were appointed only gradually and in any case
17
were to number only 500 on the eve of the war. The surveyors,
who were specially trained for land settlement operations, grew
to be very numerous, but they surpassed the land captains in
numbers only after 1910. The land captains, therefore, were for
several years the only numerically significant and established
governmental agents in the countryside (apart from policemen and
scribes). We saw in the preceding chapter that land captains had
many drawbacks as agricultural extension workers, but they also
had certain strengths as a 1911 publication of the Ministry of
18
Agriculture noted:
Because of the very nature of the land captain's functions, 
virtually no land settlement work within the commune can be 
carried out without his cooperation. The land captain habitually 
takes the place of the executive officer [of the land settlement
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commission] in case of the latter’s absence. Because of their 
knowledge of local conditions and because legal questions are 
raised at evey point in the land reform, land captains have 
contributed more than anyone to putting the reform on a stable 
footing.
The land captain may have been inadequately trained for
addressing matters of land reform and agricultural development
and he may have been weighed down by a multitude of other
responsibilities, but he could be very effective in carrying out
the simpler, purely legal side of the reform: drumming up
petitions for land settlement and supervizing the privatization
of peasant plots. He was useful in getting the peasants to apply
for land settlement, because he could use whatever authority he
posessed to explain the reform to the peasants, as well as play
politics in the village by applying personal pressure on selected 
19
individuals. Because of his judicial powers, the land captain
was also naturally suited to carrying out the privatization of
peasant lands. According to one ministerial survey, land captains
were responsible for over two thirds of the petitions for priva- 
20
tization. Considering that privatization was the broadest 
aspect of the reform in purely numerical terms, land captains 
have to be considered key figures in the Stolypin land reform.
Land captains proved much less suited to carry out the more 
complex tasks of group land settlement and consolidation, 
however. These measures were much more time-consuming than the 
privatization of peasant lands and required a delicacy and tech­
nical expertise that many land captains lacked. Furthermore, a 
major change in the peasant farming system such as consolidation 
was too important a task to be left to relatively low-level
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functionaries such as land captains. The main instrument for »
undertaking cossomation and consolidation, therefore, was the
network of land settlement commissions, which was specially
created to carry out the reform. Organized on the district and
provincial level, land settlement commissions were supposed to be
the perfect example of a well-focused collegial organ. The com-
21
missions were made up of the following figures:
The Provincial Land Settlement Commission 
the Governor (chairman)
the Executive Member (chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture) 
the provincial representative of the Ministry of Finance 
the director of the local branch of the Peasant Land Bank 
a member of the provincial court
a member of the provincial board (gubernskaia uprava) 
the provincial marshal of the nobility 
the chairman of the provincial zemstvo board 
3 peasant representatives of the provincial zemstvo 
3 other representatives of the provincial zemstvo
The District Land Settlement Commission
the district marshal of the nobility (chairman)
the Executive Member (chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture)
a member of the district court
a land captain from the district
the district tax inspector
a representative of the Department of Appanages 
the chairman of the district zemstvo board 
3 representatives of the district zemstvo 
3 representatives of district townships (volosts)
The presence of most of these members probably represented 
more an effort to transcend ministerial and local administrative 
rivalries, than an attempt to create an efficient executive 
organ. The workhorse of the commission was the executive member, 
usually a local nobleman with a record of government service who
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was chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture specially for his ,
enthusiasm for the reform. The job of the executive member was to
plan, coordinate and ratify all the land settlement projects of 
22
his district. In any given village, the job of supervizing a
land settlement project was carried out by a land settlement
agent (zemleustroitel), a term applied to the land captain,
gentry farmer or executive member who was responsible for that
project. On the eve of the war, there were about 3,000 land
23
settlement agents recorded for any given year. Broadly speaking
there were four types of rural administrators who were qualified
to play the role of land settlement agent. Their numbers are
24
illustrated in the table below.
land settlement 
land captains executive members surveyors agronomists 
1905 2,500 0 200 422
1914 2,500 500 6,800 10,000
Land settlement was a complex affair, requiring technical,
legal and diplomatic skills and the expenditure of a great deal
of time. In retrospect, we can see that the administrative
apparatus of the land reform suffered from some serious
shortcomings. None of the above mentioned groups were
sufficiently empowered to execute the reform on their own. Land
captains were criticized for being either dilatory, ignorant or
25
excessively formal in their work. In any case they were likely 
to be too burdened with other work to be able to give the com­
plexities of land settlement the necessary attention. The execu­
tive members of the land settlement commissions, meanwhile, were
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too few in number to have a profound influence on the village. In
some provinces they were accused of spending all their time
behind desks, instead of putting on their boots and going out to 
26
the villages. One former land captain carped that land captains
did all the land settlement work, while the executive member
would arrive just in time to supervize the signing of the agree-
27
ments and take credit for the project. This was certainly true
in Stavropol province, where virtually all land settlement was
carried out by overworked land captains, who could not cope with
28
all the demand in the area. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that in a 1909 report to Stolypin, the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
Inspector of Land Settlement, A.A. Kofod, wrote that the execu­
tive member needed to be "efficient and tactful" and had to work
"hand in glove" with the land captain if land settlement was to 
29
succeed.
Besides land captains and land settlement executive members, 
another group that played an important role in the reform were 
the surveyors. Surveyors were far more numerous than either of 
the other two groups -- by 1914, there were almost three survey­
ors to every land captain and almost fourteen to every land 
settlement executive member. Surveyors were trained specially for 
land settlement and had the opportunity to participate in all 
stages of the reform, but they were constrained by their lack of 
power. They did not have any legal authority beyond giving 
technical advice on the contours of the "land settled" village 
and surveying the new boundaries; they could not even call a 
village meeting without the permission of the land captain. Thus, 
the one group of workers who were both specially trained for the
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land reform and who were numerous enough to execute it
effectively did not have the power to do so.
Agronomists, meanwhile, were even more numerous than survey­
ors and even more extensively trained, but they had no official 
role in the reform, except for providing agricultural extension 
services. As we shall see, agronomists ultimately did play an 
important role in the implementation of the reform, but their 
work would be constrained by their own anti-tsarist political 
convictions and by the mass of other duties that they were called
upon to perform in the Russian countryside.
Clearly the apparatus for executing the land reform was a 
disjointed and improvized structure. It may have performed ad­
mirably, considering the fact that land settlement was a novel 
task and that the reform had to be implemented under difficult 
circumstances and in a short period of time, but it must be 
admitted that the land settlement apparatus was not up to the 
magnitude of its task. The clearest indication of this was the 
fact that the apparatus managed to satisfy less than half the 
demand for land settlement. In the period 1906-16, 7.1 million 
households petitioned for land settlement, but the number of
completed consolidation or cossomation projects was only 3.4 mil-
30
lion. Thus, the bottleneck of the land reform was not in the 
preliminary stages of the reform —  privatization of peasant 
strips or applications for land settlement —  but in the execu­
tion of the complex tasks of consolidation and cossomation. The 
land settlement cadres probably suffered from numerical insuffi­
ciency, as well as from their disjointed organizational struc­
ture. Land captains were part of the Ministry of Internal Af-
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fairs, executive members and agronomists of the Ministry of
Agriculture, surveyors of the Ministry of Justice, the Peasant
Land Bank of the Ministry of Finance —  it was a remarkable feat
of organization to get all these people to work together at all.
But resulting collegiality of leadership must have accounted for
what one observer called the land settlement organs’ "complete
paralysis of initiative, incapacity for work, and absence of any
31
independent economic creativity."
Such were the weaknesses of the land settlement apparatus, 
but before we go on to consider what the apparatus actually 
achieved, we must look at the other main constraint on the 
progress of the Stolypin land reform: the opposition of the local 
population.
Opposition to the Land Reform
Two of the three elements of the land reform —  
privatization and cossomation of strips —  were relatively 
uncontroversial. Though the vesting of full property rights in 
the head of the household rather than the whole family sometimes 
represented a significant change, privatization often represented 
no more than the transition from a repartitional commune to a 
hereditary one -- a transition which a quarter of Russia’s 
peasant households had undergone even before the Stolypin Reform. 
Similarly, cossomation of strips was also a relatively familiar 
concept; one of the objects the periodic communal repartitions,
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for instance, was cossomation and the general rationalization of 
boundaries. Consolidation, on the other hand, was a radical 
departure from traditional land tenure and usually entailed a 
thorough overhaul of the peasant farming system. In order to 
picture the magnitude of the change represented by consolidation, 
one has only to think of how peasants must have felt when they 
decided to abandon the centuries-old village order and embark on 
a disolution of the community into a network of isolated 
farmsteads. If there weren’t massive and clear economic benefits 
to be gained from consolidation, the peasants simply were not 
going to abandon their traditional social structures for the new 
system.
Predictably, most peasants were scared of taking such a
giant step. Once the agricultural reform began to gather speed,
one local correspondent reported that "anxiety and perplexity
32
have spread throughout the village." Rumours began to circulate
in the villages that agronomists would come and force new farming
33
methods on the population. Indeed, the restructuring of peasant 
agriculture set in motion by consolidation was not a cosmetic 
change. In his travels around the Russian countryside, Sir Ber­
nard Pares had a chance to see how deeply the reform affected the 
34
peasantry:
In 1911... I saw a great deal of [land settlement] work in the 
east, centre, and west of Russia. At one village I was present at 
a meeting at which communal land tenure was abolished in that 
village. The decision had already been taken, and what I 
witnessed was the actual division of the land... It was a fateful 
day for the commune. Woe to the family whose representative was 
drunk; I saw such a one. Some of the best and most alert bidders 
were widows, acting on behalf of the children. There was little
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noise but great tension. One felt, as one looked out on the wide 
fields around one, that for good or for evil, a big thing was 
being done.
There were many different groups in rural society who had
real reasons to oppose the land reform. The shop-keepers and
money-lenders were often against the reform because they found
the commune convenient in solidifying their control over the
village population. The poorer peasants feared losing the
rudimentary social security net that the commune provided.
Village women also commonly opposed the prospect of village-wide
consolidation, since this threatened to break up the
gregariousness of village life, as well as the communal grazing
system of livestock, for which the women usually tended to be 
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responsible. Similarly, in the Northwest, the merchants report­
edly opposed village-wide consolidation, since this would deny 
them communal grazing lands for their cattle and would make it 
more difficult to go from house to house selling wares. Wide­
spread opposition was also reported among priests and monks —
who apparently feared for the virtues of the traditional way of
36
life if the reform were to go through. The same fear motivated
some of the landed gentry, who professed Slavophile beliefs. A.D.
Samarin, the influential marshal of the nobility for Moscow
province, for instance, demonstrated his opposition to the reform
by boycotting the meetings of the land settlement commission, of
37
which he was theoretically vice-chairman. In the South-West,
some local government functionaries were reported to be holding
up the progress of the reform out of jealousy towards the new
38
officials who had arrived to implement it.
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Some of the most ardent opposition to the Stolypin land ,
reform was to be found in the ranks of the revolutionaries. Still
bitter at the government’s repression of the 1905 revolution,
many members of the third element fought the land reform for the
same reason they fought any measure stemming from the Tsarist
government: indominable hatred for the regime. At a Congress of
Agronomists in Moscow early on in the reform, for instance, a
zemstvo agronomist proposed a resolution condemning the land
reform and urged agronomists to undertake an "active policy of
sabotage" towards it. The proposal, according to one eyewitness,
39
was "drowned by thunderous applause." As we shall see in Chap­
ter 6, agronomists in particular were caught in a painful dilem­
ma: on the one hand, political and ideological opinions impelled 
them to oppose the Stolypin land reform, while on the other hand, 
the pragmatic nature of their mission with respect to improving 
peasant agriculture eventually forced them to admit that the 
reform was a good thing. Peasants had no such compunction. Even 
the peasants who had led the rural rebellion of 1905-7, if they 
saw that consolidation was in their economic self-interest, would 
unabashedly embrace the reform. A large number of sources, in 
fact, reported that often the most ardent supporters of the land
reform were precisely those peasant farmers who had been in the
40
forefront of the rural rebellion a few years earlier.
If true, this development must have been gratifying to the 
government. St. Petersburg was aware of the experience of Germany 
and France, where the reorganization of peasant agriculture had 
produced a class of yeoman farmers who had proved to be reliable 
supporters of Bismark and Napoleon III respectively. In Russia
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itself, there were examples of prosperous small-holders becoming
staunch political conservatives. The cossacks, with average
land-holdings of 50-75 desiatins, had long been loyal supporters
of the regime, while the German settlers along the Volga also
stood out for their economic prosperity and political
conservatism. The degree of opposition in the rest of Russia,
however, impelled some observers to suspect that whatever results
had been achieved by the land reform were achieved by coercion or
bribery on the part of the local administration. Let us now
examine the validity of such a point of view.
Were the peasants bribed into undertaking land settlement?
The very multitude of peasant households undertaking land
settlement belies this view. An extensive Ministry of Agriculture
survey in 1912-13 showed that only 16% of the consolidated farms
surveyed had received government loans. The loans usually had a
15-year repayment schedule and averaged 109 rubles for a khutor
and 89 rubles for an otrub. On consolidated farms bought from the
Peasant Land Bank (most of which were bought with mortgage-
secured loans anyway), 39% of the farms received loans —  122
rubles on average. Very rarely did the government actually give
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cash grants to consolidated farmers. We can see that only a
small minority of consolidated farms received loans on favorable
terms and even these loans were hardly sufficient to cover the
costs of moving house and changing the farming system: such costs
were calculated to be 236 rubles for a khutor and 94 rubles for 
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an otrub.
Another possibility was that local land settlement agents 
coerced the villages into undertaking the reform. On the surface
-124-
it would seem as if the Tsarist government had substantial ,
incentive to do so. The legal complexities that resulted from the
egalitarian principle of communal land tenure —  how much of each
field belonged to which household and who had what rights with
respect to pasture and woodland —  presented a formidable task
for the surveyor. The difficulty of untangling the jumble of
communal property rights was all the more debilitating since a
land settlement project had to be as simple as possible for
peasants to understand and accept it. Hereditary land held in
strips was the most difficult of all to consolidate, since this
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required the agreement of all the farmers affected. This could 
be seen in the example of Minsk and Grodno provinces, which 
unlike neighboring Vitebsk, made almost no headway with consoli­
dation, precisely because most of the land was held under heredi- 
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tary tenure.
The complexity of communal land tenure, complicating the
task of land reform, presented St. Petersburg with a dilemma. On
the one hand, one of the main aims of the reform was to imbue the
peasantry with a respect for the inviolability of private
property and the rule of law as understood in the West.
Consequently the publications of the Ministry of Agriculture, for
instance, stressed that "rigorous legality1’ was to be observed in
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all the work done by land settlement commissions. But the need 
for speedy results dictated that legality be frequently overidden 
in the effort to restructure peasant land tenure. It is sympto­
matic that the decree of 9 November 1906 was passed under Article 
87 of the constitution, bypassing parliamentary approval. Equally 
symptomatic were the officials chosen to chair the new land
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settlement commissions: the governor on the provincial level and 
the marshal of the nobility on the district level, both figures 
representing the traditional patriarchal methods of administra­
tion .
On the local level, even the confirmation of a peasant’s
strips as private property did not guarantee the inviolability of
his land, since a majority vote by the community could force him
to participate in a general redistribution and consolidation of
lands. And the way in which consolidation was promulgated was
often high-handed and undemocratic. The most common tactic
employed by administrators to force the pace of the land reform
was to encourage a few households to separate from the commune
and set up on consolidated farms. This tactic was effective
because it established several model farms of the new type in the
peasants* midst, but more importantly, it was effective through
its disruptive impact on the peasant commune: when a household
decided to consolidate its land, the commune was obligated to
undergo a full communal repartition. This, along with the fact
that the more households left the commune the less the peasants
that remained could hope to increase their allotment in the next
repartion, often drove the village to undertake a complete,
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village-wide consolidation all in one blow. It appears that 
some instances of outright coercion also took place, as a number 
of peasant complaints to the Minister of Agriculture indicate.
One case in Kiev province concerned a commune with a 
reputation for being a "dark village” : politically loyal and 
deeply conservative. A zealous land settlement executive member 
convinced the commune to petition for full-scale consolidation.
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The peasants apparently did not fully understand what was 
involved. When the time came for carrying out the plan, the
majority of peasants refused. Several peasants were thereupon
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promptly jailed for breach of contract and subversion. Another 
complaint described how, when land captains were faced with a 
village that wanted to back out of a land settlement agreement, 
they would often arrive at the door of the most vocal opponents 
to take an inventory of their personal possessions, in effect 
threatening them with confiscation of their property. According 
to an inspector reporting on land settlement in south-western
Russia, such cases of open and veiled coercion were relatively
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common and left a legacy of bitterness and discontent. Such
bitterness is evident in the following complaint of a peasant 
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correspondent:
If they would just explain to us what’s what. But these "little 
Napoleons"... never want to admit that a spoiled project can be 
set right through explanations, meetings and persuasion... They 
want to take [the village] by storm. "They’ll surrender," they 
say. "It’s not the first time."
The violence in the immediate wake of the revolution of 1905
cut both ways. A former land captain remembered how he felt
trying to implement the land reform in villages boiling over with 
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rebellion:
After the law on leaving the commune, you would stand in the 
village assembly, alone, surrounded by an infuriated crowd. I t ’s 
not possible to bring the police with you -- after all, there 
aren’t enough of them anyway. The supporters of the commune are 
for the most part socialists, with the habit of obtaining as much 
land as possible for their new-born children, and this right is
exactly what is being taken away. In some villages, they are *
ready simply to tear you to pieces. And that is the majority. *
Those leaving the commune are no help and no defense and 
themselves try to hide under your wing. And under these 
conditions, the newspapers criticize you for being despotic!
There have been times when the peasants took the land captain by
the collar and strung him from the rooftop.
There were enough cases of authoritarianism and violence
during the Stolypin land reform to provide ample food for the
political opposition, but the argument that the land reform as a
whole was pushed through by force is almost certainly wrong. For
one thing, most of the complaints contained in the government
archives seem to date from the first two or three years of the
reform, a tense and bitter time when the revolution of 1905 had
not yet been fully extinguished. The period 1910-14, when most of
the land settlement projects were carried out, is characterized
by remarkably few instances of authoritarianism. An even more
convincing refutation of the reform-by-force view is the very
magnitude of the land reform movement. It is hard to believe that
7.1 million land settlement petitions and 3.4 million completed
projects could have been imposed involutarily by the agents of
land settlement. As A.A. Kofod pointed out, "land settlement
represents such a serious change in the life of the peasant that
administrative pressure is useless. Undoubtedly there have been
cases of organizing petitions for village-wide consolidation
(razverstanie) under a certain pressure, but it is unthinkable
for anyone to have succeeded in realizing such a project in real 
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life." This argument rings true. After all, how could one 
expect the thinly-staffed network of rural administrators to 
force such a mass transformation of rural life, when they were
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hardly able to keep the peasants from burning gentry manors only 
a few years earlier.
Quantitative Results of the Land Reform
By 1917, the number of peasant farms consolidated under the 
Stolypin Reform was some 1.8 million, or 12% of all peasant 
households. Another 1.6 million peasant farms had benefitted from 
cossomation. Due to the government’s efforts to encourage private 
land tenure, approximately half the peasant households in Euro­
pean Russia now lived outside the peasant commune. Was the Stoly­
pin land reform a success? Considering the size of the Russian 
land, the extent of the peasantry’s agricultural backwardness and 
the resentment remaining after 1905, the Stolypin land reform 
achieved remarkably impressive results in just eight years. But 
the figures alone do not give an accurate picture of the degree 
to which the land reform transformed the Russian countryside. As 
we shall see in the following chapters, the land reform had a 
tremendous psychological impact on the countryside and it set in 
motion a whole array of agricultural improvements among Russia’s 
peasant farmers.
The reform greatly impressed observers from the rest of 
Europe. In 1912 Germany, which had initiated similar reforms a 
century earlier and was still working on them, sent a special 
delegation, composed of the venerable German agronomists Max 
Sering and Otto Auhagen among others, to examine the progress of
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the Stolypin Reform first hand. Auhagen, noting the "extremely 
impressive" results of enclosure (privatization) in the period of 
1906-11, remarked that "more land will have been enclosed in five 
years as a result of the Russian agrarian reform than was en-
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closed by the Prussian Gemeinheitsteilung in a whole century." 
Foreign observers were impressed not only by the grandeur of the 
reform, but also by the efficiency with which it was being car­
ried out. "In Central and Southern Russia, I was able by personal 
investigation to convince myself of the high degree of devotion, 
energy and knowledge applied to the execution of the reform," Max 
Sering was to recall in 1921. Sering went on to argue that, had 
the land reform been allowed to run its course, it would have
solved the Russian peasant problem by giving free rein to the
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efficient farmers.
What were the quantitative results of the Stolypin Land 
reform? Unfortunately, because of the spottiness of Russian rural 
statistics and because the war and revolution cut short the land 
reform after less than a decade of operation, the results of the 
reform are not easily quantified. There are some significant gaps 
in the statistical data, which sometimes need to be covered with 
educated guesses. Let us begin with the simplest part of the 
reform: privatization of peasant lands. Privatization could occur 
in several ways. First of all, any peasant household could apply 
and receive legal right to own its land in private tenure. When 
this path produced only relatively minor results, the government 
decided (according to the law of 14 June 1910) to make the priva­
tization of peasant lands which had not undergone repartition 
since the division of lands during the Emancipation of the serfs
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automatic; this applied both to "hereditary" communes and to 
"repartitional" communes which had not had a general repartition 
since 1861. The League of Agrarian Reform, a multi-party group of 
experts gathered in 1917 to examine the agricultural problem,
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calculated the results of privatization in the following way.
Results of the Privatization of Peasant Lands. 1906-17
Number of Number of
households desiatins
1. Privatization of communal land ..2,008,432 14,122,798
2. Privatization of hereditary plots.. . . 2,817,993 22,977,451
3. Privatization of land in
communes without redistribution 469,792 1,796,410
4. Awaiting confirmation on
communes without redistribution....... 2.000.000 14.000.000
Approximate total....................... 7,300,000 52,000,000
iV
If we add on the 1.8 million consolidated farms to this
figure, we can see that on the eve of the revolution, no more
than half of the 15.7 million peasant households in European
Russia were members of functioning peasant communes. Noting this
trend, the socialist economist N.P. Oganovsky remarked in 1914:
"Few can doubt that unless the wheel of history turns to the left
in the near future, the privatization of the major portion of
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Russia’s arable land is a question of one or two decades." For 
our purposes, we needn’t include the estimated 2 million house­
holds who had not undergone communal repartition since 1893, but 
had not yet received certified private tenure; the best figure 
for privatized households derived from the table above is 
5,296,217 households with 38,896,659 desiatines of land.
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The size of the movement away from communal tenure was ,
generally accepted by most analysts at the time, but this view
has recently been challenged by some Western and Soviet
historians. One of these, Dorothy Atkinson, has speculated that
there was a substantial overlap in the figures on privatization
and consolidation, even though no evidence of this has surfaced.
More to the point, Atkinson has argued that in most cases
privatization meant very little in real life, since peasant
farmers remained highly integrated into the economy of their
community and the commune was only "put on hold" so to speak, to
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resurface with the 1917 revolution. It is true that a mere
juridical change, confirming a peasant’s strips as private
property, often had little immediate impact on the ground, but
the figures on privatization are still significant because they
indicate the deterioration of the peasant commune as an
agricultural institution and because private property rights
could prove significant, if only at some later date, when the
peasant might want to sell his land or plant apple trees on it or
whatever. In other words, mass privatization had occured, but in
most cases its significance had yet to be realized economically
and, because the revolution of 1917 cut short the evolution of
Tsarist Russia, in fact never was realized.
In addition to privatization, the Stolypin land reform
managed to achieve impressive results in the complex task of land
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settlement. The results were as follows:
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The Aggregate Results of Land Settlement 1906-16 (47 provinces)
Number of % of total 
peasant peasant
households households
1. Total number of households
(1916 census)................. . .15,693,538 100%
2. Number petitioning for individual
land settlement (consolidation)............3,492,232 22%
3. Number of consolidated
farms by Dec. 31, 1916................... .1,830,082 12%
4. Number petitioning for group
land settlement (cossomation ).............. 3,634,772 23%
5. Number of households having undergone
group land settlement by Dec. 31, 1916...1,562,952 10%
The figures on completed consolidations are higher than most
that are commonly used by historians. First of all, most analysts
have usually employed the figures on consolidated farms ratified
by the land settlement commissions. Yet, as the Ministry of
Agriculture pointed out, the important moment in consolidation
was the execution of the project, when the boundaries between
plots were drawn up and approved by the village, not its formal
ratification by the commission; peasant farmers almost always
started cultivating their new plots right away, without waiting
for the deeds to be drawn up and processed through the correct
channels (the time lag between the completion of consolidation
projects and their ratification by the land settlement
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commissions was about a year). Therefore, if one were to use 
the figures for the number of consolidation projects ratified by 
the land settlement commissions by, say, 1914, one would actually 
be recording the number of consolidations that had already
i
*
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materialized by 1913. Another reason why the figures on ,
consolidation are higher than many others commonly used is that
some analysts tend to quote the number of consolidations on just
peasant allotment land, leaving out the number of consolidated
farms established on State or Peasant Land Bank lands. Finally —
and this refers to all land settlement statistics, not just
consolidations —  many analysts neglect to include the figures
for 1915 and 1916. Unfortunately the data for these two years is
spotty, but some estimate has to be ventured, for the level of
land settlement activity, though significantly reduced from the
pre-war years, was still very high: in 1915 alone, for instance,
3.3 million desiatines were surveyed for land settlement and
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184,562 consolidated farms were established.
The extent of the movement to consolidated farms was even 
stronger in Western Siberia than in European Russia. In 
allocating lands to settlers, the Ministry of Agriculture 
followed a policy of encouraging the establishment of 
consolidated plots, usually otrubs. About 30% of the land granted 
to settlers consisted of consolidated plots and these plots, 
owned either by settlers or by long-established farmers,
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accounted for an estimated 6 million desiatines by 1914.
Kofod observed in 1914 that the scale of the peasant demand
for land settlement had initially taken everybody by surprise. No
one in St. Petersburg had expected consolidation to spread beyond
the western provinces and had assumed that the progress of the
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reform would be gradual. To everyone’s surprise, not only had 
the tempo of land settlement turned out to be very rapid, but the 
peasants became increasingly radical in their demands for
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consolidation, rather than just cossomation of strips. Many
peasants, especially in the South, began by organizing otrubs,
keeping their cattle in communal pastures and their houses in the
village. Gradually they began moving their buildings out to the
fields —  first barns and storehouses, then domiciles and
stables. Finally, they petitioned for a redivision of the
communal pasture and sold their home plot in the village. Thus,
what had originally been organized as a settlement of otrubs
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evolved into a settlement of khutors.
Whereas the pace of applications for privatization had
reached its apex in 1908, the pace of land settlement —  both
consolidation and group land settlement -- was quickening on the
eve of the war (see below). Since private ownership of strips
didn’t help the process of land settlement and may actually have
hindered it, land settlement cadres were soon urged to give less
emphasis to privatization and encouage land settlement in stead.
Skeptical at first, the peasants evidently began to understand
the potential benefits after a certain period of time. After
1910, the movement to consolidation and group land settlement
swelled to such proportions that the land settlement commissions
were unable to keep up. Because of the shortage of surveyors and
the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for approval of new
property rights, the commissions managed to ratify only 44% of
the applications for consolidation and 43% of the applications
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for group land settlement over the period 1907-14. The figures
below indicate the yearly fluctuations in the demand for
privatization, group land settlement and consolidation on peasant
64
allotment land.
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The Dynamics of Privatization,
Group Land Settlement and Consolidation. 1907-1914
Number of 
households 
petitioning for 
Year privatization
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914 
Total
212,000
840.000
650.000
341.000
243.000
153.000
160.000 
120.000
2,719,000
Number of 
households 
petitioning for 
land settlement 
219,332 
380,691 
704,964 
650,347 
678,143 
1,226,225 
1,105,742 
828.096 
5,793,540
Households 
with approved 
group land 
settlement 
4,296 
17,664 
85,702 
110,625 
112,361 
125,642 
193,586 
268.201 
918,077
Households 
with 
completed 
consolidation 
13,643 
51,411 
133,786 
187,025 
206,983 
202,954 
241,773 
214.445 
1,252,020
We can see from the table above that applications for
privatization reached their peak in 1908, applications for all
kinds of land settlement —  in 1912, approval of completed group
land settlement projects —  in 1914 and completed consolidations
-- in 1913. The land reform, therefore, was clearly gathering
strength when World War I broke out in the summer of 1914. But it
was also becoming more expensive. One of the reasons for this was
that a growing proportion of consolidations were now executed
through individual separations from the commune (vydel), rather
than village-wide consolidations (razverstanie). The latter was
preferable, since it involved the creation of multitude of
consolidated farms in one blow; therefore, it had lower unit
costs and achieved much faster results. Yet, the proportion of
individual separations grew steadily throughout the reform,
rising from just 5% of all consolidations in 1907 to 39% in 
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1912. Evidently, in its desire to encourage consolidation, the
land settlement administration was increasingly willing to
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undertake the most difficult type of land settlement, and this ,
v
may be one of the reasons why it was falling behind in its
processing of land settlement applications. There were other
drawbacks as well. Consolidation through individual separations
was not only more expensive and time-consuming, it was also much
more disruptive for village life. When even a handful of
households opted for individual separations, they usually forced
the whole commune into a village-wide repartition of lands.
Predictably, individual separations caused a great deal of
animosity in the village; farming was often disrupted as the
village quarelled and communal farmers, now insecure about the
future of their land ownership, became even more negligent of the
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soil than they had been previously.
These were difficulties —  bugs in the system, so to speak 
—  but they were not symptoms of a systemic flaw in the land 
reform or of a loss of momentum. The pace of petitions for 
consolidation and even the completion of projects was 
accelerating, rather than declining on the eve of the war. The 
key factor in whether peasant farmers would continue applying for 
consolidation in ever greater numbers was whether they saw their 
neighbors prospering on consolidated farms. It is to the economic 
impact of privatization and consolidation on peasant agriculture 
that we turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE STOLYPIN LAND REFORM AND THE PEASANT FARMER
We saw in the previous chapter that the mass of the peasant­
ry could not be corralled into transforming their farming systems 
through coercion or bribery. The primary reason why peasants 
decided to opt for land settlement was that such a change was in 
their self-interest. The advantages of private plots and espe­
cially of private consolidated farms were clear enough for a 
great number of peasants to overcome their reservations and adopt 
the new system. Land reform, both in the form of privatization 
and in the form of consolidation, held the key to the improvement 
of peasant farming. At a certain stage of history, the progress 
of civilization may have been served by people coming together to 
form rural communities and communes, but in the modern era, the 
key to cultural and technological progress lay in freeing peasant 
farmers from the very same commune. The Norfolk System of crop 
rotation, for example, arose in England only after the farmland 
had been enclosed under private ownership and the "crisis of the 
commons" (the impoverishment of communal land) had been resolved.
There were examples of whole villages adopting improved technolo-
1
gies, but these were rare exceptions. Agricultural progress was 
largely borne by individual farmer entrepreneurs -- and these 
could only arise when land tenure was privatized and, if possi­
ble, consolidated. The same process was repeated throughout 
2
Europe.
In this chapter, we will begin by looking at the implica­
tions of privatization in a theoretical sense and see whether the
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hopes and fears accompanying the movement were borne out. We will 
then look at the need for consolidation of peasant strips and at 
the technological superiority of consolidated farms. Finally, we 
will look at how the land reform related to all the other ele­
ments of the government’s agricultural development program and at 
how Stolypin’s "wager on the strong" carried over into all 
spheres of the rural economy.
The Effect of Privatization
The land reform, as we mentioned, was composed of two main 
trends: privatization and consolidation. The first of these —  
privatization -- is usually dismissed by historians as relatively 
insignificant, doing little to change the system of peasant 
farming. Yet, privatization represented a sharp break in the 
traditional structure of peasant society. Admittedly, most of its 
impact was at first largely theoretical, but even this was bound 
to lead eventually to real change.
Privatization of peasant plots gave the mass of Russian 
farmers the opportunity to sell their land. Before the decree of 
9 November 1906,. if a peasant farmer wanted to sell his plot and 
move somewhere else, he was stuck in the absurd position of not 
being able to do so. The privatization of peasant land turned it 
into "capital," which could be liquidated into cash for 
reinvestment into some other enterprise. The peasant now could 
dispose of his assets in any way he wanted. In one fell swoop, a
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peasant whose property consisted of a cow, a plow, some furniture 
and 50 rubles in the bank, was enriched by some 1,000 rubles 
worth of land.
Apart from increasing the peasant farmers’ freedom to 
dispose of their assets in any way they liked, privatization 
could also be expected to have a salutory effect on rural over­
population. Under communal tenure, every new peasant family would 
automatically inherit a plot whose size would be commensurate to 
the number of family members or workers in the household. Thus, 
the communal system provided no disincentive to breeding large 
families and may even have encouraged it. The impoverishment 
resulting from too many people living off the land was borne not 
by the individual family, but by the commune as a whole. Privati­
zation would change this state of affairs. One Russian economist 
remarked that in Western Europe "the principle of private proper­
ty puts the problem of rural overpopulation before each peasant, 
so that he already prepares a greater or smaller number of his 
children for non-agricultural professions." If the peasant’s 
land was privately-held, he would be able to obtain a mortgage-
secured loan to finance the purchase of another plot of land or
3
some enterprise in town. The upsurge in peasant migrations to 
Western Siberia and to the towns in the period 1906-17 was proba­
bly due in large part to the new freedom to dispose of their 
inherited plots. Some observers in fact noticed a strong regional
correlation between land hunger, privatization and emigration to 
4
Siberia.
Privatization also tended to have a beneficial impact on the 
efficiency of farm management. Generally speaking, privatization
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encouraged freedom of enterprise, mobility of labor and ,
specialization of production in the rural economy. Now that the 
land could be sold, those peasants who were unfit or unwilling to 
farm were able to cash in and move out, leaving the land to the 
more dedicated peasant farmers. In view of the high cost of 
maintaining a modern farm and the high rate of rural under­
employment, the agricultural sector in Russia needed a 
"shakeout." The less promising peasant farmers had to be free to 
leave the village so that the nation’s agricultural resources 
could be concentrated in the hands of the more efficient produc­
ers .
Nowhere is-the need for an economic shakeout more clearly
illustrated than in the problem of peasant horse-ownership. A
horse generally needed to be worked on a large plot of land in
order to pay for itself; the expense of setting aside a large
quantity of land for pasture or growing fodder crops led many
peasants to sell their horses and rely either on hand cultivation
or renting livestock from their neighbors. In 1912, 31.5% of
5
peasant farms had no horses and a further 32% had only one. Yet,
many agronomists argued that Russia in general had too many
horses, with the existing animals being grossly under-utilized on 
6
the land. Makarov, for instance, wrote that the assumption that
every peasant household "must have one horse and one plow" would
7
lead to the bankruptcy of the peasant population. The clear 
implication was that only a portion of the peasantry (probably 
the majority) should own horses and work on the farm, while the 
rest should be given the opportunity to do something else.
The privatization of land gave free rein to the individual
-141-
farmer’s skill and initiative. The peasant farmer no longer had 
to worry about handing his land over to someone else when the 
next communal redivision took place; and was he was no longer 
limited in the amount of land he could own or what he could do 
with it. In his textbook on agriculture, Makarov wrote that 
farmers are very different in the quality and scope of their 
managerial ability. Some farmers were capable of running large, 
intensive operations, some were not. Each farmer, therefore, had 
to have the opportunity to work a farm whose size would be com­
mensurate with his ability; confining a capable farm-manager to a 
small communal allotment was a waste of his potential, while
giving an incompetent farmer a large plot of land would represent
8
a waste of land resources. Privatization opened the way for 
agricultural resources to be matched with those best equipped to 
exploit them.
Now that land was both a liquid capital asset and the pri­
vate property of the farmer, peasants were impelled to produce 
more efficiently and to take better care of their soil. Even 
Soviet analysts of the 1920’s admitted that an independent, 
privately-held peasant farm had certain "positive advantages”
with respect to developing the "thriftiness and industriousness"
9
of the farmer. The privatization of land and the rising frequen­
cy of land-purchases, land-rentals and mortgage-secured borrow­
ings, also advanced "profitability" and "return on investment" as
10
all-important criteria.
The effect of private ownership was especially strong when 
the land was consolidated into a single plot. There is 
substantial evidence that after privatization or consolidation,
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the number of land-reclamation and construction projects rose
sharply, raising the market value of the holdings as high as
11
twice the going price for communal land. The private peasant 
farmer had an incentive to clear away rocks and underbrush from 
his fields and to take better care of his soil. In the private 
consolidated farms surveyed by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
1913, 41% had undertaken some form of land reclamation or im­
provement projects since the reorganization of their land tenure. 
The most common project was the sinking of wells, but there was 
also a lot of work done draining marshes and digging irrigation
ditches. The average cost of such work, according to the survey, 
12
was 47 rubles. Another way in which the value of the farm rose
after the privatization and consolidation of the land was through
the construction of new buildings. The average value of farm
buildings (houses, barns, mills, etc.) in the aforementioned
survey rose by 12% on otrubs and 67% on khutors in just a few 
13
years.
Critics of the land reform pointed out that privatization 
had far more deleterious effects than the preceding arguments 
admitted. One of the most articulate such critics was Oganovsky. 
In a book published in 1914, Oganovsky pointed out that the 
privatization of land combined with the high land prices 
resulting from peasant land hunger would ultimately lead to the 
complete impoverishment of the peasantry. Ever since 1861 the 
land market had been a seller’s market, he argued, with land 
fetching a far higher price than a reasonable calculation of its 
productivity merited. It was the peasant buyers who would have to 
bear the burden of carrying the heavy land payments on their
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family budgets. The peasants* new freedom to dispose of their
land assets was a pyrrhic victory, Oganovsky claimed, since the
resulting debt burden would soon lead to a decline in production
and the kind of debt bondage that centuries earlier had helped
14
produce serfdom.
This argument has several weaknesses. First, land prices may 
have been very high and the land market may have been a seller’s 
market, but it was precisely the sellers (the poorer peasants) 
who needed the money most. Secondly, it was perfectly reasonable 
to expect that the buyers would be able to digest their purchase 
and pay down their debt by increasing their productivity, an 
option Oganovsky neglected to mention. Finally, Oganovsky over- 
looked the dynamic efect of the law of supply and demand: ini­
tially land prices would be very steep and this would encourage 
many peasants to sell their land and leave the agricultural 
sector, but as ever more peasants did so, land prices would fall 
and the process would level off.
It is also worth noting that Oganovsky*s objections were 
mainly theoretical. In fact, the sale of peasant land was signif­
icant in the period 1906-17, but it could hardly be considered a 
mass phenomenon. By law, peasant land could only be sold to other 
peasants. In order to safeguard against concentration of land, 
the law of 14 June 1910 stipulated that a given peasant farmer 
could acquire a maximum of six peasant allotments (he was not 
limited in the amount of gentry land he could buy). Of course, if 
Russia had been committed to a policy of laissez-faire capitalist 
development, the government would have set no limits at all. This 
continuing regulation of peasant economic development was proba­
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bly all for the best, since a rapid concentration of land into 
the hands of a minority would have been disastrous for the na­
tion’s unemployment levels. There was some concentration of 
landownership going on, but it was proceeding slowly. The excep­
tion was Stavropol province, where the highest proportion of land 
sales was recorded. The virgin soil here was very rich, but 
required a large investment in horses and machinery. Most set­
tlers before 1906 would rent out their land to the larger farmers 
and then hire themselves out as agricultural laborers. Once they
had the right to sell their private strips, many peasants did so
15
and ended up "squandering the money." On average, however, the
quantity of land sold in Russia was surprisingly small, both in
absolute terms and in terms of each individual sale. We can see
16
this from the following table.
Sale of Peasant Land 1908-14
Number of Number of
sellers desiatines sold
1908 36,152 157,099
1909 87,458 373,009
1910 134,267 524,857
1911 147,782 533,857
1912 206,879 677,280
1913 218,970 677,009
1914 222,680 685.144
Total 1,022,622 3,515,513
In other words, the average size of the plot put up for sale 
was 3.5 desiatines, far smaller than the average peasant holding. 
The above table may under-estimate the degree of land sales —  
the economist Brutskus speculated that a total of 1.5 million
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peasant households sold some 5 million desiatins of land. But ,
even so, the sale of whole peasant properties with consequent
proletarianization or emmigration of the peasant household was
comparatively rare. According to a Ministry of Agriculture survey
on the eve of the war, the proportion of peasant households
selling all of their land while remaining in agriculture was
recorded as 2.3% in a district of Stavropol, 1.9% in a district
18
of Samara, and only 0.5% in a district of Vitebsk. It is likely 
that the sellers were peasants who were unsuited to running a 
farm -- artisans, city workers, widows, etc. —  but were entitled 
to a small piece of the commune anyway. These peasants might have 
jumped at the opportunity to sell their land and abandon all 
formal links to farming. It is also possible that the sales 
represented a peasant farmer selling one of his numerous plots in 
order to pay off a debt or purchase another plot of land.
The Need for Consolidation
One of the advantages of privatization was that apart from 
rationalizing the agricultural sector as a whole by allowing 
non-farmers to leave the land, it also allowed for a certain 
amount of consolidation to take place through the market 
mechanism. Peasant farmers could now presumably sell those strips 
that were inconveniently-located and buy others closer to the 
center of the farm. But such a method of consolidating peasant 
strips was bound to be a lengthy process, with ever diminishing 
returns, since peasant farmers could be assumed to grow more
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reluctant to part with their various plots over time. Some ,
analysts pointed out that private ownership of strips actually
hindered land settlement, since the latter now required the
19
approval of the majority of the village. The most effective way 
of consolidating peasant strips was by carrying out a single, 
village-wide land settlement project, preferably in a redistribu­
tional commune.
Consolidation of peasant lands through land settlement was a
far more expensive and complex operation than the simple
confirmation of peasants’ strips as private property. Since
consolidation of even a single peasant’s lands required the
redivision of lands throughout the whole village, it not only
entailed a major upheaval in the peasant’s farming system, but it
often also resulted in an initial decline in agricultural
production. When a few members of the commune consolidated their
lands, they usually made the rest of the village very insecure.
"Why manure the fields or clear the land when you don’t know what
20
will happen to your plot of land?" the villagers would ask. Was 
consolidation really necessary? Some statistical evidence indi­
cated, for instance, that consolidation was most advantageous 
when applied to large and extensively-oriented farming systems.
For many of the smaller, more intensive farming systems, such 
evidence indicated, consolidation lost virtually all its signifi­
cance. Such was the case with the peasant farms in south-western
Russia, which like those in Germany and Austria were both frag-
21 22 
mented and highly productive. Kofod noted:
It would be absurd to argue that peasant agriculture cannot reach
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a high level of development even under a rather complex form of 
land fragmentation... but [consolidation] accelerates [the 
intensification of agriculture] many times over, while at the 
same time significantly reducing the costs of farming. That level 
of agricultural development which would require centuries to 
attain under strip land tenure, is achieved under fully 
consolidated land tenure in a matter of decades.
Would it have been better to improve communal land tenure by
carrying out cossomation, introducing improved communal crop
rotations, or subdividing the more unwieldy communes into smaller
units (so-called poselki)? Such non-radical land settlement had
already been tried by zemstvo agronomists in Russia, Kofod
responded, and had not satiated the peasant demand for better
organization of land tenure. "Only the complete elimination of
communal and fragmented land tenure will arrive at the final
23
calming of the village," he argued. For one thing, only com­
plete private ownership and geographic independence of the peas­
ant farm could eliminate the endless, senseless arguments that
24
habitually arose within the commune. And the full transforma­
tion of peasant strips into consolidated farms, as Kofod noted,
25
was also demanded by economic rationality.
The history of land settlement teaches that, all else being 
equal, agriculture progresses the more rapidly and completely, 
the more rounded the plots, the more conveniently placed and 
centralized the farm buildings are in relation to the whole 
property. The clearest proof of the superiority of 
[consolidation] is the flourishing agriculture of the United 
States, where in the course of the last century the settlers were 
given square-shaped private plots, and also Denmark and Sweden, 
which had transfered from hereditary strip tenure to khutors.
The reason why consolidation was necessary was that simple
-148-
privatization failed to solve the two main problems of the strip ,
*
farming predominating under communal tenure: land fragmentation
and land remoteness. Strip farming commonly resulted in about 10%
26
of the land being lost under roads and boundaries. In other
words, over 10 million desiatins of arable land were left
uncultivated by the peasantry because of inefficient land
settlement. Furthermore, a tremendous amount of time was lost in
travelling from one strip to another. In the South especially,
where communes were large and the peasant’s strips were often
located more than 5 miles from the village, the peasant farmer
could easily walk over 1,000 miles in the course of a year just
to get to his fields. All this reflected badly on the
intensification of production. One survey found that if a farm
had less than 10 strips, the average male worker would spend 2.6
workdays carting out manure to the fields; if the number of
strips was over 20 (as it usually was), the number of workdays
27
involved in carting manure doubled. Rather than spending more
time manuring, many peasant farmers simply stopped manuring
28
altogether. The same point emerges in the following table.
Yearly Total of Hours Spent Working 1. desiatin of Oats
distance of 
field from 
farm center
0 versts
1 verst
2 versts
3 versts
4 versts
5 versts
6 versts
hours spent 
travelling 
0 
15 
34 
58 
92 
151 
235
total
manhours
135
150
169
193
227
286
370
% travel time 
to total 
mannhours 
0 
10%
20%
30%
41%
53%
64%
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IIn the table we can see that the number of hours spent
actually cultivating the field of oats remains the same, but the
further the field was from the farm center, the more time was
spent travelling. If the field was further than five versts away
(a relatively common occurence, especially in the South), travel
took up more than half the yearly total of manhours. The
inefficiencies entailed by land-remoteness led Makarov to argue
that the optimal shape of the farm is a rectangle or square, with
29
the house located in the center. Agronomists had long observed
that the closer a given plot was to the peasant’s house, the more
intensively it was cultivated (the kitchen garden in the back
yard being the most intensive of all). The plots far from the
house, on the other hand, were given over to unmanured grain
30
crops and sometimes were left completely uncultivated. With 
consolidation, all the peasant’s land effectively became his 
backyard.
One of the arguments for consolidation was that it turned
the peasant into an efficient and strongly-independent farmer.
One symptom of this was the fact that the consolidated farmer
tended to be more satiated with his land than was the case with
the communal peasant. According to one survey, only 17% of
khutors and 35% of otrubs found it necessary to rent land, as
compared to 23% and 40% respectively of the same households
31
before they had consolidated. With all these advantages, 
consolidation usually pushed the peasant to concentrate more 
fully than ever before on farming. Peasants on consolidated farms
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were becoming professionalized and specialized farmers, rather ,
32 *
than jacks of all trades as their ancestors had been.
Perhaps privatization and consolidation of lands was pursued 
by the peasant for purely speculative aims? After all, consider­
ing the fact that consolidated land had a market value at least 
50% higher than that of neighboring communal plots and 
considering the fact that the process of consolidation was
financed at least partly by the government, there was a chance to
33
make a tidy profit from the reform. A family that made its
living mostly from non-agricultural work could privatize its
share of communal land, consolidate it and then sell it or rent
it out at a lucrative price. In fact, this rarely happened. Let
us look at private consolidated farms. According to the 1913
survey, 7% of khutors and 20% of otrubs rented out a portion of
their land, driven one must assume by some unfortunate event —  a
death in the family or the need to pay down a debt. Only 8% of
34
consolidated farms were rented out completely. The number of
consolidated farms that were sold was smaller still —  7% of
consolidated farmers sold all their land and another 6% sold part
of it, The reasons for the sales according to the survey are 
35
listed below:
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Reasons for selling off Private Consolidated Plots (1913 Survey)
1. Kept all of their land 15,154 (86.3%)
2. Sold all or part of their land 
because of resettlement 
beyond Urals or to purchase 
another farm from the 
Peasant Land Bank.............. 711 (4.0%)
3. Sold because non-agricultural 
income was sufficient........ 508 (2.9%)
4. Sold because of impoverishment
(death, alcoholism, crop failure)....794 (4.5%)
5. Sold because of other reasons 400 (2.3%)
Total 17,567 (100%)
Thus, no more than half of the small minority of consolidat­
ed farmers who sold off part of their land did so because of 
impoverishment or bankruptcy. The rest were undergoing the bene­
ficial process of economic adjustment -- either moving to more 
prosperous areas such as Western Siberia or leaving the agricul­
tural sector for other types of work.
Another potential problem was the subdivision of the 
consolidated plot as it was divided between the farmer’s heirs. 
The argument here was that with time such subdivision would 
create land hunger and land-fragmentation as acute as under the 
commune. Kofod argued that yes, subdivision of consolidated plots 
was proceeding at a steady pace, but that the experience of 
consolidated farming in Russia and Western Europe showed that 
family subdivision occured much less often on consolidated farms
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than under communal tenure. The Ministry of Agriculture survey i
found that after about four years in existence, only 2% of con-
37
solidated farmland went through family subdivisions. Such 
evidence points to the fact that redividing consolidated farms 
was probably a very rare phenomenon and that it was far from 
outstripping the process of consolidation.
The Technological Superiority of Consolidated Farmers
Did consolidation allow for the rise of a generation of
agricultural pioneers? The tendency of consolidated farmers to
cultivate their fields more carefully, adopt more progressive
crop rotations and achieve a greater degree of commercialization
was noticed by many observers, both pre-revolutionary analysts
38
and Soviet analysts of the 1920’s. There were also some notable
failures in the consolidation movement. A group of khutors was
established on the arid lands of Samara province without proper
hydrographic investigation, for instance, and the farms found
themselves short of water and experienced a sharp economic 
39
decline. Consolidation often had an especially dubious impact
on animal husbandry: the first years after consolidation and the
subdivision of communal pastures almost always saw a drop in the
40
number of cattle.
Foremost among the critics of consolidation was I.V. Cherny­
shev, who used a survey of 1,700 farms compiled by the Free 
Economic Society in 1910-11 to examine the effects of the
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Stolypin land reform. Chernyshev argued that the correlation »
between privatization/consolidation and agricultural progress was
minimal. While consolidated farms in the North may have improved
their agriculture somewhat, in the South livestock numbers
declined and farmers switched to a predatory monoculture.
Chernyshev concluded that the Stolypin land reform was motivated
not by economic aims (raising economic welfare), but by political
41
goals (the dissolution of commune). But Chernyshev’s argument
suffered from the fact that his statistics dated from 1910-1911,
a time when most consolidated farms were only a year or two old
and were still suffering from the difficulties of transition.
A longer time lag between consolidation and agricultural
results was incorporated in the 1913 Ministry of Agriculture
survey. This survey not only allowed for a time lag of three to
four years on average, but it was also broader in scope (21,000
farms were included) and more detailed. Here we find a much more
positive picture of consolidation. The improvement in crop yields
on peasant farms that took place as a result of consolidation is
42
shown in the table below.
Comparative Crop Yields in 1913 (puds per desiatin)
Type of Farm Wheat Rye Oats Barley Potatoes
Consolidated (Bank) 61.8 65.6 75.6 73.4 440.9
Consolidated (Commune) 55.6 54.4 72.8 66.1 570.1
Communal 51.0 51.3 59.9 60.4 421.9
Gentry 57.0 63.6 69.3 68.1 570.6
We can see that yields on consolidated farms, especially if 
they had been established on Peasant Land Bank land, were often 
higher than on gentry lands and up to 30% higher than on neigh-
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boring communal allotments. The improvement in yields illustrated i 
in the table above are all the more significant if one considers 
that the first years of the consolidated farm’s existence were 
usually the most difficult and that improved crop rotations would 
have relatively little impact after only 3-4 years. It is reason­
able to conclude, therefore, that all these improvements resulted 
from more careful cultivation and harvesting, from the use of 
land previously lost in boundaries, and from the use of fertiliz­
ers and seed-cleaning.
The improvement of peasant farming was also evident from
other regional surveys across Russia. Mozzhukhin, for instance,
noted that surveys in Tula, Pskov and Volhynia provinces all
showed that while consolidated farms of less than 3 desiatins
suffered from consolidation, experiencing a marked decline in
livestock and tools, for the larger consolidated farms the
43
picture was the opposite. Mozzhukhin*s own findings in Bogoro­
ditskii district of Tula confirmed what was found in many other 
districts —  that consolidated lands were fertilized more, plowed 
deeper and earlier, and subject to more complex crop rotations 
than communal lands. Yields were up to twice as high. Mozzhukhin 
explained this by arguing that consolidated farmers represented 
the stronger and more energetic segments of the population and
that liberation from mandatory communal crop rotations and live-
44
stock grazing gave free rein to the farmer's initiative.
The question of livestock was an especially touchy one with 
respect to the economic effects of consolidation. The costs of 
moving the farm and the loss of communal pasture often led to an 
initial decline in livestock, mostly in the South. Let us look at
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the data of the 1913 Ministry of Agriculture survey. Otrub 
farmers suffered the most; according to this survey, their horses 
and cows declined by 7% and the proportion of farms without any 
work animals rose from 19.4% to 21.2% over a period of about four 
years. Such farmers may have been changing over to the profitable 
hand cultivation of vegetables, fruit and root crops, but more 
likely the decline of livestock was either a sign of 
impoverishment or at least an indication that peasant farmers 
were not yet sure how to raise livestock outside a communal 
environment. The figures for khutor farmers, on the other hand, 
indicate that they had more livestock in 1913 than before 
consolidation and that the number of farms without any livestock 
decreased. Another encouraging sign was that the number of young 
horses (yearlings) and calves doubled on khutors and rose by one 
sixth on otrubs. This was a sign that the worst of the initial 
livestock crisis had passed for the consolidated farms and that 
animal husbandry was improving. Another sign that animal 
husbandry was improving among consolidated farmers was the fact 
that by 1913 the number of households engaged in butter-making 
had doubled, while fully 16% of the consolidated farms had 
transferred to either partial or full stall feeding. Consolidated 
farmers’ animal husbandry, therefore, suffered from the 
restructuring in the first years after consolidation, but then 
began to improve significantly.
The high cost associated with the restructuring of the 
peasant farming system did not prevent consolidated farmers from 
investing in modern farm equipment. The average value of 
consolidated farmers’ equipment rose from 59 rubles before
consolidation to 83 rubles in 1913. The number of wooden plows ,
v
per 100 households declined from 32 to 19, while the number of
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metal plows rose from 60 to 84. In addition, there was a marked
increase in the use of complex farm machinery after the farms
47
were consolidated, as we can see from the table below.
Percentage of Consolidated Farms having Modern Machinery
seeders harrows reapers separators threshers
Before
consolidation: 1.5% 3.7% 7.5% 18.1% 3.3%
In 1913: 3.0% 8.9% 10.7% 24.1% 5.3%
It is true that at this time Russia was experiencing a
general rise in the use of modern machinery, but the tempo of
48
change seems to have been faster on consolidated farms. Cer­
tainly the elimination of strip farming opened the way for using 
certain complex machines such as seed drills which could only be 
operated on a large plot of land. At the same time, consolidated 
farmers’ increased use of machine rental stations reflected both 
the greater availability of such services and the increased 
willingness of consolidated farmers to use them; before consoli­
dation, only 263 households used machine rental stations, but by
1913, 3,259 or almost a quarter of all the consolidated farms in
49
the survey did so.
Consolidation visibly destroyed the old system of crop 
rotation. Whereas before the land settlement, 63% of the farms 
surveyed had used the 3-field system, after consolidation this 
figure sank to only 21%. But the demise of the old 3-field system 
did not mean that the farmers had switched to any definite
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alternative: only 4% claimed that they had firmly established a
multi-field system of crop rotation. It is unclear whether the
rest had degenerated into a predatory monoculture (planting the
same crop year after year without any fallow) or whether they
were in the process of improvizing some form of improved crop
rotation. Several factors point to the latter possibility,
especially with respect to the non-black earth region. Generally
speaking, the rise in yields would not have been possible if the
peasants had been practicing a monoculture for several years.
Consolidated farms also tended to grow a more diverse collection
of crops than the neighboring communes, which would seem to
indicate complex crop rotations. The cultivation of grasses like
clover was reported by over a third of the farms surveyed, a
50
four-fold increase in four years. The number of farms growing
root crops, though still relatively small, increased six-fold in
51
the same period.
Improved crop rotation initially raised farm production by
eliminating the fallow lands, but its main significance was in
terms of soil conservation, as a good investment in future soil
productivity. Immediate, one-time boosts in crop yields could be
achieved through the use of fertilizers. The average use of
artificial fertilizer per farm, though still miniscule, increased
from 311 pounds before consolidation to 448 pounds in 1913. The
proportion of farms using some combination of manure, compost and
artificial fertilizer increased from 53% before consolidation to 
52
71% in 1913.
Even if consolidation was sometimes of questionable value 
for grain production, consolidated small-holders could gain a
decisive advantage in the land- and labor-intensive production of »
perishable goods for the urban market: milk, honey, fruit and
vegetables. The fact that consolidation was leading farmers
naturally in this direction can be seen in the practical steps
the government and zemstvos took in helping the new farms. Rather
than organizing seed cleaning or the distribution of improved
machinery (useful for grain farming), the agronomic program in
the areas of land settlement was directed towards the most
intensive branches of agriculture: dairy farming, market
53
gardening, bee-keeping, etc. The proportion of consolidated
farms engaged in such specialized farming operations rose from
54
8.2% before consolidation to 12.4% in 1913. The farming
improvements resulting from consolidation were reflected in the
steep rise in the market value of consolidated plots, which on
the eve of the war, commanded prices at least 50% higher than
55
neighboring communal allotments.
Given the broad technological superiority of consolidated 
farms over traditional communal agriculture, it is interesting to 
note the opinions of Soviet agricultural economists of the 
1920’s. Freed of the political impulse to oppose all initiatives 
coming from the Tsarist government, these analysts approached the 
problems of peasant land tenure for the most part with sobriety 
and pragmatism. These problems -- strip farming, obsolete methods 
of cultivation, lack of individual initiative —  were essentially 
the same as they had been before the revolution. A review of the 
arguments in the respectable agricultural journals, Puti Selskogo 
Khoziaistva. Uspekhi Agronomii and Selskoe i Lesnoe Khoziaistvo 
reveal certain identifiable schools of thought. No one felt it
-159-
necessary to come out in favor of the peasant commune —  every- »
body agreed on the importance of land settlement and a major 
restructuring of peasant land tenure. Opinion was divided on 
whether to support the creation of individual consolidated farms 
or to push for collectivization (though most paid lip service to 
the desirability of collectivization as an eventual goal). With 
the tide of opinion steadily turning in favor of radical egali­
tarianism and collectivization in 1926, it is all the more inter­
esting to find agricultural economists like A.Z, Selivanov, who
otherwise stood squarely in the camp of the collectivizers,
56
admitting to the substantial benefits of consolidation.
Selivanov conceded that consolidation rationalized the 
configuration of the farm by eliminating inter-stripping and 
"raised the labor-intensiveness of the farm to an extraordinary 
degree." According to Selivanov, the drawbacks of consolidation 
lay in delaying the mechanization and electrification of the 
village. A number of scattered farmsteads was harder to provide 
with electricity or cooperative marketing services than a single 
village settlement. The consolidated farm was also less likely to 
make economic use of complex farm equipment than a whole village, 
which could pay for it cooperatively and use it on a large scale.
How valid are these objections if we apply them to the Stolypin 
reform?
By "mechanization" Selivanov meant the employment of 
tractors, automobiles, and combine harvesters, all far beyond the 
horizon for most farmers at the beginning of the century, and 
even in Selivanov’s time. The type of modern tools that were 
viable at the beginning of the century -- seed-cleaners, steel
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plows, reapers and hand operated threshers —  were either easily
accessible to the consolidated farm or were easily employed on a
cooperative basis. Small-scale consolidated farming, therefore,
was in no way a constraint on the introduction of improved
agricultural equipment. It was irrational only if Russia was
going to skip stages in its agricultural development. But if one
were to argue that consolidation was disadvantageous since one
had to develop a form of land tenure which could fit the few,
expensive tractors that were being employed at the time, one
would effectively be urging society to mold itself to the
57
technology, rather than the other way around. In any case,
Russia had a long way to go before large-scale mechanized farming
would make economic sense. In fact, the main reason for the
criticism of consolidation by Soviet authors were socio-political
concerns. For Selivanov and other communists of the 1920’s, the
fear was that the peasant would develop the "harmful illusion"
that the consolidated farm was his "property" and this would make
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collectivization difficult.
The Wager on the Strong
In the decade 1906-17, Russian agriculture may not have 
changed technologically enough for us to speak of an agricultural 
revolution, but a profound structural transformation was certain­
ly underway. By 1916, gentry-managed farms accounted for just 11% 
of the arable land in European Russia. Half the peasantry had 
left the redistributional commune and one tenth lived on
consolidated farms. The social agronomic network, virtually non- > 
existent in 1905, had grown into a powerful force of 10,000 
agronomists, thousands of machine rental and seed-cleaning 
stations and tens of thousands of demonstration farms and fields. 
Agricultural cooperation, a relatively rare phenomenon in 1905, 
could boast the membership of some eight million peasant 
households by 1916. The old rural order was fading and a new one 
was taking shape. We see the emergence of a new type of peasant 
farmer, working individually on his private family farm, 
belonging to the local credit cooperative or agricultural society 
and increasingly relying on the latest in agronomic knowledge 
rather than tradition in organizing his farming system.
In this thesis, we are considering three broad trends in 
Russia’s agricultural development in 1906-17: land reform, 
agronomic aid and cooperation. All three trends arose together 
and tended to be closely intertwined on the village level. The 
key to the convergence of the three trends was that they all 
represented a wager on the strong. As we shall see in later 
chapters, the "strong" in this case did not mean a small village 
minority, but the great bulk of medium peasants, who were fairly 
secure financially, relatively commercialized and generally 
literate and quite enterprising. These were the best candidates 
for consolidation. They were also the "agricultural pioneers" 
singled out for attention by agronomists. Cooperatives too relied 
on this stratum of peasant farmers, especially in the initial 
stages. We will be examining the role of social agronomy and 
cooperation in the next five chapters, but here it is worth 
skipping ahead to see how the Stolypin land reform encouraged
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both those trends. »
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Agonomists liked the land reform because it facilitated the
peasant’s transition to a new farming system and encouraged him
to seek the agronomist’s advice. The break with the commune and
with ancestral tradition brought insecurity to the peasant farmer
-- he now found himself alone, managing his farm independently —
and consequently he often turned to the agronomist for advice.
F.V. Schlippe, who represented the Ministry of Agriculture in one
of the first village-wide consolidation projects in central
Russia, observed in person the beneficial effects of
consolidation. This particular village had been a poverty-
stricken commune, relying mostly on non-agricultural earnings;
once they were seperated into consolidated farms, however, the
villagers immediately turned their attention to improving farm
production, began clamoring for agronomic advice and, within a
few years, managed to produce a noticeable improvement in crop 
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yields. The readiness of consolidated farmers to seek the
agronomist’s advice is confirmed by the 1913 Ministry of
Agriculture study, which found that over a third of the
consolidated farmers surveyed had gone to the agronomist for
60
personal consultation.
Though for political reasons many agronomists continued to
speak out forcefully against the government and its program of
agricultural development, they nevertheless came to admit that
land settlement was a golden opportunity to introduce improved
61
crop rotations. Statistical surveys showed that the best moment 
to introduce a new farming system was at the moment of land 
settlement; if the peasant was allowed to slip back into the
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traditional three-field system after consolidation, the costs of »
62 * 
restructuring the farming system rose substantially. The idea
of helping a peasant farmer organize a completely new farming
system on a consolidated piece of land was an attractive one to
agronomists; consolidated farmers became the agricultural pio-
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neers realizing the agronomists’ ideas in practice.
Social agronomy, like a river winding its way through a
valley, naturally followed the path of least resistance.
Consolidated farmers simply were more profit-oriented, more
flexible in outlook and easier to work with. One analyst reported
that after consolidation, peasant farmers developed "a desire to
work hard, to innovate and to learn the correct methods of
64
looking after the land.” In Southern Russia, agronomists
reported that since consolidated farmers were not burdened with a
traditional outlook or an obsolete farming system, they were more
"energetic” and "progressive" than their communal counterparts;
to the delight of local agronomists, such farmers were ready to
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experiment with completely new technologies. Nationwide, it is
symptomatic that by 1912 the zemstvos were spending 53% of their
agronomic budget on areas where land settlement was taking 
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place. Strong approval of land settlement and its agronomic
benefits was voiced at agronomic congresses, including the
67
National Agronomic Congress in Kiev in 1913. Some years later,
a Soviet author was to accuse zemstvo agronomists of colluding
68
with the Stolypin "reaction:"
Wasn’t the formation of consolidated farms under Stolypin one of 
the tasks of social agronomy and didn’t certain provincial 
agronomic departments turn into the consolidation departments of
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the provincial zemstvos? And this was done not out of the »
servility of our former zemstvos, but voluntarily. *
How did the Stolypin land reform affect the development of
agricultural cooperatives, especially credit cooperatives? Soviet
analysts debated this question in the 1920’s. Some argued that
rural cooperation was encouraged by the traditional collectivism
of the peasant commune. Others, like the historian Kheisin, saw
the commune as a hindrance to cooperation. The commune, Kheisin
argued, was an involuntary union and part of the old feudal order
in the countryside and tended to breed estate banks rather than
credit cooperatives. Agricultural cooperation was dependent on
the development of market relations in the countryside, which the
commune generally discouraged. With respect to credit, Kheisin
pointed out that the peasant commune tended to be associated with
the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ estate banks rather than credit
cooperatives and he noted the experience of Western Europe, where
credit cooperatives had developed only after the peasant commune
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had been broken up. Kheisin, like many Soviet authors, took a 
circuitous and tortuous route in arriving at a positive assess­
ment of the Stolypin land reform. After waxing eloquent on the 
cruelty of the Tsarist reaction in 1905-7 and the ruthlessness of
the Stolypin Reform, Kheisin finally concluded that the reform
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helped the development of agricultural cooperatives:
After 1905, the fundamental obstacles to the development of 
credit cooperation... weakened; the power of the commune and the 
lack of a legal sense of property was... reduced. The peasants 
began to adopt better farming methods and (state) tutelage waned.
A fundamental obstacle to the development of cooperation was the 
peasantry’s lack of creditworthiness and the absence of a village
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middle class —  the basis of credit cooperation. The agrarian 
reform began to lay the foundations for this class. The path for 
cooperation was now clear.
Opponents of the land reform such as Oganovsky argued that
privatization and consolidation would destroy the peasantry’s
cooperative instincts. The rise of cut-throat competition among
peasant farmers and consequently the exploitation and
impoverishment of the majority of the peasant population had
already occured with respect to the capitalist development of
industry and it was now going to happen with respect to
71
agriculture as well, Oganovsky argued. What Oganovsky and other
critics overlooked was that agriculture was quite different from
industry. Private property and commercialization in the
agricultural sector did not result in cut-throat competition.
Even fully capitalist farmers did not compete directly with each
other, since they all sold a standardized product into a huge
market and were too numerous to worry about capturing market
share from each other. In fact, the development of the market
economy and the need for agricultural intensification commonly
drove farmers towards ever greater cooperation in pursuing their
72
common interests. And according to several observations of the
time, consolidated farmers exhibited a greater tendency to join
73
agricultural cooperatives than their communal counterparts.
According to the 1913 Ministry of Agriculture survey, 45% of 
consolidated farms were members of agricultural cooperatives in 
1913, while just 17% had been so three or four years before. The 
largest increase in cooperative membership appeared among those 
purchasing consolidated plots from the Peasant Land Bank; here
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the number rose from 12% to 55%, perhaps indicating the greater »
degree of social insecurity felt by the farmers moving out onto
74
the Bank’s lands. Peasant farmers probably felt an attavistic 
need to be part of some kind of association; in the days of 
serfdom and feudalism, this association had been the commune —  
in the era of commercialization, it was the agricultural 
cooperative. The more practical reason for the rise of 
cooperative membership was that the land reform encouraged the 
commercialization of agriculture —  probably the most important 
precondition for the development of rural cooperation. To the 
extent that privatization enabled impoverished part-time farmers 
to sell their land and move to the cities, the land reform 
encouraged specialization of production, which in turn encouraged 
the development of trade and a money economy. Consolidation had 
an even more powerful impact on the commercialization and 
increased productivity of peasant farming. Under these 
conditions, agricultural cooperatives rose and prospered.
Statistical evidence on a nation-wide basis points to the 
fact that privatization and consolidation flourished where both 
cooperation and the agronomic network were well-developed; both 
of these, in turn, were aided by the progress of the land reform. 
Together, the three elements —  land reform, agronomic aid and 
cooperation -- produced impressive productivity gains in peasant 
agriculture.(See Chapter 10) But before we go on to examine their 
combined impact on the Russian countryside, we must examine the 
nature of Russia’s social agronomic program.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIAL AGRONOMY
The Stolypin land reform was intended to change the
foundations upon which peasant agriculture rested. In most cases,
no agricultural progress could be expected if archaic economic
structures such as the peasant commune were not first eliminated.
Peasants’ strips had to be consolidated and the more enterprising
peasant farmers had to be given the opportunity to organize their
farm independently of their neighbors. The challenges of land
reform brought the government deep into the Russian countryside,
where it soon became clear that land reform alone was not a
1
sufficient condition for agricultural development. Russia’s 
farmers needed a program of agronomic aid to help them raise 
their productivity, regardless of their land tenure. Russia’s 
agricultural extension program, led by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the zemstvos, arose side by side with the land 
reform. The program was characterized by pragmatism and some very 
innovative concepts concerning the possibility of government aid 
to peasant farmers; it soon surpassed even land settlement in 
scope and impact.
In this chapter we will examine the nature of Russia’s 
agronomic network, the nature of the agronomist’s work and the 
prevailing conceptions of social agronomy’s mission in peasant 
Russia.
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The Ministry of Agriculture. Zemstvos and Russia* s Agronomists
When the Stolypin Reform propelled the peasant question to
the top of the national agenda, one of the organizations that
benefited the most was the Ministry of Agriculture. After
struggling along on a miniscule budget throughout the 1890*3 and
early 1900*s, the Ministry of Agriculture suddenly found itself
in the vortex of change. The ministry was made formally
responsible for the execution of the land reform and for the
modernization of all peasant agriculture. By all accounts the
Ministry of Agriculture at this time was a competent and dynamic,
imbued with a creative sense of mission. The organization even
won grudging admiration from observers like Kaufman and Ashin who
normally went out of their way to cast stones at any branch of
the central government. Bernard Pares was also impressed with the 
2
organization.
The Minister of Agriculture at this time, Krivoshein, was one of 
the ablest and most liberal-minded men in the Cabinet, and he had 
a very able assistant specially in charge of [land settlement] in 
Rittikh, who later for a short time was Minister. As soon as one 
entered this Ministry, one felt they must be engaged in work 
which was really going well. And this impression of efficiency 
and [effectiveness] became much stronger with me in the ten weeks 
of travel which I devoted to [the study of land settlement] in 
1910 and 1911.
The newly-empowered Ministry of Agriculture was given 
responsibility for two broad tasks: executing the land reform and 
providing agricultural extension services. With respect to the 
land reform, the ministry delegated responsibility to the
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provincial and district land settlement commissions; its power on » 
this level, embodied in the commissions’ executive members, had 
to be shared with other organizations such as the zemstvos, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The second mission —  agricultural extension —  
was also pursued without the ministry monopolizing all decision­
making power; responsibility for executing most agricultural 
extension projects was devolved onto the zemstvos and various 
agricultural societies. Nevertheless, with ultimate 
responsibility for two such daunting tasks as land reform and 
agricultural extension, the Ministry of Agriculture took on a new
stature in St. Petersburg and its budget grew more rapidly than
3
that of any other ministry. The planned budget for the Ministry
4
of Agriculture’s agricultural department is shown below.
Department of Ministry of Government
Year Agriculture budget Agriculture budget budget
1906 3,897,783 35,673,000 2,510,972,775
1907 4,044,596 46,634,000 2,497,986,809
1908 4,596,066 58,042,000 2,515,515,866
1909 5,365,422 71,224,000 2,595,046,972
1910 7,494,686 85,642,000 2,533,976,088
1911 16,365,026 103,510,000 2,890,200,000
1912 22,039,861 119,891,000 2,975,252,100
1913 29,054,821 135,503,000 3,250,559,006
1914 34,927,461 157,628,869 3,558,261,499
The budget of the Ministry of Agriculture more than 
quadrupled in these eight years, while the budget of the 
Agricultural department (the department most involved with 
agricultural extension work) increased nine-fold. Until 1910, 
most of this increase was accomplished at the expense of other
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government expenditures, since the total government budget showed
no growth; only after 1911, with the government’s tax base
expanding through economic growth and with more money being spent
on armaments did the government budget begin to rise accross the
board. But in the nine years leading up to 1914, the budget of
the Ministry of Agriculture grew faster than that of any other
ministry. While the government budget was 42% higher in 1914 than
in 1906, Agriculture’s budget had grown by 342% in the same
period; the only other ministry which approached such rates was
the Ministry of Education, whose budget rose 267% during this 
5
time.
With respect to the Department of Agriculture (the
ministerial department most involved in agricultural extension
work), most of its funds went to subsidize projects run by
zemstvos and cooperatives. In 1911 these institutions received
46% of the department’s budget, about the same amount as was
received by land settlement commissions and local ministerial
institutions; in 1914 this share rose to 68% as opposed to 30%
6
for the commissions and ministerial organs. Buoyed by the influx
of matching grants from the Ministry of Agriculture, the zemstvos
expanded their own agricultural budgets with impressive rapidity.
In 1898 the zemstvos spent about 1.8 million rubles on
agriculture; by 1905 this had risen to 4.5 million and by 1913,
to 16.2 million rubles. While total zemstvo budgets rose only 85%
7
between 1898 and 1913, expenditures on agriculture rose 816%. It 
should be noted, however, that even in 1912, the level of funding 
for agricultural development was still very low -- according to 
one estimate, combined Ministry of Agriculture and zemstvo
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agronomic expenditures amounted to 30 kopecks per rural
inhabitant, while both central and local governments took out an
8
estimated sixteen rubles in taxes.
Nevertheless, the increase in agricultural funding permitted
the rapid construction of a program of mass agronomic aid. The
total number of agronomists grew from slightly over 400 in 1905
9
to about 10,000 in 1914. Most agronomists were employed directly 
by the zemstvos, although the Ministry of Agriculture fielded its 
own staff of several thousand instructors and specialists. In 
addition, agronomists were also employed by the larger 
cooperatives or agricultural societies.
The rapid increase in the number of agronomists servicing 
the peasant economy meant that the character of agronomic work 
changed. The first agronomists to appear in the Russian country­
side were provincial (gubernia) and district (uezd) agronomists. 
One agronomist would service an area with several hundred thou­
sand rural inhabitants. Such a lone agronomist would be hard 
pressed to acquaint the population even superficially with the 
concept of agricultural improvement. As the demand for agronomic 
aid rose, however, the district and provincial agronomists began 
acquiring various types of assistants: agricultural elders, 
instructors and specialists (to be discussed in greater detail 
below). The real breakthrough came around 1905, when zemstvos 
began dividing their districts into several counties (uchastoks), 
each containing a population of about 40,000 and each serviced by 
a county agronomist (uchastokovyi agronom). County agronomists 
can be considered the shock troops of Russian agronomy during the 
Stolypin Reform. They were able to influence the mass of peasant
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households directly and it was around them that all the other
forms of agronomic aid were organized. The increase in the number
of county agronomists, then, is a good indicator of the
development of Russian agronomic aid in general. The figures are 
10
shown below.
Number of County Agronomists as of 31 December. 1905-12
Number of county 
Year agronomists
1905 10
1906 28
1907 56
1908 109
1909 310
1910 560
1911 1,112
1912 1,726
If we assume that county agronomists numbered at least 2,000 
by 1914, and that each county agronomist serviced an average 
population of 40,000 (or 8,000 households), we can see that 
county agronomists had reached a total population of about 80 
million —  a fairly high level of saturation. The size of the 
county agronomist’s area of responsibility depended on his 
region’s population density, transportation infrastructure and 
agricultural development. It also depended on the degree of 
committment shown by the local zemstvos to agricultural extension 
work and on the willingness of the Ministry of Agriculture to 
send funds there. By the end of 1912, the provinces that were 
best supplied with county agronomists -- each county containing 
less than 6,000 families -- were Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava,
-173-
Samara, Penza, Vladimir, Moscow, Iaroslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk and
11
St. Petersburg. Due to the rapid turnover of personnel, county
agronomists occasionally had to take care of several counties at
once, but generally they were able to develop a close
relationship with the farmers of their area.
As the agronomists * numbers rose and their area of operation
shrank, they began to deal with smaller quantities of population
in greater detail. Each agronomist was able to pick out a group
of the more progressive farmers to act as pioneers of modern
agriculture in the locality and he could now begin to analyze the
peasants* budgets and compare the profitability of different
operations on the peasant farm. The mission of the local
agronomist became increasingly ambitious: the goal of introducing
a few peripheral improvements into peasant agriculture gave way
to the goal of changing the peasant’s farming system as a 
12
whole. Eventually, Russian agronomists believed, agronomic aid
to peasant farmers would become fully differentiated and
customized, shunning general recipes and molding the program to
fit the needs of each individual farmer. The ideal for
agronomists was to construct a system similar to Belgium’s. In
this tiny country, the farmers no longer needed to be convinced
of the benefits of either technological change or agronomic aid.
The farmers themselves organized agricultural societies to
promote technological improvements and consulted with agronomists
13
on their own intiative.
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The Work and the Organizational Structure of Russian Agronomy
One of the peculiarities of pre-revolutionary Russian 
society was that great technological prowess in laboratories and 
universities coexisted with vast poverty and backwardness in the 
rest of the country. Russian agricultural science could boast of 
such world-famous figures as the plant geneticist Vavilov and the 
soil scientists Dokuchaev and Glinka, but to the majority of 
Russian farmers the discoveries of these scholars meant almost 
nothing. For the average peasant, modern technology remained 
something elite, urban and exotic. Russia was suffering from a 
weakness in the process of technology transfer.
The development of agricultural technology in Russia 
initially had been driven by the "spirit of improvement" embodied 
by some gentleman farmers and the agricultural societies they 
organized. By the turn of the century, in Russia as in the rest 
of the world, agricultural research was becoming increasingly 
professionalized, a responsibility taken on by the government and 
a network of special agricultural research stations. Zemstvo and 
Ministry of Agriculture expenditure on research rose from about 1 
million rubles in 1908, to 7 million five years later. In 1907,
there were 70 agricultural research stations operating in Russia;
14
by 1911, this figure had risen to 210 and by 1917, to 365. The 
problem was how to disseminate the discoveries of these research 
stations to the mass of Russian farmers. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and the zemstvos tried to encourage formal 
agricultural education for peasant children and the number of
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15
agricultural schools expanded rapidly before the revolution.
But the establishment of several hundred agricultural schools
could only have a relatively small, long-term impact on Russian
farming. To encourage the mass adoption of improved farming
techniques, Russia had to have a program of social agronomy.
Social agronomy was the Russian term for agricultural
extension work; all types of agronomic aid to the population —
private, government or cooperative -- were included in the term
social agronomy. The social agronomist was a jack of all trades.
He had to perform a multitude of roles: he had to be both a
teacher and an organizer, a veterinarian and a hydrographic
engineer, a source of information about the outside world and a
representative of local interests to the central government.
Since agronomists did not have the power to force peasants to
follow their advice, they had to appeal to the peasants* self-
interest and rationality. The peasants had to be convinced by an
extensive program of advertisement and propaganda, through the
books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, village meetings (besedy)
and slide shows (besedy s fonarem).
The territorial boundaries of the county were supposed to
unite a region that was economically and geographically similar.
Since peasant society was a "little world" all to itself, the
agronomist was advised to set up his office someplace where every
peasant would have to come at least once a year, for example the
16
market place in the largest village of the county. Ideally the 
office of the county agronomist was supposed to be large enough 
to accomodate a library with the latest agronomic publications 
and a small museum with samples of plant species, fertilizers and
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machinery. The agronomist had a common interest with both the ,
local school teacher and the local cooperative in building some
sort of a meeting hall, whether a school house, a theater or a
"people’s house" (narodnyi dom). In addition, the agronomist
oversaw the operation of separate institutions such as a seed-
cleaning station, a machinery rental station or a group of model 
17
fields. Conditions for county agronomists commonly fell far
short of this ideal. Even in an advanced province like Moscow,
agronomists had to make do with renting some squalid little rooms
18
from a peasant family, as the provincial zemstvo reported:
Many county agronomists are forced to live in impossible 
conditions. In some cases, the choice of living quarters is based 
not on the optimal location, but on the possibility of finding 
any kind of living quarters at all. Agronomists have nowhere to 
store machinery, they can’t organize seed-cleaning properly, and 
so on. These discomforts affect the productivity of the county 
agronomist and are one of the main reasons for the mobility of 
agronomic personnel which so significantly diminishes the effect 
of county agronomy.
Ideally, the county agronomist was supposed to stay in the
locality long enough to get to know the area and gain the trust
of the local peasantry. Yet, the average period of service in any
given location was unfortunately much too short. In Vladimir
province, for example, the average length of service was 23
19
months (this was a long time by Russian standards). Brunst
reported that the average length of stay in the country as a
20
whole was about a year. In the Mozhaisk district of Moscow 
province, all 4 county agronomic posts were filled in 1910, but 
two years later, there was only one county agronomist serving the
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whole district. The county agronomist was commonly stationed in
a primitve and often hostile world, 50 kilometers from the
nearest railhead, only to find that he had to scramble to find
even the most rudimentary living accomodations. Before long, he
was pining away with boredom and loneliness. One disillusioned
agronomist commented that most agronomists stayed in their
bailiwick only long enough to conclude that it was impossible to 
22
live there.
Under such difficult conditions, the morale of the
agronomist and his selfless dedication to his work often proved
decisive. Even a well financed and organized agronomic program
could prove fruitless if the agronomist was not up to the task.
Morachevskii, for instance, noted that if the county agronomist
was well-provided with a machinery rental and livestock breeding
station, his life would sometimes become stationary. This was a
serious drawback since county agronomy was directed precisely
towards the less-developed farmers on the periphery of the
county, the ones who might not have had the initiative to come to
the agronomist on their own, but who had to be actively wooed and 
23
encouraged. For the same reason, access to horse transport was
very important. ’’The social significance of an agronomist without
means of transport around his county is close to zero," commented 
24
Chayanov.
The county agronomist was a generalist, serving all the 
needs of peasant farming in his area; the integrated nature of 
the peasant farm and the primitive level of its technology meant 
that no specific branch of the peasant farm system could be 
singled out for special attention. But with Russian agriculture
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becoming increasingly specialized, there arose a need for ,
specialized agronomic aid, whether in dairy farming, bee-keeping,
or market gardening. Agricultural specialists were usually
employed by the Ministry of Agriculture and operated out of the
provincial or district town, paying visits to the county
agronomists when necessary. By 1914, there were 1,604 such
25
specialists in Russia.
The county agronomist needed more than just the help of the
relevant specialist, he needed lower-level personnel to help with
the tasks of general agronomic aid in his area. Such lower-level
personnel included agricultural elders (peasants who had
completed a six month agronomic course) and various agronomic
assistants, usually student agronomists doing their summer
field-work assignment betwen courses. Lower-level agronomic
personnel generally performed menial administrative tasks such as
keeping the books, reporting to the agronomist about local
conditions, distributing publicity and informing peasants about
where they could get credit, marketing services or farm 
26
supplies. In this way the county agronomist became a manager of
agronomic aid, coordinating the work of specialists on the one
hand and lower-level personnel on the other.
Some corruption and over-reaching of power on the part of
lower-level personnel was reported. Agricultural elders were very
numerous in some provinces and began to do agronomic work on
their own, without proper supervision or control. Such occurences
were common enough for some observers to warn of the dangers of 
27
"feldsherism". This could have grave repurcussions, since a 
mistake on the part of the agricultural elder could undermine the
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authority of the agronomist and subvert the whole agronomic
28
program. Samara agronomist A.Teitel cautioned:
Agronomic work in the village usually takes place in an 
atmosphere of notorious skepticism and suspicion, and therefore 
the position of the agronomic worker becomes one of great 
responsibility. Every initiative, in the least bit important, 
demands great circumspection and caution.
Making mistakes with respect to their technological recom­
mendations was not the only pitfall agronomists strove to avoid. 
Russian agronomists were acutely aware of the need to avoid the 
kind of authoritarian formalism vis a vis a sullen peasant popu­
lation that characterized the work of other rural functionaries. 
Some county agronomists drew attention to the bureaucratization 
of agronomic work and the multiplication of the agronomist’s 
administrative and commercial responsibilities. If the agronomist 
was too busy writing out reports or keeping the books for the 
local cooperative or farm supply depot, he was not going to have 
enough time for his main creative duty: talking with the
peasants, giving them information and helping them reorganize
29
their farming system. Here is how one former agronomist, S.P.
30
Fridolin, remembered his first years of service:
Whether I wanted to or not, I was forced to spend most of my 
first years doing office work. I read a lot, studied zemstvo 
reports and collected exhibits for my lectures and meetings... I 
would travel out into the countryside only rarely, since the cost 
of travelling was high and I was given a pittance for travel 
allowance. I had no contact with the population and I was known 
to very few of the farmers in the more distant townships. Only 
occasionally was I visited by some village chief or elder, who 
would come to my office for various reasons... Before me arose
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the danger of falling into a bureaucratic and formalistic 
attitude towards my work. That was exactly what I had wanted to 
avoid, refusing to work for government agencies. But precisely 
that was beginning to happen... Overwhelmed by the [difficult] 
environment and by bureaucratic duties, the person of course 
disappears. It is a common picture...
It is not surprising that as Russia’s agronomic program
became more extensive and complex, a certain amount of
bureaucratization should have set in. This was an unwelcome
development to most agronomists. Consequently, in order to avoid
the kind of bureaucratic and hierarchical administrative
structure that prevailed in most of Russian society, agronomists
pushed for a loose, federated-type of organization, that would be
coordinated through periodic consultations rather than 
31
commands. The provincial and district agronomists -- the senior
members of the agronomic world —  conducted financial audits of
the county offices, organized the agricultural expositions and
agronomic courses and supervised district enterprises such as
machinery depots and livestock breeding stations. Sometimes the
district or provincial agronomist would be "spiritual father" of
the agronomists of the region, but in no way was he supposed to
32
constrain their initiative. In such a non-hierarchical
administrative scheme, accountability and coordination was to be
provided horizontally rather than vertically. This meant a heavy
reliance on collegiality and consultation, in the form of either
33
district agronomic conferences or local economic councils.
Needless to say, a system of collegial administration and 
collective responsibility had its price, as agronomists were well 
aware. If agronomists opted for complete local autonomy and
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rejected all centralization, they would destroy the "unity of »
agronomic work." On the other hand, excessive application of the
collegial principle to agronomic work would lead to the
"hypertrophy of collegiality" -- there were cases, for example,
where agronomists reportedly spent as many as 100 days a year in 
34
conferences. Analysts such as Chayanov tended to emphasize the
need for greater coordination rather than greater local autonomy,
arguing that a certain unity of agronomic work could be provided
by the "comradely supervision" (nabliudenie) of the provincial or
35
district agronomist. But the essential character of agronomic 
administration —  as a federation of independent local 
agronomists -- remained.
The Urbanization of Knowledge
With industrialization, the center of power in Russian 
society was shifting from the countryside to the city. Along with 
economic production and political power, knowledge and culture 
were becoming urbanized as well. The old peasant wisdom and 
tradition, diffused among Russia’s thousands of villages, had 
been shaken with the advent of the railroad and the commercial 
economy and it was urban-based knowledge, not peasant tradition, 
which would provide the remedy for the pain of modern 
dislocation. The agronomists benefited from this shift in values 
and cultural power. According to Fabrikant: "Agronomists have
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introduced into the village new and vital ideas which have caused ,
a revolution in its thinking. And for resolution of the problems
involved in the reorganization of the farm economy, the village
36
turns to the perpetrator of this revolution."
The problem was that sometimes the "perpetrator of the
revolution" was not quite sure what kind of a revolution he was
perpetrating. The local agronomist’s confidence in his mission
was not always as high as the more enthusiastic literature would
have us believe. Many writers drew attention to a decline in the
sense of duty and professionalism among agronomists and some even
spoke of an "agronomic crisis". Ashin bemoaned the decline of
optimism and social activism among agronomists; they were showing
a lack of professional creativity and and a lack of conviction in
37
their own rectitude. While Ashin pointed to the agronomists’
loss of confidence, Samara agronomist Teitel saw the roots of the
"agronomic crisis" in the agronomists’ insufficient knowledge
about the peasant economy and their lack of clarity as to
agronomic goals. These drawbacks, according to Teitel, led to a
host of misguided agronomic initiatives and consequently to
"disillusionment and pessimism" among county agronomists and
38
strengthened skepticism among the peasantry. Whether county
agronomists suffered more from lack of knowledge, poor living
conditions or lack of confidence, there can be no doubt that
their work was extremely difficult. One young agronomist wrote in
39
the early 1920*s:
The work of the agronomist is very hard. An engineer who 
has to build a bridge sees his mission clearly: he knows the 
materials that will be needed, the quality that’s required, and
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the specifications to which the bridge must adhere... The posi­
tion of the agronomist is different. I am talking of the county 
agronomist, who has in his bailiwick several thousand independent 
peasant farms. Here, the mission is never completely clear. The 
engineer builds the bridge and can rejoice, because he can see 
the result of his work... But what is the result of the 
agronomist’s work? Improvement in the the lives of two hundred 
peasant farms. And even so, can one really say that the 
improvement in these farms is the product of the agronomist’s own 
work?
The ability of agronomists to act boldly and in concert with
one another depended on the nature and extent of the flow of
information between localities. (Generally, it is true that the
less workers are subject to commands from above, the more
information they need to make correct decisions and coordinate
their actions with their colleagues.) In this respect, agronomic
education and the rural press played an important role in
creating a certain conformity of opinion among agronomists. Books
and periodicals were often the agronomist’s only link to the
outside world and the great flood of agronomic publications at
this time (in 1914, the number of agricultural periodicals was
recorded at 352) contributed significantly in providing readers
40
with new ideas and creating a consensus among agronomists. In 
addition, a great many conferences and agricultural expositions 
not only served to inform local agronomists of the latest 
developments in their field, but also boosted their morale.
Generally, one can say that the danger was not that the 
conception of social agronomy’s mission was weak or unclear, but 
on the contrary, that it was too strong and would be pursued with 
excessive zeal. Indeed, some analysts began to adopt a certain 
undemocratic bias with respect to Russian agricultural
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development. Chayanov, for instance, noticed a "dualism" between ,
agronomists on the one hand and the elected representatives of
the local population (the boards of the zemstvos and
41
cooperatives) on the other. Chayanov argued that the elected 
representatives had the right to set the goals of the local 
agronomic program, as well as audit and control the work of the 
local agronomist (who, after all, was their employee). But that 
didn’t mean the agronomist should be a "soulless agent" of 
authority, Chayanov argued. The agronomist’s work was 
"creative" and shouldn’t be constrained by the partisan
42
intervention of local political political organizations:
The work of social agronomy transcends the boundaries of the 
district and province. The program of developing the nation’s 
agriculture is a responsibility of all citizens, and therefore 
the agronomist, having dedicated his life to this great task, is 
as much a societal agent as are the elected representatives of 
the population, though of course he serves not so much the 
population of that area to which he has been assigned, as the 
general agricultural renewal of his motherland... Therefore, in 
the same way that the zemstvo and cooperative boards represent 
the local population, the agronomist --in agronomic matters -- 
represents the movement of social agronomy itself.
Thus, social agronomy was seen as equal in importance to the 
will of the people. Insofar as social agronomy represented a good 
in and of itself, a normative value sometimes transcending the 
popular will, it gained its legitimacy from representing 
"science", which was assumed to be much more beneficial for 
society than any democratically expressed opinion. At best, 
Chayanov was walking a fine line between local democratic control 
and centralized tutelage in the name of rational progress. He
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ended up advocating a compromise solution: "collegiality of
leadership" involving both elected representatives and
agronomists, the former having more authority over "general
questions and matters of principle" and the latter having sway
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over "technical and organizational questions."
The old metaphor of agronomists imposing "urban" knowledge
on rural society was quite apt. Agronomists had been trained
mostly in urban schools and were accustomed to look to the city
for inspiration. Yet, the leaders of Russian agronomy had
acknowledged this problem and were pressing the rank and file to
pay more attention to the village. In Moscow, Chelintsev argued
that agronomists and experimental stations should work not only
according to the logic of science, but also the "logic of life"
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-- i.e. according to the logic of the peasant farm.
The agronomist, I.I. Damberg, argued at the 1910 
Ekaterinoslav Agronomic Congress that agronomic education did not 
sufficiently emphasize real life experience and a pragmatic 
approach to problems. Agronomic education was in danger of 
producing only "scientific theorists." The main problem, he 
claimed, was neglect of the fact that farming is an "art" and
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"cannot be understood by learning only its scientific basis."
Damberg was opposed by another agronomist, L.P. Sokalskii, who
advanced the view that the object of the agronomist’s work was
not the population and its economic welfare, but agricultural
production in the most technical sense (presumably, the nature of
the climate and the soil and how to achieve the maximum yield 
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from them). Such a technocratic point of view was rare among 
agronomists, but a good number nonetheless took a relatively
scholastic approach to peasant farming, often regarding it as a
monolithic mass which could be developed through broad recipes
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such as introduction of grass sowing or steel plows. Chayanov
urged agronomists to abandon such general theories and panaceas
and instead to carefully study local traditions and technology,
both of which were a key to understanding the local population
and its uniquely appropriate reaction to the conditions of the 
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area:
Unfortunately our agronomists, often hypnotized by scholastic 
agronomy, approach these peasant traditions without due respect. 
This is a great mistake, since the technology of peasant farming 
has been adapted to local conditions completely spontaneously 
over hundreds of years and often is ideally suited to them. It 
can be stated unequivocally that any new technology will be 
firmly established only when it will be molded by social agronomy 
to the context of local peasant tradition.
An equally sobering view was offered by the agronomist
Iu.Iu. Sokolovskii at the Poltava Agricultural Conference of 
49
1912:
Who of us agronomists knows the contemporary peasant farming 
system, that very farming system which we are responsible for 
improving and whose progress we must encourage? Essentially - no 
one. We don’t know it when we arrive in our bailiwick, and know 
just as little when we leave, all the more so since the time 
between the two is usually quite short....But in order to work 
sensibly for the benefit of the peasant, one has to completely 
immerse oneself into their economy. And if that is so, then who 
besides the agronomists should get to grips with the task of 
studying peasant farming. This will be a wonderful school, after 
which many pieces of advice, given out so generously now, will be 
perhaps embarrassing to even suggest.
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The best agronomist was one who not only taught the 
peasants, but also learned from them. Such an agronomist could 
take existing peasant wisdom from a wide area, digest it, and
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feed it back to them in a systematic fashion. Chayanov noted:
The most important of our tasks is not giving the population as 
many new ideas and facts as possible, but awakening the self- 
reliance of the population and guiding this initiative into the 
correct path. It would be pathetically utopian to think that the 
reform of the economic and cultural foundations of Russian life 
could be accomplished through the working out of recipes and the 
instruction of each individual peasant household by agronomists 
and cooperative instructors. Our role is only of a fermenting 
agent setting in motion mighty elemental forces and only the 
independent peasantry itself is strong enough to carry out those 
national economic reforms which we picture to ourselves.
Just as a social agronomist had to know at what point to
take his hands off a particular project, so he had to know the
limits of his own scientific knowledge and when to cede to
peasant traditions. The peasant audience, Chayanov argued, was
very rich in practical experience and imagery, but poor in ideas
and abstract logic. Therefore, the agronomist had to use plenty
of practical examples and an empirical-inductive method of
reasoning. Should agronomists do battle with the multitude of
Russian superstitions, such as the chariot of Elijah the Prophet,
which was held responsible for thunder and lightning? No,
replied Chayanov. Teach your subject and leave superstitions
aside. Why expose yourself unnecessarily to hostility? Use
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existing images and concepts.
Popular lectures have to be constructed on a foundation of
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concepts and explanations already familiar to the listeners.
Each lecturer, beginning the teaching of his course, must first 
of all mobilize from peasant experience all the elements he needs 
and on this basis construct the structure of new ideas and 
concepts. Ignorance of this fundamental rule threatens to pull 
the rug from under our feet and could lead to our speaking in a 
language incomprehensible to our audience. It seems to us that 
the task of the Russian rennaissance is the transmission to the 
peasant of a modern scientific world view without breaking his 
age-old epos (tradition); in the practical world the chariot of 
Elijah the Prophet has to make way for the concept of electrical 
discharge; but, having left the practical life, it should turn 
into legend, occupying an honourable place in the peasant way of 
life.
Legends are often merely a way of explaining something which 
can’t be explained in any other way. The agronomist’s self- 
restraint in dealing with the local way of life and his respect 
for local traditions was not only a matter of tact, but also an 
act of deference to a folk wisdom which answered many of the 
questions urban knowledge had overlooked. Thus, just as the 
problem of bureaucratization was countered by an emphasis on 
local autonomy and collegiality, the problem of ideological 
arrogance on the part of the city-trained agronomists was 
countered by an emphasis on respecting local technologies and 
customs.
Agronomists and the Wager on the Strong
Technocratic arrogance only became a potential problem after 
agronomists became fairly well established in the countryside. 
Initially, agronomists refrained from asuming too interventionist
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a role with respect to peasant farming. This was partly due to a »
kind of neo-slavophile or neo-populist faith in the ability of
the commune to work things out for itself. Consequently,
agronomists at first introduced only those technological
innovations -- like steel plows or better seeds —  which did not
necessitate a wholesale transformation in the peasant’s farming 
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system. When the agronomists tried such a strategy and found
that the returns were relatively small and when, moreover, the
resources at the disposal of Russian social agronomy increased
dramatically after 1905, they began to consider ways of changing
the peasant farming system as a whole. Work habits, farm
equipment, planting schedules, family budgets, land tenure —  all
the inter-related elements of the peasant economy had to be
considered if there was to be a significant change in peasant
agriculture. How were agronomists to approach such a task? A.V.
Chayanov, who wrote the definitive work on social agronomy,
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wrote:
The social agronomist is not so much a technical worker as a 
social worker. The focus of his attention is not land, livestock 
and other objects of farming, but people, their psychology, their 
will and consciousness, and their inter-relations. Aiming to 
create a new system of farming, the agronomist creates a new 
human culture, a new popular consciousness, and leaves [the 
people] to create a new system of farming for [themselves].
Before agronomists could even think of intervening in the 
peasant economy, they had to know how it worked and what caused 
it to change. In his studies of peasant agriculture, Chayanov 
explored the causes behind both continuity and change in the 
peasant economy. Since it is one of the clearest and most
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reasonable explanations of its kind, Chayanov*s theory is worth 
looking at in some detail.
Agricultural development, according to Chayanov, has to take 
place through a process of molecular change at the grassroots 
level, farm by farm, peasant by peasant. Every region with 
similar natural, economic and historical conditions will give 
birth to a common system of farming specially adapted to the 
environment. The prevailing regional type of farming system will 
remain unchanged as long as the environment that gave birth to it 
remains unchanged. The environment is subject to change, however. 
Rural population density could increase rapidly over a short 
period of time or the construction of a railroad could change 
market conditions for the area. Occasionally a technological 
invention could alter the economy of a whole region, though in 
agriculture, technological innovation rarely played as big a role 
as say, the invention of the steam engine had played in the 
industrial revolution. In any case, if the conditions underlying 
a region’s economy and way of life change sufficiently, 
traditional farming methods would become obsolete and inadequate, 
opening the way for successful adoption of new techniques.
The transition from one common farming system to another is 
spontaneous -- similar to the natural evolution of a species in 
the animal kingdom, Chayanov argued. Even when a traditional 
farming system is solidly entrenched in a particular region, that 
doesn’t mean that all farms are organized along the same, 
immutable pattern. The differences in the capabilities of 
individual farmers, as well as the differences in the quality of 
farmland all ensure a variation around the regional norm. Because
of the inquisitiveness of the human mind, even the most stagnant »
society is constantly in a state of movement and innovation.
Individual entrepreneurs are constantly trying to deviate from
the norm, to find better and easier ways of doing things. Many
attempts at agricultural innovation fail and the innovator is
forced back to the common farming system, but some of the
innovators succeed and are soon widely imitated by their
neighbors. In this way, a new common farming system gradually
evolves, destined for dominance because of its appropriateness to
the new conditions. Thus, according to Chayanov*s Darwinian
worldview, agricultural progress is spontaneous, evolving without
the conscious intervention of organized social forces, without
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the dictates of the authorities and without a plan.
What role, then, is left to social agronomy? Social agronomy
could accelerate this spontaneous of evolution, by singling out
willing entrepreneurs, working with them and helping them succeed
in developing a better farming system. As Chayanov explained, the
task of finding agricultultural pioneers lay at the heart of
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social agronomy:
Social agronomy, like any other social work, is based upon people 
and can affect agriculture only through personalities. Therefore 
it must develop close ties with all those members of society in a 
given region which could act as pioneers of the new culture. 
Successful peasant farmers, students of agricultural and 
cooperative courses, administrators of local cooperatives, the 
rural intelligentsia -- these are the first and most important 
points of contact for agronomic aid, the most important allies of 
social agronomy.
Social agronomists, Chayanov wrote, must select from among
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the local population "the most active and conscious farmers," who
want to improve their enterprise and "organize them into self-
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reliant peasant groups..." Though Chayanov was hardly an
advocate of laissez-faire capitalism, his explanation of
agricultural progress is quite elitist. Chayanov was deeply aware
of what we now call the "growth versus welfare dilemma" in
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development economics. If investment pays off the most when it
is concentrated in high-growth sectors, to what extent did
economic growth demand a sacrifice of egalitarian-welfare goals?
Chayanov believed that peasant agriculture was communitarian
enough that the progress of a few of the more progressive farmers
would benefit the peasantry as a whole. Even if the agronomist
inevitably ended up working with particular individuals, Chayanov
argued, he should regard these individuals as representatives of
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peasant farming in general. But meanwhile, it was becoming
increasingly clear that the peasantry was becoming socially
stratified, i.e. divided into richer and poorer families. To
account for social stratification and to deal with the growth
versus welfare dilemma, many agronomists began to speak of a
"differentiated agronomic program" to suit the different types of
peasants. Helping the weakest peasants is very difficult, argued
the agronomists, but at least a differentiated agronomic program
doesn’t "throw to the winds of fate those farms for whom the path
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of economic development is not altogether clear."
It is interesting to note that the language above implies 
that the weakest peasant farms required welfare, not development, 
since they were virtually useless from the point of view of 
economic growth. This was indeed a dilemma, since most
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agronomists were at least moderately socialist in political >
orientation. But they were also pragmatists and Chayanov was not
the only agronomist to place his wager on the "sober and the
strong." The agronomist A.A. Minin made an interesting proposal
in 1914 to deal with the dilemma. Minin observed that the poorest
elements of the village had no useful role in the Stolypin Reform
(which he supported). He also noted that the village poor were
often regarded by the rest of the peasantry as parasites no
better than loansharks and shopkeepers. In order to protect the
weakest elements of the village from being bankrupted by the
Stolypin Reform, Minin proposed a novel idea: organize the poor
into production cooperatives, similar to the collective farms of
the Soviet era. Such production cooperatives would serve to
employ the mass of poor peasants, protecting them from total
impoverishment or proletarianization. With proper mangement,
Minin argued, the production cooperatives could prevent the
village poor from acting as a ballast on the community or from
flooding to the cities in unemployable hordes. In other words, it
was hoped that cooperation of production would allow the village
poor to avoid becoming a drag on the local economy, but Minin
admitted that all the driving force of agricultural development
had to come from the stronger, more progressive peasantry, for
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whom cooperation of production was not necessary.
Other agronomic writers took the same approach as Chayanov 
and Minin. Brunst wrote in 1914 that the zemstvo agronomist
initially regarded the peasantry as a "sluggish" and "uniform"
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mass. After a while, the agronomist came to realize that, on 
the contrary, the peasantry contained quite a variety of
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different types and that "by relying on people with initiative",
he could achieve great progress in introducing agricultural
improvements. Brunst recommended that besides conducting meetings
for the benefit of the whole village, the agronomist should
organize special agricultural courses for the more enterprising
peasants. The courses would create "a very valuable element in
the village, serving as a crucial support for the 
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agronomist..." Similarly, in his 1911 book on social agronomy,
K.S. Ashin loudly criticized the Stolypin government and its
"wager on the strong". In approaching the practical question of
organizing agronomic aid, however, Ashin wound up making his own
type of "wager on the strong", these being the minority of
peasant farmers who stood out for their efficiency and
productivity and who, according to Ashin, should represent the
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focus of the agronomic program.
As the saying goes, you can bring a horse to water, but you
can’t make him drink. In order to achieve results, social
agronomy had to change the outlook of the peasant farmer. The
social agronomist had to awaken the activism of the population
and give them a psychological push (emotsionalnyi tolchek).
"Without such a psychological push," argued Chayanov, "no amount
of empirical evidence will be convincing and all propaganda will
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end up merely a curious story..." The most effective 
psychological push for the Russian peasant farmer was observation 
of a neighbor enjoying the fruit of some agronomic improvement. 
The key task for Russian agronomists, therefore, was to nurture 
and encourage a stratum of agricultural pioneers, who would lead 
the villages into agricultural improvement. Upon such pioneers --
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whether they were the peasants who consolidated their land under i 
the Stolypin land reform, or the farmers who implemented an 
agronomist’s suggestions, or the founding members of an 
agricultural cooperative —  depended the success of Russia’s 
agricultural development program.
To find such pioneers, agronomists had to abandon the neat,
scholastic agronomic theories they had been taught in school and
learn how appreciate the subtle differentiation in the peasant
village. One analyst wrote that agronomists had to understand
"the influence of outstanding individual entrepreneurs, whose
farms are as important to the progress of [agriculture] as the
work and talent of the inventor is to industry. How often we used
to pass by without noticing... an extraordinarily rational
organization of livestock feeding or an exemplary kitchen garden
or an extremely clever way of organizing a crop rotation... And
concerning any attempts to search out such pioneers, there was
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very rarely even a mention."
As much as Russian agronomy was a mass program, with mass 
education of peasant farmers through lectures, brochures and 
expositions, it was also quite elitist in focusing on the more 
enterprising minority in the village. This was yet another 
dilemma confronting the county agronomist as he set about his 
job. Combined with the other dilemmas -- bureaucratization versus 
decentralization, scientific rationality versus respect for local 
traditions -- the difficult question of the agronomist’s "wager 
on the strong" meant that he had to walk a thin line in peasant 
Russia. Whether he would succeed in doing so depended on his 
individual intelligence, energy and tact.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE WORK OF THE AGRONOMIST
4
When the newly-arrived county agronomist looked out over his 
bailiwick, he was likely to be struck by the magnitude of the 
task that lay before him. The peasant economy was suffering from 
low crop yields, inefficient crop rotations and primitive equip­
ment. Peasant land tenure was fragmented into a multitude of tiny 
strips. Village livestock was poorly fed and had no pedigree. The 
system of marketing agricultural products and purchasing farm 
supplies was painfully inefficient, while the shortage of credit 
in the rural economy threatened to turn any agronomic project 
into a form of charity work. What was the agronomist to begin 
with? Where was the string that could unravel the knot of tradi­
tion and obsolescence and how should the rural order be recon­
structed?
The path agronomists took in developing peasant agriculture 
mirrored the path of the Stolypin agricultural development pro­
gram in general. As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, 
this strategy boiled down to a simple progression: (1) disloca­
tion, (2) differentiation, (3) development and (4) self- 
perpetuation. The agronomic program underwent the same evolution, 
with each stage following on the heels of the preceding one. In 
the first stage —  dislocation —  agronomists were concerned with 
simply making an impact on peasant society. They did this by 
arriving in the village accompanied by a slide show or a 
travelling agricultural exposition. The task of jolting peasant
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society out of its lethargy and resistance to change was made t
easier by the fact that traditional peasant agriculture was 
increasingly showing signs of strain. Agronomists also benefited 
from the fact that they were riding into the village behind the 
disruptive wave of the Stolypin land reform; and peasant society 
was made more amenable to change by rapidly increasing literacy 
rates in the village. In the second stage —  differentiation —  
agronomists tried to single out the more enterprising peasant 
farmers to act as agricultural pioneers. In the third stage —  
development —  agronomists organized various initiatives such as 
seed-cleaning, the purchase of better machinery or cooperative 
marketing to help all peasant farmers, focusing especially on the 
chosen pioneers. In the final stage —  self-perpetuation —  
agronomists encouraged peasant self-reliance by handing over 
control of the various organizational initiatives to local 
cooperatives. These four stages are examined below.
«
The Agronomist Arrives: Agronomic Propaganda
Russian agronomists zealously proclaimed their own vital
role in revitalizing peasant agriculture. One agronomist spoke of
the "agronomic army moving into the village" and of agronomists
1
as the "forgers of the rennaissance of young Russia." Certain of 
the importance of their mission, agronomists were ready to take 
the initative in introducing the concept of social agronomy into 
the village. A good agronomist was not a sage, but an activist, 
an agitator, constantly prodding peasant farmers to try new and
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better methods of production. Brunst advised agronomists to
2
aggressively capture the attention of farmers:
Don’t wait for the farmer. Go to him. Don't wait for questions to 
arise, but do something that will make the farmer listen, take 
interest and try out the agronomist’s suggestions.
Intially the tools of the agronomist were limited to
speeches and demonstrations. Upon arrival in his bailiwick, the
first measure the agronomist usually took was to organize
lectures and meetings (chtenia i besedy) in the villages of his
area. "During the long winter evenings, the organization of...
meetings, where everybody talked freely of their needs enabled
the agronomist to draw closer to the population, to establish a
good trusting relationship with them, and identify potential
collaborators [in pioneering agricultural improvements],"
3
remembered one former agronomist. As the network of agronomists
spread across Russia, the number of agricultural lectures grew
rapidly. By 1912, over a million listeners were registered
4
attending some 11,000 lectures annually. The most lectures by
far occured in the province of Poltava, followed by Kharkov and
Kherson provinces; significantly, as we saw in the previous
chapter, these provinces were exceptionally well staffed with
5
agronomic personnel. Lectures usually took place in the winter 
and focused in detail on one specific subject, such as the proper 
way to feed livestock or introduce grass hays into a crop 
rotation. Organizing a lecture or a meeting was a good way for 
the agronomist to introduce himself to a village. After having 
heard the agronomist at the meeting, the peasants ceased
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regarding him as merely a zemstvo functionary and began to look ,
upon him as a "familiar person" who could be freely consulted on
6
any problem. One county agronomist reported:
It seems to me that even if these meetings don’t immediately 
leave a visible impression, then in any case they give us the 
opportunity to get acquainted with a large part of the population 
and sound out their various needs and opinions. And furthermore, 
here we can acquaint the population with what an agronomist is 
and what his role among them is.
In order to overcome the skepticism of the peasantry,
agronomists came up with special gimmicks to attract an audience.
The gimmick most commonly used was a type of slide projector
called the magic lantern. The magic lantern fascinated peasant
audiences and ultimately became the agronomist’s most valuable
7
tool. As one county agronomist argued:
The magic lantern is helpful in two ways: first in clarifying 
what is being explained and second —  and this is perhaps the 
most important —  as an object of fascination. Having heard of 
the magic lantern, the peasant will go with greater enthusiasm to 
"marvel at the pictures" than to hear about "what he already 
knows and understands" [i.e. farming].
Another good way of breaking down the solipsism of the 
peasantry and introducing the agronomist with a bang was to have 
him arrive accompanied by a travelling agricultural exposition. 
Travelling agricultural expositions were often sent to those 
areas where social agronomy was either weakly developed or not 
yet established. The travelling agricultural exposition was 
usually set up in the local school or cooperative and lasted
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three to four days. The rooms would be hung with posters and
bright-colored materials to give the place a "festive
atmosphere." Various examples of agricultural machinery were set
outside in a shed. Visiting agronomists organized lectures on
grass-seeding, commercial dairy farming, etc., spending the rest
of the time explaining the exhibits to the visitors. The
expositions often created a "profound impression" on the
visitors. It was then up to the local agronomist to follow up
with other measures, "so that the impression wouldn’t die and the
social relations established with the local population wouldn’t
8
be broken off."
The visit of travelling agricultural expositions became a
fairly regular occurence in Russia, and not just in regions where
social agronomy was weakly developed. Poltava province for
instance played host to 33 expositions in one year; the
9
expositions were visited by a total of 78,321 people.
Country fairs also became a common event. These were 
generally larger affairs than the travelling expositions. Like 
the expositions, country fairs featured agronomic lectures and 
exhibits of agricultural technology, but they also included more 
pure entertainment and various curiousities. Agronomically, the 
most valuable contribution of the country fairs was a series of 
prize competitions in farming, livestock and handicrafts. These 
competitions enabled the local peasantry to compare different 
methods of production and established a competitive atmosphere 
that encouraged economic innovation. They also illustrated the 
economic elements of the region and thus played a valuable
10
educational function for agronomists and local peasantry alike.
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The Agronomist Established: Selecting Agricultural Pioneers
The organization of lectures, the handing out of pamphlets
and brochures or the organization of agricultural expositions
could only go so far in convincing the peasants to change their
farming system. Peasant farmers were very poor and their farming
system had only the thinnest margin of error; they would hardly
jeopardize their families and adopt some new production strategy
just because they had read about it in a pamphlet or had heard
about it in a lecture. Similarly, agricultural expositions or
fairs were often only perceived as curiosity shows. As one
observer commented: "The visitors [at a country fair] see huge
gourds or cabbages, excellent bulls or calves, exceptionally rich
and full heads of wheat, but at the same time they don’t know
11
under what conditions these results were attained..." Peasant
farmers would only agree to adopt a new technology if they were
able to see how the technology worked under conditions similar to
their own farms. The peasants required visible proof and the best
such proof was the sight of one’s neighbor prospering as a result
of the new technology. For this reason, one of the top priorities
for agronomists was to find out who in the village was a good
candidate to try out a new technology. After having introduced
the concept of a new technology to the whole village, the
agronomist had to focus on cultivating allies within the village
who would pioneer the new technology. One veteran Russian
agronomist, M.E. Shaternikov, described how a peasant village
12
usually came to adopt grass hays into its crop rotation:
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fThe agronomist first arriving in the village preaching the 
introduction of grass in crop rotations is usually met with a 
skeptical attitude and with exclamations filled with 
incomprehension. MWe don*t understand this clover one bit!
You’re concerned with our livestock, but there’s nothing for us 
to eat", and so on. However, the agronomist shouldn’t be put off 
by this incomprehension, since it is completely natural —  the 
listeners simply don't want to be bothered and push away anything 
foreign and unfamiliar. It is essential for the agronomist to 
carefully examine the audience while he is speaking and to try to 
find within it one or two attentive listeners in whose eyes he 
can detect a spark of interest. Usually after the talk, they come 
up to the lecturer themselves; if this doesn’t happen, he has to 
search them out and have an especially thoughtful and detailed 
talk with them about grass-cultivation so that they understand it 
completely. Having accomplished this, the agronomist can 
contentedly leave the village, and returning in a week or two, he 
will find his audience reborn. There is no longer any crude 
rejection. There are many doubts and there is still a lot of 
disbelief about the benefits of clover, but the questions take on 
the most practical and concrete form: "Where shall we organize 
the fourth field, where will we get the seeds," etc.
It was natural for county agronomists, being relatively few 
in number, to focus their attention on a minority of the most 
enterprising peasants. We have seen in the foregoing chapters how 
most agronomists came to approve of the agronomic principles 
behind the Stolypin land reform and themselves made a kind of 
"wager on the strong". The agricultural pioneers on whom the 
success of Russian agronomy was based could be those 
individualists who decided to take advantage of the decree of 9 
November 1906 and consolidate their lands or they could be young 
communal peasants who eagerly listened to the agronomist’s 
suggestions and enrolled in special agricultural courses. As 
Chayanov noted: "Such is the power of propaganda with the
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peasantry, that converted peasants often become fanatics of
agronomic progress... The creation of a cadre of such peasant
pioneers is a matter of the first priority for social 
13
agronomy..."
Most of Russia’s potential agricultural pioneers were to be 
found in the younger generation. Young farmers and even children 
represented the soft underbelly of the tradition-hardened peasant 
village. Though the number of agricultural schools was growing 
steadily at the beginning of the 20th century, formal 
agricultural education was still a matter of the distant future 
for most farming families. The agronomist could achieve a more 
modest, but immediate effect by convincing the local 
schoolteacher to give primary education an agricultural bias: 
maths could be taught as book-keeping; science instruction could 
be focused on biology and chemistry; geography could include the 
geography of farming around the world, and so on. The number of 
rural schoolteachers was growing rapidly during the Stolypin 
Reform and, as we shall see below, the tactical alliance between 
the local teacher and the local agronomist was visible on many 
levels. For the agronomist, the farmer’s children were an 
invaluable channel to influencing the farmer himself. The 
organization of boys’ and girls’ clubs was a major component of 
the agricultural extension program of the United States and could 
be successfully applied in Russia. Louis Guy Michael, an Iowa 
agronomist who was invited by the Bessarabian provincial zemstvo 
to help develop corn production, organized several such clubs and 
had them compete for the best methods of raising corn in the 
school kitchen gardens. When the children began to produce a
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better crop than their parents, the picqued farmers were shamed
into adopting Michael’s suggestions concerning seed-cleaning and
14
better cultivation.
For young farmers interested in breaking with village
tradition and improving their production methods, agronomists
organized short courses. Usually organized during the rainy
season when travel was difficult, such courses could last
anywhere from several days to several months. The subject matter
included a study of the predominant form of agriculture in the
area (i.e. dairy, flax, or wheat) and certain elementary skills
such as book-keeping; classroom work would be accompanied by
15
field trips, real life examples and experiments. The typical
agricultural course consisted of about 40 students. The selection
of students for the course was a very important matter, since
this was often the path towards membership in the farming elite.
While some agronomists saw the desire to sign up as a
qualification in itself, other agronomists believed that course-
members should be carefully recruited either by the agronomist or
16
by the local cooperative. Some of the students at the longer-
term courses were not peasant farmers at all, but scribes,
aspiring agronomic assistants, cooperative workers and teachers.
Teachers were especially important, because if they were made to
understand the aims of the agronomist and if their help could be
enlisted, the agronomist could acquire a "very powerful ally" in
the village, as well as access to the facilities of the local
17
school network. Louis Guy Michael reported that teachers and
priests were the two types of rural authorities who were
18
invaluable in helping spread agricultural improvements.
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The great majority of students, however, tended to be
peasant farmers, usually young, literate and relatively modern in 
19
outlook. A major problem with graduates of these courses was
preventing them from migrating out of the area in search of
higher-paying occupations. A 1910 Agronomic Conference in the Don
Teritory, for instance, stressed that agricultural courses should
aim "to develop the younger generation's love for farming" and
20
try to "keep the young people on the land." If the students
could be convinced to remain in the community, they would usually
play an important role in improving the agriculture of the
region. One survey found that the best-organized farms in any
given region usually belonged to graduates of agricultural
courses and that around these farms there always gathered a
21
string of imitators. Brunst noted this effect in a 1910 
22
article:
We have to remember that our population lives in communes and 
decides all its questions communally. The presence of better 
educated individuals [i.e. course students] may therefore prove 
highly significant. Furthermore, since the course students are 
the more advanced farmers, they will act as pioneers of improved 
farming methods, irrespective of whether they are private- 
consolidated or communal farmers.
Another way of encouraging the emergence of agricultural 
pioneers was to subsidize them. In Poltava, for instance, 
subsidies of up to 200 rubles were awarded based on the degree of 
reorganization undertaken by the farmer. Such subsidies were not 
the main incentive for agronomic improvement, but represented "a 
kind of compensation to the farmer for the risk which in his
23
opinion he is taking on himself in introducing new technology."
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Small subsidies played a role in another successful agronomic i
measure: the organization of a demonstration allotment or field
on a peasant farmer’s land. The agronomist would draw up a
contract, agreeing to give the peasant farmer free seeds or a
small cash grant in return for the farmer’s following the
agronomist’s advice on what crops to plant and how to cultivate
them. The organization of demonstration plots and fields on
peasant land was a strategy advocated especially forcefully by
the influential Samara agronomist, A. Teitel, who described the
24
process in the following way:
Upon receiving his assignment, the agronomist settles into his 
bailiwick. After having acquainted himself with local conditions, 
he begins introducing agronomic measures, mostly with respect to 
field-crop rotations. The agronomist searches out the most 
developed peasants, who agree to introduce the recommended 
changes under the agronomist’s personal supervision.
Subsequently, the attention of the agronomist is focused on the 
farms of these peasants. In order to develop the necessary 
authority, the agronomist should not allow these farms to 
undertake any experiments in whose results he is not certain; he 
introduces only those measures which in his opinion are 
guaranteed to succeed. In this way, the farm under his 
supervision is evidence [that improved technology works] to its 
neighbors.
The demonstration fields, cultivated on peasant lands with 
the resources of the peasant family, proved immensely useful with 
respect to Russia’s agricultural development. On the one hand, a 
demonstration field on a peasant’s land enabled neighboring 
peasants to see with their own eyes the effects of agronomic 
improvement. On the other hand, demonstration fields taught the 
agronomist what modern farming techniques were viable in his
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area; one analyst spoke of demonstration fields as "schools" for
25
the agronomist. Though they had to maintain close supervision
of the demonstration fields, agronomists were urged to avoid
subsidizing the projects financially, since this would weaken
26
their demonstration value. In fact, it is unlikely that
demonstration fields were heavily subsidized, since they
proliferated very rapidly throughout Russia without making a
large impact on the budget of either the zemstvos or the Ministry
of Agriculture. It is not possible to get a precise number of all
the demonstration fields and demonstration farms in European
Russia, but an educated guess would put their number on the eve
of the war at about 50,000, almost all of them established since 
27
1906. Such proliferation was more a reflection of the activism 
of Russia’s agronomists and of the peasant farmers* willingness 
to try out new technologies, than a result of government 
subsidies.
In areas where social agronomy was already firmly 
established, the agronomist began to spend more time on 
individual consultations than on general lectures and courses. 
Such consultations resembled visits to the doctor. The agronomist 
would make it known that he would be available for consultation 
on a particular day either in his office, the office of the local 
cooperative, the tea house, or some other public meeting place. 
Through consultations, the agronomist was able to maintain 
contact with his course graduates and with the agricultural 
pioneers of his district. He would catch up on the latest farming 
problems in the area and be able to give the farmers very 
specific and thorough advice on what needed to be done. The fact
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that individual consultations were already taking up much of the
agronomist’s time was a sign that he had passed the stage of
acquainting himself with the local population and establishing
his credibility; he had now become an authority whose opinion was
28
considered in the decisions of local farmers.
The Agronomist Gains Authority: Organizing Development
When an agronomist was assigned to a particular county, he
was told to draw up an overall plan for agricultural development
in his area and identify specific objectives such as the
replacement of the wooden plow (sokha) with a metal one (pluga)
or the introduction of the seed drill (riadovaia sealka) into
29
peasant farming. The implementation of certain small
improvements with a rapid pay-off was essential in gaining the
trust of the peasantry. The most successful such project took
place in Moscow province, where zemstvo agronomists concentrated
on two goals: introducing steel plows and grass hays; the results
were "enormous" and the project was a great success, "despite
30
very limited resources." According to one estimate, agronomists
were responsible for converting 4,000 peasant communes in the
provinces of Moscow, Tver, Novgorod, Vladimir and Kostroma to
multifield crop rotations; in Moscow province alone, 31% of all
31
communal lands were were changed to multifield rotations.
Such quick, significant triumphs must have bolstered the 
morale of agronomists all over Russia, but unfortunately they 
were relatively rare. After a certain period of working with
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peasant farmers, agronomists found that marginal improvements
were not sufficient to keep the peasantry out of poverty. At
every turn, agronomists were running up against the obsolete
32
foundations of the peasant farming system. It wasn’t much use
trying to introduce new plows or seeds when peasant farming was
based on archaic crop rotations or an almost complete lack of
commercialization. Agricultural development strategy had to
address these fundamental questions before it could introduce
many of the technological innovations available at the time.
Agronomists came to realize that for a great number of peasant
farms "the missing factor is not water, not phosphorus and not
even nitrogen, but a proper organizational plan for peasant 
33
farming."
As agronomists increased in numbers across the Russian 
countryside, they grew ever more confident in their job and ever 
more ready to initiate the organizations necessary for agricul­
tural progress. At the regional agronomic congress in Ekaterinos- 
lav in 1910, one hears the first mention of the concept of the 
agronomist as organizer (agronom-organizator); this concept was 
echoed at agronomic congresses in Moscow in 1911 and Poltava in
1912. With these congresses, Russian agronomists began to realize
34
their role as organizers of Russian agricultural development.
The plans to improve peasant agriculture began assuming ever more 
ambitious proportions. No longer did agronomists just talk of 
introducing improved plant varieties and farm equipment; they 
began to speak of changing peasant crop rotations, reorganizing 
the system of animal husbandry and organizing credit and 
marketing cooperatives. This was a new stage of evolution for
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Russian social agronomy. If the agronomist's introductory 
meetings and lectures represented his arrival in the village, and 
if his organization of agricultural courses and demonstration 
indicated that he was settling down in his locality, then the 
assumption of an organizational role meant that he had now put 
himself in the peasant's shoes and was helping resolve 
agricultural problems in the field, side by side with the farmers 
of the village.
Every problem in Russian agriculture had a remedy that 
required organizational initiative. The fragmentation of peasant 
land tenure could be redressed through the organization of land 
settlement. Lack of credit in the rural economy could be 
alleviated through the organization of credit cooperatives. The 
excessive managerial conservatism of peasant farmers could be 
changed through the organization of courses, lectures and 
exhibitions. Poor quality seed could be improved through the 
organization of seed-cleaning stations. Bad quality livestock 
could be improved through "control associations". The lack of 
cheap, modern equipment could be alleviated through the 
organization of machinery depots and rental stations. The peasant 
farmer's lack of commercialization could be redressed through the 
organization of marketing cooperatives. In their search to spur 
Russian agricultural development, agronomists took on all of 
these organizational initiatives. Let us consider some of them in 
greater detail.
With respect to improving grain farming, one of the simplest 
measures was to organize a seed-cleaning station. Seed-cleaning 
machines, which were relatively simple and cheap to operate,
could be extraordinarily effective in giving an immediate boost
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to crop yields. Nowadays, we take good quality seed so much for
granted that we forget that in those days a good portion of what
the farmer cast on the field was infertile, effectively chaff;
that meant that the farmer had to throw a much greater quantity
of grain onto the field in order to get the same harvest. Seed-
cleaning stations in Vladimir province enabled farmers to raise
36
the productivity of their spring sowing by 50% on average. A
cheap, simple and effective way to raise yields, seed-cleaning
spread rapidly throughout Russia —  on the eve of the war,
agronomists had organized at least 8,000 seed-cleaning stations
37
across the country.
The livestock problem, one of the most worrying aspects of
Russian agriculture, had received surprisingly little attention
in the nation’s agronomic program. But this began to change on
the eve of the war. The Ministry of Agriculture, for instance,
which had spent only 200,000 rubles on matters of animal
husbandry in 1909, was spending 1.4 million rubles four years 
38
later. Most government and zemstvo funds in this area were
spent on the standard agronomic techniques: lectures and short
courses given by specialists and dairy instructors. Livestock
exhibitions were also coming into vogue, most notably in
Iaroslavl province, where one five day exposition was attended by
39
over 10,000 people. County agronomists also began to organize
control associations, especially in the important dairy areas of
Iaroslavl and Western Siberia. Control associations were a form
of mutual book-keeping, keeping track of the bloodlines, feeding
40
habits and milk-fat content of each cow in the village herd.
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The resolution of the livestock problem and the »
encouragement of dairy farming demanded a resolution of Russia’s
fodder question, specifically the expansion of grass cultivation.
Agronomists encouraged such a change through their talks and
meetings, through organizing model fields, and by giving out
41
grass seeds for free or at zero-interest. The increase in grass
cultivation points to the success of their work. Some 1.6 million
desiatins in European Russia were planted with grass hays in
42
1916, almost triple the amount in 1901. The greatest success
came in areas where commercial dairy farming had already
developed at least to a certain extent. Correlation between
successful development of the two was found in the provinces of
Vologda and Moscow, for instance. Work on the introduction of
grass in the latter province started in 1905; by 1917, observers
noted that everywhere grass hays were introduced, they resulted
43
in a "significant reorganization of the whole farming system".
Another major constraint on agricultural development in 
Russia was the poor quality or utter lack of farm supplies 
available to the peasantry. In order to improve the quality of 
farm supplies available to peasant farmers —  whether cheap metal 
plows, tin sheet or fertilizer —  county agronomists organized 
agricultural depots (selskokhoziaistvennye sklady). These depots, 
commonly managed by the agronomists themselves, were in fact 
general stores selling everything from machinery, hand tools and 
fertilizer to nails, seeds and cement. Through the depots the 
peasants could obtain modern agricultural equipment. The wares 
were widely acknowledged to be of good quality, an important 
feature for the peasant farmer, who traditionally valued
-213-
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durability and effectiveness over price. Since its wares were
sold at cost, the depot often played a pivotal role in driving
down the prices of competing private merchants. From the
agronomist’s point of view, the depots also provided a valuable
point of contact with local farmers and a good place to
45
disseminate agronomic propaganda.
Agricultural depots spread with impressive rapidity through­
out Russia after 1906 and played a major role in the nation’s 
rising investment in farm equipment. In 1902, there were only 300
depots in Russia, with a turnover of some 5 million rubles —  15%
46
of the total sales of agricultural equipment in Russia. With
the advent of the Stolypin Reform, the sales of agricultural
depots flourished. According to one survey, by 1910, 310 out of
370 zemstvos were engaged in the sale of agricultural equipment,
47
with total sales of 12 million rubles. By 1912, the sales of 
just government-run depots (as opposed to cooperative-run depots)
in Western Siberia amounted to 8 million rubles, more than was
48
sold by all depots across Russia a mere ten years earlier. By 
1914, it was estimated that agricultural depots run by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the zemstvos and the cooperatives
49
accounted for half the seeds and machinery sold in Russia. This
is an especially impressive statistic when one remembers that the
purchase of agricultural machinery almost tripled in this period,
rising from 40 million rubles in 1906 to 116 million rubles in 
50
1912. Since depot sales rose from 15% of total sales in 1902 to 
50% of total sales in 1914, it is evident that it was the depots 
that accounted for most of the growth of agricultural equipment 
sales during the Stolypin Reform.
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The depots managed to develop such enormous sales —  over 50 i
million rubles in 1912 —  by exploiting the previously untapped
peasant market. One survey of depots in Kazan province found that
immediately after 1905 peasant farmers accounted for only a
quarter of the purchases; by 1916 they accounted for 80%,
Similarly, on the eve of the Revolution, the peasantry
constituted virtually all the buyers from depots in Kherson
51
province, 96% of the buyers in Samara and 90% in Kharkov.
Virtually all the increase in demand was for modern, complex
machinery. A survey of 8 provinces over the ten years before the
revolution showed that the demand for simple machines like plows
and hand instruments (scythes, sickles) remained stable, but the
demand for reapers tripled and the demand for seed drills more
52
than quadrupled.
Another way for the agronomist to encourage the adoption of
improved equipment was to organize machine rental stations. These
were a smaller affair than the depots and therefore commonly
managed by the county agronomist. Intended to introduce modern
equipment to the peasant in the same way that demonstration
fields introduced new crop rotations, machinery rental stations
were rarely profitable and were heavily subsidized by the 
53
zemstvos. The idea was a good one. For a small user fee the
peasant was able to rent a reaper or seed drill or threshing
machine, gaining access to equipment that he couldn’t dream of
buying. Machine rental stations spread very rapidly —  on the eve
of the war they numbered at least 12,000 —  and played an
important role in the growing mechanization of Russian
54
agriculture after 1905.
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Complex machines like cultivators, threshers or cream
separators were usually out of reach for the peasant smallholder;
their expense was such that they could only be justified if used
on a large platform of land. Some analysts regarded machine
rental stations as a form of cooperative machinery use. But
strictly speaking, these institutions were more a government
service than a cooperative, and as such, they probably suffered
from the same weaknesses that afflicted machine rental stations
in the 1920's: much of the equipment lying about either
55
underutilized or broken. A machinery cooperative, strictly 
speaking, would involve a contract between a number of farms for 
the joint purchase and shared use of machinery. Mention of these 
kinds of organizations is comparatively rare in the literature 
before 1917, though most instances of cooperative machinery use 
probably went unrecorded, taking the form of informal contracts 
(dogovory) between farmers to use a particular machine.
Otherwise, when a peasant bought any piece of equipment as 
complex as say, a thresher, chances are that he rented it out to 
neighboring farmers in order to get a decent return on his 
investment.
Generally speaking, the assumption of an organizational role 
by the agronomist meant that he not only had to provide the 
peasant with bricks for the building (better seeds or a better 
plow), but also suggest how the building should be built (crop 
rotations, animal husbandry and budget strategy). In other words, 
the agronomist was to formulate a comprehensive plan of changing 
the peasant’s farming system. He could often realize such far- 
reaching change by focusing on just one or two of the key aspects
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of the peasant’s farming system. Chayanov described it this way:
"The social agronomist, [having analyzed] the farming system and
having drawn up a plan of essential organizational changes,
realizes them in a series of technical innovations; introducing
the latter, he will inevitably restructure the farming system as 
56
well.” The introduction of grass into the crop rotation, for
instance, could lead to the elimination of fallow lands and to
the organization of modern stall feeding for livestock.
Similarly, the introduction of a cream separator (for butter-
making) into a village could lead to the development of
commercialized dairy farming.
Other agronomists, recognizing the need to reorganize the
peasant farming system, went further and urged the agronomist to
organize collective entities such as cooperatives or groups of
consolidated farms in order to disseminate agricultural
improvements. Only by organizing agricultural progress
communally, the argument went, could the agronomist achieve a
mass transformation of peasant agriculture. The agronomist had to
draw up a comprehensive agronomic plan including land settlement
measures, crop rotations and cooperation of certain branches of
the farming system; this plan would then be ratified by the
peasant assembly as a type of contract of economic development 
57
and welfare. Such a comprehensive and orderly reorganization of 
peasant farming was probably achieved only very rarely, but the 
idea is indicative of the growing ambitions of Russia’s 
agronomists.
The new organizational approach to agronomic aid raised the 
question of the degree to which the agronomist had to be
authoritarian in pushing forward his plan for the rationalization
of the peasant farming system. Some agronomists noted that
Catherine the Great had introduced potatoes into Russia "with the
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help of cannon and executions." Hyperbole aside, perhaps it was
necessary to force the peasants to modernize? No, responded
Chayanov. The social agronomist could be considered the organizer
of agricultural modernization only insofar as his task consisted
of the acceleration of the spontaneous evolution of agriculture.
For Chayanov, "agronomist-organizer" did not mean "boss" similar
to the agro-organizer on gentry estates. The agronomist-organizer
dealt not with wage laborers, but with independent farmers who
couldn’t be ordered to do anything. In other words, the
agronomist-organizer couldn’t realize any plans by his own
volition -- he could only hope to influence the intelligence,
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will and self-interest of the farmers of his area.
It’s interesting to look back on the dynamic era of the 
Stolypin Reform to see what was thought of the kind of 
agricultural strategy later pursued during Stalinist 
collectivization. Was the stress on a collective approach to 
agronomic aid and the ever-present temptation of a science-based 
authoritarianism a premonition of 1928? Even those agronomists 
who advocated the cooperation of various farm operations such as 
harvesting, marketing and livestock grazing, never mentioned 
complete cooperation of production (full collectivization), with 
the possible exception of Minin. Agronomists only mentioned 
communal development plans on the understanding that the 
communities were made up of individual family farms; forced 
communal solutions, such as the imposition of optimal crop
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rotations or mass privatization upon a particular region, were »u
strongly condemned. The agronomist was to have only a
consultative role, allowing each farm to develop creatively and
60
according to its own peculiar needs.
The Agronomist Relinquishes Control: Local Self-Reliance
The roots of agronomists’ self-restraint lay in purely
practical considerations. There were too few agronomists and too
many peasants to manage the restructuring of peasant agriculture
directly. Lack of funds and personnel meant that the zemstvos and
the government agencies de facto had to leave many projects of
economic development to the cooperatives and to the private
sector. As Chayanov argued, society doesn’t have the capability
of carrying out the necessary reform even if it uses the full
extent of the government apparatus. "The work of the farmer is of
such a particular, local nature, it is so carefully adapted to
each little clutch of land, that no externally-directed authority
will be able to manage the farm if it is to be at all intensive.
One can say that the skill of the farmer consists above all in
the ability to take care of details. Only the farmer himself,
having acquired a knowledge of his land through long years of
practice, can successfully operate his farm, let alone reform 
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it." Therefore the agronomist had to play the role of a
"fermenting agent" in agricultural development, speeding it along
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and directing it into the most rational channels. (Chayanov
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didn’t mention that the real fermenting agent encouraging i
agriculutral change was the market, though perhaps this was
assumed to be a given.) Although the agronomist introduces the
idea of reform and helps bring it to life, "the reformer and
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organizer of the system is the peasant himself."
By 1910, agronomists had fully accepted the necessity of
comprehensive restructuring of the peasant farming system, but
they had also come to realize that they could only produce
results by employing the "saving force" of cooperatives and local
self-reliance. The Ekaterinoslav Agronomic Congress of 1910, for
instance, resolved that "agronomists are preparing to act not
only as technicians -- as 'engineers’ of agriculture —  but as
social workers and organizers, fully conscious that their work
would be impossible without an array of self-help organizations
64
among the rural population." That meant cooperatives.
"If we continually argue that the success of agronomic aid
can only be built on the foundation of the self-reliance of the
population," wrote Chayanov some years later, "then we are
talking first of all about cooperation, as self-reliance in its
most organized form." Agronomists considered cooperatives "the
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sounding board of agronomic propaganda." Cooperatives proved
useful in organizing agronomic lectures, in disseminating
agronomic literature, in establishing libraries and experimental
fields, in organizing farm supply, marketing, machine rental,
66
seed cleaning and cattle-breeding operations. One survey of 
1,322 credit cooperatives in 1911-12, for instance, indicated 
that many conducted non-banking operations: among other things,
14% managed farm supply depots, 11% operated machine rental
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stations, 9% had seed-cleaning stations. ”We can say with »
certainty,” wrote Chayanov "that without cooperatives, social
agronomy is incapable of maintaining contact with the population
of a region and that its lonely voice will be lost among the
68
thousands of households." This view was echoed by the econo-
69
mist, Khizhniakov:
The work of the zemstvo agronomist is indissolubly linked with 
the cooperatives. The cooperatives provide the agronomist with a 
receptive audience and are themselves an indispensable condition 
for economic progress among the population. As a result, zemstvo 
agronomists very often take on the role of cooperative organizers 
and instructors. In the last several years, the zemstvos have 
hired specialists in cooperative work to carry out specially 
defined duties as cooperative instructors.
The agronomists and the zemstvos generally were happy to see
cooperatives take over many local economic functions —  this was
a cost-free way of spreading agronomic improvements and setting
the business of agricultural development on a sober commercial
basis by mobilizing the energies and financial resources of the
local population. One of the speakers at the Ekaterinoslav
Congress, for instance, argued that since the task facing social
agronomy was now the reorganization of the peasant farming
system, the zemstvos had to provide farmers with the necessary
capital for such a reorganization. But instead of continuously
doling out subsidies, the speaker argued, the zemstvos should
simply organize credit cooperatives and leave these to function
independently. The nature of social agronomy, the speaker
concluded, was that it was based on the self-reliance and
70
initative of the local population.
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It was more than just expediency that made agronomists
support agricultural cooperation. Joining a cooperative was often
an essential step in the progress of small farm, since it gave it
the possibility of attaining economies of scale. Chayanov
explained the principle of cooperation this way: "The small farm
separates from its organizational plan those branches which favor
large-scale operations and, uniting with other interested parties
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through a cooperative, organizes them on a large-scale basis.”
Whether in credit, marketing or the provision of farm supplies,
cooperation was always linked with the growing commercialization
of the peasant economy. Hence, the growth of agricultural
cooperatives proceeded alongside the restructuring of peasant
farming. Nowhere was this clearer than in the effect of
cooperative marketing on peasant farming. In the words of the
Moscow provincial agronomist, "the organization of cooperative
marketing is in many cases the most effective means of
reorganizing the farming system and raising its productivity and
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profitability.”
Another agronomist described the experience of peasants in a 
hemp-growing region in Orel province. The by-product of hemp is 
valuable as cattle feed, since it increases the fat content of 
the livestock. Despite agronomic propaganda, the peasantry in 
Orel didn’t feed the hemp byproduct to their own cattle, 
prefering to export it instead. But as soon as a cooperative 
butter-making plant appeared in the area and milk began to be 
priced according to its fat content, the peasant demand for hemp 
byproduct for their cattle skyrocketed. The peasants also 
suddenly became interested in the services of livestock-breeding
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stations. "All [agricultural cooperatives] bring the farm closer
to the market, and insofar as the market demands [better quality
and efficiency in production], it indirectly influences the
organization and technical character of the farm," commented the
agronomist. "Where there appears a butter-making plant, for
instance, there will soon follow grass-sowing, the improvement of
livestock, improved feeding, and much else. Everything that
agronomists tried in vain to achieve through sermons and
demonstrations is easily achieved as soon as there appears on the
73
scene an economic interest —  the ruble."
Whether the peasants joined cooperatives from the desire to
rationalize production by achieving economies of scale or from an
orientation to the market, cooperative members represented the
agricultural pioneers of the Russian countryside as surely as the
consolidated farmers. "Rural cooperatives bring together the most
active and developed part of the the population," wrote one
observer. "Agronomic aid will be successful insofar as it works
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hand in glove with the rural cooperatives." Cooperatives
provided agronomists not only with a receptive audience, but also
with an opportunity to prove their usefulness to the local
population. At a meeting of the Ufa Provincial Agronomic Council
in 1913, one agronomist reported that "if the agronomist wants to
gain popularity, he has to go to the credit association and help
the confused people there bring order to their books, help them
understand credit operations. Having thereby acquired the trust
of the working population, he can organize agronomic measures
75
through the cooperative." In fact, in both Ufa and in 
neighboring Perm province, almost all agronomic projects such as
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seed-cleaning or distribution of equipment were reportedly run by
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the credit cooperatives.
Thus, there were many reasons for agronomists to look upon
cooperatives as an essential part of agricultural development and
a crucial part of their work. Organization of cooperatives was
one of the first things that the agronomist did when he arrived
77
in his bailiwick. The following survey of 215 cooperatives in
Moscow province revealed that zemstvo agronomists assumed a
78
leadership role in the majority of the organizations.
Agronomists and Rural Cooperatives in Moscow Province. 1913
Type of
cooperative
Credit
Consumer
Agricultural
Dairy
Handicrafts
% organized with 
help of agronomist 
66%
29%
59%
83%
28%
Average (weighted) 60%
% receiving consistent 
agronomic aid 
54%
28%
85%
100%
25%
55%
Agronomists encouraged the development of cooperatives by
giving talks on the virtues of cooperation and organizing courses
79
on book-keeping. It was hoped that such instruction would not
only encourage the peasants to join cooperatives, but would allow
the cooperatives to be self-sufficient. "But considering the sad
experience of the more enlightened Western European peasantry,"
commented Chayanov, "we harbor no hope that peasant book-keeping
80
will have any kind of mass development in the near future." 
Consequently, due to the lack of people capable of keeping the 
books, the agronomist or some other local government employee 
would usually have to take care of the book-keeping himself.
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The success of the cooperative movement created a kind of
identity crisis among zemstvo agronomists. Were they part of the
cooperative movement or were they agents of the zemstvos?
Chayanov noted that agronomists had widely divergent views on
this question. "Some agronomists, having developed...
cooperatives without cooperators, are forced to singlehandedly
lead and even ‘manage’ the cooperatives." Such agronomists
tended to regard cooperatives merely as an instrument of their
program, much in the same way that they regarded their own farm
supply depots or seed cleaning stations. But other agronomists
"completely forgot about their zemstvo duties and effectively
became agents of the cooperative movement, serving as members of
the board and differing from their cooperative comrades only in
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the source of their income." In Moscow province, agronomists
tended to spend at least a third of their time on various forms
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of cooperative work. One former agronomist commented that
because the agronomist felt insecure with the broad and ill-
defined aims of social agronomic work, he jumped enthusiastically
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into cooperative work with its "real and concrete goals."
Another agronomist would recall: "I have to admit that
cooperation took up almost all my time and moreover captured all 
84
my thoughts."
As both cooperation and the zemstvo agronomic organization 
matured, the question came down to which of the two would take 
the leading role in the agricultural development of the country. 
In regions where zemstvo agronomists had been instrumental in 
building the cooperative movement, such as Moscow and the Urals, 
they demanded to be given control over the organizations, serving
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as chairmen of cooperative assemblies} conducting audits of »
cooperative business and supervizing all cooperative trading 
85
operations.
The issue moved to a different resolution, however. Though
instances of cooperatives employing their own agronomic personnel
and carrying out their own agronomic projects were relatively
rare, cooperatives rapidly developed into institutions with their
own special interests and a substantial degree of independence.
Since county agronomists were unable to meet the demand for
cooperative work, the zemstvos in 1913 began to organize special
cooperative instructors, specializing in dairy production,
86
consumer cooperation, credit cooperation, etc. Cooperatives
began to take the initiative in inviting agronomists to organize
agronomic courses, provide consultation services, manage depots
87
and stock breeding stations. Soon some observers were proposing
that all social agronomy should be overseen by the cooperative
administration, with agronomists presumably paid a flat fee for
consultation or receiving commissions on various commercial
projects. This effectively meant duplicating the zemstvo
agronomic network, constructing a parallel organization complete
88
with county, district and provincial agronomists.
Relations between cooperatives and zemstvos were far from 
smooth. The 1912 Cooperative Congress denied zemstvo delegates 
the right to vote, even though questions on zemstvo activities 
figured prominently on the agenda. Similarly, every annual 
shareholders meeting of the Moscow Narodny Bank (the central 
cooperative bank) resolved to exercise caution in admitting 
zemstvo funds as shareholders or even in doing business with the
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zemstvos. Evidently, in the eyes of cooperators, the zemstvo »
v
conservative reaction after 1905 and the subsequent purges of
"subversive elements" had given proof that the zemstvos were in
the same camp as the government; as an agency, the zemstvos were
to be used by the cooperatives, but only with great wariness.
The absence of a proper delineation of functions between
zemstvos and cooperatives, says Chayanov, often led to "serious
struggles and conflicts." Many of these conflicts, he says, were
a product of "the distrust harbored by democratic cooperation
towards the officially authorized zemstvo". Chayanov recounts
frequently hearing the opinion of fervent cooperators that "the
broad development of cooperative movement will ultimately make
all zemstvo institutions superfluous." On the other hand, "many
zemstvo figures assumed that the creation of the volost zemstvo
90
would obviate the need to organize any types of cooperatives".
Even the benevolent intentions of the zemstvos carried
danger. One economist wrote that both agronomists and zemstvos
could potentially stifle cooperation with "aid" and tutelage. If
the zemstvos crossed that important line where aid became
control, local economic initiatives could be discredited as
"gentry undertakings." An example of such an action was when the
zemstvo funds of small credit tried to take on the role of credit
unions by coordinating the flow of funds among local credit 
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cooperatives. Another observer argued that the zemstvo "must
not infringe upon the independence of cooperation, its freedom to
92
take whatever forms it wants and its freedom of initiative."
Chayanov called for the functions of the two institutions to 
be divided rationally. Zemstvos should take care of road-
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building, the telegraph and postal networks, enforcing the rules 
of commerce, organizing local medical and veterinary services, 
running primary and adult education, and of course, establishing 
a network of social agronomy. Credit, marketing, retailing 
consumer goods and farm supplies were the areas left to the 
cooperatives. In no case was the zemstvo or the zemstvo 
agronomist to manage the work of the cooperative, as they would 
be betraying both zemstvo principles (no commercial activity) and 
cooperative principles (non-involvement in government and 
politics). If there weren’t enough competent managers or book­
keepers, for example, the agronomist was to organize courses for 
them; if the cooperatives’ financial base was weak, the zemstvo
was not to subsidize them, but rather loan them money through the
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funds of small credit.
The reason why the conflict between zemstvos and coopera­
tives seemed so important was that the character and interests of 
the two institutions were very different. As agronomists often 
noted, zemstvo undertakings never mobilized the self-interest of 
the local population as well as the cooperatives. If the zemstvo 
organized a seed-cleaning operation, for example, the population 
would often remain unconcerned with any financial losses of this 
project, since the losses would be made good by the zemstvo 
budget and by the tax-payers of the area. Such lack of interest
was not common among cooperatives, whose budget usually was
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financed by membership dues. But the very advantages of 
cooperatives —  their basis in commercial profitability —  was a 
disadvantage when matters concerned projects that did not bring 
an immediate financial gain —  road-building, education,
medicine, public health, large land reclamation projects and 
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agronomic aid.
Nowhere was this difference of character clearer than in the
arguments that went on over farm supply depots. Initially, depots
were managed and subsidized by the zemstvos and the Ministry of
Agriculture. But as their operations expanded, many depots
evolved into self-sufficient cooperative undertakings, based on
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the initiative and financial savings of local farmers. This 
"privatization" of institutions that had previously been wholly 
government-managed had certain advantages —  less
bureaucratization and a greater degree of self-accounting —  but
to the extent that commercial and educational goals diverged,
privatization also had its drawbacks. Many agronomic measures,
for example, could not have been undertaken if they had had to
have been based on short-term profitability.
Farm supply depots were in fact founded on contradictory
premises from the very beginning: on the one hand, they were
commercial enterprises, which had to at least break even, and on
the other hand, they were social-agronomic organs, whose "first
priority" was educational. This contradiction made itself felt
every time a question of policy came up. For instance, if the
depot was intended to make money, it had to sell familiar brands
of agricultural machinery at a markup; if it was intended to
introduce peasant farmers to modern machinery, it would sell
97
unfamiliar brands at cost and with easy terms of credit.
Initially, most depots were supervized by local agronomists, 
who were likely to stress their non-commercial mission. But even 
good agronomists often turned out to be poor managers and
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traders. Consequently, many depots became cash-starved and bogged ♦
down with bad loans. Government subsidies mounted. Many
agronomists found that the long hours required to manage the
depot took away from the time they had for other agronomic tasks.
In short, there were many good arguments for the agronomists
ceding control of the depot to some sort of local farmer 
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cooperative. But other agronomists were loath to forgo the job
of managing the depot. As one agronomist was to note, the sale of
farm supplies was one of the most important points of contact
between the agronomist and the population. "When the peasant is
thinking of spending money, then he begins to listen attentively.
[Managing the farm supply depot is a great opportunity to
develop] the best kind of close relations with peasant farmers,
99
on a practical, purely business-like basis." In France, for
instance, farm supply depots served as the center for all
agronomic aid —  through them courses were organized,
agricultural societies established, demonstration fields set up
100
and periodicals published.
Gradually, however, most observers came to realize that the
privatization of the farm supply depots was an inevitable
consequence of their success and maturity. The institutions
needed to be put on a sound commercial basis. The job of
providing easy credit was to be given to credit cooperatives or
to zemstvo funds of small credit. The introduction of new
machinery into the village was to be the task primarily of the
machinery rental stations. The agronomist could then go back to
what he did best: talking to the peasants, inspiring them with
101
new ideas and helping them implement farming improvements.
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Agronomists occasionally had trouble propagating their ideas
among cooperative members. Some agronomists pointed to the
futility of organizing agricultural lectures at the cooperative
assemblies, since the peasants were usually too taken up with the
work of the cooperative to give any attention to the lecturer. In
one district, the local agronomist reported, the members of the
local credit cooperative would meet to discuss business and
having finished their discussion of credit operations, would
leave the assembly, regarding the agronomic lecture that followed
102
as completely irrelevant to the interests of the cooperative.
A similar problem was noted with respect to the zemstvo funds of
small credit by one of the participants at the Ufa Agronomic
Conference. "Agronomic projects are regarded as risky experiments
[by the members of the fund] and are tolerated only out of
propriety. These funds do not pursue any cultural and educational
103
aims and increasingly resemble normal banking establishments."
The argument that went on between zemstvos and cooperatives 
continues to this day around the world. It is essentially the old 
conflict between Government and the private sector, between 
centralization and decentralization. The rural cooperative move­
ment represented the peasantry’s powerful impulse to commercial­
ized self-reliance, and as such it made many agronomists uneasy. 
With cooperatives, the peasantry was finally taking charge of its 
own destiny.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RISE OF COOPERATION
>
The growth of cooperation in the years of the Stolypin
reform is one of the most extraordinary aspects of that period.
Though Russia was one of the last great powers to develop a mass
cooperative movement, the speed of its growth soon placed it in
the leading ranks of world cooperation. Russia had a greater
number of cooperatives and a greater proportion of its population
1
in cooperatives than practically any other country. The phenome-
2
nal growth of the movement can be seen in the figures below.
Number of Cooperatives in Russia 1904-1916
Type of Cooperative 31 Dec. 1904 31 Dec. 1916
Credit Cooperatives: 1,430 16,057
Consumer Societies: 950 20,000
Agricultural Societies: 700 6,000
Agricultural Associations: 1,000 2,500
Dairy or Handicrafts Associations: 2,000 4.000
Total 6,080 48,557
Consumer societies numerically grew faster than any other
type of cooperative, but they were usually small, financially
weak and urban-based. The real jewel of the cooperative movement,
as we will see later, was credit cooperation. With respect to
Russian cooperation in general, obviously something had changed
after 1905. That year, cooperatives had approximately one million
members; by the end of 1916, this figure had jumped to an esti-
3
mated 24 million. Credit cooperatives and agricultural societies
4
alone counted 12 million members; in other words, if one takes
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into account that each member accounted for a family of five. »
¥
half the peasantry of European Russia and Western Siberia had 
joined cooperatives, even taking some double-counting into con­
sideration. At the same time, from a fragile network of a few 
associations, agricultural and credit cooperation grew to wield
considerable economic clout, accounting for some 1.8 billion
5
rubles in turnover by the end of 1916.
In this chapter we will give a brief overview of this 
remarkable movement. First, we will look at how several leading 
cooperative thinkers defined cooperation and we will examine the 
question whether cooperatives were capitalist institutions, 
socialist or something in between. We will then look at the 
different roles of the central government and the rural 
intelligentsia in supporting the cooperative movement. This will 
be followed by an examination of the social content of the 
cooperative membership and of the growing dominance of peasant 
entrepreneurs in running local cooperatives. Finally, we will 
look at agricultural societies as an example of how cooperatives 
interacted with the zemstvos and agronomists in disseminating 
improved agricultural technology.
The Nature of Cooperation
The essential function of cooperatives was the pooling of 
resources, transforming a multitude of weak units into a powerful 
economic entity. Credit cooperatives did this with respect to 
peasant savings; trading cooperatives did it with respect to
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collective marketing or wholesale purchases. Cooperatives were an i
organic outgrowth of small farm agriculture, allowing smallhold­
ers access to markets, capital and technology normally accessible
6
only to larger farms. For this reason, in almost every country
where small farming predominated, the commercialization and
intensification of agriculture was accompanied by the rise of
some form of cooperation. The development of fruit farming in
California was made possible by the rise of the California Fruit
Growers Association. Germany’s evolution in the 19th century from
primitive grain farming to an intensive system of mixed farming
based on the multi-field crop rotation was accompanied by the
7
development of rural credit cooperatives.
In many cases the new possibilities opened up by cooperation
resulted in the creation of completely new industries in a
variety of agricultural regions. It is not an exaggeration to say
that often the growth of cooperation was directly correlated with
8
the development of agriculture. This was strikingly illustrated 
in the case of Denmark. Still backward in the 1870’s, Denmark’s 
agriculture grew to be one of the most sophisticated in the world 
by the turn of the century. This was due in large part to the 
establishment of cooperatives, which not only marketed the coun­
try’s dairy and pork products around the world, but also organ­
ized agronomic projects such as exhibitions, courses and lec­
tures. According to one estimate, at the beginning of the cen­
tury, over half of Denmark’s gross national product passed 
through agricultural cooperatives. Thus, the experience of Danish 
agriculture, and the central role of cooperatives in that coun­
try, was a powerful source of inspiration for agronomists and
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reformers trying to improve peasant agriculture. ,
It was more than its success in Europe that made the idea of 
cooperation attractive to virtually every segment of Russian 
society. The difficulty of placing cooperatives on any specific 
point in the ideological spectrum meant that all political 
factions could legitimately claim cooperatives as their own. To 
revolutionary socialists, the cooperative movement in the 
countryside represented a demonstration of the working masses’ 
economic potential and the awakening of their class 
consciousness. To liberal reformers, rural cooperation 
represented the long-awaited appearance of entrepreneurial spirit 
among the Russian peasantry and the golden road to "civilizing" 
the masses. One liberal advocate of cooperation, for instance, 
argued that the cooperative movement could accomplish "the recon­
struction of the economic order, the breaking down of class
differences and the economic differences between the sexes, the
10
dreams of international peace and brotherhood." The Tsarist 
government, though at times hostile towards the cooperative 
movement, ultimately embraced agricultural cooperation as a cor­
nerstone of its agricultural development program. To the peasant­
ry, of course, cooperatives simply represented the best way of 
advancing their own economic interests.
The Russian intelligentsia and the agricultural press ac­
tively debated the precise nature of cooperation. Both socialists 
and their ideological opponents tried to fit cooperatives into 
their view of the world. Socialists, for instance, saw 
cooperatives as a step towards full socialization of production.
This view was echoed in the work of the agronomist Ashin, who saw
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cooperative development as directly linked to economic »
development, with both ultimately leading to complete
socialization of production. Ashin saw agricultural (and
cooperative) progress as a series of stages. In the first stage,
as peasant farming becomes commercialized and evolve from the
three-field crop rotation, economic progress is mirrored by the
rise of credit cooperatives. This is followed by the second
stage, when peasant farmers become more commercialized and begin
to develop farm supply and marketing associations. The third
stage sees cooperatives extend their reach to certain branches of
food processing and consumer goods production (meat packing,
butter-making, and flour milling). Finally, in the fourth stage,
all production becomes cooperative and all property, except for
11
the household and the home plot, is collectivized. While the 
first three stages in Ashin’s scheme (cooperation of credit, 
trade and processing) were borne out in the agricultural develop­
ment of many countries at the time, the fourth stage (full coop­
eration of production) remained a theoretical postulate.
Many Russian economists took pains to deflate exaggerated
expectations that cooperatives represented some new form of
economic production that would lead to socialism. Tugan-
Baranovsky conceded that the rise of cooperatives differed
markedly from the rise of capitalism. Whereas capitalist
institutions had developed spontaneously and on the basis of
individual self-interest, cooperatives represented a deliberate
and conscious effort on the part of the intelligentsia to recon-
12
struct society in a planned manner. But while cooperative and 
capitalist institutions developed differently, the institutions
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themselves were rather similar. "The cooperative enterprise is *
neither an institution of charity, nor an organ of propaganda, 
nor a political organization, nor a labour union," wrote Tugan-
f
Baranovsky. "It is an economic organization in the interests of a
certain group of people and, in order to be successful, it must
be run in a business-like manner, on the basis of strict commer-
13
cial accounting, in the same way as any capitalist enterprise." 
Prokopovich also dismissed the idea that cooperatives represented 
a new form of economic production, arguing that, with the possi­
ble exception of certain handicrafts associations, cooperatives
played only a "subsidiary role with respect to the economy of
14
their members" and remained completely dependent on it. And
Makarov also took pains to point out that cooperatives were
15
wholly dependent on the businesses of their members.
The socialist strain in the Russian cooperative movement was 
undoubtedly very strong, especially among the early "cooperators"
—  i.e. the leaders of the movement, who usually came out of the 
third element. But the socialist tendency was countered by many 
staunch defenders of private property. One of the leaders of 
Russia’s cooperative movement, A.N. Balakshin, for instance, 
assailed the tendency to paint cooperation with socialist colors. 
"Russian cooperators regard private capital with haughtiness and 
with a sense of their own superiority," he wrote. "But they 
forget that private capital does not take its stand on exploita­
tion only, and that altruistic ideas are not foreign to it. We 
know of capitalists who have built cathedrals. Shaniavsky left 
big funds for a people’s university, and the merchant Tretyakov 
bequeathed his unique, rich gallery of Russian masters to the
-237-
16
town of Moscow.”
Clearly, the cooperative movement included all sides of the 
political spectrum. Cooperatives are indeed difficult to define 
in terms of political ideology. A cooperative is neither a purely 
capitalist nor a purely socialist institution, containing 
elements of each. In some ways it is similar to a commercial bank 
or stock-holder corporation. Like the latter, cooperatives are 
usually open to anyone who is willing to open up an account, buy 
a share or pay a membership fee. Like the corporation, the 
cooperative is a legal entity, established on the basis of 
corporate bylaws or a mutual contract, and based on the limited 
liability of shareholders and members. Ultimate authority rests 
with the general meeting of members, which like the shareholders 
of a corporation, elects a board of directors. In Russia, since 
cooperatives were relatively simple organizations compared with 
latter-day corporations, the elections were usually direct rather 
than by proxy. The affairs of the enterprise were managed by the 
board —  usually two or three elected members -- sometimes 
assisted by an elected council to supervise their work. Finally, 
the cooperative resembles a capitalist firm in that it has to 
show a profit, must compete on the free market and depends for 
its survival on the marketing, accounting and management skills 
of its leadership.
But there are some significant differences between 
cooperatives and stock-holder corporations. Power inside the 
cooperative is democratic: though there is usually no limit to 
the number of shares any individual can buy, voting takes place 
according to the principle of "one member, one vote." Even more
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importantly, cooperatives benefit their members in ways which are ,
*
much more complex and hard to quantify than is the case with a 
public corporation. The management of a corporation, for 
instance, can clearly be judged on how large a dividend is payed 
out to shareholders or on how much the company’s stock 
appreciates on the stock market. The shares of the cooperative, 
on the other hand, can not be traded and the dividends are 
usually fixed. Since in most cases the members of the cooperative 
are also its customers, management can produce value for its 
members in one of two ways: first, by making a profit, which is 
then remitted proportionally to all members; or second, by 
providing members with superior services (cheap credit, farm 
supplies sold at cost, minimal fees charged for marketing, etc.).
The two courses of action are inversely related: the more the 
cooperative provides low-cost services, the less profit it is 
able to remit to the members, and vice-versa.
Since the value of cooperative services and other downstream 
benefits is hard to quantify and therefore can lead to managerial 
inefficiencies, the optimal course of action for the cooperative 
is the first one: to make a profit and then remit it to the 
members in the form of dividends. But this course of action 
contains the danger of hiding the benefits of cooperation (at 
least for most of the year, when there were no remittances) and 
losing market share by abstaining from underpricing private 
competitors. For this reason, Russian cooperators tended to 
follow the other path. Makarov, for instance, wrote that 
"cooperative credit differs from private capitalist banks in that 
the aim of its activities is not the maximum return on capital,
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but the provision of cheap, accessible credit to its members." »
The final difference between cooperatives and capitalist compa­
nies is that, as Prokopovich noted above, the cooperative is only 
a subsidiary to the business of its members. The cooperative 
typically remains focused on performing a narrow set of func­
tions. Its members —  say a group of family farms —  while taking 
a proprietary interest in the organization’s welfare, for the 
most part work independently of the organization.
The Cooperative Movement and the Government
The first effort to develop a mass network of rural 
cooperatives came in the late 1890*s. In the period 1895-98, the 
government drew up a series of model statutes for various types 
of cooperatives: consumer societies, credit associations, 
agricultural societies, etc. In the following decade, though, the 
growth of the cooperative network was disappointing. By 1904, 
there were only a few thousand small cooperatives throughout the 
whole country. This led the Special Commission on the Needs of 
Agriculture to conclude that cooperation was "a dream of the 
future." Due to the lack of individual initiative and intelligent 
leadership, and because the rural economy was still relatively 
uncommercialized, the environment for the development of 
cooperation in the village was not deemed favorable. Rural 
cooperation was "an exceptional phenomenon," concluded one of the 
reports of the Commission, possible only where the work was taken
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up by some energetic and intelligent member of the upper or
18
middle classes. Then came 1905. Ironically, it was the coopera­
tives* role in the Liberation Movement of 1904-5 which convinced 
the government that these were indeed important organizations.
Although some authors were to argue that the government was 
hostile to cooperation because "cooperation, as one of the purest 
forms of collective self-reliance in economic life, is completely
incompatible with a bureaucratic regime and bureaucratic tute- 
19
lage," the real reason for the government’s suspicion was the 
active participation of the revolutionary-minded third element in 
the cooperative movement. Reluctant to admit the existence of 
widespread opposition among the rural masses, the government was 
quick to blame the insurrection on left wing agitators among the 
rural intelligentsia, who had insinuated themselves into peasant 
society by taking up posts in cooperatives, local government and 
other rural institutions, "financing the revolution on tax-
20
payers’ money," as one irked marshal of the nobility commented. 
Long suspicious of the expanding relationship between the third 
element and the peasantry —  a relationship which threatened to 
supplant its own traditional bond with the peasants —  the gov­
ernment encouraged widespread purges of the third element by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the right-wing zemstvos. Cooper­
atives were hard hit. The land captains often dismissed coopera­
tive boards, cancelled general meetings and broke up cooperative 
21
conferences.
Taking the brunt of the purges were the cooperatives which 
carried out trading activities for the poorer peasants and the 
working class: mostly consumer societies and handicrafts
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associations. Any such cooperative had a ready foe in the person
of the local merchant, and the latter often denounced the
cooperative as a hotbed of revolutionaries to the police. These
denunciations were common and quite damaging to the cooperative
22
movement. Prokopovich reported in 1913:
In general, the position of rural members of the intelligentsia 
participating in the cooperative movement is very difficult. The 
main task of cooperation is the re-organization of the commercial 
economy of small producers on the basis of comradely mutual aid 
in the struggle against the exploitative tendencies of the 
usurers, loan-sharks, and shop-keepers. Precisely these monied 
people of the village, however, wield a large degree of influence 
and clout. Any cooperator, therefore, must first of all carry out 
a hard struggle against the more prosperous and active elements 
of the village, those who wield not only significant economic 
power, but substantial political and administrative influence as 
well. Lacking political rights and being constantly under 
surveillance, cooperatives find this struggle all the more 
difficult, since they must also overcome the opposition of almost 
all the rural authorities -- the village constable, the district 
police officer and the land captain.
To be sure, St. Petersburg’s suspicions were not unfounded.
As Soviet writers were later to admit, socialists in the third
element did use cooperatives as a platform for revolutionary
agitation. Beginning with the Saratov Congress of Cooperatives in
1904, a string of cooperative congresses in various provinces
called for the development of cooperatives based on the "changing
political foundations" of Russia —  a barely veiled reference to
23
the Revolution. Nevertheless, excessive repression of the 
cooperative movement proved to be both politically and economi­
cally counterproductive for the government —  politically so, 
because it merely reinforced the hostility of the cooperators and
economically counterproductive, because cooperation was crucial 
to Russia’s agricultural development.
The government’s attitude had never been entirely 
consistent. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs took the lead 
in repressing the cooperatives, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Agriculture worked hard to encourage their 
development. Administrative hostility was most consistent towards 
the consumer societies and some of the handicrafts cooperatives, 
probably because these organizations generally represented the 
poorer (and more radical) peasants. Consistent antagonism was 
also shown towards the unions and congresses of the cooperative 
movement, since these threatened to rival the government on the 
national political stage. With respect to those cooperatives, 
like agricultural societies and credit cooperatives, whose 
beneficial effect on agricultural development was clear and who 
rarely engaged in any political agitation, the government showed 
only strong support.
When Stolypin arrived in St. Petersburg and the government 
began to undertake the matter of agricultural development in 
earnest, cooperatives received a tremendous boost. The model 
statutes for cooperatives that had been drawn up in the 1890*s 
had failed to produce sufficient results and consequently were 
all re-written in the period 1904-8. The minimum membership fees 
and share prices were reduced and the functions of cooperatives 
were expanded. In addition, the Ministry of Finance established a 
cadre of inspectors of small credit, based in provincial or 
district towns, who would help organize credit associationas and 
audit their books. Government subsidies to new cooperatives also
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increased.
Other ministries were mobilized to help in developing the
rural cooperative network. The repression of the revolution was
giving way to social conciliation and matters of economic
development; the peasant rebellion had not even subsided before
the Council of Ministers began praising and encouraging the third
element in their cooperative work. The Ministry of Finance’s
credit inspectors and the Ministry of Agriculture’s agronomists
were already deeply involved in the cooperative movement, but
other ministries also began joining the crusade. The Ministry of
Education, for example, encouraged local teachers to help the
development of credit cooperatives by joining up as members of
24
the board or as book-keepers. Similarly, the Holy Synod encour­
aged local priests to take part in organizing and running the 
25
cooperatives. The Synod declared that credit cooperatives were 
"different from other types of credit institutions, since they 
are based not on material interests, but on comradely founda­
tions, on the basis of mutual responsibility and trust, and
cannot exist without the idea that economic interests must unite
26
people among themselves on the basis of Christian reciprocity." 
Here, in the government’s and the church’s turn towards coopera­
tion, we see the hope of reconciling the classes and breathing 
life into the Slavophile idea of a corporate state. The govern­
ment, by infusing the cooperative movement with the more loyal of 
its employees, hoped to guide the movement away from political 
subversion, replacing revolutionary socialism with Christianity 
and patriotism. This was a clever policy, rather reminiscent of 
the Zubatov trade unions, created by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in the early years of the century.
The government’s appeal met with an enthusiastic response 
from the third element, which had been waiting for the opportuni­
ty to lead just such a crusade for the economic liberation of the 
nation’s working masses (and cooperatives were independent enough 
for the radical intelligentsia to avoid feeling as if they were 
supporting the government). Within a few years, various minis­
tries were voicing their concern that their local employees were 
sacrificing their official duties for cooperative work. In 1911, 
for example, the Ministry of Education urged rural teachers not
to let their participation in the credit cooperatives detract
27
from their teaching duties. The Governor of Livonia issued a
circular reproving volost scribes for getting carried away with
cooperative work and forgetting about their official responsibil- 
28
ities. The cooperative movement, like the peasant economy, was 
in the midst of an astounding boom and high ministerial officials 
evidently could only urge caution to local employees not to lose 
their heads.
Cooperatives and the Third Element
The change in model statutes and the government’s 
encouragement of rural cooperation clearly had an enormous 
effect, but the main factor in the cooperative movement’s growth 
was the participation of the rural intelligentsia. In a village, 
where the bulk of the people were illiterate, the skills of an
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educated person were very valuable. Someone who could keep
accounts, deal with bureaucratic regulations or draw up contracts
was of great use to the village community. For this reason, as we
saw above, Stolypin and the Council of Ministers soon realized
that the participation of the third element was essential to the
success of the cooperative movement. Though commercially less
adept than the local merchants and money lenders, the local
intelligentsia made up in dedication and perseverence what they
lacked in terms of business skills. They proved instrumental in
29
the growth of the cooperative movement. The rural economist 
Khizhniakov, for instance, found that the degree to which cooper­
atives had developed in various districts was directly related to
the participation of the zemstvos and the local intelligentsia in
30
cooperative work.
Our cooperatives are still being imposed from above, rather than 
growing up through the initiative and self-help of the local 
population. As a result of the primitiveness of the population 
and its lack of certian essential habits and skills, our 
cooperation is still a delicate flower requiring careful 
nurturing by a pair of skilled hands. Therefore its successful 
development is wholly dependent on the nature of the local intel­
ligentsia, its dedication to cooperative work and its ability to 
develop and lead the cooperative movement.
Cooperators were an amorphous group of entrepreneurs. In a 
way one can classify the Russian cooperative movement according 
to who were its leading cadres at any given point in time. Rus­
sian cooperation evolved through a succession of stages in which 
each generation of cooperators was superceded by the next, larger 
generation: the gentry philanthropists who started the movement
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in the 19th century were gradually eclipsed by government func­
tionaries such as the State Bank’s inspectors of small credit and 
by the thousands of agronomists, teachers and other members of 
the third element; during the war, these old-style cooperators 
were increasingly overshadowed by a new stratum of cooperative 
administrator-bureaucrats in the cities and clever peasant 
leaders on the village level. To get an idea of who was formally
credited with starting credit cooperatives, let us look at the
31
following survey:
Survey of Credit Cooperatives in Moscow Province 1908-11 
26 organized by peasants
9 " " agronomists
7 " " clergy, doctors or teachers
4 M ” landowners
2 ” " marshals of nobility
1 M " chairman of the zemstvo board
1 " " land captain
1 " " inspector of small credit
1 !!_ H. agricultural society
52 Total
This proportional picture of organizers is confirmed by a
similar survey of credit cooperatives in Perm province; here
peasants organized the most cooperatives (35%), followed by
agronomists (19%); priests, teachers and volost scribes each 
32
organized 11%. The proportions are slightly reversed when one
considers agricultural societies, which tended to have a greater
educational role than did the credit cooperatives. The following
33
is a survey of 1,700 societies in 1912.
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JA Survey of 1.700 Agricultural Societies in 1912
Percent of 
agricultural societies
Organized on the 
initiative o f : 
agronomists 
peasants 
landowners 
clergy 
teachers
land captains, scribes 
other cooperatives 
other
31%
24%
11%
9%
8%
5%
5%
7%
100%
What these figures don’t necessarily show is the strong role
played by the central government. This was especially true with
respect to credit associations, which usually relied on the State
Bank for start-up capital and on the inspectors of small credit
for guidance. Tugan-Baranovsky even remarked that credit associa-
34
tions were almost like Potemkin villages. Other observers 
responded that state funds soon ceased to dominate the finances 
of the credit cooperatives and that cooperative membership grew 
rapidly, indicating that cooperatives were independent, popular
organizations led by local entrepreneurs and activists.
Whether one sees cooperation as a genuine mass movement or 
merely as a successful modernization campaign led by 
intellectuals and government administrators, it is impossible to 
deny the importance of the cooperative cadres. Even a mass 
movement, after all, has its theorists, its agitators and its 
leaders. And these self-styled missionaries certainly took to 
their task with zeal. But at the same time, cooperation was a
35
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grass-roots movement. If constructive popular movements were 
perceived to have been very rare in Russian history —  "the state 
had grown strong while society had grown weak," to use 
Kliuchevsky*s famous phrase -- then the cooperative movement was 
a refreshing example of popular initiative in which the state and 
the intelligentsia, though important, for once were not the 
decisive factor.
Peasant Managers and the Cooperative Movement
Cooperation’s mission of educating the peasantry in demo­
cratic action and economic management was widely considered to be 
one of the most important aspects of the movement. It was often 
argued that cooperatives were constrained by the narrow-minded­
ness and primitivism of the peasants and many cooperatives there­
fore undertook educational and cultural tasks for the enlighten­
ment of the peasants. According to one war-time survey, 75% of 
the older credit cooperatives and 52% of the newer cooperatives
stated that they ran some sort of cultural-educational program
36
(lectures, courses, tea houses, peoples’ palaces, etc.) Cooper­
atives published their own periodicals, both local and national
37
in scope; by the end of 1917 these numbered 117. Peoples* 
houses or palaces were like village clubs, with a library, a tea 
room, and lectures or live entertainment in the evenings. Peo­
ples’ theaters were especially popular; they were organized by 
local zemstvos or by cooperatives. The plays were produced by a 
"musical-dramatic troupe", consisting of the peasants themselves.
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One correspondent reported: »
A conference of co-operative societies of the province of Vologda 
convened in February, 1914 for the purpose of discussing the 
educational aims and possibilities of co-operation. In some 
places, mostly as a result of interference on the part of the 
officials, the playhouses were made to produce low and vulgar 
farces, vaudevilles, and similar plays of the music-hall turn, 
which, however, was strongly resented by the peasants, who pro­
tested, and finally the attendances dropped. "What the peasants 
want," reported some delegates, "are plays with some deep moral 
meaning, reproducing the sorrows and joys of real life, inspiring 
the hearers with higher ideals..." Where sufficient freedom and 
discretion is allowed to the "peasant circles", they usually 
introduce plays by some of the best authors and playwrights, such 
as Tolstoy, Chekhov, Ostrovsky, and others.
The cooperatives also proved to be an excellent form of 
civic education, teaching peasants the skills of democratic 
organization and financial management. The cooperative general 
assemblies in particular were an excellent school, despite the 
disorder and heated argument that often prevailed. For Chayanov 
(writing under the alias Ivan Kremnev) cooperatives before the 
revolution represented a kind of "rural soviet," a local 
democratic organ uniting the interests of the peasants and 
representing them on the national level.
As the peasants gained cooperative experience, the gentry
and rural intelligentsia who had led the movement in the early
days were confronted by the emerging force of peasant
cooperators, voicing contempt for the high ideals of the older
generation and increasingly willing to claim their central posi-
39
tion in the movement. Balakshin recalled:
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I remember the enthusiasm with which we started upon the 
formation of a cooperative creamery association. It was not the 
material side alone that interested us. It was a moral satisfac­
tion for us to do some good for our fellow men. We felt that not 
by bread alone will man live. It was, so to speak, the honeymoon 
of cooperation, full of festive feeling. The struggle with the 
opponents of cooperation has brought to the surface the egotisti­
cal instincts of self-preservation. We took greater interest in 
the material advantages of cooperation, in dividends, than in its 
exalted aims and objects. The ideal side was getting obscured by 
material cravings. People without any ideals whatever turned to 
the cooperative movement with the object of advancing their 
personal ends to the detriment of the cause.
Balakshin seemed to be saying that careerists and revolu­
tionaries were taking control of the cooperatives. What is defi­
nitely true, however, is that the larger the cooperative movement 
grew, the more independence it gained from the government agents 
and intelligentsia who had initiated it. There appeared large 
numbers of professional cooperators, employed as instructors, 
managers, book-keepers, auditors, etc. This transition from 
domination by government or intelligentsia cooperators to a 
growing corps of self-reliant peasant managers represented a 
fundamental change in the relations within the cooperative move­
ment. Tugan-Baranovsky described the evolution of credit coopera-
40
tion in the following way:
Initially, [the credit association] was an institution 
established through the initiative of the inspector of small 
credit or some other outside figure. Its members took no 
interest in it whatsoever and saw it only as a source for 
receiving loans out of government funds. However, the longer a 
credit association was in existence, the stronger became its 
educational influence on its members. At first, a small group 
from the immediate management begins to take a conscious interest 
in the affairs of the association. Subsequently, this group
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increasingly takes root in the local community and increasingly »
begins to attract the peasantry from the village into the conduct * 
of its affairs.
As cooperatives spread throughout Russia’s towns and vil­
lages, the older generation of cooperators (gentry, government 
functionaries and members of the intelligentsia) were gradually 
overshadowed by the new breed of peasant or worker cooperators, 
contemptuous of the intelligentsia and often hostile to govern­
ment and private property. Already at the 1908 Cooperative Con­
gress, one peasant delgate was heard declaring: "Those days when 
the working masses obediently followed the leadership of the
intelligentsia are passing, and in many localities, have already
41
passed irrevocably." This was perhaps an inescapable conse­
quence of success: as coooperatives introduced more local self- 
reliance, even the appreciation for the intelligentsia’s special 
skills began to vanish and rank and file peasant members began to 
eclipse non-peasants in the management of cooperatives. This is 
evident in a 1913 survey of credit associations concerning the
42
educational level of village-level cooperative administration.
Educational Level of Credit Association Management
University Intermediate Elementary Illiterate 
Board members 2.7% 11.2% 85.4% 0.7%
Council members 4.2% 10.5% 83.5% 1.8%
The table shows the vast predominance of people with only 
elementary education in the management of credit associations.
Since it is reasonable to assume that most members of the gentry 
and the rural intelligentsia had more than an elementary
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education, we must conclude that they represented no more than ,
15% of the cooperative board members. The demise of the 
intelligentsia within the cooperative movement is a dramatic 
change from the early days of cooperation. But it was inevitable 
considering the very rapidity of the movement’s growth. If, by a 
conservative estimate, we assume that each cooperative had an 
average of four board and council members, then the 26,000 
agricultural cooperatives (all rural cooperatives, excluding 
consumer societies) must have had at least 100,000 such 
executives. A movement on this scale could not have been managed 
by anybody besides local peasants, though as we shall see, non­
peasants still retained a dominant leadership role in 
agricultural societies.
Even in those branches of cooperation such as credit 
associations, where peasants had taken over the management of the 
grassroots organizations, the cooperative intelligentsia 
continued to play an important role. Those non-peasant 
cooperators who were truly committed to the cause either contined 
to carry out their duties on the village level or moved up to 
serve in the burgeoning national cooperative apparatus. They 
staffed the higher-level cooperative organisations such as the 
provincial unions, the larger agricultural societies, the Moscow 
Peoples Bank, etc. In addition to serving in the cooperative 
administration itself, the non-peasant cooperators occupied 
positions in the cooperation departments of the zemstvos and 
various educational institutions. As cooperation began to prove 
an important force in the Russian countryside in 1906-17, any 
organisation that dealt even remotely with the peasant economy
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opened a special section dealing with cooperation. The coopera- »
tive movement began to develop an extensive staff of its own 
experts: the largest staff of "cooperative instructors" was main­
tained by the powerful Moscow Union of Consumer Societies, but 
cooperative courses were also run in the universities of Kharkov,
Kiev and Omsk among others. Special mention must be made of the 
Shanyavsky People’s University in Moscow, which not only educated 
cooperators at its courses, but also organised a system of trav­
elling lecturers who ventured far and wide over Russia, explain-
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ing the principles of cooperation. Finally, the growing cooper­
ative press also demanded a large number of cooperative intelli­
gentsia. By 1917, there were over 100 cooperative periodicals and 
a string of publishing organisations spreading information,
propaganda and developing a national "cooperative
44
consciousness."
The cooperative movement was intended to be a multi-class 
effort at improving the local economy and resolving the class 
struggle. Instead of reconciling the classes, however, the coop­
erative movement soon began to reflect the class struggle going 
on around it. While the higher-level cooperative organizations 
began to work with government or the Duma opposition on a nation­
al level, the majority of rural ground-level cooperatives started 
to develop a marked anti-government, anti-urban and anti­
intelligentsia bias. The class antagonism was reflected in the
discord between consumer societies on the one hand and credit
45
cooperatives and agricultural societies on the other. It was 
also indicated by the peasantry gradually taking control of the 
bulk of the ground level cooperative movement from the
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intelligentsia. Soviet historians like V.V. Kabanov, therefore,
may be right in postulating that a kind of class struggle was
emerging in the cooperative movement, a class struggle that was
only resolved in 1917-19, when the top of the cooperative
movement was purged and replaced by the emerging generation of
46
"red cooperators."
Whether this was true or not, two things are certain: first,
that the cooperative movement succeeded in awakening the
democratic instincts of self-reliance among the Russian peasantry
and second, that the network of small, self-reliant cooperatives
was becoming an increasingly powerful and complex organization
and necessitated a growing administrative apparatus to coordinate
the cooperative movement on the national level.
The latter point can be seen in the mounting evidence that
the cooperative movement was becoming bureaucratized. Some
observers of rural cooperation began to notice a certain amount
of peasant alienation from what were supposed to be organizations
of peasant self-help. Prokopovich, for instance, noted an "us and
them" attitude of the rank and file membership toward the board
47
of the cooperative. General meetings of the cooperative were 
only sparsely attended, and there were many complaints that 
meetings were formalistic to the point of incomprehensability. 
Peasants often regarded credit cooperatives as just another place 
where they could get a loan, rather than a body organized for 
their collective advancement. This attitude would seem to be 
confirmed by a survey of credit cooperatives in Iaroslavl 
province: over three quarters of the cooperatives reported that
the population regards them as an organ of the state, rather than
-255-
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their own organization. One observer recounted the following >
49 *
symptomatic tale of rank and file alienation.
A peasant, on his way back from work will call out to the book­
keeper, "I’ll come by the association on Sunday for some money."
When he comes for the loan, the board will sign him up as a 
member, and the cashier will hand him the money - that’s the 
extent of the relationship of the member to the cooperative 
organization.
When the peasants did regard the cooperative as their own 
institution, attitudes towards outsiders tended to be suspicious 
and hostile. Prokopovich notes a case when a credit cooperative 
refused to allow a non-peasant, a member of the local intelli­
gentsia, into their cooperative. The local inspector of small 
credit, however, insisted that the cooperative must have at least 
one memeber of the intelligentsia on its advisory committee, and 
eventually forced the peasant to accept the person in question.
Life was made very difficult for the unfortunate altruist —  his 
life was threatened, and when this didn’t work, his ink was 
sabotaged so that his writing would fade away on the paper.
Finally, the goal was achieved and the man declared that he was 
leaving the cooperative. The inspector of small credit then 
closed down the cooperative for a whole year, in reprisal, after
which the peasants finally came around and agreed to elect
50
intelligentsia to their board and advisory council.
Prokopovich argued that the peasants* distrust of those "in 
charge" in the cooperatives was not due to class differences.
Most of the cooperative executive staff, after all, was composed 
of peasants. Rather, it was the venality and careerism of the
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cooperative administration, which irked the peasants. Prokopovich i
cites peasant opinion that only those related to board memebers
or those who bribed the board with a good lunch or a good drink
were able to get loans. Consequently, rank and file members often
responded with a tried and tested democratic cure: re-electing a
whole new board "so that the old ones wouldn’t start giving
51
themselves airs.”
It was a mark of the soundness and maturity of the 
cooperative movement that the burning issue ceased to be how to 
convince peasants to join cooperatives and was replaced by the 
dilemma of reconciling increasingly sophisticated operations on 
the one hand and growing bureaucratization on the other. It was 
also a mark of the cooperative movement’s maturity that the 
"pupils" (i.e. the peasants) had begun to strive for such a 
degree of independence from their erstwhile "teachers" (the 
government agents, gentrymen and rural intelligentsia who were 
involved in the movement).
Social Content of Cooperative Membership
Cooperatives were not egalitarian in their membership. They 
tended to represent the solid middle and rich peasants of Russia 
—  a majority of the rural population, but not everyone. "Experi­
ence has shown that (in order to make use of cooperation), work­
ing people must have a certain amount of economic security and 
wealth. The lower budget groups of working people, especially
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those with an irregular income, cannot be active members even of »
52 *
the consumer societies,” wrote Prokopovich.
Minin, in an examination of pre-revolutionary agricultural 
cooperatives, concluded that though poor and middle peasants pre­
dominated numerically, rich peasants accounted for a disprortion- 
ate number of members. As cooperatives developed, the relative
weight of the rich peasants declined and it was the other strata
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of the village who derived the most benefit from cooperation.
While the more prosperous peasantry contributed a
disproportionate amount of the savings, the mass of the middle
peasants were the ones to take out loans. Loans were limited by
law to 300 rubles without collateral and 750 on security;
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interest rates were fixed at a relatively low rate. Thus, the
fact that the rich peasants provided most of the deposits and
that these were then loaned out to the mass of the members was a
positive development. The debtors were hardly falling into debt
bondage (especially if they managed to avoid going to the local
loan-shark) and the whole phenomenon of credit cooperation
represented a redistribution of investment funds. Concerning the
membership of credit cooperatives we have several surveys. This
one covered 1,928 credit associations nation-wide in 1911 and
55
used the national horse census of 1904-6 as a control.
-258-
Horses Owned by Cooperative members and the General Population
Category % cooperative members % population
Without horses: 10% 34%
1 horse: 26% 38%
2 horses: 33% 20%
3-4 horses: 20% 6%
5 horses or more: 11% 1%
100% 100%
The table shows that cooperatives had a greater proportion
of households well-endowed with horses and a smaller proportion
with few horses than did the general population. In other words,
cooperative members tended to be significantly richer than the
general population, at least in regard to horses. A similar, but
slightly weaker, relationship was found in a 1904 survey of
credit associations in Kharkov, Taurida and Ekaterinoslav 
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provinces. A zemstvo survey of 15,365 credit association
members in Ufa province in 1911 uncovered some interesting
characteristics. The survey found that the average cooperative
member had a larger family than the average peasant farmer, but
he owned approximately the same amount of land —  he merely
farmed it more intensively (sowed more desiatins) and rented more
land. This led Krasilnikov, the local zemstvo analyst, to
conclude that cooperative members were ’’more enterprising” and
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’’more industrious" than the average peasant. The Ufa survey
showed that in terms of horse-ownership cooperative members were
definitely wealthier than the average farmer, but that this
tendency weakened over time as increasing numbers of poor and
58
middle peasantry joined up. We can see this in the following 
59
table.
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Horse-ownership among credit association members in Ufa Province
Percentage in each group
Group 1906 1911
Without horses: 2% 4%
1 horse: 16% 28%
2 horses: 29% 32%
3-4 horses: 34% 25%
5 horses or more: 19% 11%
100% 100%
The table shows that the stronger peasants were the first to
join, but that the proportion of members who were middle and poor
peasants increased with time. Another analyst, writing in 1913
about agricultural cooperatives in Chernigov province, argued
that the cooperatives did not represent a "wager on the strong";
they represented "the working part of the population, the middle
and the poor peasants, but only those poor who have their own 
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farm." And this can safely be said about most Russian 
cooperatives, especially since a mass movement of 10 million 
member households could not help but be dominated by the middle 
peasantry.
Agricultural Societies
In the following chapters we will be examining the crucial 
role of cooperatives in Russia’s agricultural development. As we 
shall see, cooperatives advanced agricultural development merely 
by their own existence, by fulfilling the need for credit, farm 
supplies and marketing services. But cooperatives were also
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linked directly to the agronomists * attempts to disseminate ,
knowledge and improved agricultural technology. To illustrate
this relationship and to glimpse the dynamics of cooperative
development we can take a look at agricultural societies.
Agricultural societies are not often thought of as
cooperatives, since cooperatives are usually assumed to be
economic entities and players in the market. We tend to envision
agricultural societies as similar to the venerable scientific
clubs that played such a large role in promoting English
agriculture in the 18th and 19th centuries. In Russia some
agricultural societies did fit this image, but the vast majority
were quite different. Most Russian agricultural societies were
very small and located deep in the Russian countryside; 80% were
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based in areas that contained only a few villages. Russian
agricultural societies were composed overwhelmingly of peasant
farmers. A 1912 survey of 95,000 agricultural society members
found that in the most common small-scale society, independent
peasant small-holders (excluding tenant farmers) constituted 91%
of the membership. The remainder of the membership was made up of
gentry landowners, tenant farmers, agronomists, philanthropists,
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scientists, and other members of the provincial intelligentsia.
The primary aim of the societies was educational: the
organization of lectures, courses, expositions, the publishing of
periodicals, etc. Consequently, despite the large peasant
component, agricultural societies tended to attract the more
advanced portion of the population; the 1912 survey found an
average literacy rate of 84% (versus a nationwide literacy rate 
63
of 28%). The leadership of the societies tended to come from
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groups outside the peasantry. The following is a survey of 1,283
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societies carried out in 1912.
t v
Social characteristics of Agricultural Society Leadership
Group 
Peasants:
Landowners:
Clergy:
Teachers:
Land captains, scribes: 
Agronomists:
Other:
% of chairmen % of secretaries
42%
16%
13%
9%
4%
5%
11%
33%
4%
6%
22%
11%
9%
15%
100% 100%
We can see from the table that peasants constituted the 
plurality, but not the majority of agricultural society chairmen 
and secretaries. Interestingly, members of the gentry and the 
clergy often took up posts as chairmen, but worked as secrataries 
relatively rarely. Conversely, teachers, land captains, scribes 
and agronomists were rarely agricultural society chairmen, but 
often served as secretaries.
The weakness of the agricultural societies was financial. 
Self-financing could come from either membership fees or payments 
for business services; membership fees were limited (4% of 
societies’ revenues, according to one survey) in the interests of 
not excluding the majority of the population, while commissions 
for agricultural services were also kept down (23% of societies* 
revenues) in order to make them as widely accessible as
possible. That meant that over half of the societies* revenues 
came from subsidies or loans provided by the Ministry of
65
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Agriculture, the zemstvos or private patrons.
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The agricultural societies’ financial dependency did not 
prevent them from growing rapidly and playing an important eco­
nomic role in their locality. With time, the financial dependency 
presumably decreased —  the data above refers to 1911, when 
agricultural societies were in their initial stage of 
development. That agricultural societies were not just hollow,
state-subsidized institutions is indicated by their rapid growth,
67
as we can see from the following table.
Agricultural societies in Russia 
Year
as of 31 Dec. Number of Societies
1895 175
1901 268
1907 1,275
1913 3,000
1916 6,000
By the end of 1916, agricultural societies included 430,000
paid-up members and could boast of an anual turnover of an
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estimated 60 million rubles. Agricultural societies spread very
quickly —  three new societies a day after 1913 —  and thus
proved their financial viability and their suitability for
Russian agricultural conditions. Another reason to think that
agricultural societies were increasingly gaining financial
strength was the growth in their various educational and
commercial services, some provided free, others for a fee. By
1914, agricultural societies boasted 66 experimental and research
facilities and 20 agricultural schools, not to mention a
69
multitude of courses and lectures. They were, in the words of
70
one sympathetic observer, primarily "propaganda institutions."
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Agronomists liked agricultural societies for being a point 
of contact with the population and the fact that they were 
organizations which united people with common economic interests 
and entrepreneurial impulses. This was the view of one of the 
agronomists speaking at the Ekaterinoslav Congress, for instance. 
But, he argued, in view of the backwardness of most of the 
population, agricultural societies can’t limit themselves to 
educational functions, but must provide visible material benefits 
for their members: cooperative procurement of farm supplies, 
marketing services and consultation services. Zemstvos should
help agricultural societies by subsidizing their projects and
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jointly planning a program of agronomic aid. With or without
zemstvo support, the majority of agricultural societies (79%) in
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fact became involved in economic operations. One publication
mentioned that in 1915 agricultural societies operated 1,151
demonstration fields, 1,231 stud farms, 1,260 libraries, 1,454
machine rental stations, 1,030 seed cleaning stations, 806 agri-
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cultural depots, and so on. The involvement of agricultural
societies in these kinds of activities may have been even more
extensive. A 1916 survey of 2,977 societies found that they ran
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the following operations:
demonstration fields............1,454 societies
stud farms 1,340 societies
libraries 1,260 societies
machine rental stations........ 1,044 societies
schools, museums, bookshops 203 societies
Agricultural societies were most widely developed in Polta-
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va, where they numbered over 300 by 1915. A 1911 survey of 45
agricultural societies in Poltava found that they had 504 model
fields. A survey of 187 societies a year later revealed that over
the course of the year they had organized 1,008 lectures attended
by a total of 49,410 listeners. 133 societies had libraries,
containing a total of 29,696 books. 35 agricultural expositions
were organized by societies in 1912 (some attended by up to
10,000 visitors). 234 societies operated machine rental stations,
offering 2,083 pieces of equipment and 174 societies ran seed-
cleaning operations, which were used by 20,046 farmers over the
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course of the year.
Another telling example is the Shumilin Agricultural Society 
founded in the Don Territory in 1905. Though average in size by 
Russian standards, this society proved itself remarkably active, 
at least by local newspaper accounts. By 1911, it had offices in 
the town square: a two-story building, which it it shared with 
the local consumer society. The society offered the usual seed- 
cleaning, farm supply and livestock breeding services, but it 
also organized expositions, demonstration fields, and employed 
two agronomists. Since this was horse and cossack country, the 
Shumilin ran a veterinary station, staffed by a veterinary as­
sistant. Like many other agricultural societies, the Shumilin 
society also took it upon itself to promote local economic inter­
ests. It successfully petitioned the government for money to open 
a basket-weaving school, a rest home, and a post office; it also
convinced the provincial authorities to build a bridge over the
77
local Peskovatka river.
Often an agricultural society’s commercial operations, if
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successful, won it popularity and trust among the population. >
But if commercial operations grew too extensive, the agricultural
society often organized other cooperatives to do the job —
credit cooperatives, consumer societies or dairy associations.
The 1912 Ministry of Agriculture survey found that almost 30% of
agricultural societies had started new cooperatives. 45% had
either financial ties or were running joint projects with other 
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cooperatives. Sometimes agricultural societies would play the 
role of a cooperative union, coordinating the activities of all 
the cooperatives of the area. These so-called Central 
Agricultural Societies played an important role in Vitebsk, Riga 
St. Petersburg, Pskov, Vladimir and Kostroma.
The largest agricultural societies represented the interests 
of Russian agriculture to the central government, organizing 
national congresses, lobbying for changes in laws, railroad rates 
and tariffs. The most important such organization undoubtedly was 
the venerable Moscow Committee on Rural Credit and Industrial 
Societies (otherwise known as the Moscow Agricultural Society), 
along with its St. Petersburg branch. Apart from publishing 
several very influential periodicals, the Moscow Agricultural 
Society was instrumental in drafting the model laws for the first 
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives (credit associations) and the 
Moscow Peoples Bank. The Kharkov Agricultural Society was also 
very important, running a farm supply operation which recorded
700,000 rubles of sales in 1912, boasting an impressive research 
center and several agronomists on the staff, and maintaining an 
office in Minneapolis. Other, more specialized agricultural 
societies such as the Imperial Poultry-Rearing Society were
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active in the technological advancement of their respective
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branches of agriculture.
This gives some idea of the breadth of activities organized 
by agricultural societies. Their value for agronomists and their 
influence on Russia’s agricultural development was significant. 
Yet, they were not even the dominant type of rural cooperative. 
That honor belonged to the credit cooperative.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
COOPERATION AND CREDIT
*
Credit cooperatives were the lynchpin of the cooperative
movement. They were the most numerous form of rural cooperative
and by far the strongest economically. The emergence of the new
Russian farmer —  specifically the success of land settlement and
agronomic measures -- depended on the ability of the peasant
farmer to invest in his farming system. There was only so far
that either government or zemstvo subsidies could go in financing
agricultural innovation. The solution was to mobilize existing
peasant savings and establish a rural banking system, which would
provide a real interest rate on savings, while giving farmers
access to cheap credit. Given the proper market mechanisms, this
would set in motion the great capitalist phenomenon of
multiplying a small amount of initial funds into a large capital
base. The importance of credit in any program of agricultural
1
development was underlined by Chuprov in 1906:
Only through the broad development of easily accessible credit... 
can we explain the amazing speed of the technological transforma­
tion of the German or Italian village. The example of the West 
clearly shows that without the organization of a mass credit sys­
tem, which is both broadly-based and expedient in form, it’s not 
possible to even think of any successful large-scale changes in 
farming.
In this chapter we will examine the importance of credit to 
the peasant economy and the impact of the rise of credit 
cooperatives. We will trace the evolution of these institutions
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from their beginnings as fragile organizations dependent on the »
guidance of the inspectors of small credit or some other members 
of the rural intelligentsia, to a powerful network headed by 
regional and national credit unions, wielding significant clout 
in the national economy.
Importance of Credit in Agriculture
For a farmer, a large proportion of his assets are fixed —  
in the form of land and buildings; this is especially true when 
there is a low degree of agricultural mechanization, and hence a 
low degree of investment in equipment and other moveable 
resources. The importance of his fixed assets means that the 
farmer often needs long-term credit; in Russia, the peasants 
received such long-term credit from the Government in the 1861 
Emancipation settlement and, later, from the Peasant Land Bank.
In addition to large fixed investments in property and buildings, 
the farmer commonly makes numerous medium- and short-term 
investments. He makes a several-year investment in livestock or a 
piece of equipment and he makes a half-year investment in seeds, 
fertilizers or hired labor during the work season. Since the 
farmer faces a lag time of six months or more between his 
expenditure and the return, he often needs credit to tide him 
over the dry period. If medium- or short-term credit is difficult 
to obtain, the farmer is forced to pay extortionate interest 
rates for his farm supplies or sell his produce immediately on a 
soft market.
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In Russia at the end of the 19th century, as the self-
sufficiency of the peasant economy was eroding and rural
production was becoming increasingly commercialized, the peasant-
2
ry experienced a sharp money shortage. The need for credit 
became acute, with demand far outstripping supply. A new genera­
tion of loan sharks and money lenders arose, spreading throughout
3
the countryside and charging interest rates as high as 40%. The 
most common form of credit was provided by shop-keepers, who sold 
the necessary consumer goods, loaned out money and charged steep 
interest rates on peasant accounts. After the harvest the shop­
keepers/moneylenders would often act as grain merchants, taking a 
hefty commission on marketing peasant produce. These were the 
kulaks, the infamous bogeymen of Soviet propaganda.
Everybody agreed that the interest charged by private lend­
ers in the countryside was extortionate. Peasant farmers were 
hemorraging money in the form of interest payments and income 
lost to middlemen and financiers. An alarming number of peasants 
were falling into debt bondage to the local kulak. The question 
was what to do about it. At first, the government took an admin­
istrative approach, trying to enforce a law limiting interest 
rates to 12%. This did not work. The demand for credit was so
high that both peasants and money-lenders conspired in sidestep-
4
ping the regulations.
The government’s impulse to cap interest rates by 
administrative fiat was misguided, since it did not go to the 
root of the problem. The problem was not high interest rates or 
the existence of unscrupulous money-lenders —  it was the 
shortage of rural credit. Kulak credit was the lesser of two
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evils, the greater evil being the absence of any credit
whatsoever. The peasant chose to go to the moneylender because
he had to. As a later generation of agricultural economists would
point out, the private moneylender was not such an evil figure as
he was made out to be. His money was available, whereas
government or cooperative loans were not. The high interest rates
reflected real factors of risk and demand. If the Russian
government had succeeded in imposing a ceiling on rural interest
rates, the consequence would have been either capital flight from
the peasant economy or the concentration of capital as
moneylenders understandably chose to deal only with the safest 
5
borrowers. The best solution, as Nikolai Bukharin was to note in
the 1920’s, was to fight extortionate kulaks and middlemen by
6
outcompeting them on the market. Rather than driving away the 
peasants* only available source of credit, one had to provide an 
alternative. In Stolypin’s Russia such an alternative emerged: a 
broad-ranging network of credit cooperatives.
A well developed system of credit cooperation helped the 
peasantry in several ways:
First, credit cooperatives, with their short-term loans at 
11% or 12% interest, drove down kulak interest rates by providing 
an alternative source of credit.
Second, credit cooperatives played an integral role in the 
process of commercialization of the peasant economy. Since they 
relied on mobilizing existing peasant savings, credit 
cooperatives could develop only where a commercialized rural 
economy had already arisen. But by rewarding savings accumulation 
and providing cheap credit, they also encouraged the process of
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commercialization. Previously, if the peasant farmer accumulated 
any cash savings, he was likely to hide them in his mattress, in 
which case the money went out of circulation both for him and for 
the national economy. If he was willing to travel to the nearest 
city, the peasant farmer could deposit his savings in a 
commercial bank in order to earn interest, but in that case his 
money would probably be reinvested in the urban economy. The 
virtue of credit cooperatives was not only that they provided 
peasants with a convenient place to deposit their savings and 
earn interest, but also that the savings would be reinvested 
precisely where they were needed most: back into the peasant 
economy.
Third, while credit cooperation encouraged the process of
commercialization in the peasant economy, it also enabled peasant
households to pursue a more profitable budget strategy. The
accessibility of cheap credit allowed the peasant farmer to hold
off on marketing his harvest until prices were higher later in
the year; he could also purchase farm supplies at a moment when
prices were lowest, without waiting to have the cash in hand.
This was no small gain. The price of a horse, for example, was
7
almost 45% higher in April than it was in December. The monthly 
fluctuations of grain prices were equally significant and the 
ability of the peasant to hold off on marketing his goods effec­
tively raised his income considerably.
Finally, credit cooperatives were a channel enabling
peasants to tap outside sources of capital, from government funds
8
to private investments. One agronomist explained the process:
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Each medium farmer, if taken alone, constitutes a very small 
financial unit. If you add up all his property, you find it is 
not worth much —  perhaps 1,000 rubles. When you combine several 
such farmers, say 100 people, then their combined property is 
worth 100,000 rubles, already a sizeable sum. Against such a 
security it is possible to give a lot of money. Furthermore, to 
lend money to an individual, especially if one doesn’t know him 
very well, is dangerous, but to lend to a hundred people, espe­
cially if they vouch for each other, is perfectly feasible.
The Cooperation of Credit
At the beginning of the century, the Russian village was
notoriously poor and short of capital. It was in arrears on taxes
and redemption payments, and heavily in debt to merchants and
money-lenders. Who would have thought in 1906 that ten years
later the Russian village would have constructed a rural banking
9
system with over a billion rubles in assets. This development
was nothing short of spectacular. Perhaps it was due to the
general economic renaissance of the Russian village. But it is
symptomatic that while credit cooperatives spread to every corner
of Russia and multiplied their assets almost 20 times over in the
period 1905-16, the Ministry of Internal Affairs* response to the
rural credit problem —  the peasant estate banks —  continued to
number around 5,000 and only managed to triple their assets in 
10
this time. Evidently, the development of a credit system in 
peasant Russia was intimately linked to the particular advantages 
of cooperative credit.
Developing a cooperative credit system was by no means a 
simple process. As the agronomist Minin remarked, cooperatives
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were caught up in a vicious circle based on the poverty of the ,
*
rural population. The lack of capital in the countryside meant
that rural cooperatives were initially very weak financially and
this financial weakness damaged their credibility in the eyes of
the peasants, who hesitated to invest their precious savings in
unproven institutions. If credit cooperatives didn’t receive a
large dose of start-up capital from the outside, therefore, they
11
were doomed to slow and painful development. This had been the 
fate of the savings and loan associations (ssudo-sberegatelnye 
tovarishchestva), which relied on shareholders* equity for their 
base capital. Since the savings and loan associations had to 
charge a hefty sum for shares or membership fees (usually about 
50 rubles), the organizations tended to be limited to the 
wealthiest peasants, merchants and towndwellers. Not surprising­
ly, the growth of savings and loan associations in the period 
1895-1916 was steady, but not spectacular.
The explosive growth of credit cooperation after 1905 
undoubtedly reflected at least to some degree the general 
economic upsurge accompanying the Stolypin reform, but it was 
also due to the success of a new model of credit cooperative: the 
so-called credit association (kreditnoe tovarishchestvo). If 
Russian credit cooperation had been limited to savings and loan 
associations, it would not have emerged as an important national 
phenomenon. But the credit associations, which were first set up 
in 1895 on the model of the Raiffeisen cooperatives in Germany, 
enabled credit cooperation to develop into an impressive mass 
movement. Instead of obtaining their start-up capital by issuing 
shares to the public, credit associations usually borrowed the
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necessary amount from the State Bank, the zemstvos or some
*
private lender. With outside investors priming the pump, credit 
associations could be established in even the most poverty- 
stricken areas. There were other characteristics that made credit 
associations especially accessible to the majority of the peasant 
population. Membership was contingent not on the purchase of 
shares, but on entry fees of usually not more than five rubles.
Loans were made not on collateral, but on trust; a peasant did 
not need to have substantial commercial property to secure a loan 
-- he only needed one or two members of the cooperative to vouch 
for him. Because of the provision for outside start-up capital, 
the low cost of membership and the ease with which one could take 
out loans, credit associations proved to be the ideal form of 
cooperative bank for peasant Russia.
In the decade following the establishment of the first 
credit association, however, the new institutions grew rather 
slowly. By 1905, there were only about 800 credit associations 
with several hundred thousand memebers. In view of such modest 
progress, the government decided to revise the statute on credit 
associations in 1904. According to the new statute, the State 
Bank was encouraged to play a greater role in financing credit 
associations and a new corps of functionaries —  inspectors of 
small credit —  were established to help organize the credit 
associations. The powers of credit associations were expanded: 
they were now allowed to engage in trading operations and to form 
regional credit unions. The new statute was hardly a few months 
old before Russia plunged into anarchy. During the revolution of 
1905, credit cooperatives found themselves squeezed from all
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sides: both from the side of the government and from the side of
the revolutionaries. They suffered from the rash of bank
robberies and brigandage (or "expropriations” ) that occured at
this time, though, as peasant cooperatives, they tended to be
12
victimized less than other types of banks. Since many credit 
cooperatives had participated in the Liberation Movement, they 
were also subjected to some government repression, mostly in the 
form of prohibitions of cooperative congresses and the formation 
of credit unions. By 1911, even these relatively modest repres­
sions ended, and the government approved 5 additional credit 
unions and the creation of a central cooperative bank, the Moscow 
Narodny Bank.
Though theoretically credit associations could receive their
start-up capital from the zemstvos or from private sources, in
practice the bulk of the capitalization came from the State Bank.
The average State Bank loan to a credit association was from
3,000 to 10,000 rubles at 5% interest. Since the State Bank
eventually came to invest a substantial amount of money in the
credit associations -- 86 million rubles in 1915 alone -- it was
understandable that it should insist on retaining considerable
auditing and oversight powers. These functions were carried out
by inspectors of small credit. The inspectors, who numbered about
400 in 1912, operated out of provincial or district town, acting
as "curators" to the associations, auditing their books and
13
approving major questions of policy. They were empowered to 
investigate associations at any time, to see that they complied 
with the law and their own by-laws, to call general meetings at 
any time and to suspend elected officers whenever abuses were
-276-
discovered. Tugan-Baranovsky observed that "in the person of the ,
inspector of small credit, each association had a chief or, more
specifically, a guardian, who guided almost every step of the 
14
association."
The activism of the small credit inspectors in travelling
the Russian countryside, helping to organize credit associations
and getting them approved by the Ministry of Finance undoubtedly
had a great influence on the rapid growth of rural credit
cooperation. Even more important was the inspectors* role as
auditors. For a credit institution, a system of reliable auditing
of accounts is essential in maintaining the trust of the
depositers and investors. With their knowledge of accounting and
of how to enter the market or deal with the government
bureaucracy, the inspectors proved of continuing value to the
cooperatives -- "like spectacles for a man with poor vision,"
15
observed one cooperative board member. The inspectors also 
provided a valuable service to the cooperatives by generally 
representing their interests to the central government —  possi­
bly one reason why credit associations were persecuted so much 
less than other types of cooperatives.
Were credit associations, then, only an extension of the 
State Bank and the Ministry of Finance? Hardly. The government’s 
capitalization of thousands of credit associations, for instance, 
was not a very expensive operation. Government loans played an 
important role in supporting credit associations, especially in 
the early years of their existence, but as credit associations 
grew more profitable and attracted more peasant savings, 
government loans shrank to under 10% of the cooperatives* capital
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by 1916. This hardly represented a condition of subsidy addic­
tion. Nor did the government suffer any net loss on the opera­
tion. Up until 1911, for example, the State Bank earned almost 6
million rubles in interest on its capitalization of credit asso-
17
ciations, while losing only 400,000 rubles on bad loans.
Credit associations succeeded because they were accessible
to the majority of the population and were based on the use of
local assets. Considering the poverty of the peasant economy,
credit associations proved surprisingly healthy financially. Out
of the 10,000 credit associations in existence between 1905 and
1914, only 79 failed, though 10% were listed as "hopeless” and
18
effectively insolvent. This is an impressive rate of success.
Neither bad harvests nor the occasional case of fraud, it seems,
could stop the growth of rural credit cooperatives. The total
19
number of credit cooperatives is shown below.
Credit Cooperatives 1895-1916
Year end Number Members Deposits (Rubles)
1895 724 200,000 9,300,000
1900 783 300,000 13,800,000
1905 1,680 729,107 37,500,000
1910 6,693 3,447,035 150,600,000
1914 14,586 9,475,412 404,800,000
1916 16,261 10,478,000 682,300,000
In the ten years up to 1916, an average of over a thousand 
new credit cooperatives were established every year. The fastest 
numerical and membership growth took place among the credit 
associations. In 1905 there were about 800 credit associations;
20
by 1916 they numbered about 12,000 with over 8 million members. 
Out of the membership of all the credit cooperatives, 16% were
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town-dwellers (mostly in the savings and loan associations).
That meant that in 1916, fully 8.8 million credit cooperative
members were rural inhabitants. Assuming that each member
accounted for a family of six, rural credit cooperatives serviced
a population of 53 million, almost half the rural population. It
is interesting to compare this rapid growth with the fate of the
traditional peasant estate banks operated by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs: between 1905 and 1916, their membership held
steady at 2.4 million, while deposits increased from 22 million
22
rubles to 74 million rubles.
The Structure and Operations of Credit Cooperatives
The regions where credit cooperation was most developed --
central and southern Russia, the Urals and Western Siberia —
also had the largest average size of cooperative. The Directorate
of Small Credit reported in 1911 that almost 60% of credit asso-
23
ciations had more than a thousand members. This contrasts
sharply with the average membership of the Raiffeisen-type credit
cooperatives throughout most of Western Europe, which rarely
24
exceeded 90 or 100. The reason lay in the greater wealth of the
average depositor in the German credit cooperative: according to
one estimate, the average German depositor accounted for 700
rubles of turnover capital in his cooperative, compared with the
25
Russian depositor’s 75 rubles. Thus, the large size of Russian 
credit cooperatives was necessary to concentrate scarce
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administrative and financial resources; it lowered overhead costs 
and increased financial security. But it was bound to have some 
deleterious effects.
The credit association relied completely on the personal
knowledge it had of its debtors —  the peasant’s trustworthiness
was his collateral. Russian credit associations must have found
it difficult both to gain a personal knowledge of a debtor’s
trustworthiness and to ensure that the loan was used properly for
productive purposes. Consequently, it would come as no surprise
if the Russian credit associations were painstakingly cautious in
dispensing loans. One economist found that the larger the region
covered by the cooperative, the smaller the proportion of the
population that would become members. The peasant would hesitate
to travel long distances to join the cooperative, while the
cooperative, not having personal knowledge of the applicant,
26
would be much more hesitant in accepting new members.
Not all peasants were served equally with credit. The more
land, capital and labor a farm had, the larger the loan it was
able to receive. The further a farm was from the cooperative, the
less likely it was to be a member and if so, the less likely it
was to receive a large loan. Statistical data showed that this
tendency was especially prevalent with respect to the smaller
peasant farms -- for a small farm, it was crucial to be close to
27
the cooperative.
The large size of the credit cooperatives had political 
implications as well. The larger credit cooperatives inevitably 
had to substitute a meeting of representatives for the general 
meeting of all members, with the result that the majority of
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members often did not participate in the affairs of the coopera­
tive except to elect delegates. Thus, the peasant members would 
miss out on that valuable educational benefit of cooperation —  
an introduction to democratic procedure and self-reliance —
while the cooperative would inevitably suffer from the lack of
28
participatory spirit among the rank and file. Although those
Soviet authors who ascribe the large size of credit cooperatives
to the deliberate, cynical calculation of the "kulaks" to concen-
29
trate power in the hands of the board are probably mystifying 
the issue, there is no doubt that large cooperatives suffered 
from a certain bureaucratization.
It was especially hard to mobilize the hidden savings of the 
peasantry in the first years of the cooperative’s existence. It 
was hard enough for the peasant to scrape together any savings at 
all and it was certainly ambitious to expect him to stop burying 
the money in the yard and deposit it in some newly-established 
institution. This is why the very number of credit cooperatives 
and their membership was an important indicator of the movement’s 
development, even if the amount of money deposited was minimal. 
After the cooperatives proved themselves over a period of a few 
years, deposits could be expected to pour in. That the coopera­
tives had gained the trust of the peasantry on a mass scale on 
the eve of the war can be seen from the influx of deposits during 
the war itself. As credit cooperatives established themselves in 
rural society, they received the lion’s share of rural savings.
Prokopovich estimated that in 1913-14, cooperatives received 47%
30
of the new rural savings.
The cooperatives offered 6-7% interest on savings accounts,
but charged 10-11% on loans. Both these rates were quite high, >
especially for an environment of almost zero inflation. But what
was even more extraordinary was the 4% spread between the
interest on the deposits and the loans; this was much higher than
the 0.5% spread in German cooperatives, for instance, and
31
indicated the high risks of lending to peasant farmers. How can
one explain the rapid growth of deposits in the credit
cooperatives? Undoubtedly this was due in large part to the
general economic renaissance of the Russian village after 1906
and to the increasing acceptance of credit cooperatives by the
local population. Some Soviet authors, however, attempted to
explain this phenomenon by the increasing participation of the
32
wealthier elements of the village in the cooperatives. It is
true that 32% of the members accounted for 61% of the deposits,
in other words that the cooperatives relied heavily on the money
33
of the wealthier peasants for their financial stability.
This did not mean that credit cooperatives were an 
instrument of the kulaks. While the more prosperous peasantry 
contributed a disproportionate amount of the savings, it was the 
rest of the members who accounted for most of the borrowing. In 
other words, the credit cooperatives gave the medium peasants 
access to capital (consisting of the deposits of richer peasants) 
at much lower interest rates than if that money had been borrowed 
on the private market. As one State Bank official argued at a 
Congress of Small Credit in Orel province: "If a member deposits 
say 2,000 rubles, then such a member will have no reason to apply 
for a loan of any significant size. You should try to attract 
precisely these kinds of members. Then your deposits will grow
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and you will work with money entrusted to you by the population.
34
You will become self-sufficient." This view was supported by a
credit inspector who said, "It would be very good if you have
more of these kinds of members who save. They are not the ones
to whom the doors of the credit association should be shut; the
doors should be shut to that hungry mob which is crawling from
everywhere into the association. ‘Loan me 50 rubles, I have sold
my last head of cattle.* These people should be pitied and can be
35
given charity, but lending to them would be unwise." Similarly,
the Moscow Congress of Cooperative Credit in 1911 agreed that
"the main condition for the success of the associations is the
36
participation of as many prosperous members as possible."
The attraction of the monied elements of the village was an 
important factor in the financial strength of rural credit 
cooperatives. Another factor was the low incidence of defaults. 
One of the main reasons for this was peer pressure, since loan 
applicants had to get a third party to vouch for them. The spon­
sor of the loan was hardly going to take this responsibility 
lightly since all the members were interested in the financial 
health of the cooperative. Some historians mention a few cases in 
which cooperatives had to turn to the zemstvos, police or land 
captains to help them collect on loans, but the main force seems
to have been the collective responsibility and self-interest
37
inherent in the cooperative organization.
An even more important reason for the low default rate was
the cooperatives* policy of "strictly ascertaining the reason for
38
the loan and supervizing its investment." Cooperative loans 
were meant only to be used for raising production, not for the
peasant’s immediate consumer needs. This had been the policy
since the enactment of the 1896 statute and was stated even more
unambiguously in the revized version of 1904. The rationale was
sound. Only investment in improved production would raise the
peasant’s standard of living and ensure repayment. As one
economist pointed out, if loans were not used productively
(merely to cover consumption expenses in a bad year, for
instance) the credit cooperative would turn into yet another
39
instrument imposing debt bondage on the peasantry. The 
productive use of loans was one of the rules strictly enforced by 
the inspectors of small credit. Presumably word of how the loan 
was used got back to the credit association through the social 
grapevine. Was the money drunk away or did it go to buy a horse 
—  the neighbors were sure to know.
But as Prokopovich reminds us, under conditions of the not- 
fully-capitalist peasant economy, it was often difficult to dis­
tinguish household (personal consumption) expenditure from pro-
40
duction investment. In practice, it was also very difficult to 
supervize the way in which loans were used, especially in the 
larger cooperatives where members did not know each other very 
well. There was little to prevent a member from applying for a 
loan to buy improved seed grain for instance, and then using it 
to buy flour for winter consumption. Nor was strict supervision 
an unambiguous good. A survey of Iaroslavl cooperatives quoted 
the opinion of one cooperative representative that strict super­
vision of the proper use of loans was neither practicable nor 
desirable. It would mean "imposing a nanny on the debtor, dis­
trusting him, and demeaning his human dignity," the cooperator
said. He pointed out that such tutelage had never benefitted the
41
peasant in the past and was unlikely to do so now.
In order to minimize the risk of cooperative loans and
ensure that they would be accessible to the maximum number of
members the government fixed a limit on the size of the loans
that could be given out: 1,000 rubles for a loan on collateral
(usually in the loans-savings associations) and 300 rubles for a
42
non-secured loan. In practice, the average loan was much small­
er, though it increased as both commercial farming and credit 
cooperation matured. The average indebtedness was 197 rubles in
the savings and loan associations and only 62 rubles in the
43
credit associations. The loans were predominantly short-term
(with a term of up to one year), but the proportion of long-term
loans (3-5 years) was increasing, representing 42% of all loans 
44
by 1914. Not surprisingly, the larger the peasant’s family, 
horse-ownership and fixed capital, the higher was his creditwor­
thiness and the larger the sum loaned to him by the credit 
45
cooperative. But the limits set upon the size of the loans
ensured that this discrepancy would not be very great.
The small loans provided by the credit cooperatives did not
eliminate the credit squeeze in the village and usually had to be
supplemented with borrowings from private sources if the credit
were to be used for anything more than an incremental change to
46
the peasant’s farming system. In 1906, as we can see from the
table below, 26% of cooperative loans were used unproductively or
47
outside the farm; by 1913, this portion had sunk to 14%.
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How Credit Cooperative Loans were Used
Purpose 1906 1913
Productive investments:
Livestock and fodder 26% 23%
Purchase and rental of land 19% 26%
Construction 11% 11%
Farm supplies 8% 10%
Handicrafts supplies 7% 7%
Hiring of labor 2% 3%
Unproductive or non-farm investments 
Purchase of goods for retail 12% 7%
Personal consumption 9% 5%
Debt repayment 5% 2%
The opportunity to rent an extra piece of land or buy an
extra horse or piece of equipment predictably served to improve
peasant agricultural production. The one statistical examination
we have —  a survey of 229,000 credit association members carried
out by the Finance Ministry’s Directorate of Small Credit in 1911
—  indicates that peasant farmers became considerably richer as a
result of their membership in a credit association. The table
below shows the condition of the cooperative members in 1911, as
compared to when they first joined the cooperative (probably not
48
more than 5 years earlier, on average).
Effect of Credit Association Membership on Peasant Farmers
upon entry 1911
desiatines sown 8.1 9.4
heads of working cattle 2.2 2.5
heads of dairy cattle 1.7 1.9
According to the table above, peasant farmers’ land-
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ownership and livestock ownership both improved as a result of 
their membership in credit associations. This is especially 
significant when one recalls that the amount of land and the 
number of both horses and dairy cattle per peasant household were 
all declining in this period. The foregoing survey reinforces the 
reasonable conclusion that the establishment of such an effective 
rural banking system as Russia’s network of credit cooperatives 
greatly aided the general development of the nation’s 
agriculture.
Credit Cooperatives and the Growth of Cooperative Unions
The growth of new credit cooperatives peaked in 1912, and
declined slowly thereafter. The Department of Small Credit
attributed this to a saturation of many parts of Russia with
credit cooperatives. Many cooperators, however, argued that
credit cooperation had reached a dead end. If it was to develop
49
any further, credit cooperation needed unions. There could be 
little further progress in developing either cooperative credit 
or cooperative trade in depth without higher level cooperative 
organizations —  either secondary level unions (uniting one or 
more provinces) or tertiary level unions (uniting whole regions 
or the country as a whole). Since credit cooperation was the best 
developed branch of the cooperative movement, it would be here 
that unification would first develop.
Credit cooperative balance books were affected by the highly
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cyclical nature of peasant savings. Peasant members all needed »
*
loans at approximately the same time of year —  in the spring —  
and would receive their revenue half a year later -- autumn and 
early winter. Credit cooperatives needed outside funds to tide 
them through the financial dry season. They needed extra cash to 
cover their loans during the work season and they needed 
somewhere to invest savings during the winter. Many local 
cooperatives suffered from liquidity shortages. Others,
50
especially those in the Baltic, had an excess of deposits. But
there was no cross-regional organization to distribute these
funds, no union to bring together buyer and seller. Under these
conditions both parties suffered —  one because it had
insufficient funds and the other because it had to pay its
depositors an interest rate while receiving a smaller rate of
return by keeping the funds or investing them in the money 
51
market. Credit unions could prevent this outflow of funds from
the credit cooperatives to the commercial banks, as well as help
organize new cooperatives and provide consultation and trading
services. With truly "cooperative" logic, Tugan-Baranovsky states
that credit unions "wholly retained the advantages of the
localization of credit associations, but eliminated the
52
disadvantages of the credit institutions’ small size."
While the government was relatively indulgent towards 
allowing local credit cooperatives to participate in the 
country’s agricultural development, it regarded any cooperative 
union with undisguised suspicion. Unions, especially a national 
union, would "crown the edifice" of cooperation, and rival the 
government on the national stage. Even after the law of 1904
-288-
permitted cooperative unions, the government constrained their ,
*
development with inumerable bureaucratic obstacles. Before even 
the smallest union could be legalized, for instance, it was 
necessary to obtain a report from the Minister of Finance, a 
decree from the Council of Ministers, and approval from the 
Emperor. As a result some unions had to wait as long as six years 
for approval. In order to get around the government’s 
restrictions on unification, the cooperative movement improvized 
substitutes. Often a strong local agricultural society would take 
on the role of a cooperative union,providing leadership and 
trading services for the cooperatives in their region. The law of 
1904 permitted another type of "substitute credit union": the 
zemstvo fund of small credit. By 1913, 167 such institutions had 
been set up, with a combined balance of 59 million rubles. About 
half of this money was loaned to various cooperatives, while the 
rest went for loans to individuals.
The average zemstvo fund was not very large. In 1913, only 
13 out of the 167 zemstvo funds had balances of over 1 million
rubles; the rest were not much larger than a big credit associa-
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tion. Usually run by the district agronomist or some other 
responsible zemstvo employee, the zemstvo fund often played a 
valuable role in the cooperative movement. By 1917, for instance, 
zemstvo funds had financed the creation of more than 500 credit 
cooperatives, but the bulk of this activity was undertaken by a 
minority of expecially active zemstvos. In any case, the zemstvo 
funds of small credit could not make up for the lack of genuine 
credit unions. Unlike credit cooperatives, zemstvo funds of small 
credit were not run by the people who used them and consequently
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did not elicit the self-interest of the local population. The
peasants reportedly regarded the zemstvo funds merely as sources
of government funds and tried to fleece them for all they were 
54
worth.
Otherwise, credit cooperatives could turn to the State Bank
or to commercial banks for financing. The State Bank played the
largest role in this sense, since the provision of credit
cooperatives’ start-up capital was one of its mandates. The Bank
could make further loans to cooperatives, but only on condition
that credit cooperatives clear all debt from their books at least 
55
once a year. The sources of credit for credit cooperatives is
56
shown in the table below:
Borrowing by Credit Cooperatives as of 31 December. 1913
State Bank 57,175,000
Zemstvos 29,817,000
Private individuals and organizations 9,877,000
Various Institution of Small Credit 6,122,000
Private and Cooperative Banks 5.853.000
108,845,000
But cooperatives needed their own higher-level institutions.
Both the zemstvos and the local cooperatives continually spoke of
57
the need for such unification. The trend towards greater
unification is evident in the growing number of provincial or
regional cooperative congresses. The number of congresses held
every year grew from just 6 in 1906, to 21 in 1910, to 81 in 
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1913. Three national cooperative congresses were also held: the 
first -- in Moscow in 1908 -- proved politically too radical and 
was dispersed by the police; the second -- held in St. Petersburg
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in 1912 —  excluded consumer societies; and the third, which was ,
i
successful in all respects, was held in Kiev in 1913. The need
for cooperative unions and cooperative trading operations came up
59
at every cooperative congress. It was a sign of the times that
by the time the Third National Cooperative Congress convened in
1913, the question of unification had evolved to such a degree
that now the main issue concerned the form a national cooperative
union should take. (Representatives from the South pushed for a
loosely federated structure, while those from the Moscow area
60
pushed for greater centralization.)
The government, however, refused to ratify all but a few
regional unions before 1914. Only the strain of wartime and the
need to accept cooperative help in alleviating the goods crisis
induced the government to ease its cumbersome regulations.
Consequently, credit unions which had numbered just 2 in 1905 and
even in 1914 numbered only 11, rose to 83 in the first two years 
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of the war. Most of these new organizations were relatively
small, representing on average about 52 cooperatives and 40,000
households. The cooperatives which joined the unions tended to be
the stronger organizations with larger financial resources and
62
better developed trading operations. Even by 1916, therefore, 
cooperative unification was still in its incubation stage.
On the national level, ironically, cooperative unions met 
with a more favorable response. The Moscow Union of Consumer 
Societies had been established in 1898; in 1908 the Shaniavsky 
People’s University was inaugurated to serve as a national 
institution dedicated to the cause of cooperation, while the 
Union of Siberian Dairy Associations was established and began
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its rise to national and international prominence. All coopera- »
tives could benefit from the establishment of a central coopera­
tive bank to accept deposits and make loans and this idea was 
brought up at the First Congress of Consumer Societies in 1896 
and at the Congress of Savings and Loan Associations in 1898. The 
government was reluctant to permit such an institution. At the 
1908 Cooperative Congress, government representatives were irked 
when the congress flatly refused to ratify plans for a national 
cooperative bank closely tied to the State Bank.
Despite these constraints, the Moscow Narodny Bank opened 
its doors in 1912 as a public corporation financed purely by 
cooperatives and by selected individual "friends of cooperation."
The forebodings of some cooperators did not materialize. The Bank 
successfully issued 2 million rubles worth of shares by 1914.
Not only was the Moscow Narodny Bank able to find two million 
rubles of share capital from purely cooperative sources, it also
managed to attract an enormous influx of deposits, achieving an
63
impressive rate of financial expansion as can be seen below.
Operations of the Moscow Peoples Bank (in thousans of rubles)
Share and
reserve All liabilities Annual
Year capital Deposits as of January 1 turnover
1912 1,000 660 2,300 22,700
1913 1,000 2,260 4,300 53,600
1914 2,000 3,800 8,400 110,200
1915 2,020 10,900 27,600 243,200
1916 2,090 36,800 83,800 1,188,400
1917 10,470 153,300 321,000 5,823,500
What a triumph the establishment of the Moscow Narodny Bank
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must have seemed to cooperators. Here was credit cooperation 
emerging from the villages, often in spite of government 
opposition, to assert its growing financial autonomy and its 
national significance. At the very time when credit unions and 
the Moscow Narodny Bank were asserting their financial viability 
in Russia, similar institutions in Germany were collapsing in 
bankruptcy and scandal. When the Central Bank of German credit 
associations tried to devleop greater autonomy from the 
government in 1911, the latter reacted forcefully and withdrew 
all its funds from the Bank. This brought the Central Bank near 
bankruptcy, which it managed to avoid only by giving up its 
financial independence and merging with the Dresden Commercial 
Bank. At the same time, Germany cooperators were shocked to hear 
of one of the country’s most important cooperative unions 
collapsing amidst a financial scandal which landed several 
executives in jail. Finally, the heaviest blow to the German 
cooperative movement came in 1913 with the financial collapse of 
the German counterpart to the Moscow Peoples Bank, the Imperial 
Cooperative Agricultural Bank.
"Worst of all," writes Tugan Baranovsky, "was that the
Imperial Bank, like many other (cooperative) credit
institutions... had essentially abandoned its duty to serve the
development of peasant small credit and gradually acquired the
nature of an everyday commercial bank. The Bank invested a large
part of its working capital into the capitalist Agricultural
Credit Bank. In fact, these two institutions became practically
64
indistinguishable."
The lessons to be learned from the German experience are
two-fold: firstly, that credit cooperation, no matter how large
its financial resources, remains dependent on the government; and 
secondly, that at a certain level of development, cooperative 
credit becomes coopted into the capitalist money market —  coop­
erative banks, instead of distributing their financial resources, 
among the peasants and the cooperatives, begin to pump money out 
of the peasant economy into commercial banks and the state treas­
ury. But when this transition began to take place, it could be 
seen as the final sign that cooperation had come of age.
Credit Cooperatives during the War
With the mid-summer harvest of 1914 came the Great War. At
first the war proved a shock to the credit cooperatives. There
was a run on all the banks, including credit cooperatives, which
65
was overcome only with some difficulty. Most of the export 
markets for Russian agricultural products were closed off and 
even the transportation network linking the domestic market began 
to break down. Many of the cooperatives’ book-keepers and 
managers (not to mention millions of peasant farmers) were called 
to arms. But Russia’s peasant farmers and their cooperatives 
stood firm. The fact that agricultural production continued 
undiminished despite all the hardships was a tribute to the 
soundness and resilience of the rural order as it had been 
constructed in the eight years since Stolypin became Prime 
Minister in 1906. Despite raging inflation and a shortage of 
consumer goods, peasant farmers continued to produce a massive
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surplus, at least until 1917. Since they couldn’t buy much with 
their cash, the peasants invested their money into cooperative 
savings accounts or livestock.
It is interesting to contrast this with the situation that 
was to prevail a decade later, under the New Economic Policy, 
when goods shortages or inflated prices for manufactured goods 
caused peasants to withold their marketings, reverting to a 
self-sufficient economy and causing food shortages in the cities. 
But in the Russia constructed by Stolypin, peasants continued 
producing surpluses for the market, and merely invested their 
liquid savings in bank accounts, a potent indication of their 
trust in the banking system and in the economy generally.
This is not to say that life went on as always in peasant 
Russia during the war. The rapidly mounting liquid savings of the 
peasantry and the equally rapid disappearance of both consumer 
and producer goods from the market entailed a wrenching change in 
the way credit cooperatives operated. While cooperatives accumu­
lated funds in the form of deposits, the demand for loans fell 
off sharply. With much of the male work force away and few in­
vestment opportunities available, the peasants were reluctant to 
spend their accumulated cash, and were even more loath to take 
out loans. The cooperatives were thus left with a large surplus 
of funds and few opportunities to put the money to work. Savings 
deposits in ground level credit cooperatives increased from 284
million rubles at the end of 1913 to 682 million rubles by the 
66
end of 1916. How credit associations used these funds is shown
67
in the table below.
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Assets of Credit Associations as of December 31. 1913-16
Assets: 1913 1914 1915 1916
1. Loans 86% 82% 69% 49%
2. Free funds 9% 11% 20% 34%
3. Plant and equipment 3% 4% 4% 4%
4. Merchandise on hand 2% 2% 5% 9%
5. Other assets 0% 1% 2% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
As the table shows, by the end of 1916, loans constituted 
less than half of credit associations* assets. Free funds (cash 
savings without a place to be invested) had expanded to an as­
tounding 34% of assets -- unthinkable only a few years before in 
the credit-starved Russian countryside. While the total assets of 
the credit associations at this time nearly doubled, from 305 
million rubles to 601 million, while free funds grew from 27 
million rubles to 202 million in 1916, The newly-formed credit
unions, which began to flourish at this time, did even worse. As
68
of July 1, 1916, only 14% of their funds were spent on loans.
Much of the money accumulated by credit cooperatives and credit 
unions was invested in government bonds or deposited in commer­
cial banks -- most of the 202 million rubles in credit associa­
tion free funds was spent this way, as were 34% of credit union 
funds. This meant that not only were peasant savings not being 
invested in the rural economy, they were not even being invested 
in expanding cooperation’s role in the economy. Given the 
strength of the population’s demand for consumption goods, it is 
perhaps surprising —  and certainly disappointing —  that more 
funds were not invested in trade and the production of consumer 
goods. At most 17% of credit associations’ assets were invested
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in this way at the end of 1916. Since credit unions could be i
expected to be stronger in distributing funds among cooperatives
and investing in cross-regional trade, the proportion of their
69
funds invested in commerce was up to 52% in 1916.
The fact is that the war presented a golden opportunity to 
credit cooperatives. Having grown financially strong, they had a 
chance to carve out an important position for themselves in the 
country’s production and trade. Certainly both the demand and the 
financial means were there. How can one explain, then, that far 
more money flowed into the coffers of the government and 
commercial banks than into cooperative projects? Patriotic mo­
tives? As we will see in our discussion of cooperative trade, it 
was possible to serve both the war effort and the cause of 
cooperation. But credit cooperatives, instead of expoiting the 
economic and organizational potential of the cooperative move­
ment, reverted to the traditional channel of Russian economic 
development: pumping out huge amounts of (rural) cooperative 
capital for the use of the government and the commercial banks. 
Originally credit cooperation was promoted with the idea of 
accumulating capital in the countryside in order to build up the 
rural economy at the village level. During the war, credit coop­
eratives became an agent of the centralization of capital and its 
investment in the cities or in the war effort.
It is possible that credit cooperatives missed an historic 
opportunity to expand the reach of cooperation into new fields of 
trade and production. We will be examining the role of coopera­
tives in Russia’s domestic and international trade in the next 
chapter. With respect to credit cooperatives, the fact that they
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didn’t do more should in no way detract from the grandeur of 
their real achievement. The fact is that credit cooperatives 
permitted peasant Russia to develop a powerful banking system in 
a remarkably short period of time. Having created this banking 
system, cooperative members should not have been surprised to see 
their organizations begin to act like banks all over the world —  
paying a reliable interest rate on savings and investing the 
funds where they could bring the greatest return.
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CHAPTER NINE 
COOPERATION AND COMMERCE
>
Cooperation was clearly a very successful concept with 
respect to credit, but this was a function that was relatively 
easy to perform. When cooperatives began to enter into other 
aspects of the peasant’s economy, they found them to be more 
complex and much more difficult to influence. Yet, as we saw in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the organization of agronomic measures to 
improve peasant farming was a natural outgrowth of cooperatives* 
mission to perpetuate peasant self-reliance and self-interest. We 
have already seen how peasant farming systems could be improved 
and peasant incomes could be raised through the organization of 
agricultural extension and a rural banking system. An equally 
effective way of spurring agricultural development and improving 
rural living standards was to rationalize the system of rural 
trade. If distant markets could be made more accessible to 
peasant farmers, if transportation and marketing fees could be 
reduced and if a greater quantity of improved farm suplies could 
be brought to the village, the prices of peasant agricultural 
produce would be raised and the prices for farm supplies would be 
lowered; this, in turn, would spur the commercialization of 
peasant farm production and raise the technological level of 
peasant farming. These were sufficient reasons to impell all 
different types of cooperatives to enter into rural trade.
Whereas the organization of an effective credit system 
served to improve the peasant economy on the village level, the
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rationalization of rural trade promised to do much more, since it »
would bring the peasant farmer out of his traditional isolation
and integrate the village economy into the world market.
Cooperative trade, therefore, was a new and higher stage of
agricultural cooperation and it captured the imagination of many
cooperative workers. At a Siberian conference in 1900, for
example, one agronomist from Tomsk declared: "I see a picture of
the near future when the Siberian peasant, united in big
associations, will stretch out his hand to the Manchester working
man and enter into direct relations by handing the product of his
1
labor directly to the consumer."
In this chapter we will look at the way in which different 
types of Russian cooperatives went about realizing this dream. We 
will examine the role of cooperatives in the provision of farm 
supplies and in the marketing of grain, flax and dairy products. 
Finally, we will look at how cooperative trade fared under the 
stressful conditions of war.
Cooperatives and the Provision of Farm Supplies
The farm supply activities of cooperatives were constrained 
by several factors. Firstly, peasant farmers generally bought 
very little of their farm supplies for cash on the market. They 
were accustomed to getting most of what they needed from home or 
from their neighbors. But cooperation of an economic activity 
could only take place where the money economy was already fairly 
well developed. Lack of commercialization in much of the
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agricultural sector, therefore, was a problem. Peasant farmers,
we are told, were ill-acquainted with improved varieties of seed
and farm equipment and did not see the need to invest cash in
such improvements. Secondly, cooperative farm supply was
dependent on receiving advance orders so that goods could be
bought wholesale and then sold to the last item. Since
cooperative sales strategy called for low or even zero mark-ups,
any goods that were not sold and kept in inventory resulted in a
loss of money for the cooperative. The problem was that the
peasants were skeptical of new types of farm equipment and
refused to order them in advance. Even with familiar products and
brand names, the peasants were accustomed to buying something
only after having looked it over and thought things out, waiting
until the last minute to put down money. Cooperatives often
complained that they received too few orders for goods, but when
the shipment came in, the peasants would clean out the shelves
2
and demand more.
Cooperative farm supply operations were run out of depots, 
similar to the ones described in earlier chapters. The 
cooperative purchase of farm supplies was started by the 
zemstvos, mostly in the interests of gentry agriculture. 
Cooperatives entered the field in earnest after 1905 and their 
operations grew rapidly. The expansion of cooperative farm supply 
reflected both the growing sophistication of the Russian farmer, 
who was increasingly willing to purchase modern machinery, and 
the growing sophistication of the cooperative movement which was 
willing to provide the service. No one type of cooperative 
monopolized farm supply operations; rather, farm supply
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operations were performed by whichever type of cooperative »
organization happened to predominate in a particular region. In 
central and southern Russia, that meant credit cooperatives; in 
the Ukraine, agricultural societies; in the North and South-West, 
consumer societies; in the Baltic, agricultural associations. Any 
type of cooperative served primarily as an organization of self- 
help and self-reliance, branching out beyond its statutory func­
tions to meet whatever demands of the population seemed uppermost 
at the time.
The strongest branch of the cooperative movement was credit
cooperation. Credit cooperatives were by far the most numerous
and financially the strongest of all rural cooperatives before
the war. Since agricultural associations and the more
commercially-minded agricultural societies relied on subsidies
and equity capital to support their commercial operations, they
were generally viable only where the rural population had reached
a certain level of education and economic prosperity. While
agricultural societies were not appropriate for every region,
credit cooperatives were ubiquitous and had the financial
3
strength to undertake trading operations. It was natural for a 
credit cooperative to branch out from pure savings and loan 
operations to projects designed to improve the economy of its 
members. One agronomist noted that credit cooperatives were
4
naturally impelled to undertake agricultural extension services:
Rural credit cooperatives, which are dedicated to improving the 
economic condition of their members, can’t be disinterested in 
all the methods of raising their members’income. This is why they 
are responsible for disseminating agricultural knowledge among
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the population and the organization of various projects aiding in 
the development of proper farming methods.
Agronomists tended to regard credit cooperatives as ideal
vehicles for their work and in regions such as the Urals, the
success of agronomic work was seen as directly correlated to the
5
development of credit cooperatives. For their part, credit 
cooperatives found it beneficial to organize agricultural depots 
and machine rental stations, to set up libraries and museums, and 
arrange agronomic lectures and meetings. Since credit coopera­
tives gained financial stability by having more members, they
often used the provision of such agronomic services as a gimmick
6
to attract new members. With respect to agricultural trade, 
credit cooperatives undertook farm supply operations not only 
because it was in their interest to help their members prosper, 
but also because the fields of credit and farm supply were inti­
mately linked. The most common form of private credit, after all, 
was trade credit: the village kulak tended to be both a retailer 
of farm supplies and a grain merchant and a money-lender. The 
peasant would commonly buy a piece of equipment on the security 
of his harvest in the spring and pay for it (with a hefty inter­
est) in the form of produce in the fall. This fact alone ensured 
that credit cooperatives, in their struggle against private
money-lenders, would enter the field of selling farm supplies and
7
marketing the peasants’ harvest.
While this may have been the cooperative ideal, in practice 
the cooperatives were constrained by several government policies. 
The model statutes for credit cooperatives required cooperative 
members to pay in advance for their purchases, while the
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cooperatives themselves had to finance their trading operations
from special funds created from their reserve capital. This type
of financing was woefully inadequate. Even by 1914 all these
funds totalled a little over 10 million rubles —  hardly enough
8
to make a significant impact on rural trade. Several cooperative 
congresses called for permission to use cooperatives* turnover
capital to finance trade and for the creation of special insur-
9
ance funds in case of losses. But the government was understand­
ably hesitant to allow cooperatives to invest the savings of 
members into trading operations, since these were by nature a 
much more risky operation than small-scale, short-term lending. 
Another constraint on cooperative purchase of farm supplies was
the lack of cooperative unions to coordinate the flow of funds
10
and goods across a wide area. The importance of cooperative 
unions is illustrated by the case of Siberian dairy cooperation, 
where the establishment of a regional union resulted in a take­
off of cooperative trade. St. Petersburg’s opposition to unions 
in other branches of agriculture, therefore, probably served to 
significantly limit cooperative trade.
Nonetheless, despite these constraints, the rationale of 
introducing the cooperative principle into the purchase of farm 
supplies was so strong that purchasing operations by credit
cooperatives grew at an impressive clip, as can be seen in the 
11
table below.
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Purchasing Operations by Credit Cooperatives 1906-1916
Number of Percent of all Total purchases
Year cooperatives cooperatives (in rubles)
1906 165 8% 700,000
1908 641 15% 2,400,000
1910 1.334 20% 6,600,000
1912 2.990 27% 18,100,000
1914 5,854 40% 40,000,000
1916 10,602 65% 267,900,000
Harnessing the self-interest of the local population and 
selling a broad array of goods at cost, credit cooperatives took 
on the characteristics of a chain of discount stores, selling to 
the lower end of the mass market. In many areas, they soon drove 
the more exclusive private merchants out of business. One offi­
cial English publication, counseling British businessmen on
12
trading opportunities in Siberia observed in 1916:
In regard to agricultural machinery and implements, the effect of 
the facilities offered by these credit associations... has been 
to cause many wholesale firms to withdraw from business. While 
this is regrettable in a sense, it has its compensations, as the 
manufacturer is on safer ground in selling to credit societies. 
His rate of profit will be diminished, but in view of the proba­
bility of a larger turnover as the consumption of agricultural 
machinery increases, his aggregate profits should be greater. The 
strong point about the credit associations is that they possess 
the local knowledge which enables them to sell to the right 
people, and, most important of all, they possess the means of 
securing a relatively quicker liquidation of debts, and of en­
forcing payment in doubtful cases. Their losses from bad debts 
are said to be practically nil. The wholesale firm, on the other 
hand, has still the best class of farmers with whom to trade, 
and, in practice, prices do not fall below a figure offering a 
reasonable profit.
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Another kind of cooperative that grew to have an important
role in providing farm supplies to the peasantry was the consumer
society. Consumer societies initially saw their mission as
providing food and household goods at wholesale prices, but the
stronger societies soon began selling farm supplies as well.
Consumer societies were fairly well developed before 1914, but
subsequently, with the breakdown of normal channels of trade
during the war, they mushroomed across Russia. Numbering 10,080
in 1914, they grew to 35,000 by 1917, according to one estimate;
out of this total, 31,000 or 89% were village consumer societies,
13
with a total membership of 7.5 million members. Though the
individual consumer society was a humble affair -- the average
rural society, for instance had only 242 members —  the great
number of these organizations meant that they had a significant
14
effect on the provision of farm supplies among other things.
Credit cooperatives, with their generally better-heeled members,
tended to regard the more proletarian consumer societies with 
15
disdain. Consumer societies had sprung up spontaneously, often
on shaky economic and legal foundations, and therefore were
particularly in need of the help of financial sponsors such as
16
the credit cooperatives. One correspondent wrote in 1917:
Tens and hundreds of new [consumer] societies were opened and 
conducted their operations for several months, without obtaining 
expert advice, because in the present Russian villages every man 
who can read or write is up to his neck in work. Many of the new 
societies will probably fail because of this. In some instances, 
the societies are formed by the village grocer or miller, who, 
with their stock gone, hope with the aid of a cooperative shop, 
to obtain a supply... Many of the societies will, however, 
survive, principally those working hand in hand with the credit
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associations, and will prove of the greatest benefit to the 
population.
To be sure, much of the consumer cooperative movement had 
arisen precipitously, as an act of desperate self-defense against 
consumer shortages, but even so, it was more than just a 
numerically impressive, but effectively weak rural phenomenon.
The primary value of rural cooperatives, as we have seen, was to 
give form to peasant self-reliance and as such, consumer 
societies provided an excellent organizational base upon which 
cooperative farm supply could be established. In some cases, this 
potential was realized, especially in the case of higher-level 
organizations such as consumer unions and the enormously 
successful Moscow Union of Consumer Societies (renamed Tsentro- 
soyuz in 1917), which not only distributed a large volume of 
goods but organized their own production facilities as well; 
during the war, according to one estimate, the combined produc­
tion by consumer unions of consumer goods (candles, soap, cloth­
ing, flour, etc.) and equipment for farming and cottage industry
17
reached almost 300 million rubles annually.
Apart from credit cooperatives and consumer societies, a 
whole variety of other organizations undertook cooperative farm 
supply operations. As we have seen in foregoing chapters, 
probably the largest single component in the cooperative farm 
supply market was the network of agricultural depots run by 
zemstvo agronomists. But other institutions also operated farm 
supply depots. The Ministry of Agriculture ran its own depots and 
Russia’s 6,000 agricultural societies also became important 
participants in the farm supply market. Together, the zemstvos,
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the Ministry of Agriculture, the agricultural societies and other 
types of cooperatives captured half the market for the sale of 
agricultural equipment on the eve of the war. As we saw in 
Chapter 6, the operations of these depots during the Stolypin 
reform expanded more rapidly than the market as a whole, and 
hence we can conclude that they were in large part directly re­
sponsible for the tripling of farm equipment purchases by Russian
18
farmers in the period 1906-1914.
Understandably threatened, the major private manufacturers 
of agricultural equipment formed a cartel early in 1914 in order 
to block cooperative wholesale purchases of farm supplies and to 
protect the private firms’ network of dealers and merchants.
Named Urozhai. the cartel deliberately charged cooperatives a
19
higher price for the wholesale purchase agricultural equipment.
To counter such a powerful competitor, the zemstvos and the
cooperatives began to organize their purchases through ever
larger regional unions. The zemstvos began to cooperate in the
sale of agricultural machinery as early as 1899, when 40 zemstvos
in the central agricultural region joined a farm supply network
organized by the Orel provincial zemstvo; during the Stolypin
Reform, many more such zemstvo associations were established to
facilitate the purchase of agricultural machinery, including the
Southern Russian Zemstvo Association established in Ekaterinoslav
in 1911 and the Kiev Association of Western Zemstvos established 
20
in 1912. The Moscow Narodny Bank in 1913 organized a trading 
division to help its member cooperatives in purchases and market­
ing; though the work of this division was reported to be woefully 
disorganized, its yearly turnover reached almost 15 million
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rubles by 1916. In 1915, the Moscow Narodny Bank, the Orel Socie­
ty of Zemstvos, the Kiev Society of South-Western Zemstvos and 
the Ministry of Agriculture entered into an agreement to form a 
trading cartel of their own. Several observers later remarked 
that the resulting government-zemstvo-cooperative syndicate
(named Selskosoyuz) stood to gain a virtual monopoly on the trade
21
in farm supplies. The opportunity never came, however, since 
the revolutions of 1917 broke out two years after the establish­
ment of the cartel.
Cooperative Marketing
Just as the peasant farmer could benefit substantially from 
obtaining modern farm supplies at low prices, he could also 
benefit from an improvement in the marketing of his produce. If 
peasant farmers could pool their produce and market it 
themselves, they could economize on transportation costs and 
appropriate some of the merchandising profits for themselves. As 
we shall see, in some branches of agriculture, such as dairy 
production, the organization of cooperative marketing was 
directly related to the commercialization of peasant farming. In 
other branches, such as grain or flax production, cooperative 
marketing was less developed, but it nonetheless helped raise 
peasant incomes and improve product standards. If peasant farmers 
could organize cooperatives to sell directly to foreign traders 
or even directly to foreign consumers, a relatively small
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investment in time and money could result in a big increase in 
farmers’ incomes.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the marketing of 
agricultural produce was an area greatly in need of improvement. 
Peasant farmers had long marketed a portion of their products to 
buy consumer goods, but the prices they were paid were unneces­
sarily low. Peasant farmers received a small fraction of the 
already low world market price; the bulk of the revenue went to 
pay for transportation and the numerous middlemen who conveyed 
the goods to the ultimate consumers. It should be noted that the 
role of grain merchants -- large and small -- may not have been 
nearly as parasitical as was assumed at the time. The hefty 
merchandising commissions, after all, reflected real costs, real 
risks and real demand. The losses occasionally borne by middlemen 
tended to be ignored, but their windfall profits were noticed and 
bitterly resented. As in the rest of the world at this time, 
middlemen became objects of frustration and hostility in the 
countryside. But the way to combat the high marketing costs was 
to further develop the marketing system, rather than contract it 
by eliminating the middlemen. As with the problem of money­
lenders and high rural interest rates, the only thing worse than 
a middleman was no middleman at all. If cooperatives could push 
the private merchants out of the market and perform the merchan­
dizing function themselves —  fine, but if they couldn’t, then 
the middlemen were a necessary and legitimate part of the rural 
economy.
If the commercialization of agriculture and consequently the 
role of private merchants were seen as a good thing, then the
cooperation of the agricultural marketing network represented an >
even higher stage in the progress of Russian agriculture.
Unfortunately, this branch of cooperation arose relatively
slowly, even more slowly than the cooperation of farm supply.
There were several reasons for such retarded development.
For one thing, while both the rural credit markets and the trade
in farm equipment were comparatively under-developed in 1906,
Russia’s trade in agricultural produce had already assumed
massive proportions by this time (exports alone averaged 700
22
million rubles annually in 1900-5). Both the local and the 
national markets, therefore, were already dominated by well- 
established players and this made it hard for cooperatives to 
break in. The relative financial weakness of the cooperatives —  
even credit cooperatives —  meant that they had trouble rounding 
up enough trading capital to enter the market on the necessary 
scale. It also meant that they didn’t have the flexibility to 
hold the produce until market conditions were right or to offer 
the cash advances that many peasant farmers demanded. Many peas­
ants consequently prefered to sell their harvest to a merchant
who would pay them less, but advance them most of the cash right 
23
away.
Generally, the type of cooperative best suited to marketing 
the peasants’ harvest was the credit cooperative. The commercial 
surplus that the local peasantry produced was often too small to 
necessitate the establishment of a special trading cooperative.
Many of the peasantry’s cash crops, such as grains, flax and 
garden vegetables, furthermore, were traded only a few months of 
the year, making it difficult to justify the establishment of a
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special marketing cooperative on the basis of 2-3 months’ work. ,
i
The prices for many of these products were also highly unstable,
and most cooperatives had neither the capital nor the human
resources to play the market astutely. Therefore, only credit
cooperatives, which had sufficiently strong finances and
undertook marketing operations as subsidiary occupations, could
24
hope to make a lasting impact on the agricultural market. The
one exception was dairy farming, which produced a marketable
product year-round and hence could be organized into special
dairy cooperatives (dairy associations).
Cooperatives found it especially difficult to undertake the
marketing of grain. The grain trade was a game for very high
stakes and no place for amateurs. A bad move on the grain market
could destroy an otherwise successful cooperative. That happened
to one southern agricultural society which signed a contract to
sell 9,000 tons of grain in 1912, only to see world grain prices
plummet because of the Moroccan crisis and Italy’s invasion of
Libya. The society suffered major financial losses and its secre-
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tary later committed suicide. Such reverses notwithstanding, 
numerous cooperatives, especially credit cooperatives, felt im­
pelled to enter the grain trade. Their growing role in this field 
was acknowledged by the State Bank, which gave out an increasing 
amount of credit to finance credit cooperatives’ marketing of
grain: from 3 million rubles in 1911 to 31 million rubles three 
26
years later. By 1913, 1,672 credit cooperatives were engaged in 
marketing grain. They owned some 500 storage bins and grain 
elevators with a total capacity of 180,000 tons; Makarov 
estimated at the time that such cooperative activities saved
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member farmers about 6-8 rubles a ton. ,
Cooperatives also faced problems gaining a foothold in the
flax market. The potential benefits of cooperative flax marketing
were no less than in the case of grain. Flax was the main cash
crop of peasant agriculture in the non-black earth region. Russia
was famous for its long-fibre flax and even though there was a
considerable domestic demand for linens, over half the annual
crop was exported. Nearly 80% of Russia’s flax was produced by
small peasant farmers, who generally did not benefit from the
profitability of their crop. Peasant flax production and
marketing were highly fragmented, allowing for the almost
complete domination of the Russian flax market by a small group
of powerful foreign trading firms. The lack of domestic
facilities to process, grade and standardize the flax harvest
seriously diminished the product’s market value. Because of the
primitive quality of the product and because peasant producers
were too disorganized to wield any bargaining clout with their
buyers, they had to accept an unnecessarily low price for the 
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flax harvest. As a result, many agronomists called for the 
development of cooperation in the flax trade. Mindful of the 
experience of Siberian dairy farmers, who at the beginning of the 
century had been in much the same position as the flax growers, 
Russian agronomists hoped that cooperatives would edge out 
domestic middlemen, help improve the quality of the flax, improve 
farmers’ bargaining clout with foreign trading firms and 
ultimately encourage peasant commercialization.
The Ministry of Agriculture responded in May 1912 by 
establishing a Flax Committee within the Ministry and charging it
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with the responsibility, among other things, of encouraging the ,
v
development of seed cleaning stations and farm supply depots and
29
the training of special flax instructors. In fact, the process
of the cooperation of the flax trade had been proceeding at the
grassroots for some time. Beginning in the early years of the
Stolypin Reform, agronomists and credit cooperatives succeeded in
developing cooperative flax marketing in the provinces of Tver,
Moscow, Iaroslavl, Kostroma, Pskov, and Vologda. By 1914, a
cooperative newspaper claimed, over 4,000 cooperatives were
involved in marketing 335,000 tons of flax (about two thirds of
30
the total harvest). But even if these very high figures are
accurate, it was probably cooperation on a very superficial and
simple level (such as organizing the construction of storage
bins, where some of the flax could be kept until local merchants
came to pick it up). Hoping for the greater penetration of the
cooperatives into the flax trade, the Ministry of Agriculture and
numerous cooperatives and agronomists came together to organize
the Central Flax Growers Association in September, 1915. The
Central Association had only a short time to show what it could
do, but it managed to achieve some impressive results. It
collected over 15,000 tons of flax in its first full year of
operation and nearly 41,000 the year after. In 1916, the Central
Association accounted for 65% of Russia’s flax exports (which
admittedly were greatly constrained by the war) and registered
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150,000 flax growers as participants.
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Cooperative Dairy Farming
As we have seen in Chapter 1, dairy farming was probably the 
single most important factor in transferring to a progressive 
system of crop rotation and breaking out of the rural poverty 
cycle. It so happened that dairy farming also lent itself very 
well to cooperation. Since dairy products (whether milk, cheese, 
or butter) required an almost daily effort at processing, 
packaging and transportation to market, it represented a 
lucrative business to whoever carried out these operations. As a 
result, dairy farming bred a particularly thick crop of 
middlemen, who were willing to market the peasants* produce on 
the urban market; particularly lucrative was butter-making, since 
butter had the ability to withstand long journeys to distant 
markets. The organization of dairy cooperatives enabled the 
peasant to keep much of the hefty marketing commission for 
himself. Dairy cooperatives, by bringing like-minded producers 
together to pursue common interests, not only enabled the peasant 
to achieve economies of scale in processing, storage, 
transportation and the purchase of farm supplies, but also served 
as a useful basis for introducing technological and agronomic 
improvements.
Cooperative marketing of milk grew up around major cities 
such as Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kiev. In the north-eastern 
provinces of Iaroslavl, Vologda, Tver and Novgorod, dairy 
cooperatives tended to concentrate on marketing butter and 
occasionally cheese. But by far the most successful development
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of dairy cooperation took place in Western Siberia. Siberian 
dairy cooperation was the most successful branch of the whole 
cooperative movement, since it was probably the only instance in 
pre-Revolutionary Russia when cooperation came to virtually 
dominate the entire economy of a wide area.
Western Siberia had several salient characteristics that set 
it apart from other regions of Russia. Even by Russian standards, 
its population was very sparse and transportation was poor. The 
average Siberian peasant was prosperous, farming ten or fifteen 
desiatins of land and owning five or six cows. Natural conditions 
militated for the development of butter making. The natural 
pastures contained a particularly rich mixture of grasses, making 
for exceptionally good quality milk. Foreign companies, espe­
cially Danish firms, had discovered these advantages already in 
the 1890’s, and when commercialized butter-making in this region 
became viable with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Rail­
road, they rapidly expanded their hold on the market. It would 
not be long before the peasants organized themselves into cooper­
atives to reap the full benefits of their good fortune and hard 
work.
As so often happens, the successful development of 
cooperation was dependent on the strong leadership of a single 
visionary person. For the dairy farmers of Western Siberia this 
man was A.N. Balakshin. Born into a wealthy Siberian merchant 
family of liberal views, Balakshin initially made his career in 
commerce. Like so many others, he was impelled to enter public 
life by the horror of the famine of 1891 and he was elected 
president of the Kurgan Agricultural Society in 1896. The most
important question facing the society at the time was dairy
farming and the role of private trading firms in the local butter
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trade. Balakshin later recalled how he became a cooperator:
One day, I had a guest from St. Petersburg. It was a high offi­
cial from the Ministry of Agriculture who was sent to Siberia on 
some important business. I discussed with him the question of 
the Siberian butter-makers and expressed hope that the govern­
ment, through some compulsory regulations and a better organisa­
tion of agronomic aid, would be able to render great help to the 
peasant population in Western Siberia and to liberate it from the 
exploitation of private profiteers. My guest laughed at my words, 
and after a little while answered: "You are quite mistaken if you
think the government could render any effective assistance to the 
Siberian peasants through [agronomists] and regulations. We tried 
that system somewhere else, and the result was complete failure. 
You cannot help it with compulsory measures. The peasants must 
realize the gravity of the situation themselves. They must them­
selves be able to find an adequate solution to the problem, as 
was done by the peasants of Denmark and Ireland." And then my 
visitor in brief outlines sketched me the substance and the 
principles of cooperative organization. It was quite new to me 
and struck my imagination. After my guest departed I spent a few 
days thinking over what he had said to me, and then I became a 
cooperator.
A few weeks later, in 1900, Balakshin organized a special 
conference on Siberian butter-making at Kurgan where he advanced 
the idea of cooperation. In 1902 he traveled to St. Petersburg 
and obtained credits from the Finance Minister, Serge Witte, and 
from the Ministry of Agriculture to establish a network of dairy 
cooperatives in Western Siberia. Despite the opposition of 
private traders and even agronomists, who tried to spread bad 
rumours about Balakshin in St. Petersburg, cooperation in Western 
Siberia spread rapidly and in 1907 the first 65 dairy 
cooperatives banded together to form the Union of Siberian
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Creamery Associations. Incredibly, within a few years, the
Union was already reporting millions of rubles of sales and was
gaining market share rapidly against private trading firms. The
higher price paid by the Union for the farmers* butter —  double
the previous price, according to one estimate —  helped drive up
34
butter prices in the Siberian market as a whole. Not only did
the Union help farmers market their produce, it also maintained
42 agronomists specializing in dairy farming and established a
network of "company stores" for the purchase of consumer goods
and farm supplies. But the Union’s greatest achievement was in
the export market. Like the California Fruit Growers across the
ocean, the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations played a
crucial role in developing the export of Siberian butter in
general. The first exports went to Denmark, but Britain and
Germany soon became major buyers as well. The Union developed a
substantial global presence, with offices in London, Copenhagen,
New York, Boston and Harbin; the London branch even traded on the
London Stock Exchange. Balakshin and his colleagues had come a
long way from the discussions in the Kurgan Agricultural Society.
The rapid expansion of their organization’s operations and market
35
share can be seen in the table below.
The Union of Siberian Creamery Associations 1908-17 »
Year
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Member
associations
cooperative
stores
Annual 
Turnover 
(in rubles)
% total 
Siberian butter 
handled by Union
65
108
181
218
328
563
804
902
922
12
20
34
54
133
502
600
681
694
2,880,000
2.924.000
4.355.000
4.255.000
7.485.000
14.066.000
20.208.000
34.854.000
73.498.000
5%
6%
8%
8%
11%
14%
21%
28%
93%
71%1,410 1,167 160,367,000
The advent of the war closed off most of the foreign markets 
for Siberian butter. This shortfall, potentially ruinous for the 
Siberian dairy cooperatives, was soon made up by the supply of 
butter, pork, hay and other products to the army. The value of 
these supplies, which totaled 220 million rubles over the three 
years of war, made the Union of Siberian Creamery associations
the single most effective organization for supplying the army.
But success brought its own problems. One of these was the 
development of centrifugal tendencies within the Union itself. 
Previously all the finances of the Union had been highly 
centralized, with some of the more prosperous regions of Western 
Siberia effectively subsidizing the weaker cooperatives. Now, 
with Balakshin an ailing old man without much of his earlier 
authority, these prosperous regions, namely Altai and Kurgan, 
broke off and organized their own unions. Balakshin’s union met 
even more powerful competition from the socialist-oriented Union 
of Siberian Cooperative Unions, or "Zakupsbyt," which was formed 
in late 1916. Zakupsbyt rapidly grew to be a sort of super-union,
36
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encompassing cooperative activities of all different types. »
However, neither Balakshin's union nor Zakupsbyt had much chance 
to show their mettle, for soon all cooperatives were to be swept 
up in the holocaust of revolution and civil war from which they 
were never to recover.
The experience of the Union of Siberian Creamery 
Associations was seen as the model for all cooperative organiza­
tions. From the simple function of marketing local butter, it 
expanded to include virtually all aspects of economic life in its 
area. It built its own plants for butter-making, purchased all 
the necessary machinery and materials for dairy processing, 
operated an extensive network of consumer stores, opened up 
trading offices abroad and operated its own transport fleet. By 
one estimate, the Union in its prime included 650,000 households,
representing a population of 3.5 million or 42% of the population
37
in the butter-making regions of Western Siberia. This made
Western Siberia the heartland of the cooperative movement in
Russia. The English journalist and historian B. Pares had an
opportunity to appreciate the development of Siberian cooperation
38
when he travelled through Western Siberia during the Civil War:
Nothing was more impressive than the part which Cooperation then 
played in the life of Siberia. They ran about half the news­
papers and about three-quarters of the magazines. Many of the 
theatres and even the circuses were their property. All this 
machinery they utilised for educational purposes... Whatever 
little was done at this time in primary education was mostly 
their work... education [being] a primary task of any organiza­
tion that aimed at raising the level of public welfare. But on 
the business side, too, cooperation can have a much wider scope 
in Russia than with us. In the first place, it is undoubtedly in 
the genius of the people, and answers to their best instincts:
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always with the proviso that co-operation should be based on »
operation, namely, that it should be the free union of a number 
of independent individual wills. But what co-operation can do in 
Russia is limitless. Certainly, the movement was over-inflated at 
this time; the prevailing chaos had set a premium on it. Individ­
ual trading was almost impossible, and a number of persons were 
co-operators who in ordinary circumstances might not have been 
so. But I have always anticipated that when we get our first 
real sight of the new Russia, we shall find that the Co-operative 
movement is playing an extremely important part in it.
The Cooperation of National Trade and the War
For Russia’s farmers, traditional export markets were closed
off in 1914, but a new and lucrative market soon opened up:
namely, Russia’s huge armed forces. Peasant farmers in the
Ukraine and on the Black Sea, instead of shipping their goods
south, now sent them north and west. Faced with the task of
supplying the Army, and increasingly faced with the
responsibility of ensuring the supply of the cities as well, the
government initially opted to deal with the traditional network
of private traders, and refrained from expanding the role of
cooperatives. Only in some areas of the Central Agricultural
Region and Western Siberia did cooperatives find themselves with
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a major trading role right from the beginning. By the end of 
1914, as it became clear that the war would be a much larger and 
more prolonged affair than had been expected, the government 
recognized that existing commercial channels would not be equal 
to the task of providing a steady supply of goods to the Army and 
the cities. The government therefore turned to the zemstvos and 
the cooperatives.
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Both the zemstvos and the cooperatives were soon organizing »
V
hospitals and convalescent homes for the wounded and helping with
the resettlement of refugees. The dry laws gave impetus to the
already strong temperance campaign within the cooperative
movement and led to a spate of projects for tea rooms, people’s
palaces, theaters and other substitutes for the local tavern. In
the economic realm, cooperatives and zemstvo agronomists took
measures to limit the damage caused by the departure of the
peasant menfolk to the front. They organized cooperative
harvesting for under-staffed households and encouraged the
introduction of labor-saving machinery (though the limits of the
Russian agricultural machinery industry did not permit the kind
of vigorous agricultural mechanization that took place in Britain
and especially in the USA during the war). Because of the
disruption in the labor supply and the worsening market
conditions for agricultural producers, Russian grain shipments in
1915 were only 65% of 1913 levels; but since half the grain
shipments before the war had been destined for export markets,
which were now largely closed, Russia still produced an ample
surplus of grain to feed its own population. Similarly, the Army
requisitioned millions of horses from the peasantry, but peasant
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livestock herds actually increased during the war. Thus, the 
trials of the war-time economy underlined the strength of the 
productive side of Russian agriculture; the problem lay not in 
the lack of production, but in the lack of storage capacity and 
in a disorganized distribution network.
The cooperatives were asked by the government to help 
procure grain not only from their own members, but also from
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farmers who were not members. By the end of the first year of the 
war, private merchants were accounting for only half the grain 
supplied to the Army; a third was sold directly through agrono­
mists and other agents of the Ministry of Agriculture and almost 
one fifth was collected through cooperatives. The Executive Board 
of the Special Conference on Supply reported in 1916 that the
government had procured its food and fodder supplies (for the
41
armed forces and the cities) from the following agents:
Source of Government1s Purchases (by %%)
1914-15 1915-16
Private Traders: 60% 50%
Landowners: 13% 18%
Cooperatives: 12% 17%
Individual Peasants: 15% 15%
In addition to grain, cooperatives supplied the Army with
meat, butter, boots and ropes. The Pavlovsk Kustar Association in
Nizhni Novgorod supplied the Army with surgical equipment.
Agricultural societies in just six provinces —  Voronezh,
Poltava, Kharkov, Kostroma, Nizhni-Novgorod and Iaroslavl —
supplied the Army with half of its requirement in canned fruits
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and vegetables. The Union of Siberian Dairy Associations, 
meanwhile, supplied the Army with almost all its butter —  53,000 
tons in 1916 -- as well as large quantities of pork, hay and
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peasant handicrafts, worth 62 million rubles in all in 1916.
Since existing production facilities were incapable of 
meeting the demand for a society that now had to be self- 
sufficient, cooperatives began to organize their own food 
processing and light manufacturing enterprises. The handicrafts
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industry experienced a revival at this time and, through 
cooperatives, supplied the Army with much needed equipment. The 
Rural Trades Association of Borovichi Valdai in Nizhni Novgorod 
province, for instance, operated a metal-workshop, an iron found­
ry, a leather factory and a lumber mill. Incredibly, this one
cooperative supplied nearly the entire demand for gloves in the 
44
Russian army. Credit cooperatives and consumer societies all
over Russia constructed flour mills, smokehouses for ham and
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bacon, sausage factories, macaroni factories and canneries. The
Moscow Union of Consumer Societies raised its own production from
a value of 75 thousand rubles in 1914, to as much as 40 million
rubles by 1917, most of this being in the form of basic consumer
necessities such as flour and soap; the total production of the
Moscow Union and other unions of consumer societies during the
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war was valued at 300 million rubles. Credit cooperatives were
recorded as operating 192 different enterprises by 1917,
including 58 flour mills, 38 metal workshops, 29 leather and
shoe-making plants and 17 enterprises manufacturing agricultural 
47
equipment. In addition to providing vital consumer goods, the
cooperatives, along with the zemstvos, were enlisted in the
government’s battle against war-time inflation; in 1916, the
Union of Zemstvos alone was given 187 million rubles in
government subsidies to sell consumer goods below market 
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prices.
Much has been written about the inadequacy of supplies for 
both urban consumers and the Army during the war. Undoubtedly, 
part of the reason for the goods shortages was the fact that so 
much of the produce was supplied by peasant farmers and craftsmen
and their cooperatives. But it is not the cooperatives who should »
be blamed for the disasters that befell Russia after 1914. Rural 
cooperatives were never intended for a role that in all the other 
great powers was performed by modern industry. The fact that 
rural cooperatives rose to the challenge of supplying a war-time 
economy at all is quite extraordinary and indicative of the 
strength of the transformation of rural society that had begun in 
9 November 1906. The crash of Tsarist Russia was not due to the 
weakness of the rural economy, but to the shortcomings of urban 
Russia, with its industries, parliaments and decision-making 
bodies.
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CHAPTER TEN 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF RURAL TRENDS
»
The degree of social restructuring taking place in the 
Russian countryside during the Stolypin Reform has been the 
subject of this thesis. In this chapter, we will examine the 
effect this restructuring had on economic production. We have 
mentioned already some of the authoritative comments of analysts 
and observers during the Stolypin Reform: perhaps they noted that 
consolidation helped improve crop yields or that railroads helped 
the process of rural development or that credit cooperation and 
land reform tended to evolve together, and so on. In this chap­
ter, we will refer to provincial data for 42 provinces of Euro­
pean Russia (the Klebnikov database) to try to quantify the 
inter-relationship of the various trends in rural society and the 
rural economy. As we shall see, regression analysis of this data 
confirms most of the conclusions arrived at in other parts of the 
thesis.
Problems of Quantification
How can one evaluate an agricultural development program 
such as the Stolypin Reform? Ideally, one would want to have 
enough statistical information to be able to measure the agricul­
tural development program in terms of efficiency (the ratio of 
output to input or benefits to costs) or in terms of 
effectiveness (the ability of a program to achieve stated goals).
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But very often the main achievements of such programs are in the 
realm of information and culture, in other words, unquantifiable. 
Our age is not the only historical era which can call itself the 
"Age of Information". Information was just as crucial for Russian 
peasant farmers at the beginning of this century, and it was the 
Improvement of the information available to them and the 
consequent change in their managerial culture which may well have 
been the most important achievement of the Stolypin Reform. Such 
an improvement in the knowledge and management abilities of 
Russian farmers would only begin to show up in agricultural 
statistics after a time lag of at least several years. Hence, 
given the short lifespan of the Stolypin Reform and 20th century 
Tsarist agriculture in general, we will never know the true 
impact of the Stolypin Reform.
Before focusing once again on economic statistics, let us 
recall the social impact of the Stolypin Reform -- precisely that 
unquantifiable change mentioned above. Let’s begin with the land 
reform. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the Stolypin land reform 
produced some very significant changes in rural society. In a 
period of some eight years, gentry landownership had declined 21% 
to 41.7 million desiatins of land, while gentry-managed farms 
came to account for just 11% of total cultivated land. From the 
standpoint of the optimal use of the nation’s land and labor 
resources (maximum gross production, minimum unemployment), as 
well as from the standpoint of political stability, this was a 
positive development. At the same time, the redistributional 
peasant commune shrank from 78% of allotment land to about half, 
while 1.8 million new peasant farmsteads sprang up around the
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country. From the point of view of the technological efficiency 
and managerial initiative for peasant farmers, this too was a 
positive development. Yet, probably the most important result of 
the Stolypin land reform, at least in the short term, was the 
least quantifiable of all: the subversion of tradition in peasant 
Russia and the introduction of a new mood of uncertainty and 
experimentation. It ’s probably true that, more than anything 
else, it was this subversion of tradition and psychological 
conservatism that had the greatest impact on rural technological 
progress.
Social agronomy too brought some of its greatest benefits in
an intangible, psychological sense. The mission of social
agronomy, if we recall the words of Chayanov, was "not in the
creation of new methods of production, but in the acceleration of
economic evolution and the introduction of a new economic system
sooner than it would have emerged without social agronomic inter- 
1
vention." We can get an idea of the rising influence of agrono­
mists at this time by measuring such seemingly mundane indicators 
as the number of farmers attending expositions, lectures or 
courses (see Chapters 5 and 6). The problem is that, aside from 
certain anectdotal accounts, we have no way to quantify the 
effect that such projects had on peasant farming —  all we know 
is that the peasant farmers* interest in agronomic projects was a 
sign of a new curiousity about the modern world and of a "spirit 
of improvement". For this reason, if for no other, agronomists 
were very valuable to Russian peasant agriculture, since they 
served to increase the flow of commercial and technological 
information down to the village.
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Then we come to the phenomenon of rural cooperation. In a
period of ten years almost half the peasant households joined
some form of rural cooperative (see Chapter 7). How important a
development was this? Joining a cooperative didn’t necessary
signify any major transformation in the peasant’s farming system
-- and that, no doubt, explains why so many peasants did join up
—  but it did represent an important socio-psychological change
in rural society. The wave of rural cooperation represented the
first time that the peasantry voluntarily enrolled in a social
organization other than the church and the commune; as such,
rural cooperation was symptomatic of an upsurge in creative
self-help and local initiative. The adaptability of cooperatives
in undertaking any number of economic functions showed their
importance mainly as social organizations —  as the peasantry’s
bridge to the market and the outside world. Russian scientists,
for instance, could continue to produce a multitude of technical
innovations, but without an open-minded population and a social
network to diffuse the new knowledge, Russian science would be
like a pair of wheels spinning in the mud. Rural cooperatives, as
organizations of independent farmers drawn by self-interest,
provided the solid ground for new technologies and commercial
strategies to flourish. Chayanov expressed this idea quite elo- 
2
quently:
Not so long ago, our rural plain was covered with a centuries-old 
silence. In the capitals, cultural life boiled, far-reaching 
reform projects rose and fell, a great struggle was being fought 
by various schools of thought in the name of the broad masses who 
populated the Russian plain. However, this activity hardly 
affected the broad peasant masses, and these masses had neither
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their own voice, nor a creative will of their own, nor their own 
acknowledged social idea, since they had been and remained widely 
scattered. The Russian people constituted only a demos, a dark 
human mass, when it should have been a democracy. a people 
conscious of itself... However, observers of Russian life could 
have noticed in the Russian village molecular processes building 
up the future democracy and the most important process in this 
respect was Russian rural cooperative. In the ordinary everyday 
work of the boards, advisory councils, government assemblies, in 
the forging of unions, in the endless arguments about building a 
flourmill or the marketing of flax, are born those new people on 
whose shoulders will be the burden of building the future of our 
motherland.
Chayanov was not alone in being struck by the social 
significance of the changes that were taking place in the Russian 
countryside during the Stolypin Reform. Even assuming a high 
margin of error in the statistics on the land reform, social 
agronomy and cooperation, it is clear that major changes were 
taking place in rural society. The question of a direct causal 
link between these changes and a tangible improvement in farming 
productivity, however, is more difficult to determine. In 
agriculture, any organizational restructuring or investment in 
new technology would pay off only after a certain time lag. For 
example, if the peasant consolidated his land and began to 
cultivate it more carefully, or if he switched to a multi-field 
crop rotation or bought a metal plow for deeper plowing, the most 
significant returns on this investment only started coming in 
after a couple of years. (The one exception was the application 
of fertilizer, which raised yields immediately.) Since both 
consolidation, cooperation and social agronomy only began hitting 
their stride after 1909 or so, the real returns could have been 
expected to begin in 1912-15. As we shall see in the following
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chapter, this period witnessed a significant improvement in »
virtually all agricultural indicators. Yet, this could still be 
attributed to either to accidental coincidence or to the general 
long-term tendency of Russian agriculture to improve. The prob­
lem, therefore, is to prove that these improvements were linked 
directly with the Stolypin Reform.
To support such a view, many historians refer to the 
accounts of eyewitness observers and contemporary analysts 
(Brutskus, Pershin, Makarov, Max Sering, etc.). The accounts of 
reliable, dispassionate observers are historically important and 
have been examined in the relevant chapters on the land reform, 
social agronomy and cooperation. In order to reinforce these 
conclusions, we need to find some kind of statistical correlation 
between various social reforms and economic performance. Here, we 
have usually been treated to two kinds of analyses: one, on the 
broadest national level, asserting that it was no accident that 
the social changes of the Stolypin Reform coincided with the 
upturn of Russian agriculture in 1909-13, and the other, on a 
micro-economic level, using various local surveys, such as the 
1913 Ministry of Agriculture survey which showed the technologi­
cal superiority of 24,000 consolidated farms to their communal 
neighbors (see Chapter 4). Both of these approaches have been 
explored in this thesis and have generally supported the hypothe­
sis that the various elements of the Stolypin Reform spurred 
agricultural productivity. With the help of the statistics of the 
period, we can go even further and bridge the gap between the 
national figures and the purely local surveys.
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Analyzing the Data
i
The Klebnikov database breaks the national-level statistics 
down into 42 provinces (containing roughly two thirds of the 
population of the Russian Empire) and then relates these on the 
basis of how they differed in terms of yields, consolidation, 
gentry land tenure, cooperation, etc. The relationships that are 
yielded by regression analysis of this data will not be a revela­
tion to the reader, but it will allow us to quantify and confirm 
most of the relationships that have been discussed in this the­
sis .
That said, we must bear in mind the approximate nature of
Russian statistics during this period. It has already been
mentioned, for instance, that Russia’s official grain statistics
have been subject to substantial revisions by historians, who
3
have claimed a margin of under-reporting as high as 19%. This 
should not be a very large problem for us, however, since we 
examine grain statistics only with repect to various provinces’ 
progress over time, and if there was under-reporting, there is no 
reason to believe that it would have changed much between 1901 
and 1913. In seeking an explanation for the differing rates of 
agricultural progress in different provinces, we have tried to 
consider all possible factors. Many important factors, such as 
the degree of commercialization or industrialization within a 
particular province, can be represented by proxies (the degree of 
urbanization and railroad density, for example), but it is proba­
ble that there are many factors influencing agricultural develop-
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ment which we were unable to capture. For this reason and because , 
the provincial data obscures many of the variations within the 
provincial economy, the following analysis is indicative of 
causality rather than proof of it.
The key indicator is, of course, improvement in agricultural 
productivity. For an indicator, I have chosen the growth in 
(peasant) grain yields between two five-year periods: 1901-5 and 
1909-13, working on the assumption that all technological 
improvements, from better crop rotations to the introduction of 
modern equipment would eventually be reflected in higher grain 
yields. Given what we said above with respect to the time lag 
between technological improvement or social restructuring and 
improvements in production, it may seem as if the period 1909-13 
would hardly reflect the changes wrought by the Stolypin Reform.
Yet, if the eyewitnesses are to be believed, the potential impact 
of changes such as consolidation of strips or implementation of 
agronomists* advice were so great that we must be able to notice 
at least a small difference between those regions where the 
reform made progress and those where it made hardly any.
Unfortunately, it proved impossible to standardize much of 
the extraneous economic data with reference to a single year. The 
literacy and population statistics are taken from the census of 
1897, while the number of peasant households is taken from the 
census of 1916. The length of railroads and roadways refers to 
the year 1912; density is calculated by dividing total length by 
100,000 square versts. The use of different years as referents 
should not prove troublesome, since we are not so much interested 
in objective numbers as in comparing data between provinces, and
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Ithere is little reason to believe that the relative position of ,
different provinces with respect to literacy or urbanization 
rates would be radically different in 1910 and 1897. With respect 
1to calculating the average number of desiatins per peasant house­
hold, however, it was important to reproduce the situation on the 
eve of the Stolypin land reform (since the latter changed the 
size and nature of land tenure so substantially) and the figures 
given are for 1905.
With respect to the land reform, we have taken the 
registered number of land settlement applications, consolidated 
farms, households having undergone group land settlement and 
households having privatized their strips (not including those 
strips automatically privatized because of membership in a 
hereditary land commune) in the period 1906-16. These numbers 
were divided by the number of peasant households registered in 
the 1916 census to arrive at a percentage. All of the data refers 
to 42 provinces, except in the case of privatization, where 
numbers for only 37 provinces were available (the other factors 
relevant to a regression analysis of privatization were adjusted 
accordingly —  in other words, five provinces were dropped).
With respect to social agronomy, the indicators are the 
level of agronomic expenditure in 1913 by the Department of 
Agriculture on the one hand and the zemstvos on the other. In 
both cases, the expenditures were labeled as "agronomic expenses" 
and included the funding of agronomic personnel, agronomic 
courses, livestock breeding stations, popular agronomic 
literature, and so on, but not expenditures on land settlement.
The total provincial expenditures are divided by the number of
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households registered in the 1916 census. Of course the agronomic 
expenditures of 1913 hardly influenced the size of the harvests 
in the 1909-13 period, but what they show is the degree of 
developement in the agronomic programs of various provinces. If 
Kharkov province, for instance, was spending a massive 2.4 
million rubles in zemstvo and Department of Agriculture funds on 
agronomic projects, it is reasonable to assume that the agronomic 
program there was fairly mature and well-developed.
The development of the cooperative movement is measured in 
terms of the development of both credit cooperatives and 
agricultural societies in 1913. The development of credit 
cooperation is measured by the amount of credit cooperative loans 
per (1916) peasant household. With respect to agricultural 
societies, however, we are forced to measure only the number of 
societies per capita, since more specific ways of measuring the 
vitality of these societies is not available.
In examining the data, it is important to remember the high 
degree of multiple collinearity between several of the factors. 
This is true with respect to the various elements of the land 
reform (consolidation, land settlement applications, group land 
settlement and privatization), which tended to move together, and 
Department of Agriculture agronomic expenditures which tended to 
move along with them. It is also true with respect to literacy 
and urbanization, which tended to be closely interrelated. Anoth­
er point to note is that the following numbers measure only the 
degree to which two variables moved together —  we cannot say 
with absolute certainty which variable caused the other to chan­
ge. The rise in grain yields showed a strong correlation with the
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level of Department of Agriculture agronomic expenditure, but we ,
*
cannot say whether the Department’s agronomists spurred the pace 
of farming improvment or whether the Department’s agronomic 
program was directed precisely to those areas where agriculture 
was progressing most rapidly. Some factors, such as railroad 
density, gentry farming, peasant allotment size, literacy rates 
and urbanization changed relatively slowly or at least according 
to other dynamics than the tempo of crop yield improvment; in 
these cases, the causal relationship could have worked only one 
way: the tempo of crop yield improvment being determined by the 
other factors. But even the appearance of correlation without a 
definite determination of causality is significant: even if it 
was the fast pace of farming improvment that caused the high 
degree of consolidation rather than vice-versa, for instance, we 
can at least say that the transfer to consolidated land tenure 
was a natural result of peasant agriculture having achieved a 
certain degree of technological sophistication.
In the following tables, we use correlation coefficients 
(square root of R squared), whose maximum limits are plus or 
minus 1. The simple correlation calculations as well as the 
arithmetic were done using the Lotus 123 data processing program.
In purely scientific terms, most of the relationships exposed 
below are not statistically significant. The margin of error 
would be too great to allow a professional statistician to draw 
anything more than a tentative set of conclusions. This data is 
not meant to stand alone, however. It is meant to reinforce and 
elaborate on certain conclusions that were arrived at in other 
parts of the dissertation. As such, even the the crude, tentative
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relationships that emerge below have a certain statistical sig- »
nificance. It should also be reiterated that the raw figures
underlying this analysis (reproduced in the appendix of this
dissertation) should not be regarded as adequate figures for
illustrating the aggregate results of various social phenomena.
Much better aggregate figures are to be found in the relavent
parts of this dissertation; the material for this database was
chosen on the basis of its reliability and comparability. Thus,
we are working with literacy rates circa 1897, for example, even
though these numbers, as aggregate figures, do not necessarily
4
reflect the true state of affairs during the Stolypin Reform.
That said, let’s look at the factors affecting improvement 
in grain yields.
Factors Related to Improvement in Grain Yields
(POSITIVE)
Consolidation:
Dept, of Agriculture expenditure:
Privatization (37 provinces):
Railroad density:
Credit cooperatives:
Road density:
Agricultural societies:
Group land settlement:
Zemstvo expenditure:
(NO RELATION)
Size of peasant allotment 
Gentry farming 
Literacy 
Urban population
First among the factors linked to grain yields were consoli­
dation and privatization, both exhibiting a strong correlation
.486
.442
.418
.304
.300
.262
.161
.161
.151
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with how agriculture fared in any given region. The funds of the 
Department of Agriculture, which bore most of the burden for 
financing social agronomy in Russia, were also strongly related 
to the pace of farming improvement. Surprisingly, zemstvo 
agronomic expenditures showed a relatively weak positive 
correlation with grain yield improvement, evidently moved by 
different dynamics than that which moved the Department of 
Agriculture’s program. Credit cooperatives showed a strong 
correlation with the pace of farming improvement, both because 
the latter provided farmers with more money to deposit in the 
institutions and because credit cooperatives evidently played a 
role in enabling farmers to take such measures as were necessary 
to raise their crop yields; agricultural societies, by contrast, 
showed only a weak positive correlation with crop yields.
Easy access to market was important in spurring a rise in 
crop yields, judging by the strong correlations exhibited by both 
road and railroad density (the latter was also a symptom of a 
certain amount of industrialization). While this may have been 
true, it was evidently not important for those markets to be 
within the peasant’s own province, judging by the irrelevance of 
the degree of urbanization to the pace of farming improvements. 
Similarly, it seems that the local farmers did not need to be 
literate in order for a province to achieve good crop yields. 
Despite some theories to the contrary, the most progressive and 
innovative peasants were not those who were forced to squeeze out 
a living on the smallest plots; neither was the presence of 
(supposedly progressive) gentry farms a positive influence on 
peasant farmers.
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Factors Related to Land Settlement Applications i
V
(POSITIVE)
Dept, of Agriculture expenditure: 
Literacy:
Urban population:
Railroad density:
Zemstvo expenditure: 
Privatization:
.543
.475
.465
.291
.271
.219
(NEGATIVE)
Size of peasant allotment: -.276
(NO RELATION)
Gentry farming
Department of Agriculture agronomic expenditure showed the 
highest correlation with applications for land settlement; 
zemstvo expenditures also showed a relationship, though the link 
was much weaker. Significantly, the degree to which the province 
was economically and socially developed (as indicated by the 
degree of urbanization, literacy and railroad density) exhibited 
a very strong influence on the pace of land settlement 
applications. The size of peasant allotments showed a relatively 
strong negative correlation coefficient —  in other words, the 
larger the average size of peasant allotments in a given 
province, the less likely were the peasants to apply for land 
settlement; this rings true when one considers land-abundant 
provinces such as Viatka, Olonets and the Don Territory on the 
one hand and land-hungry provinces such as Volhynia and Voronezh 
on the other. The degree to which gentry farming was developed, 
once again, proved irrelevant to the number of land settlement 
applications.
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Factors Related to Consolidation 
(POSITIVE)
Dept, of Agriculture expenditure:
Credit Cooperatives:
Urban population:
Privatization:
Railroad density:
Literacy:
Agricultural societies:
Zemstvo expenditure:
Gentry farming:
(NEGATIVE)
Size of peasant allotment:
We see the same strong relationship of Department of 
Agriculture expenditure and (relatively weak) relationship of 
zemstvo expenditure with respect to consolidation as with land 
settlement applications. The degree of socio-economic development 
(literacy, urbanization, railroad density) similarly exerts a 
strong positive influence. The interesting development here is 
the very strong correlation of credit cooperatives and (slightly 
weaker) of agricultural societies. The prevalence of gentry 
farming also played a small role in the progress of 
consolidation. As with land settlement applications, the larger 
the average peasant allotment, the less likely was there going to 
be a strong tendency to consolidation.
.680
.499
.470
.435
.424
.374
.365
.339
.269
-.223
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»Factors Related to Privatization
(POSITIVE)
Railroad density:
Consolidation:
Road density:
Dept, of Agriculture expenditure: 
Gentry farming:
Credit cooperatives:
Agricultural societies:
(NO RELATION)
Size of peasant allotment 
Urban population 
Literacy
Zemstvo expenditure
As we have seen in the previous two tables (land settlement 
applications and consolidation) and as confirmed in this table, 
the pace of privatization moved closely with the pace of the 
various forms of land settlement (though it moved much more with 
consolidation than with land settlement applications, implying 
that it moved hardly at all with the other major form of land 
settlement: group land settlement). With respect to 
privatization, a well-developed transportation network (road and 
railroad density) proved to be very important, though the level 
of urbanization and literacy within a province was irrelevant. 
The presence of gentry farming was also a relatively important 
factor, but the size of the peasant allotment was irrelevant. 
Department of Agriculture expenditure was quite important, but 
zemstvo expenditure was irrelevant. Finally, both credit 
cooperatives and agricultural societies showed a mildly positive 
correlation with privatization, suggesting that private farmers
.455
.435
.331
.317
.284
.273
.248
-341-
were more likely to join a cooperative and that the commercial *
benefits of cooperative membership in turn made farmers think 
about privatizing their land.
Factors Related to Department of Agriculture Expenditure
(POSITIVE)
Urban Population: .784
Consolidation: .680
Literacy: .641
Railroad density: .455
Credit cooperatives: .379
Agricultural societies: .374
Privatization: .317
Zemstvo expenditures: .225
Gentry farming: .154
Department of Agriculture expenditure was very strongly 
related to the degree of urbanization, literacy and, to a 
slightly smaller degree, railroad density. It also correlated 
strongly with the degree of consolidation in the province and, 
slightly less, with the degree of privatization. The presence of 
a strong cooperative movement (credit cooperatives and 
agricultural societies) in the province also showed a strong 
correlation with Department of Agriculture expenditure. The 
expenditures of the zemstvos followed the Department’s 
expenditures to a slightly lesser degree. Finally, the Department 
of Agriculture did not favor gentry agriculture, since the 
presence of gentry farming showed only a very weak positive 
correlation with the Department’s expenditures.
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I
V
Factors Related to Zemstvo Expenditure
(POSITIVE)
Credit Cooperatives:
Consolidation:
Railroad density:
Gentry farming
Dept, of Agriculture expenditures:
.387
.339
.317
.272
.225
The strongest correlation with zemstvo agronomic expenditure 
is to be found in the degree of development of the province’s 
credit cooperatives, confirming our suspicion of a strong link 
between the two. The zemstvos’ link to the degree of 
consolidation was slightly weaker. The commercialization of the 
local economy (as indicated by railroad density) and the presence 
of gentry farming both exerted a modestly positive influence on 
the degree of zemstvo agronomic expenditure. Finally, zemstvo 
expenditures correlated positively with Department of Agriculture 
expenditures, but not very strongly. It must be noted, that due 
to the generally lukewarm relationship of all these factors to 
zemstvo agronomic expenditure, we are evidently missing the key 
factors in determining the latter; such factors could have been 
political orientation or general levels of prosperity, neither of 
which are measured in the Klebnikov database.
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Factors Related to Credit Cooperation »
(POSITIVE)
Gentry farming: 
Consolidation:
Zemstvo expenditure: 
Department of Agriculture: 
Railroad density:
Urban population:
.532
.499
.387
.379
.292
.238
(NO RELATION J_
Agricultural societies 
Literacy
Size of Peasant allotment
Credit cooperation was the one area in which the zemstvos* 
agronomic expenditures played a larger role than the Department 
of Agriculture’s. This was probably due to the zemstvos* 
ideological championing of credit cooperation and to the helpful 
role of the zemstvo funds of small credit in expanding credit 
cooperation. But the strongest correlation with credit 
cooperation appears to be the prevalence of gentry farming and 
the degree of consolidation. The strong correlation with gentry 
farming is rather mysterious, since gentry farmers may have 
helped organize credit cooperatives, but generally did not 
participate in them. Perhaps the explanation is that this was the 
one area in which the demonstration effect of gentry farming was 
very strong: peasant farmers, looking at neighboring gentry 
enterprises, developed a strong desire to accumulate capital and 
this led them to the credit cooperatives. The commercialization 
of the region’s economy (as indicated by urbanization and 
railroad density) exerted a moderately positive influence on the 
development of credit cooperation. The degree of literacy, the
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average size of peasant allotments and the prevalence of 
agricultural societies were all irrelevant factors.
»
Factors Related to Agricultural Societies
(POSITIVE)
Literacy:
Urban population:
Dept, of Agriculture expenditure: 
Consolidation:
Privatization:
.526
.418
.374
.359
.248
(NO RELATION)
Credit cooperatives 
Gentry farming
The prime factors encouraging the establishment of 
agricultural societies were the degree of literacy and 
urbanization in the province, which points to the societies* role 
as primitive types of scientific institutions. Department of 
Agriculture expenditures, which generally moved together with 
literacy and urbanization, also showed a strong positive 
correlation. The land reform (consolidation and privatization) 
exhibited a moderately strong correlation with the establishment 
of agricultural societies. The prevalence of gentry farming, on 
the other hand, was irrelevant (agricultural societies, though 
proto-scientific institutions, were predominantly peasant in 
membership). The prevalence of other cooperatives such as credit 
cooperatives was also irrelevant.
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Miscellaneous Relationships 
(POSITIVE)
Literacy to Urbanization 
(NEGATIVE)
Gentry farming to peasant allotment:
We can see from the table above that literacy rates within a 
given province were very closely related to the the degree of 
urbanization. This explains why urbanization and literacy tended 
to move together with respect to their influence on various other 
phenomena (the only exception being with respect to credit 
cooperation, where urbanization was important and literacy was 
not). The other relationship we see is a relatively strong 
negative correlation between the prevalence of gentry farming and 
the average size of peasant allotments —  in other words, the 
more gentry farming a province was likely to have, the smaller 
the average peasant allotment was likely to be. This agrees with 
the common observation that in those regions where the soil was 
most fertile, the gentry held on to as much land as it could, 
while the peasants were capable of making a living off very small 
plots. It should be noted, however, that according to the grain 
yield table above neither the prevalence of gentry farming nor 
the average size of peasant allotments played any role in 
determining the tempo at which crop yields improved during the 
Stolypin Reform.
In sum, when considering the general progress of Russian 
agriculture during the Stolypin Reform, we find that we are 
justified in regarding the land reform (especially consolidation) 
as the main factor in determining the pace of farm improvements,
f
.854 
-. 299
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both through the improvements taking place on the consolidated ,
i
farms themselves and because of the demonstration effect these 
farms exhibited on the neighboring peasant communes.
The extent of the Department of Agriculture’s agronomic 
expenditures also played a strong role, both directly (through 
more agronomic advice) and indirectly (through encouraging land 
reform, cooperation, etc.).
Zemstvo agronomic expenditures were slightly less 
influential (except in the case of credit cooperation). It should 
be remembered, however, that the bulk of the Department of 
Agriculture’s agronomic program was administered by the zemstvos, 
so these remained extremely important institutions.
The role of agricultural societies was at best mildly 
positive with respect to many of these developments, though our 
methods for measuring the development of agricultural societies 
are probably the crudest in the Klebnikov database (we are 
measuring simply the number of societies with respect to the 
number of peasant households, rather than the strength of those 
societies or their membership).
Credit cooperation (which we measure by loans per 
household), on the other hand, exhibited a strong link with both 
the land reform, the agronomic program and the pace of farming 
improvements, though it may be that credit cooperation was more a 
result of rising prosperity and rural free enterprise than a 
cause of these changes.
Predictably, the degree of a province’s general socio­
economic development (literacy, urbanization, railroad density) 
was important in determining the pace of the land reform, the
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agronomic program, cooperation and ultimately, farming ,
v
improvements.
Finally, the bogeymen of the 1905 agrarian revolution, 
gentry farming and peasant land hunger, appear to have been 
largely irrelevant to most economic phenomena. The only 
exceptions were the gentry’s strong link to peasant credit 
cooperation and the general tendency of small peasant landholders 
to undertake land reform.
The analysis of the Klebnikov database generally confirms 
the statistical surveys and the observations quoted earlier in 
this dissertation. Having confirmed the inter-relationship 
between the Stolypin land reform, social agronomy, rural 
cooperation and agricultural progress, we can now go on to look 
at the economic progress of rural Russia as measured by national 
statistics.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE STOLYPIN REFORM AND RUSSIA * S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
i
In a relatively short period, the Stolypin Reform succeeded 
in changing the face of the Russian countryside. The 
transformation had not gone far enough for us to speak of an 
agricultural revolution, but the reform did give a mighty push to 
the processes of social and economic modernization. The change 
was only partly reflected in agricultural production figures 
(though these were quite impressive by themselves). An equally 
important part of the Stolypin Reform was its effect on the 
restructuring of the social foundations of agriculture: the 
continuing erosion of gentry farming, the decline of the peasant 
land commune, the rise of American-style farmsteads, the rise of 
agronomic extension service and agricultural cooperation, and so 
on. The results of the Stolypin Reform appear all the more 
impressive when one recalls the material and political 
destructiveness of the 1905 revolution; that Russia was able so 
quickly to get back on the rails of socio-economic modernization 
is a tribute to the appropriateness of the development course 
charted by the Stolypin Reform.
In this chapter, we will look at various indices of agricul­
tural production and economic growth in the period 1905-1917. It 
should be noted that unfortunately this data is not completely 
standardized —  by necessity, the tables often relate to differ­
ent regions (72 provinces or 63 or 50) or to different periods 
(the crop production averages for 1909-13 or 1911-13, for exam­
ple), and so on. Nonetheless, the data is sufficiently comparable
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and the trends are sufficiently clear for us to draw strong 
conclusions as to the progress of Russian agriculture during the 
Stolypin Reform and the direction of the Russian economy as a 
whole.
The Development of Russia1s Agricultural Sector. 1905-17
Before we go on to look at the performance of the rural 
economy in the years after the 1905 Revolution, it is worth 
considering the social upheaval taking place in the Russian 
countryside during this period. However promising such change and 
dislocation may have been for long-term economic growth, it 
probably had a severe, constraining effect on production in the 
short term.
The most disruptive event was the revolution of 1905 itself.
This event involved several years of near anarchy and violent
confrontation in the countryside; hundreds of millions of rubles
worth of property was destroyed, while crops were neglected and
1
farm investment languished. One of the lasting results of the
revolution of 1905 was the continued decline of the most modern
and commercialized part of the agricultural sector: gentry 
2
farming. By 1916, gentry farmers cultivated only 11% of the
land, owned only 6% of the horses, 6% of the cattle and 5% of the
3
pigs of European Russia. The transfer of gentry land to the 
peasantry probably had a negative impact on national crop yields, 
since gentry farmers (as opposed to landowners renting their land 
to peasant farmers) tended to produce crop yields that were about
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4
15%-30% higher than those of peasant farmers. Gross agricultural ,
production, on the other hand, probably benefitted from increased 
peasant land ownership: while the gentry often left much of their 
land as forest or pasture, peasant farmers tended to put every 
scrap of arable land under the plow and also tended to cultivate
more intensive crops such as flax, potatoes, vegetables and
5
sunflowers.
No less of a structural transformation was taking place 
within peasant agriculture itself: as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, 
the peasant commune was breaking up. Accounting for 78% of 
peasant allotment land in 1905, the redistributional commune 
accounted for little more than half by 1916. In other words, 
peasant land was being rapidly privatized. The sale of communal 
allotments was rising and peasant migration to the cities or 
beyond the Urals reached record levels. 1.8 million new peasant 
farmsteads mushroomed throughout European Russia. Such social 
restructuring produced widespread dislocation and uncertainty,
leading initially to declines in both crop yields and gross
6
production. But after about 1909, the new forms of peasant land 
tenure (private plots and consolidated farms) as well as the 
expansion of the rural cooperative and agronomic networks began 
to have a positive impact, contributing to the general upturn in 
Russia’s rural economy. In effect, the socio-economic reform had 
to allow for a time lag of several years before it could show 
productive results: as the new social norms became securely 
established, more time and money could be spent on improving 
production rather than deciding legal and social issues, and 
agricultural productivity consequently began to improve. Indeed,
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after a rather severe crop failure in 1911, Russia’s farmers 
enjoyed two record-breaking harvests in 1912 and 1913 and three 
very good years in 1914, 1915 and 1916, despite the ravages of 
the world war.
The expansion of agricultural production occured despite the
time lag allowing for the Stolypin Reform to take effect. The
improvement was no more a product of good fortune or good
weather, than the failings of Soviet agriculture are a product of
70 years of bad weather. In order to factor out the influence of
climatic variations, we can compare the averages of two five-year
periods: 1901-1905 and, eight years later, 1909-1913. While the
choice of the 1909-13 period neutralizes the effect of any
extraordinary windfalls or crop failures, it may also obscure the
heightened productivity of 1912-13. Even allowing for such a
short time lag (after all, the Stolypin Reform had hardly had a
chance to flourish by 1909), we can see a notable improvement in
Russia’s agricultural production, as is evident in the table 
7
below.
Crop Production in 72 provinces of Russia (millions of quintals)
Flax Sugar
Wheat Rye Barley Oats Maize Fiber Potato Beet 
1901-1905: 161 220 75 128 12 5.1 264 79
1909-1913: 199 232 104 155 24 6.0 348 114
% change +24% +5% +39% +21% +100% +18% +32% +44%
We can see a significant expansion all across the the board. 
The biggest increases came in the more valuable grains (wheat, 
barley and maize) and the more intensive crops such as potato and 
sugar beet. The production of the five main grains increased 20%
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during these eight years, representing a 2.31% compounded annual
growth rate. Much of the growth of agricultural production was
due to the expansion of cultivated land. As we saw in Chapter 9,
the expansion of cultivation in Western Siberia gave birth to a
large dairy industry; the settlement of Central Asia increased
cotton production, which doubled between 1900 and 1913 and
provided over half of the raw material for Russia*s burgeoning
8
cotton textile industry. Between the periods 1901-5 and 1911-13,
9
cultivated land expanded by an estimated 14% in European Russia. 
As we have seen, the expansion of cultivation was encouraged by 
the following policies of the Stolypin government: (1)
encouragement of colonization of lands beyond the Urals; (2) 
encouragement of the purchase of gentry lands by peasant farmers; 
and (3), encouragement of new crop rotation technologies, 
allowing for fallow lands to be brought under cultivation without 
exhausting the soil and diminishing crop yields.
In the short term, the expansion of cultivation could have 
served to diminish average crop yields in Russia as a whole. If 
the expansion resulted from increasingly desperate cultivation of 
marginal lands or lands which needed the replenishment of a 
fallow cycle, one could expect average yields to drop; on the 
other hand, if the expansion of cultivation took place through 
colonization of virgin lands, yields would also suffer, at least 
initially, as the farmer spent a couple of years clearing and 
grading his land and generally getting his farming system in 
order. As it was, however, the average crop yields in Russia did 
not drop, but improved significantly between 1901-5 and 1909-13, 
indicating significant technological progress and productivity
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growth. According to a 1924 study by Zemplan, the planning arm of ,
the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, about half of the growth of
agricultural production during the Stolypin Reform was due to the
expansion of arable land and rural labor; the other half was due
10
to productivity improvements. Improvement in crop yields was
especially crucial in the older agricultural regions of the
Russian Empire. While farmers migrating to the abundant lands of
the East could afford to raise half the yield of their European
Russian counterparts, the latter had to improve their land-
productivity or face utter impoverishment. Fortunately, crop
yields in European Russia did rise significantly during this
11
period, as can be seen below.
Cron Yields; 63 provinces of European Russia (quintals per hect.)
Years Wheat Rye Barley Oats
Flax
Fibre Potato
Sugar
Beet
1901-1905: 6.9 7.4 7.6 7.1 3.1 65 . 9 148
1909-1913: 7.3 7.9 8.9 8.4 4.1 76.5 164
% change + 6% + 7% + 17% + 18% + 32% + 16% + 11%
Once again, significant improvement is evident across the 
board. Judging by the data from the European part of the Russian 
Empire, rising crop yields were important especially with respect 
to flax production, which rose 18% even though the area of 
cultivation actually shrank. (A similar phenomenon also occured 
with rye.) Why were yields rising, in spite of the heavy use of 
land and the growing tendency to skip the fallow cycle? The 
reason was almost certainly the employment of new soil- 
conservation technology in the form of better crop rotations, 
more manuring and greater use of artificial fertilizers. The
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growing employment of manure and sophisticated crop rotations was ,
*
reflected in the rise in livestock numbers and in the greater
diversification of Russia’s agricultural production. The
cultivation of nitrogen-fixing fodder grasses, for instance,
increased by 79% during this period to account for 1.5 million
desiatins of cultivated land. (This was especially important in
the flax growing regions of non-black earth Russia, allowing for
the impressive increase in flax yields shown in the table above.)
In addition, the production of row crops (breaking up the soil
and varying the crop cycle) rose as well: the cultivation of
sunflowers rose by 61%, sugar beet by 44%, potatoes by 32%. It
should be noted that though grain farming lost some ground to
other crops during this period, it still accounted for the vast
12
bulk of Russia’s cultivated land: 89.7% even as late as 1913.
Another symptom of the increasing technological
sophistication (and material prosperity) of the Russian farmer
was the rapid growth of purchases of manufactured farm equipment
and artificial fertilizers. The purchase of farm equipment can be
13
seen in the table below.
Purchase of Agricultural Machinery 
(in thousands of rubles)
1900 27,909
1906 39,650
1912 119,186
After rising 42% in the six years between 1900 and 1906, the 
purchase of agricultural machinery tripled in the next six-year 
period. Most of the growth in demand was satisfied by the
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expansion of domestic production of agricultural equipment. In ,
1900, 43% of equipment puchases were of Russian manufacture; in 
14
1913, 55%. In some large estates in Southern Russia and Western
Siberia on the eve of the war the first gasoline-powered tractors
15
were beginning to appear. The growing purchases of agricultural
machinery not only reflected the rise in the commercial
prosperity of the farming population, it also boded well for
improvements in labor and land productivity. It should also be
noted that one of the reasons for the increased adoption of
machinery was the rise in agricultural wages after a long period
16
of decline before 1906. (There will be more about this later in 
the chapter.)
The use of fertilizers, though still miniscule by West
European standards, also showed a sharp upturn in this period.
Since the great majority of fertilizers used by Russian farmers
were imported, the rise in consumption is best judged by
17
considering fertilizer imports, which are shown below.
Imports of Artificial Fertilizers 
(in millions of puds)
1900 6.0
1905 7.3
1913 34.3
While crop production clearly underwent an impressive 
expansion, the record for animal husbandry was more ambiguous. Of 
course animal husbandry can’t be judged by livestock numbers 
alone: important improvements in the livestock feeding (as
-356-
witnessed by changed crop rotations and increased cultivation of ,
v
grass hays, for example) and livestock breeding can take place
without ever showing up in the statistics on livestock numbers.
That said, let us consider those numbers in the following 
18
table:
Livestock Ownership. 1905-1916
Horses 
Cattle 
Pigs:
Horses 
Cattle 
Pigs:
Horses 
Cattle 
Pigs:
1905
13,426,100
19,025,388
6,148,262
1905
7,777,352
13,516,624
3,979,127
26 black earth provinces 
1909 1914
14,169,693
18,141,522
6,541,493
14,505,670
18,312,949
8,039,324
1916
16,674,998
24,688,022
10,474,345
22 non-black earth provinces
1909 1914 1916
6,600,020
11,183,111
3,869,801
6,159,813
10,786,799
4,158,721
6,332,541
12,874,932
5,825,163
Total for 48 provinces of European Russia 
1905 1909 1914 1916
21,203,452 20,769,713 20,665,483 23,007,539
32,542,012 29,324,633 29,099,748 37,562,954
10,127,389 10,411,294 12,198,045 16,299,508
The table above refers to the older agricultural regions of 
European Russia; it does not take into account the fertile new 
lands in Stavropol, Kuban and Western Siberia, where livestock 
ownership rose rapidly in conjunction with the expansion of 
cultivation. With respect to the 48 provinces considered above, 
it is evident that animal husbandry as a whole suffered in the 
first years of the Stolypin Reform; the situation had stabilized 
and even improved a little by 1914, and the war years witnessed a 
sharp jump upward as peasants invested their increased savings in
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farm animals. Two positive trends visible in the table above are »
*
the growth in working livestock in the black earth provinces and 
the growth of pig farming throughout European Russia. Working 
livestock (horses) were the most important farm animals for the 
black earth provinces, since this was a region of crop production 
and very little dairy farming; the consistent growth in the 
number of horses here was therefore a very encouraging sign. Pig 
farming, meanwhile, was a very economical branch of agriculture, 
since pigs generally required no grazing land and could be fed 
byproducts such as potato skins, linseed cake and sugar beet 
leaves; and that accounts for the consistently rapid growth in 
the number of pigs throughout the 48 provinces.
By far the most encouraging development in Russian animal 
husbandry was its increasing commercialization. Because of 
growing specialization and efficiency improvements in animal 
husbandry, the marketing of animal products increased 
dramatically during the Stolypin Reform. It should be noted that 
animal husbandry should be judged not only by the quantity of 
livestock, but also by its quality. Here there was a substantial 
improvement: one official English publication estimated that the
value of Russian cattle had risen 25% through better breeding
19
during the Stolypin reform. Another indicator was the increased 
production derived from Russia’s farm animals. As can be seen in 
the next table, between the periods 1901-5 and 1911-13, shipments 
of dairy products more than doubled, while the shipments of meat 
increased more than ten-fold. Exports of both meat and dairy 
products also doubled. Evidently, Russia’s farmers no longer 
aspired to keep animals just for domestic consumption or social
-358-
prestige; they were taking a more modern, commercially-oriented ,
approach to raising farm animals.
Not only animal husbandry, but Russian agriculture as a
whole was becoming commercialized. We can get a very good picture
of all the agricultural products that were marketed outside
purely local markets by looking at how much was transported along
the railways and waterways of Russia. According to the Board of
Railroad and Water Transportation, total agricultural products
marketed in 1900-05 averaged about 2.3 billion rubles; by 1911-13
this figure had risen 39% to 3.2 billion rubles. If we include
local markets, the total agricultural marketings on the eve of
20
the war was about 4.5 billion rubles annually. Not only was the
gross amount of marketings rising, but the proportion of the
total agricultural product that was put on the market was rising
as well. According to the railroad statistics, for instance, the
proportion of the grain that was produced for the market rose
21
from 28% of the total in 1901-5 to 37% in 1911-13.
The value of agricultural exports grew 61%, from 700 million
rubles in the 1900-05 period to 1,126 million rubles in 1911-13.
(In 1909-13, exports accounted for almost half of all grain 
22
marketings.) The increase was partly a result of a quantitative
rise in export shipments and partly of a rise in world market
prices for most farm products. Another factor was the shift in
the make-up of the agricultural exports to higher-value farm
products: barley and wheat replaced rye as Russia’s primary
export; and industrial crops (sugar beet, potatoes, etc.) and
23
animal products grew at the expense of grain generally. The 
following table shows the growth of agricultural marketings and
-359-
24
exports in this period. i
1
Russian Agricultural Products Exported and Shipped 
by Railroads: % change in 1911-13 over 1901-5
Product Shipments Exports
Grain: + 22% + 7%
Flax, hemp: + 31% + 31%
Dairy: + 112% + 104%
Meat: +1,019% + 127%
Potatoes: + 61% +265%
Starch: + 67% +1,427%
Spirits: +60% + 309%
Sugar beets: + 146% -2%
Sugar: + 59% + 107%
If we refer back to the first table in this chapter (gross
agricultural production) we can see that in all major crops —
from grain and flax to potatoes and sugar beet —  commercial
shipments increased faster than gross production. This confirms
once again the growing level of commercialization in Russian
agriculture. Secondly, domestic consumption (shipments) of grain,
meat and dairy products increased faster than exports, indicating
increased urban demand and probably improved nutrition —  a point
which is reinforced by the production per capita figures
mentioned later. Finally, with respect to exports, Russia seemed
to be doing more agricultural processing at home: exports of
starch and spirits rose much faster than the export of potatoes;
similarly, sugar beet exports actually fell, but the export of
sugar more than doubled, reflecting the proliferation of sugar
processing plants —  "rising like mushrooms" —  on plantations
25
throughout central and southern Russia in 1910-13. This points 
to one of the ways in which the development of the agricultural
-360-
sector helped the national process of industrialization. ,
The increase in shipments brought in its wake the problem of
storage. That meant grain elevators, where Russia's grain could
be cleaned, sorted and stored for shipment. In 1910, the State
Bank, aiming to raise the quality of Russia’s grain exports and
capture some of the trading and storage fees appropriated by
foreign merchants, decided to finance an intensive campaign of
grain elevator construction at Russia’s most important ports and
railheads. The need for these elevators was acute. In 1910,
Russia, which exported about 8 million tons of grain, had only 62
elevators with a capacity of 400,000 tons; by contrast, the
United States, which exported about 2 million tons of grain, had
424 elevators with a capacity of 7 million tons (most for
internal shipments). When the war interrupted Russia’s
construction program, it had hardly gotten off the ground; 21 new
elevators had been completed, with a combined capacity of 232,000
26
tons (increasing the nation's capacity by more than 50%).
Besides grain storage, Russia needed facilities for cold storage
to accomodate the burgeoning trade in butter, eggs, fish, beef
and bacon. The products were commonly shipped by rail in "ice-
cars" —  packed on matting on top of chunks of ice —  to ports
and railheads, where they were stored in enormous ice cellars.
Because of the evident inefficiency of this system, mechanical
refrigerators began to be introduced in Russia, though still on a
27
comparatively small scale.
Agriculture also spurred the process of industrialization by 
earning foreign currency. The growth of Russia's agriculture 
helped consolidate its position as the world's largest
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agricultural exporter. Russia’s position vis a vis other
28 «
exporters is shown in the following table:
Net Exports of Grain, Potato, Butter and Flax (1909-1913 average) 
(by the world’s main exporters: in thousands of quintals)
Flax
Wheat Corn Barley Oats Ry_e Potato Butter Fiber
Russia 41,174 7,544 36,999 10,683 5,341 1,705 672 2,821
Argent. 24,249 29,401 6,170
USA 14,271 10,264 1,628 557
Rumania 13,314 9,837 3,508 1,559 894
Canada 20,152 1,803
Hungary 2,240 2,544 1,663 2,752 648
Germany 4,047
Italy 912
Netherlands 3,218 318
Denmark 859
Total 144.754 62.877 51.076 22.941 13.877 8,141 2,971 3.855
Russia’s
share of
the total 28% 12% 72% 47% 38% 21% 23% 73%
This table does not include the other major export crop on
world market — cotton -- of which Russia was a net importer and
the United States was a major exporter, but even this doesn’t
significantly alter the picture. The awesome weight of Russia’s
agricultural produce on world market at this time is clear.
According to the 1924 Zemplan study, between 1900 and 1913,
the total market value of Russia’s agricultural production rose 
29
89%. This expansion included a 34% rise in volume and a 41% 
rise in the average prices fetched by Russia’s agricultural 
produce. Unfortunately, the rise in prices is not explained in 
the Zemplan study and specifically the possibility of inflation
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is not explored. One Western economist calculated that the ,
30 «
national consumer price index rose 29% between 1900 and 1913.
This would leave agriculture with 47% real growth. In reality, it 
was probably greater since we have have to account for the sharp 
turn in the terms of trade towards agriculture and the phenomenon 
mentioned previously: Russian farmers’ switch to higher-value 
products such as wheat, barley, sugar beet and dairy products. In 
other words, the pure volume of agricultural production may have
risen only 34% according to Zemplan, but the produce was also of
31
better quality and greater value. Whether or not one could 
include this 89% increase in the market value of agricultural 
production in a calculation of GNP growth for instance is 
debateable, but in any case, for the farmer, it represented a 
real gain. An 89% improvement over little more than one decade 
was in fact an unprecedented windfall for Russia’s farming 
population; since peasant farmers accounted for over 78% of the
(grain) marketings on the eve of the war, most of this added
32
income must have accrued to them. Even though much of the money
must have gone to pay the merchants and tax collectors, peasant
farmers still ended up with record quantities of cash on their
hands. An indication of this was the explosive growth of the type
of small savings accounts mostly used by peasants, as well as in
State Savings Bank deposits, a large part of which belonged to
33
the peasantry. Witness following table:
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Deposits in Millions of Rubles (as of 31 D e c . 1895-1916)
Peasant Zemstvo Savings State
estate funds of & loan Credit Savings
Year banks small cred. assoc.s assoc.s Banks Total
1895 10.3 0.0 9.3 0.0 367.9 387.5
1899 10.3 0.0 13.7 0.1 608.3 632.4
1905 21.9 0.0 32.2 5.3 831.2 890.6
1910 31.9 9.2 105.5 45.1 1,396.9 1,588.6
1914 59.8 54.6 205.1 199.7 1,835.9 2,355.1
1916 73.8 86.6 262.7 419.6 3,769.0 4,611.7
As we can see, deposits almost tripled in the nine years
between 1905 and 1914, and this before the inflationary spiral of 
wartime. If we exclude the State Savings Banks, deposits at 
credit cooperatives and other small savings banks increased 
almost nine-fold in the nine years after 1905; The great majority 
of the increment came from credit cooperatives, especially credit 
associations, which came to account for over 400 million rubles 
of deposits. What proportion of total savings deposits belonged 
to peasant farmers? Many accounts, after all, belonged to 
merchants, shop-keepers and townsmen. Unfortunately, no precise 
figures exist, but we can make a fairly well-educated guess.
We can assume that 100% of the deposits of the peasant
estate banks and virtually 100% in the zemstvo funds of small
credit belonged to peasants —  in the case of the former, because
they were estate institutions and in the case of the latter,
because they were especially set up to help peasant agriculture
and credit cooperation. With respect to credit cooperatives, we
34
know that town-dwellers made up 16% of the total membership; we 
can assume conservatively, therefore, that the peasantry 
accounted for 75% of the total deposits in credit cooperatives. 
With respect to State Savings Banks, several Western historians
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have estimated that the peasantry accounted for at least 25% of 
35
the deposits. Using these proportions, we can estimate that
peasant savings deposits increased from 258 million rubles in
1905 to 877 million rubles in 1914. The total savings deposits of
peasant farmers in 1914 —  877 million rubles —  represented 25%
of the total cash revenues from peasant agriculture in 1913
36
(3,510 million rubles). Evidently, when given a chance,
Russia’s peasants turned out to be a thrifty bunch. Incidently,
the level of sobriety among the Russian peasantry seems to risen
as well, and some observers saw this as one of the causes in the
37
rise in savings.
The healthy progress of the agricultural sector at this time 
helped to spur the economy as a whole. According to the Zemplan 
study, the volume of industrial production expanded by 63%
38
between 1900 and 1913 (and total market value grew by 83%).
Russia’s population, meanwhile, was becoming rapidly urbanized;
with respect to 42 provinces of European Russia, for instance,
the urban population rose from 13% of the total in 1897 to as
39
high as 21% in 1916. In other words, Russia’s rural economy was 
prospering, while the country as a whole was becoming urbanized 
and industrialized.
How did Russia measure up to the other great economic powers 
during this time? Was it catching up or falling behind. To answer 
this we can try to measure gross national product. Comparing the 
gross national product of different countries is a difficult 
exercise even in our day, when economic statistics are relatively 
precise and the global economy relatively open and integrated. 
Comparing GNP’s at the turn of the century can’t be considered as
anything but skilled guesswork, since economic statistics were ,
often vague, prices of similar goods and services varied widely
between different countries and the very concept of a GNP hardly
existed for measurement purposes. Nonetheless, several economists
have tried to compare GNP growth between nations as far back as
40
two hundred years. One of the most exhaustive efforts was
41
undertaken by Paul Bairoch. According to Bairoch, whose figures
for the year 1900 were used at the beginning of this thesis, the
growth of Russia’s GNP compared in the following way to the other 
42
great powers.
Comparative GNP in 1900 and 1913
(in millions of 1960 US dollars)
1900 1913 % Growth
United States 77,426 128,615 66%
Russia 32,000 52,420 64%
Germany 35,800 49,760 39%
Great Britain 36,273 44,074 22%
France 23,500 27,401 17%
Accoding to Bairoch*s calculations, in the period 1900-13,
Russia overtook Great Britain and Germany to become the second
largest economy in the industrialized world. In these thirteen
years, the Russian economy grew 64%, or at a compounded annual
rate of 3.9%; this was almost twice as fast as the 2.1% average
growth rate achieved by the rest of Europe and was matched only
by the booming United States economy. Russia’s growth was only
partly due to the expansion of its population, according to
Bairoch, since GNP per capita in this period grew at a rate of
43
2.1% (compounded) per year. What enabled Russia to turn in such
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an impressive economic performance was the rapid growth of its
agricultural sector, for Russia’s industrial sector remained far
44
smaller than that of Britain, Germany and the United States.
Of course, all these figures provide a somewhat distorted
picture of economic development as it concerned the average
inhabitant of these countries. What difference did it make to the
average Russian, for instance, that his country was the second
largest economy in the world if he himself was still mired in
poverty? For this reason, we should look at economic wealth on a
per capita basis and measure economic development in terms of
productivity growth. In per capita terms, Russia’s claim to be a
great power was dubious. Russia’s strength still lay in the size
of its land and population —  in the mass rather than the
intensity of its production. Russia’s per capita GNP remained
half of Germany’s, a third of Britain’s and a quarter of the
45
United States*. But even here there was progress, for the 
period of the Stolypin Reform witnessed a great expansion in 
productivity.
Let us go back to the Russian peasant farmer. How can we 
explain the great expansion of agricultural production, 
marketings and exports that took place during the Stolypin 
Reform? How can we explain the dramatic increase in peasant cash
savings and at the same time the increase in the purchases of
agricultural equipment, fertilizers and presumably all sorts of 
other manufactured consumer goods? The answer is that peasant 
farmers at this time experienced a significant increase in the 
profitability of their enterprises. This was partly due to the 
general rise in agricultural prices with respect to other goods,
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but most of the reason lay in productivity improvements. Since ,
breaking down Russia’s agricultural sector into a labor force and 
a non-productive population is virtually impossible (who could 
say which members of the peasant household were not productive?), 
we will measure rural productivity as production per capita of 
the rural population. The rise in rural productivity was due to 
two trends: first, as we have seen above, the rapid expansion of 
gross production, and second, a decline in the growth of the 
rural population.
At the turn of the century, Russia’s rural economy had been
severely constrained by the problem of rural over-population,
which depressed living standards and limited the amount of
capital (or profits) that peasant farmers could hope to
accumulate. Rural overpopulation and the consequent land hunger
of the peasantry led many peasant farmers to try to supplement
their earnings with jobs outside their farm. During the 1890’s,
the number of agricultural wage laborers grew especially quickly,
a sign, among other things, that the number of landless or
poverty-stricken peasants was on the rise. Beginning in 1903,
however, the size of this group began to shrink; and after 1907,
agricultural wages began to rise, a sign that rural landlessness
was on the decline and that the moment was becoming ripe for 
46
mechanization. Initially, the mobilization for the Russo- 
Japanese War played a role, but the longer-term, secular trend 
towards a decline in the number of agricultural wage workers was 
a result of both agricultural and industrial growth. During the 
Stolypin Reform, Russia’s surplus rural population began to find 
a way out of their impoverished environment. According to one
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estimate, in the period 1905-10, resettlement to Siberia reduced ,
rural population growth in 10 key central provinces by 44%; in
Poltava, one of the provinces most affected by overpopulation,
rural population growth in 1910 declined to one quarter of what
47
it had been in 1900. Emigration abroad, migration to Russia’s
cities and resettlement beyond the Urals reached record
proportions during the Stolypin Reform; during this period,
emigration abroad took away over 100,000 annually (though many of
these were Jews and other town-dwellers), resettlement beyond the
Urals took away another 350,000, and the cities claimed another
48
several hundred thousand. The surplus population of rural 
Russia was leaving the countryside on an unprecedented scale.
Even more important in raising rural labor productivity, however, 
was the flourishing state of Russian agriculture. As we have 
seen, the growing agricultural sector in the older regions of 
European Russia began to offer more opportunities for profitable 
independent employment. The intensificatiation of agricultural 
production raised land- and labor-productivity and obviated much 
of the peasant’s need to seek more land or outside earnings.
These trends indicated that the vast problem of rural under­
employment and economic under-development was on the way to being 
solved.
The trends in peasant wage labor, urbanization, resettlement 
to Western Siberia and emigration are only symptoms of a larger 
trend: the key indicator is the growth of rural population. Here, 
unfortunately, the statistics get rather murky. The problem is 
that Russia never had a chance to produce a good national census 
after 1897. The 1916 census was incomplete and was distorted by
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the influx of war refugees and the absence of millions of men at
the front. The Central Statistical Administration (TsSK)
published annual statistics charting Russian population growth;
comparing the statistics of 42 provinces of European Russia
between 1897 and 1913, we get compounded annual growth rates of
2.10% for the rural population, 2.31% for the urban population
49
and 2.13% for the total population. The problem is that the 
annual numbers of the TsSK, like all such annual updates between 
censi, are based on projections of the 1897 numbers and adjusted 
slightly based on information received from localities. They do 
not expose radical changes in population dynamics. For this 
reason, it is better to take the 1916 census into account, since 
this was in fact a census (despite its many faults) rather than 
just an update.
The 1916 census for the 42 provinces of European Russia
showed a rural population of 81 million, an urban population of
50
22.2 million and a total population of 103.3 million. If we 
were to compare these figures with those in 1897, we would get a 
surprisingly small rate of population growth (especially with 
respect to the countryside) and an extremely fast rate of 
urbanization. In order to factor out the distortions caused by 
the war and get an accurate picture of how Russia’s population 
had changed between 1897 and 1916, we must make certain 
revisions. At every point, we will try to be conservative with 
respect to the size of the urban population. The figures on rural 
population show about 10 million more females than males. (It is 
unclear whether the total population figures include the millions 
who had left for the front.) It may be that these 10 million
males had left to work in the towns (a relatively common ,
¥
occurence —  even the 1897 figures for these 42 provinces showed
2.4 million more females than males), but on such a large scale
this is an unlikely scenario. Let us assume that most of these
absent males had gone to the front and add back 7.5 million males
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into the rural population. The 22.2 million people registered
as urban are not broken down into males and females, so we have
very little idea how many urban citizens were drafted into the
army. Let us add back a conservative 1 million.
The revised 1916 figures for the 42 provinces yield a rural
population of 88.5 million (79%), an urban population of 23.2
52
million (21%) and a total population of 111.7 million.
Comparing the 1916 data with the 1897 data with respect to 42
provinces of European Russia, we arrive at a compounded annual
growth rate of 1.24% for the rural population, 4.42% for the
urban population and 1.76% for the total population. Compared
with the annual TsSK revisions of the 1897 census, the revised
figures show a lower population growth (especially with respect
to rural areas) and a much higher rate of urbanization (the TsSK
allowed for virtually no proportional change since 1897). That
the revised figures are more accurate is confirmed by the Zemplan
study, as well as by the estimates of Western economists such as
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Bairoch, Goldsmith and Gregory. Furthermore, since the 42 
provinces of European Russia accounted for about two thirds of 
the population of the pre-war Russian Empire, and since the 
urbanization trends for these provinces reflected fairly 
accurately the trends for the Empire as a whole, we can extend 
them to the whole country and compare them to national production
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figures. What we get is the following:
Compounded 
annual growth
Total pop. growth, 42 provinces, 1897-1916 (revised): 1.76%
Rural pop. growth, 1897-1916, 42 provinces (revised): 1.24%
Grain output, 1901-5 to 1909-13 (Empire): 2.31%
Market value of agricultural output, 1900-13 (Empire): 5.02%
Gross National Product, 1900-1913: 3.88%
Clearly, to the extent that the population trends in
European Russia and economic trends in the Russian Empire are
comparable, rural productivity was rising very rapidly during the
period of the Stolypin Reform. The rise in the volume of grain
production, extended to 44.1% between 1900 and 1913 and compared
with a 17.4% rise in rural population during the same period,
represented 23% rise in productivity. As measured by the total
market value of agricultural output (much of it a relative
increase in prices), rural productivity increased even more: 61%.
It was this rise in productivity which explained the ability of
Russian farmers to simultaneously increase their marketings,
increase their cash savings and spend more money on equipment and
other manufactured goods. The rapid development of Russia’s
agricultural sector set the pace for the economy as a whole. If
we take Bairoch’s (conservative) estimate of a 64% growth in GNP
between 1900 and 1913, Russia’s GNP per capita appears to have
grown 31%. This compares favorably with the 16% growth rate in
55
Germany and the 10% growth rate in Britain.
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Conclusion »
Clearly, the Stolypin Reform was a very important event in 
Russian history. In a brief period, it managed to produce 
impressive results in terms of spurring economic growth, 
encouraging the national specialization of labor and the 
emergence of a rural middle class and in changing century-old 
attitudes among Russia’s peasant farmers. The reform also is an 
important model for how to accomplish a socio-political 
renaissance in a country wracked by political and economic 
troubles. Let us list some of the more important lessons that can 
be drawn fijom Russia’s experience with agricultural development 
during the Stolypin Reform.
The Stolypin land reform, consisting of the privatization 
and consolidation of strips, along with the sale of gentry lands 
and resettlement, met with a generally favorable response among 
the Russian peasantry. The reason for this was that the peasants 
found the reform to be in their interest. The Stolypin Reform 
shows that the majority of the working population will jump at 
the chance to own property and gain a degree of mangerial 
independence, even in a country as tradition-bound as Russia was 
at the turn of the century.
Tsarist Russia’s experience with social agronomy shows that 
a well-organized extension service can do much to spur 
technological progress and economic growth among the general 
population. But it should be noted that Russian social agronomy 
was successful because it managed to keep a fine balance between 
initiating changes and intervening excessively in the local
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economy. The proper role for an extension service is primarily to ,
provide information, not to give commands or become involved in 
commercial activities.
The cooperative movement was able to flourish in Russia 
because of the growing commercialization of peasant agriculture 
and the growing entrepreneurial flair of the peasant farmers. 
Cooperative membership spread very quickly, because cooperatives 
were well-suited to peasants’ economic needs. Here again, the 
movement was successful because it did not threaten the 
independence of peasant family farms: under the right conditions, 
the cooperative opened new opportunities for the peasant 
smallholder and allowed him to attain economies of scale in 
financial management, marketing, farm supply and food processing, 
but it did not take over functions which the peasant farmer 
regarded as rightfully his and which he was better able to 
perform in any case.
In terms of the national economy, the Stolypin Reform 
spurred the prewar boom in Russia by boosting capital 
accumulation in peasant agriculture, expanding the domestic 
market for manufactures and raising export earnings. The new 
Russian farmer that was emerging under the Stolypin Reform was 
more efficient than the Russian peasant of old. The combination 
of private property to provide managerial and labor incentive, 
social agronomy to provide technological modernization and 
cooperation to provide economies of scale, resulted in a steep 
rise in agricultural productivity and gross agricultural 
production. Far from being squeezed out of the market by large 
gentry estates, small family farmers increased their dominance in
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the rural economy. ,
*
Finally, the Stolypin Reform is very interesting as a model 
of government administration. Russia was in a deeply troubled 
state when Stolypin became Prime Minister in 1906. Perhaps it was 
the great danger facing Tsarist Russia at the time which made the 
government take such bold and innovative actions. It is true that 
many elements of the Stolypin Reform had been discussed and even 
enshrined as government policy before Stolypin came to power. But 
what made Stolypin*s government different from previous 
administrations was the emphasis on action. Considering the 
difficulty of administering a country the size of Russia and 
considering the political divisions in society following the 
Revolution of 1905, it has to be said that the Stolypin Reform 
was implemented with remarkable vigor, wisdom and skill.
Stolypin’s government understood that even good laws remain a 
dead letter, unless social conditions are right for them to have 
an impact. Consequently, the reform was not only passed into law, 
but was brought to life with a host of subsidiary actions such as 
a virtual propaganda campaign throughout peasant Russia, the 
financing of the agronomic extension service and encouragement of 
agricultural and credit cooperation. The other reason why 
Stolypin’s reform program took root so effectively is that the 
central government had the wisdom to rely on local personnel and 
even local finances to undertake regional agricultural 
development projects. This was remarkable behavior for a 
government that was so often criticized for being bureaucratic 
and autocratic.
For all these reasons, the Stolypin Reform deserves an
-375-
important place in the study of Russian history and even in the 
history of the world.
London, 1990.
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APPENDIX t
*
The Klebnikov Database 
(42 provinces of European Russia)
The calculations of the database (both the correlation coeffi­
cients and simple arithmetic calculations such as agronomic expendi­
tures divided by the number of peasant households) were computed with 
the Lotus 123 data processing program. Lotus calculates to 6 decimal 
spaces, but the figures are shown in their rounded form. The sources 
of the data are the following:
1) Grain yields on peasant farms. Taken from Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Zemleustroistva i Zemledelia, Sbornik Statistiko-Ekonomicheskikh 
Svedenii po Selskomu Khoziaistvu Rossii i. Nekotorvkh Inostrannykh 
Gosudarstv. Vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1911) and vol. 10 (Petrograd, 
1916). The Ministry of Agriculture published 5-year averages if it 
had at least 3 reliable annual reports and if the grain in question 
was important enough (accounting for about 5% of cultivated land or 
more). I have taken a crude average of grain yields (by adding the 
yields together and then dividing), which makes for an admittedly 
crude measurement, though it is still better than focusing on only 
one type of grain (wheat for instance), which would discriminate 
against those provinces not suited to it. The weights of the differ­
ent crops are broadly similar, enabling us to average without too 
much distortion. Such a methodology, however, does not capture the 
improvement that resulted from farmers switching to higher value 
grains. For the consistent margin of error in Russian grain produc­
tion statistics, see Chapter 10.
2) Number of peasant households, 1905. The numbers are reprinted in 
N. Oganovsky and N. Kondratiev, eds., Selskoe Khoziaistvo Rossii v XX 
veke (Moscow, 1923). pp. 68-73.
3) Number of peasant households, 1916. Figures reprinted in A.V. 
Chayanov and la.S. Artiukhov, eds. Statisticheskii Spravochnik po 
Agrarnomu Voprosu (Moscow, 1917) pp. 10-11.
4) Desiatins of peasant allotment land per peasant household, 1905. 
Figures reprinted in Oganovsky and Kondratiev, op. cit., pp. 68-79.
5) Urban, rural and total population, in absolute numbers and per 
square verst, 1897 and 1916. The results of the censi are reprinted 
in Oganovsky and Kondratiev, op. cit., pp. 18-21. The total number of 
square versts in any given province is calculated by dividing the 
total rural population 1897 by the rural population per square verst 
1897.
6) Railroad and roadway length per 1,000 square versts of territory 
taken from Sbornik Statistiko-Ekonomicheskikh Svedenii.... op. cit., 
(Petrograd, 1916).
7) Literacy of total population in 1897. Figures in Tsentralnyi 
Statisticheskii Komitet M.V.D., Ezhegodnik Rossii 1908 g . (St. 
Petersburg, 1909) pp. 80-82.
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8) Land cultivated by gentry farmers as a percentage of total 
cultivated land, 1916. Figures reprinted in Chayanov and Artiukhov, 
op. cit., pp. 10-11.
9) Applications for land settlement, 1906-1916. Taken from Minis- 
terstvo Zemledelia (Komitet po Zemleustroitelnym Delam), Kratkii 
Ocherk za Desiatiletie 1906-1916 (Petrograd, 1916), appendix.
10) Number of consolidated households 1906-16. Taken from P. Per- 
shin, "Formy Zemlepolzovania" in 0 Zemle, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1921), pp. 
188-91. Figures do not include consolidated farms established through 
the Peasant Land Bank.
11) Number of households claiming strips in private tenure and 
number of households undergoing group land settlement, 1906-16. 
Figures reprinted in Chayanov and Artiukhov, op. cit., pp. 24-27. 
Privatization figures do not include automatic conversion of heredi­
tary communes or of those communes not having undergone redistribu­
tion for over 12 years.
12) Department of Agriculture agronomic expenditures, 1913. Taken 
from Glavnoe Upravlenie Zemleustroistva i Zemledelia, Statistika 
Raskhodov Departamenta Zemledelia. 1913 god. (Petrograd, 1915) table 
attached to p. VIII.
13) Zemstvo (district and provincial) agronomic expenditures, 1913. 
Taken from Statistika Raskhodov♦... op. cit., pp. LXIV-LXV.
14) Number of agricultural societies, as of 31 December 1914. 
Reprinted in V.V. Morachevskii, Spravochnve Svedenia o 
Selskokhoziaistvennykh Obshestvakh po dannvm na 1915 god (Petrograd, 
1916), p. 6.
15) Loans of credit cooperatives as of 1 January 1913. Taken from 
Tsentralnyi Statisticheskii Komitet M.V.D., Statisticheskii 
Ezhegodnik Rossii 1915 g . (Petrograd, 1916), section XII.
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TABLE 1: YIELDS OF RYE AND WHEAT ON PEASANT LANDS, 1901-15.
(puds per desiatin)
winter winter spring
rye rye wheat wheat wheat
Province 1901-10 1911-15 1901-10 1911-15 1901-10
1.Archangel 46 50
2.Olonets 45 53
3.Vologda 50 56 48
4.Kostroma 46 50 36
5.Viatka 44 53 40
6.Perm 61 62 64
7.Ufa 61 56 48
8.Kazan 53 57 38
9.Simbirsk 54 56 37
10.Penza 51 56 39
11.Nizhni Novgorod 49 58 39
12.Vladimir 44 54 47
13.Riazan 52 58
14.Moscow 44 57
15.Tver 43 54
16.Iaroslavl 54 58 48
17.Novgorod 41 54
18.St. Petersburg 58 70
19.Pskov 41 56 37 55 38
20.Vitebsk 34 52 33 53 32
21.Smolensk 48 63 46
22.Mogilev 42 56 50 64 45
23.Minsk 42 55 52 60 43
24.Volhynia 57 65 67 68 43
25.Podolia 72 78 73 80 56
26.Kiev 80 89 81 91 53
27.Chernigov 44 53 57 75 49
28.Kursk 59 67 59 75 57
29.Orel 45 50
30.Kaluga 39 51
31 .Tula 49 54
32.Tambov 57 61
33.Voronezh 50 65 46 68 42
34.Kharkov 55 77 57 79 52
35.Poltava 66 81 64 82 57
36.Kherson 48 52 47 53 40
37.Ekaterinoslav 44 58 50 60 48
38.Taurida 41 48 48 64 33
39.Samara 38 49 37
40,Saratov 40 46 34
41.Don Territory 31 42 32 40 37
42.Astrakhan 15 15 18
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TABLE 2: YIELDS OF OATS AND BARLEY ON PEASANT LANDS, 1901-15.
(puds per desiatin)
j
spring
wheat oats oats barley barley
Province 1911-15 1901-10 1911-15 1901-10 1911-15
1.Archangel 51 55 57 59
2.Olonets 46 50 51 51
3.Vologda 49 52 55 55 58
4.Kostroma 41 45 52 43 48
5.Viatka 45 48 46 48 52
6.Perm 60 62 60 63 62
7. Ufa 44 50 51 50 51
8.Kazan 40 45 44 44 43
9.Simbirsk 40 42 40 47 43
10.Penza 42 43 46
11.Nizhni Novgorod 44 42 48 42 47
12.Vladimir 50 50 50 50 50
13.Riazan 50 55
14.Moscow 50 56 41 47
15.Tver 49 53 51 55
16.Iaroslavl 56 56 59 58 66
17.Novgorod 47 49 49 53
18.St. Petersburg 57 61 56 58
19.Pskov 62 45 48 44 48
20.Vitebsk 37 38 45 37 43
21.Smolensk 63 53 55 49 50
22.Mogilev 56 47 53 47 53
23.Minsk 52 46 53 48 54
24.Volhynia 49 53 66 57 67
25.Podolia 61 67 73 64 72
26. Kiev 54 74 81 68 79
27.Chernigov 61 44 54 57 65
28.Kursk 64 54 64 57 61
29.Orel 40 50
30.Kaluga 43 48 42 43
31,Tula 50 56
32.Tambov 54 57
33.Voronezh 47 46 58 46 50
34.Kharkov 60 55 69 53 63
35,Poltava 60 63 73 62 70
36.Kherson 31 48 56 51 55
37.Ekaterinoslav 43 56 62 58 57
38.Taurida 42 45 55 46 54
39.Samara 42 33 42 32 48
40.Saratov 35 34 38 32 39
41.Don Territory 38 39 47 44 50
42.Astrakhan 24 24 26
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE GRAIN YIELDS ON PEASANT LANDS, 1901-15.
(puds per desiatin)
t
*
Average
grain
Average
grain 1911-15
yield yield as % of
Province 1901-10 1911-15 1901-10
1.Archangel 51.3 54.7 106.5%
2.Olonets 47.3 51.3 108.5%
3.Vologda 51.3 54.5 106.3%
4.Kostroma 42.5 47.8 112.4%
5.Viatka 45.0 49.0 108.9%
6.Perm 62.5 61.0 97.6%
7. Ufa 52.3 50.5 96.7%
8.Kazan 45.0 46.0 102.2%
9.Simbirsk 45.0 44.8 99.4%
10.Penza 44.3 48.0 108.3%
11.Nizhni Novgorod 43.0 49.3 114.5%
12.Vladimir 47.8 51.0 106.8%
13.Riazan 51.0 56.5 110.8%
14.Moscow 45.0 53.3 118.5%
15.Tver 47. 7 54.0 113.3%
16.Iaroslavl 54.0 59.8 110.6%
17.Novgorod 45.7 52.0 113.9%
18.St. Petersburg 57.0 63.0 110.5%
19,Pskov 41.0 53.8 131.2%
20.Vitebsk 34.8 46.0 132.2%
21.Smolensk 49.0 57.8 117.9%
22.Mogilev 46.2 56.4 122.1%
23.Minsk 46.2 54.8 118.6%
24.Volhynia 55.4 63.0 113.7%
25.Podolia 66.4 72.8 109.6%
26.Kiev 71.2 78.8 110.7%
27.Chernigov 50.2 61.6 122,7%
28.Kursk 57.2 66.2 115.7%
29.Orel 42.5 50.0 117.6%
30.Kaluga 41. 3 47.3 114.5%
31.Tula 49.5 55.0 111.1%
32.Tambov 55.5 59.0 106.3%
33.Voronezh 46.0 57.6 125.2%
34.Kharkov 54.4 69.6 127.9%
35.Poltava 62.4 73.2 117.3%
36.Kherson 46.8 49.4 105.6%
37.Ekaterinoslav 51.2 56.0 109.4%
38.Taurida 42.6 52.6 123.5%
39.Samara 35.0 45.3 129.3%
40.Saratov 35.0 39.5 112.9%
41.Don Territory 36.6 43.4 118.6%
42.Astrakhan 19.0 21.7 114.0%
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TABLE 4: ROAD AND RAILROAD DENSITY IN 1912
»
Versts per 1000 Total per 1000
of sq versts Versts of sq verst;
railroad area roads area
Province (1912) (1912) (1912) (1912)
1.Archangel 225 0.3 2763 3.7
2.Olonets 184 1.6 10406 90.5
3.Vologda 697 1.9 6020 16.4
4.Kostroma 520 6.9 3628 48.1
5.Viatka 608 4.4 4156 30.1
6.Perm 1897 6.5 5542 19.0
7. Ufa 646 5.9 4346 39.7
8.Kazan 158 2.6 2381 39.2
9.Simbirsk 652 14.5 7312 162.6
10.Penza 732 21.2 2334 67.6
11.Nizhni Novgorod 363 7.2 3586 71.1
12.Vladimir 882 20.3 3135 72.2
13.Riazan 1025 27.1 3753 99.2
14.Moscow 1288 40 3334 103.5
15.Tver 902 15.4 3035 51.8
16.Iaroslavl 437 12.5 1649 47.2
17.Novgorod 1125 10.4 4516 41.7
18.St. Petersburg 1084 24.4 4065 91.5
19.Pskov 829 21.6 28741 748.9
20.Vitebsk 1142 28. 8 5027 126.8
21.Smolensk 819 16.6 2987 60.5
22.Mogilev 708 16.5 19739 460.0
23.Minsk 1138 14.7 6050 78.2
24.Volhynia 1120 17.5 5369 83.9
25.Podolia 1137 30.5 2776 74.5
26.Kiev 1049 22.9 7630 166.6
27.Chernigov 1047 22.4 3717 79.5
28.Kursk 1129 27 2132 51.0
29.Orel 1124 26.8 5138 122.5
30.Kaluga 667 23.2 2384 82.9
31.Tula 1001 35.9 17891 641.6
32.Tambov 1283 21.6 3368 56. 7
33.Voronezh 1224 21.1 6946 119.7
34.Kharkov 1139 23.2 4259 86.8
35.Poltava 1052 23.8 11559 261.5
36.Kherson 1271 19.8 40977 638.4
37.Ekaterinoslav 2210 36.8 4683 78.0
38.Taurida 750 13.4 11627 207.7
39.Samara 1434 10. 7 7799 58.2
40.Saratov 1387 17.8 2076 26.6
41.Don Territory 2010 13.1 89372 582.5
42.Astrakhan 573 2.6 5073 23 .0
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TABLE 5: POPULATION AND POPULATION DENSITY, 1897
i
Total
square Urban Rural Total %
Rural 
popul.
versts in popul. popul. popul. urban per 1 sq
province 1897 1897 1897 popul. verst
Province (000) (000) (000) (000) 1897 1897
Archangel 788 32 315 347 9.2% 0.4
Olonets 117 26 339 364 7.1% 2.9
Vologda 355 63 1279 1342 4.7% 3.6
Kostroma 74 94 1293 1387 6.8% 17.5
Viatka 135 96 2935 3031 3. 2% 21.8
Perm 290 179 2815 2994 6.0% 9.7
Ufa 107 107 2089 2197 4.9% 19.5
Kazan 56 186 1985 2171 8.6% 35.5
Simbirsk 44 108 1420 1528 7.1% 32.6
Penza 34 140 1331 1471 9.5% 39
NizhniNov 45 143 1442 1585 9.0% 32
Vladimir 43 191 1325 1516 12.6% 30.9
Riazan 37 170 1632 1802 9.4% 44.3
Moscow 29 1134 1296 2431 46.6% 44.1
Tver 57 155 1614 1769 8.8% 28.4
Iaroslavl 31 146 925 1071 13.6% 29.6
Novgorod 104 86 1282 1367 6.3% 12.3
St.Peters 39 1422 690 2112 67.3% 17.6
Pskov 38 73 1050 1122 6.5% 27.6
Vitebsk 27 130 857 988 13 . 2% 32.2
Smolensk 49 121 1404 1525 7.9% 28.5
Mogilev 42 147 1540 1687 8.7% 36.5
Minsk 65 189 1481 1670 11.3% 22.7
Volhynia 28 119 1272 1391 8.6% 45.9
Podolia 37 222 2796 3018 7.4% 75.7
Kiev 45 459 3100 3559 12.9% 69.2
Chernigov 46 209 2088 2298 9.1% 45.3
Kursk 41 222 2149 2371 9.4% 52. 7
Orel 41 244 1790 2034 12.0% 43.6
Kaluga 27 95 1038 1133 8.4% 38.2
Tula 27 172 1248 1420 12.1% 45.8
Tambov 59 226 2458 2684 8.4% 42
Voronezh 58 170 2362 2531 6.7% 40.8
Kharkov 48 367 2125 2492 14.7% 44.3
Poltava 44 274 2504 2778 9.9% 57.1
Kherson 62 789 1945 2734 28.9% 31.2
Ekaterin. 56 241 1873 2114 11.4% 33.6
Taurida 53 289 1158 1448 20.0% 21.8
Samara 137 159 2593 2751 5.8% 18.9
Saratov 74 310 2096 2406 12.9% 28.2
Don Terr. 145 319 2246 2564 12.4% 15.5
Astrakhan 189 133 871 1004 13 . 2% 4.6
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TABLE 6: POPULATION AND POPULATION DENSITY, 1916 4
Total
square Urban Rural Total %
Rural 
popul.
versts in popul. popul. popul. popul. per sq.
province 1916 1916 1916 urban verst
Province (000) (000) (000) (000) 1916 1916
Archangel 788 148 361 509 29.1% 0.5
Olonets 117 40 362 402 10.0% 3.1
Vologda 355 113 1425 1538 7 . 3% 4.0
Kostroma 74 265 1476 1741 15.2% 20.0
Viatka 135 247 3241 3488 7.1% 24.1
Perm 290 663 3341 4004 16.6% 11.5
Ufa 107 287 2674 2961 9.7% 25.0
Kazan 56 324 2278 2602 12.5% 40.7
Simbirsk 44 217 1637 1854 11. 7% 37.6
Penza 34 261 1597 1858 14.0% 46.8
NizhniNov 45 361 1697 2058 17.5% 37.7
Vladimir 43 531 1571 2102 25.3% 36.6
Riazan 37 266 1941 2207 12.1% 52.7
Moscow 29 2321 1494 3815 60.8% 50.8
Tver 57 273 1712 1985 13.8% 30.1
Iaroslavl 31 324 959 1283 25.3% 30. 7
Novgorod 104 129 1349 1478 8. 7% 12.9
St.Peters 39 2825 799 3624 78.0% 20.4
Pskov 38 131 1141 1272 10.3% 30.0
Vitebsk 27 208 824 1032 20.2% 31.0
Smolensk 49 250 1570 1820 13.7% 31.9
Mogilev 42 392 1536 1928 20.3% 36.4
Minsk 65 406 1994 2402 16.9% 30.6
Volhynia 28 192 1272 1464 13 .1% 45.9
Podolia 37 781 3021 3802 20.5% 81.8
Kiev 45 1340 3229 4569 29.3% 72.1
Chernigov 46 553 2236 2789 19.8% 48.5
Kursk 41 387 2449 2836 13.6% 60.1
Orel 41 592 2022 2614 22 . 6% 49.3
Kaluga 27 127 1102 1229 10.3% 40.6
Tula 27 277 1410 1687 16.4% 51.7
Tambov 59 296 3029 3325 8.9% 51.8
Voronezh 58 267 2979 3246 8.2% 51.5
Kharkov 48 730 2674 3404 21.4% 55.7
Poltava 44 450 2599 3049 14.8% 59.3
Kherson 62 1251 2221 3472 36.0% 35.6
Ekaterin. 56 1291 2772 4063 31.8% 49.7
Taurida 53 541 1414 1955 27.7% 26.6
Samara 137 483 3054 3537 13.7% 22.3
Saratov 74 691 2502 3193 21.6% 33.7
Don Terr. 145 695 3077 3772 18.4% 21.2
Astrakhan 189 240 1062 1302 18.4% 5.6
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TABLE 7: POPULATION DYNAMICS, 1897-1916 (part I)
i«
Total Total
popul. popul.
1897 1916
Province (000) (000)
Archangel 347 509
Olonets 364 402
Vologda 1342 1538
Kostroma 1387 1741
Viatka 3031 3488
Perm 2994 4004
Ufa 2197 2961
Kazan 2171 2602
Simbirsk 1528 1854
Penza 1471 1858
NizhniNov 1585 2058
Vladimir 1516 2102
Riazan 1802 2207
Moscow 2431 3815
Tver 1769 1985
Iaroslavl 1071 1283
Novgorod 1367 1478
St.Peters 2112 3624
Pskov 1122 1272
Vitebsk 988 1032
Smolensk 1525 1820
Mogilev 1687 1928
Minsk 1670 2402
Volhynia 1391 1464
Podolia 3018 3802
Kiev 3559 4569
Chernigov 2298 2789
Kursk 2371 2836
Orel 2034 2614
Kaluga 1133 1229
Tula 1420 1687
Tambov 2684 3325
Voronezh 2531 3246
Kharkov 2492 3404
Poltava 2778 3049
Kherson 2734 3472
Ekaterin. 2114 4063
Taurida 1448 1955
Samara 2751 3537
Saratov 2406 3193
Don Terr. 2564 3772
Astrakhan 1004 1302
Urban Urban 1916
popul. popul. to
1897 1916 1897
) (000) (000) ( in %)
. 7% 32 148 462.5%
.4% 26 40 153.8%
.6% 63 113 179.4%
.5% 94 265 281.9%
. 1% 96 247 257.3%
.7% 179 663 370.4%
.8% 107 287 268.2%
.9% 186 324 174.2%
.3% 108 217 200.9%
.3% 140 261 186.4%
.8% 143 361 252.4%
. 7% 191 531 278.0%
.5% 170 266 156.5%
. 9% 1134 2321 204.7%
. 2% 155 273 176.1%
.8% 146 324 221.9%
. 1% 86 129 150.0%
. 6% 1422 2825 198.7%
.4% 73 131 179.5%
. 5% 130 208 160.0%
.3% 121 250 206.6%
.3% 147 392 266.7%
.8% 189 406 214.8%
.2% 119 192 161.3%
.0% 222 781 351.8%
.4% 459 1340 291.9%
.4% 209 553 264.6%
. 6% 222 387 174.3%
.5% 244 592 242.6%
. 5% 95 127 133.7%
.8% 172 277 161.0%
.9% 226 296 131.0%
.2% 170 267 157.1%
. 6% 367 730 198.9%
. 8% 274 450 164.2%
.0% 789 1251 158.6%
.2% 241 1291 535.7%
.0% 289 541 187.2%
. 6% 159 483 303.8%
. 7% 310 691 222.9%
. 1% 319 695 217.9%
. 7% 133 240 180.5%
1916
to
1897
in %
146
110
114
125
115
133
134
119
121
126
129
138
122
156
112
119
108
171
113
104
119
114
143
105
126
128
121
119
128
108
118
123
128
136
109
127
192
135
128
132
147
129
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TABLE 8: POPULATION DYNAMICS, 1897-1916 (part II)
»
t
Rural Rural 1916
popul. popul. to
1897 1916 1897
Province (000) (000) (in %)
1.Archangel 315 361 114.6%
2.Olonets 339 362 106.8%
3.Vologda 1279 1425 111.4%
4.Kostroma 1293 1476 114.2%
5.Viatka 2935 3241 110.4%
6.Perm 2815 3341 118.7%
7. Ufa 2089 2674 128.0%
8.Kazan 1985 2278 114.8%
9.Simbirsk 1420 1637 115.3%
10.Penza 1331 1597 120.0%
11.Nizhni Novgorod 1442 1697 117.7%
12.Vladimir 1325 1571 118.6%
13.Riazan 1632 1941 118.9%
14.Moscow 1296 1494 115.3%
15 . Tver 1614 1712 106.1%
16.Iaroslavl 925 959 103.7%
17.Novgorod 1282 1349 105.2%
18.St. Petersburg 690 799 115.8%
19.Pskov 1050 1141 108.7%
20.Vitebsk 857 824 96. 1%
21.Smolensk 1404 1570 111.8%
22.Mogilev 1540 1536 99. 7%
23.Minsk 1481 1994 134.6%
24.Volhynia 1272 1272 100.0%
25.Podolia 2796 3021 108.0%
26.Kiev 3100 3229 104.2%
27.Chernigov 2088 2236 107.1%
28.Kursk 2149 2449 114.0%
29.Orel 1790 2022 113.0%
30.Kaluga 1038 1102 106.2%
31.Tula 1248 1410 113.0%
32.Tambov 2458 3029 123.2%
33.Voronezh 2362 2979 126.1%
34.Kharkov 2125 2674 125.8%
35.Poltava 2504 2599 103.8%
36.Kherson 1945 2221 114.2%
37.Ekaterinoslav 1873 2772 148.0%
38,Taurida 1158 1414 122.1%
39.Samara 2593 3054 117.8%
40.Saratov 2096 2502 119.4%
41.Don Territory 2246 3077 137.0%
42.Astrakhan 871 1062 121.9%
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TABLE 9: PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS, LAND TENURE AND LITERACY
%
Desiatins % 
Number ofNumber of of land literates
Arable
land
farmed
Peasant Peasant 1916 per of both by gentry
Houshlds .Houshlds. as % of houshld. sexes farmers
Province (1905) (1916) 1905 1905 (1897) (1916)
Archangel 55100 69746 127% 6.1 23.3% 0.3%
Olonets 59300 71672 121% 65.1 21.7% 0.3%
Vologda 238100 286812 120% 15.5 19.1% 0.6%
Kostroma 239700 303795 127% 8.9 24.0% 0.9%
Viatka 482500 591020 122% 16 16.0% 0.3%
Perm 520500 674847 130% 15.8 19.2% 0.5%
Ufa 318700 499682 157% 18.8 16.7% 3.6%
Kazan 374600 445011 119% 8.6 17.9% 5.3%
Simbirsk 244800 304558 124% 6.8 15 . 6% 6.4%
Penza 241000 281549 117% 7.5 14.7% 12.8%
NizhniNov 264700 318805 120% 7.4 22.0% 4.2%
Vladimir 242900 267036 110% 8.9 27.0% 3.0%
Riazan 280900 336920 120% 6.6 20.3% 10.1%
Moscow 210500 281409 134% 7.5 40.2% 6.4%
Tver 302900 338416 112% 8.6 24.5% 4.3%
Iaroslavl 198500 214371 108% 7.1 36.2% 2.1%
Novgorod 214300 260531 122% 13.5 23.0% 3.4%
St.Peters 106500 130327 122% 9.7 55.1% 7.5%
Pskov 158900 203115 128% 9.2 14.6% 3.2%
Vitebsk 138600 189375 137% 11.5 24.6% 8.2%
Smolensk 215900 267193 124% 9 17.3% 7.2%
Mogilev 198300 248603 125% 8.2 16.9% 11.3%
Minsk 213900 312726 146% 9.1 17.8% 10.1%
Volhynia 292400 290648 99% 7.8 17.2% 18.5%
Podolia 458800 573687 125% 3.8 15.5% 32.2%
Kiev 363000 652194 180% 5.5 18.1% 28.4%
Chernigov 367300 391533 107% 6.3 18.4% 6.8%
Kursk 335200 380995 114% 7.3 16.3% 13.8%
Orel 287200 331395 115% 7 17.6% 11.7%
Kaluga 171900 197763 115% 8.1 19.4% 5.9%
Tula 214100 245968 115% 6.3 20. 7% 16.8%
Tambov 406000 484121 119% 7 16.6% 15.1%
Voronezh 388600 474950 122% 9.6 16.3% 7.8%
Kharkov 364200 424783 117% 7.3 16.8% 14.5%
Poltava 446800 475619 106% 4.9 16.9% 18.9%
Kherson 294300 417038 142% 7.8 25.9% 20. 5%
Ekaterin. 270800 482912 178% 9.3 21.5% 14.3%
Taurida 132900 239784 180% 14.7 27.9% 13.9%
Samara 337100 517186 153% 19.8 22 .1% 8.8%
Saratov 351100 433575 123% 9.5 23.8% 7.8%
Don Terr. 130700 445283 341% 75.3 21.4% 6.7%
Astrakhan 67900 198062 292% 28.4 15.5% 3.7%
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TABLE 10: THE STOLYPIN LAND REFORM (part I)
»
Number of
Total Applications Number of
Number offor Land Consolidated
HouseholdSettlement Households
Province (1916) (1906-1915) f1906-1915)
1.Archangel 69746 17758 25.5% 270 0.4%
2.Olonets 71672 24706 34.5% 1051 1.5%
3.Vologda 286812 87713 30. 6% 8556 3.0%
4.Kostroma 303795 97793 32.2% 8722 2.9%
5.Viatka 591020 61460 10.4% 4759 0.8%
6.Perm 674847 203636 30.2% 12543 1.9%
7. Ufa 499682 108678 21.7% 18699 3.7%
8.Kazan 445011 256688 57.7% 20478 4.6%
9.Simbirsk 304558 98633 32.4% 21126 6.9%
10.Penza 281549 115733 41.1% 23608 8.4%
11.Nizhni Novgorod 318805 149160 46.8% 20932 6.6%
12.Vladimir 267036 154659 57.9% 13910 5.2%
13.Riazan 336920 114739 34.1% 15477 4.6%
14.Moscow 281409 206247 73 . 3% 20358 7.2%
15.Tver 338416 152006 44.9% 26977 8.0%
16.Iaroslavl 214371 125666 58.6% 14421 6.7%
17.Novgorod 260531 104057 39.9% 20936 8.0%
18.St. Petersburg 130327 85963 66.0% 33475 25.7%
19.Pskov 203115 67445 33.2% 29843 14.7%
20.Vitebsk 189375 83443 44.1% 44128 23.3%
21.Smolensk 267193 115334 43 . 2% 39381 14. 7%
22.Mogilev 248603 72564 29.2% 30596 12.3%
23,Minsk 312726 80781 25.8% 14460 4.6%
24.Volhynia 290648 185853 63 . 9% 37858 13.0%
25.Podolia 573687 73060 12.7% 11336 2.0%
26.Kiev 652194 149980 23.0% 37437 5.7%
27.Chernigov 391533 84640 21.6% 14848 3.8%
28.Kursk 380995 123795 32.5% 28279 7.4%
29.Orel 331395 96268 29.0% 17518 5.3%
30.Kaluga 197763 99206 50.2% 10482 5.3%
31.Tula 245968 134485 54 . 7% 26917 10.9%
32.Tambov 484121 166689 34.4% 27018 5.6%
33.Voronezh 474950 293657 61.8% 36337 7.7%
34.Kharkov 424783 297654 70.1% 87899 20. 7%
35.Poltava 475619 161326 33.9% 50149 10.5%
36.Kherson 417038 167132 40.1% 70692 17.0%
37.Ekaterinoslav 482912 197991 41.0% 90488 18. 7%
38.Taurida 239784 86089 35.9% 42875 17.9%
39.Samara 517186 169635 32.8% 87448 16.9%
40.Saratov 433575 262755 60.6% 64981 15.0%
41.Don Territory 445283 56962 12.8% 13076 2.9%
42.Astrakhan 198062 77329 39.0% 5824 2.9%
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TABLE 11: THE STOLYPIN LAND REFORM (part II)
Number of 
Households 
Total With completed Number of
Number Group Land Privatized
Houshlds.Settlement Holdings
Province (1916) (1906-1915) (1906-1915)
1.Archangel 69746 8485 12.2% 3590 5.1%-
2.Olonets 71672 4692 6.5% 8062 11.2%
3.Vologda 286812 28636 10.0% 21643 7.5%
4.Kostroma 303795 23148 7.6% 34898 11.5%,
5.Viatka 591020 12434 2.1% 27662 4.7%
6.Perm 674847 30788 4.6% 26892 4.0%:
7. Ufa 499682 14616 2.9% 48374 9. 7%
8.Kazan 445011 114863 25.8% 33941 7.6%
9.Simbirsk 304558 29502 9.7% 59858 19.7%-
10.Penza 281549 33942 12.1% 60677 21.6%
11.Nizhni Novgorod 318805 44277 13.9% 48095 15.1%
12.Vladimir 267036 51888 19.4% 28595 10.7%
13.Riazan 336920 31607 9.4% 63495 18.8%
14.Moscow 281409 82741 29.4% 87070 30.9%
15.Tver 338416 44531 13.2% 73405 21.7%"
16.Iaroslavl 214371 42520 19.8% 29575 13.8%
17.Novgorod 260531 16576 6.4% 35438 13.6%
18.St. Petersburg 130327 14160 10.9% 16577 12.7%
19.Pskov 203115 5240 2.6% 56905 28.0%
20.Vitebsk 189375 3194 1.7% 30332 16.0%
21.Smolensk 267193 5516 2.1% 74777 28.0%
22.Mogilev 248603 3331 1.3% 109405 44.0%
23.Minsk 312726 3072 1.0%
24.Volhynia 290648 1684 0.6%
25.Podolia 573687 3134 0.5%
26.Kiev 652194 16339 2.5% 15961 2.4%
27.Chernigov 391533 11270 2.9% 25992 6.6%
28.Kursk 380995 19033 5.0% 129246 33.9%
29.Orel 331395 12410 3.7% 116837 35.3%
30.Kaluga 197763 31644 16.0% 90989 46.0%
31.Tula 245968 58184 23.7% 56460 23.0%
32.Tambov 484121 41788 8.6% 112632 23.3%
33.Voronezh 474950 68346 14.4% 80491 16.9%
34.Kharkov 424783 56186 13.2% 121483 28.6%
35.Poltava 475619 12221 2.6% 12290 2 . 6 % v
36,Kherson 417038 9774 2.3% 138371 33.2%.
37.Ekaterinoslav 482912 12899 2.7% 156013 32.3%.
38.Taurida 239784 8890 3.7% 80219 33.5%
39.Samara 517186 10563 2.0% 180105 34.8%
40,Saratov 433575 67316 15 . 5% 100893 23.3%
41.Don Territory 445283 14682 3.3%
42.Astrakhan 198062 6869 3.5%
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TABLE 12: EXPENDITURES ON SOCIAL AGRONOMY, 1913
»
*
Expendit.Expendit.Expendit.Expendit
by Dep’t by by Dep’ t by
Number ofof Agri. zemstvos of Agri. zemstvos
Peasant in ’000 in ’000 per• 1916 per 1916
Houshlds . rubles rubles houshld. houshld.
Province (1916) (1913) (1913) (rubles) (rubles)
1.Archangel 69746 92 1.32
2.Olonets 71672 67 117 0.93 1.63
3.Vologda 286812 171 223 0.60 0. 78
4.Kostroma 303795 298 408 0.98 1.34
5.Viatka 591020 237 780 0.40 1.32
6.Perm 674847 221 993 0.33 1.47
7 .Ufa 499682 257 478 0.51 0.96
8.Kazan 445011 326 418 0.73 0.94
9.Simbirsk 304558 142 272 0.47 0.89
10.Penza 281549 384 179 1.36 0.64
11.Nizhni Novgorod 318805 271 461 0.85 1.45
12.Vladimir 267036 267 367 1.00 1.37
13.Riazan 336920 241 117 0. 72 0.35
14.Moscow 281409 969 544 3.44 1.93
15.Tver 338416 345 287 1.02 0.85
16.Iaroslavl 214371 251 222 1.17 1.04
17.Novgorod 260531 246 221 0.94 0.85
18.St. Petersburg 130327 515 106 3.95 0.81
19.Pskov 203115 446 216 2.20 1.06
20.Vitebsk 189375 335 162 1.77 0.86
21.Smolensk 267193 368 166 1.38 0.62
22.Mogilev 248603 396 197 1.59 0.79
23.Minsk 312726 262 249 0.84 0.80
24.Volhynia 290648 392 391 1.35 1.35
25,Podolia 573687 206 528 0.36 0.92
26.Kiev 652194 1133 1009 1.74 1.55
27.Chernigov 391533 341 624 0.87 1.59
28.Kursk 380995 381 518 1.00 1.36
29.Orel 331395 416 328 1.26 0.99
30.Kaluga 197763 249 156 1.26 0.79
31.Tula 245968 460 179 1.87 0.73
32.Tambov 484121 346 367 0.71 0.76
33.Voronezh 474950 497 662 1.05 1.39
34.Kharkov 424783 1206 1148 2.84 2.70
35.Poltava 475619 625 1293 1.31 2.72
36.Kherson 417038 560 806 1.34 1.93
37.Ekaterinoslav 482912 646 1294 1.34 2.68
38.Taurida 239784 660 294 2.75 1.23
39.Samara 517186 609 754 1.18 1.46
40.Saratov 433575 574 658 1.32 1.52
41.Don Territory 445283 486 1.09
42.Astrakhan 198062 161 0.81
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TABLE 13: COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP, 1913-14
»
Loans by N o . of
Loans by credit agri.
credit coop.s : societiei
Number of coop.s N o . of (1913) (1914)
Peasant (thous. agri . rubles per
Houshlds. rubles) societiesper 1916 househld
Province (1916) (1913) (1914) houshld. (1916)
1.Archangel 69746 273 11 3.91 0.00016
2.Olonets 71672 148 35 2.06 0.00049
3.Vologda 286812 984 106 3.43 0.00037
4.Kostroma 303795 2627 185 8.65 0.00061
5.Viatka 591020 10637 163 18.00 0.00028
6.Perm 674847 12139 248 17.99 0.00037
7. Ufa 499682 7448 60 14.91 0.00012
8.Kazan 445011 5927 42 13.32 0.00009
9.Simbirsk 304558 3484 54 11.44 0.00018
10.Penza 281549 5511 100 19.57 0.00036
11.Nizhni NovgorodI 318805 4505 75 14.13 0.00024
12.Vladimir 267036 6399 66 23.96 0.00025
13.Riazan 336920 4732 72 14.04 0.00021
14.Moscow 281409 3978 81 14.14 0.00029
15.Tver 338416 1926 33 5.69 0.00010
16.Iaroslavl 214371 3741 89 17.45 0.00042
17.Novgorod 260531 1638 168 6.29 0.00064
18.St. Petersburg 130327 2894 140 22.21 0.00107
19.Pskov 203115 1376 75 6.77 0.00037
20.Vitebsk 189375 5142 168 27.15 0.00089
21.Smolensk 267193 3119 67 11.67 0.00025
22.Mogilev 248603 6737 23 27.10 0.00009
23.Minsk 312726 10587 23 33.85 0.00007
24.Volhynia 290648 12401 19 42.67 0.00007
25.Podolia 573687 8417 72 14.67 0.00013
26.Kiev 652194 20627 70 31.63 0.00011
27.Chernigov 391533 9466 134 24.18 0.00034
28.Kursk 380995 6718 42 17.63 0.00011
29.Orel 331395 8369 34 25.25 0.00010
30.Kaluga 197763 1883 103 9.52 0.00052
31.Tula 245968 6418 63 26.09 0.00026
32.Tambov 484121 8265 74 17.07 0.00015
33.Voronezh 474950 12893 85 27.15 0.00018
34.Kharkov 424783 21671 104 51.02 0.00024
35.Poltava 475619 15961 345 33.56 0.00073
36.Kherson 417038 22139 105 53.09 0.00025
3 7.Ekaterinoslav 482912 16123 113 33.39 0.00023
38.Taurida 239784 17146 58 71.51 0.00024
39.Samara 517186 9932 90 19.20 0.00017
40.Saratov 433575 8515 74 19.64 0.00017
41.Don Territory 445283 15995 76 35.92 0.00017
42.Astrakhan 198062 2832 32 14.30 0.00016
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CALCULATION 1 RISE IN AVERAGE GRAIN YIELDS
Size of peasant allotment to 
Regression Output: 
Constant 1,
Std Err of Y Est 0,
R Squared 0,
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 0.000089 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000961
Gentry farming to yield
Regression Output: 
Constant 1
Std Err of Y Est 0
R Squared 0
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 0.088578 
Std Err of Coef. 0.180043
Literacy to Yield
Regression Output: 
Constant 1.
Std Err of Y Est 0
R Squared 0
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) -0.00903 
Std Err of Coef. 0.176798
Urbanization 1897 to yield 
Regression Output: 
Constant 1
Std Err of Y Est 0
R Squared 0
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 0.034943
Std Err of Coef. 0.118252
yield
133181
085606
000212
43
41
126202
085363
005869
43
41
138433
085403
000065
42
40
132243
085313
002178
42
40
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CALCULATION 1 GRAIN YIELDS (cont.)
Railroad/area density to yield 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.089049
Std Err of Y Est 0.081575
R Squared 0.092144
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.002588
0.001269
Road/area density to yield 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.117008
Std Err of Y Est 0.082619
R Squared 0.068756
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 0.000121 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000069
Land Settlement Applications to Yield 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.099732
Std Err of Y Est 0.084445
R Squared 0.027140
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 0.088263 
Std Err of Coef. 0.082528
Group Land Settlement to Yield 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.149349
Std Err of Y Est 0.084500
R Squared 0.025873
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) -0.18384
Std Err of Coef. 0.176178
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CALCULATION 1 GRAIN YIELDS (cont.)
Privatization to grain yields 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.073006
Std Err of Y Est 0.082010
R Squared 0.174457
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.312451
0.114887
Consolidation to Yield
Regression Output:
Constant 1.078732
Std Err of Y Est 0.074825
R Squared 0.236178
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 0.644844 
Std Err of Coef. 0.181108
Dept of Agri. to yield
Regression Output:
Constant 1.071902
Std Err of Y Est 0.076793
R Squared 0.195463
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 0.048667 
Std Err of Coef. 0,015420
Zemstvos to yield
Regression Output:
Constant 1.105320
Std Err of Y Est 0.086803
R Squared 0.022883
No. of Observations 40
Degrees of Freedom 38
X Coefficient(s ) 0.023583
Std Err of Coef. 0.024999
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CALCULATION 1 GRAIN YIELDS (cont.)
Yields to Credit Coop.s
Regression Output:
Constant -36.3122
Std Err of Y Est 13.81498
R Squared 0.090145
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 50.91496
Std Err of Coef. 25.57575
Agricultural Societies to Yield 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.116834
Std Err of Y Est 0.084505
R Squared 0.025766
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 61.01159 
Std Err of Coef. 58.59059
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tCALCULATION 2: PRIVATIZATION
Privatization to land set applic.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.353934
Std Err of Y Est 0.146173
R Squared 0.048158
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 0.272495 
Std Err of Coef. 0.204772
Privatization to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.044418
Std Err of Y Est 0.059758
R Squared 0.189406
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 0.239407 
Std Err of Coef. 0.083715
Privatization to Credit coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 14.10456
Std Err of Y Est 14.04000
R Squared 0.074719
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 33.06643 
Std Err of Coef. 19.66853
Privatization to Agri. Soc.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000408
Std Err of Y Est 0.000223
R Squared 0.061472
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) -0.00047
Std Err of Coef. 0.000312
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CALCULATION 2 PRIVATIZATION (cont.)
Privatization to Gentry farms 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.052165
Std Err of Y Est 0.063370
R Squared 0.080740
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
37
35
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.155650
0.088774
Privatization to road density 
Regression Output:
Constant 39.77310
Std Err of Y Est 173.7364
R Squared 0.109663
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 505.3411 
Std Err of Coef. 243.3860
Privatization to Railroad density 
Regression Output:
Constant 9.971866
Std Err of Y Est 9.161143
R Squared 0.207242
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 38.82022 
Std Err of Coef. 12.83377
Privatization to Dept of Agri exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.913227
Std Err of Y Est 0.774822
R Squared 0.100648
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 2.148231
Std Err of Coef. 1,085442
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CALCULATION 2 PRIVATIZATION (cont.)
Privatization to Zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
1.195528
0.615608
0.000877
37
35
0.151241 
0.862401
Privatization to size allotment 
Regression Output:
Constant 13.29642
Std Err of Y Est 9.902274
R Squared 0.019765
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
-11.6536
13.87201
Privatization to Literacy
Regression Output:
Constant 0.222221
Std Err of Y Est 0.079719
R Squared 0.000840
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
-0.01915 
0,111678
Privatization to Urban population
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.100599 
0.120616 
0.014038 
37 
35
0.119281 
0.168971
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CALCULATION 2 PRIVATIZATION (con t .)
Privatization to houshld. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.230475
Std Err of Y Est 0.192193
R Squared 0.018332
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.217670
0.269241
Privatization to total pop. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.249308
Std Err of Y Est 0.176761
R Squared 0.005012
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 0.103981 
Std Err of Coef. 0.247623
Privatization to urban pop. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 2.452661
Std Err of Y Est 0.867670
R Squared 0.020501
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) -1.04037 
Std Err of Coef. 1.215512
Privatization to rural pop. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.121733
Std Err of Y Est 0.093799
R Squared 0.018942
No. of Observations 37
Degrees of Freedom 35
X Coefficient(s ) 0.108022
Std Err of Coef. 0.131402
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CALCULATION 3: LAND SETTLEMENT APPLICATIONS
Dept of Agri exp to applications 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.255106
Std Err of Y Est 0.133686
R Squared 0.294378
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.109685 
0.026850
Zemstvo exp. to applications 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.318291
Std Err of Y Est 0.153196
R Squared 0.073397
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.067445 
Std Err of Coef. 0.037890
Land per houshld. to applications 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.435620
Std Err of Y Est 0.152949
R Squared 0.076382
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -0.00313 
Std Err of Coef. 0.001721
Gentry farming to applications 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.409045
Std Err of Y Est 0.158784
R Squared 0.004567
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -0.14469
Std Err of Coef. 0.337726
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CALCULATION 3: LAND SETTLEMENT APPLICATIONS (cont.)
Urban pop. to applications 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.316927
Std Err of Y Est 0.140923
R Squared 0.215915
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.648287
0.195333
Literacy to applications
Regression Output:
Constant 0.184895
Std Err of Y Est 0.140034
R Squared 0.225778
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.990087 
Std Err of Coef. 0.289890
Railroads/area to applications
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.316464 
0.152238 
0.084954 
42 
40
0.004568
0.002370
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CALCULATION 4: CONSOLIDATION
Dept of Agri exp. to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.014612
Std Err of Y Est 0.047754
R Squared 0.462548
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.056275
Std Err of Coef. 0.009591
Zemstvo exp. to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.047114
Std Err of Y Est 0.061284
R Squared 0.114845
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.034531 
Std Err of Coef. 0.015157
Land per houshld. to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.100013
Std Err of Y Est 0.063492
R Squared 0.049923
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -0.00103 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000714
Gentry farming to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.065724
Std Err of Y Est 0.062746
R Squared 0.072125
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.235329
Std Err of Coef. 0.133458
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CALCULATION 4 CONSOLIDATION (cont.)
Urban pop. to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.054148
Std Err of Y Est 0.057487
R Squared 0.221135
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.268532
0.079683
Literacy to consolidation
Regression Output:
Constant 0.018962
Std Err of Y Est 0.060422
R Squared 0.139592
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.318644 
Std Err of Coef, 0.125082
Railroads/area to consolidation 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.039546
Std Err of Y Est 0.058995
R Squared 0.179742
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.002719 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000918
Consolidation to houshld. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.415735
Std Err of Y Est 0.450619
R Squared 0.007267
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) -0.59752
Std Err of Coef. 1.090688
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CALCULATION 4 CONSOLIDATION (cont.)
Consolidation to total pop. grth. 
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s ) 0.564641 
Std Err of Coef. 0.413578
1.224826 
0.170385 
0.044523 
42 
40
Consolidation to urban pop. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 2.371308
Std Err of Y Est 0.848300
R Squared 0.011806
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -1.42345 
Std Err of Coef. 2.059088
Consolidation to rural pop. grth.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.149636
Std Err of Y Est 0.104251
R Squared 0.000019
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.007103 
Std Err of Coef. 0.253051
Consolidation to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 11.90247
Std Err of Y Est 12.54773
R Squared 0.249412
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 111.0397 
Std Err of Coef. 30.45725
Consolidation to Agri. societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000176
Std Err of Y Est 0.000209
R Squared 0.133313
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) 0.001274 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000507
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CALCULATION 5: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE
Gentry farming to Dept of Agri 
Regression Output:
Constant 1.137879
Std Err of Y Est 0.777844
R Squared 0.023718
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 1.630943
Std Err of Coef. 1.654437
Zemstvo exp. to Dept of Agri.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.965023
Std Err of Y Est 0.767003
R Squared 0.050740
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.277391 
Std Err of Coef. 0.189704
Dept, of Agri. to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 12.58448
Std Err of Y Est 13.40003
R Squared 0.143981
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 6.980930 
Std Err of Coef. 2.691354
Agri societies to Dept of Agri.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.904523
Std Err of Y Est 0.730236
R Squared 0.139566
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 1304.481
Std Err of Coef. 512.1252
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CALCULATION 5 : DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE (cont.)
Railroads/area to Dept of Agri.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.670785
Std Err of Y Est 0.701144
R Squared 0.206758
42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.035253
Std Err of Coef. 0.010918
Literacy to Dept of Agri.
Regression Output:
Constant -0.12441
Std Err of Y Est 0.604150
R Squared 0.411048
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 6.608177 
Std Err of Coef. 1.250676
Urban pop. to Dept of Agri.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.624241
Std Err of Y Est 0.488262
R Squared 0.615323
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 5.413523 
Std Err of Coef. 0.676778
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CALCULATION 6 ZEMSTVO AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURE 
Gentry farming to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s ) 2 336741
0.942090
0.615224
0.073835
42
40
Std Err of Coef. 1.308553
Literacy to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(s ) 0.364427 
Std Err of Coef. 1.322141
1.074743 
0.638671 
0.001895 
42 
40
Urban pop. to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.081422
Std Err of Y Est 0.635819
R Squared 0.010792
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.582204 
Std Err of Coef. 0.881306
Zemstvo Expenditure to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 11.44990
Std Err of Y Est 13.35498
R Squared 0.149728
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 8.766521 
Std Err of Coef. 3.303113
Agri societies to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 1.058327
Std Err of Y Est 0.635117
R Squared 0.012973
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 322.9641 
Std Err of Coef. 445.4169
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CALCULATION 6 ZEMSTVO AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURE (cont.)
Railroads/area to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.805090
Std Err of Y Est 0.606345
R Squared 0.100377
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.019946
0.009441
Dept of Agri. to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.917454
Std Err of Y Est 0.622848
R Squared 0.050740
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.182920 
Std Err of Coef. 0.125097
Applications to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.721484
Std Err of Y Est 0.615370
R Squared 0.073397
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 1.088250 
Std Err of Coef. 0.611370
Consolidation to zemstvo exp.
Regression Output:
Constant 0.863404
Std Err of Y Est 0.601449
R Squared 0.114845
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 3.325848
Std Err of Coef. 1.459905
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CALCULATION 7: CREDIT COOPERATION
Agri. Soc.s to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom
23.72225
14.38564
0.013425
42
40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
-7443.48
10088.85
Gentry Farming to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 12.22404
Std Err of Y Est 12.26459
R Squared 0.282903
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 103.6266 
Std Err of Coef. 26.08621
Consolidation to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 11.90247
Std Err of Y Est 12.54773
R Squared 0.249412
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 111.0397 
Std Err of Coef. 30.45725
Railroad density to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 14.30879
Std Err of Y Est 13.85358
R Squared 0.085054
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.415987
Std Err of Coef. 0.215724
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CALCULATION 7: CREDIT COOPERATION (cont.)
Dept, of Agri. to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 12.58448
Std Err of Y Est 13.40003
R Squared 0.143981
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 6.980930
Std Err of Coef. 2.691354
Zemstvo Expenditure to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 11.44990
Std Err of Y Est 13.35498
R Squared 0.149728
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient ( s ) 8.766521 
Std Err of Coef. 3.303113
Size allotment to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 22.08970
Std Err of Y Est 14.47092
R Squared 0.001694
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -0.04245 
Std Err of Coef. 0.162909
Literacy to Credit Coop.s
Regression Output:
Constant 19.46565
Std Err of Y Est 14.46389
R Squared 0.002664
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient( s ) 9.788379 
Std Err of Coef. 29.94231
Urban Population to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 17.87240
Std Err of Y Est 14.06843
R Squared 0.056455
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 30.16750 
Std Err of Coef. 19.50020
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CALCULATION 8: AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES ,
1
Agri. Soc.s to Credit Coop.s 
Regression Output:
Constant 23.72225
Std Err of Y Est 14.38564
R Squared 0.013425
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -7443.48
Std Err of Coef. 10088.85
Gentry farming to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000352
Std Err of Y Est 0.000219
R Squared 0.049197
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) -0.00067 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000467
Dept of Agri exp. to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000153
Std Err of Y Est 0.000209
R Squared 0.139566
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.000106 
Std Err of Coef. 0.000042
Zemstvo exp. to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000245
Std Err of Y Est 0.000223
R Squared 0.012973
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 0.000040
Std Err of Coef. 0.000055
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CALCULATION 8 AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES (cont.)
Consolidation to to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000183
Std Err of Y Est 0.000210
R Squared 0.128799
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.001242
0.000510
Railroads/area to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000259
Std Err of Y Est 0.000224
R Squared 0.007005
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.000001
0.000003
Literacy to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant -0,00003
Std Err of Y Est 0.000191
R Squared 0.276403
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 
Std Err of Coef.
0.001551
0.000397
Urban pop. to agri societies 
Regression Output:
Constant 0.000190
Std Err of Y Est 0.000204
R Squared 0.175012
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s )
Std Err of Coef.
0.000826
0.000283
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CALCULATION 9 : MISCELLANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS .
Gentry farming to peasant allotment 
Regression Output:
Constant 17.63695
Std Err of Y Est 13.26910
R Squared 0.089366
No. of Observations 43
Degrees of Freedom 41
X Coefficient(s ) -56.1375
Std Err of Coef. 27.98624
Literacy to Urbanization, 1897 
Regression Output:
Constant -0.15000
Std Err of Y Est 0.059330
R Squared 0.729479
No. of Observations 42
Degrees of Freedom 40
X Coefficient(s ) 1.275596 
Std Err of Coef. 0.122822
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NOTES t
*
In the interest of brevity and consistency, I have chosen to 
employ abreviated citations in the notes. The full citation for 
each work can be found in the Bibliography in the back. In 
addition, I have found it convenient to substitute initials for 
some of the longer names of government organizations. They are as 
follows:
GUZZ: Glavnoe Upravlenie Zemleustroistva i Zemledelia
GUZZ (D Z ): Glavnoe Upravlenie Zemleustroistva i Zemledelia
(Departament Zemledelia)
NKZ: Narodnyi Kommisariat Zemledelia
M Z : Ministerstvo Zemledelia
TsSK: Tsentralnyi Statisticheskii Komitet
TsSU: Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie
TsUNKhU: Tsentralnoe Upravlenie Narodnokhoziaistvenogo Ucheta
TsSKhB; Tsentralnyi Selskokhoziaistvennyi Bank 
IIA; Institut Internationale d ’Agriculture
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»Chapter One: The Imperative of Agricultural Development
(1) The GNP figures for the European countries and Russia are 
from Bairoch, "Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975", pp. 
281, 286. Unfortunately, Bairoch doesn’t include his estimates of 
the U.S. GNP, but I have felt it necessary to give an estimate 
here, since we must include the U.S. in order to give a proper 
perspective to what was happening in Europe.
Bairoch mentions that in 1913, per capita U.S. GNP was 40% 
higher than Britain’s (see Ibid., p. 285), in other words $1,351. 
We have to multiply this figure by the 1913 U.S. population, 
which I have estimated to be roughly 95,200,000 based on the 
official figure of 91,972,000 given for 1910 and adding 30% of 
the increment for the decade 1910-20 (see Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. p. 17). The total 
U.S. GNP for 1913, then, comes out to $128,615 million (still in 
1960 US$). If we take the estimate of another economic historian, 
Maddison, that U.S. GNP in 1900 was 60.2% of its GNP in 1913 (see 
Maddison, "Growth and Fluctuation of the World Economy", p. 193), 
we can estimate U.S. GNP in 1900 to have been $77,426 million. 
Dividing this figure by the population in 1900 (see Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. p. 17), 
we get a per capita GNP figure of $1,019.
The urbanization figures are circa 1900 as reproduced in 
Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1911, p. 38.
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(7) TsUNKhU, Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo SSSR:
Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, pp. 378-79.
(8) For crop yields 1860-1900, see the data reproduced in 
Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy 1850-1917. p. 101.
(9) The conventional view that Russian agriculture was in crisis 
is reflected in works such as Robinson, Rural Russia Under the 
Old Regime: Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture; and Simms, 
"The Crisis in Russian Agriculture". This view has been 
challenged recently in works such as Crisp, Studies in the 
Russian Economy: Bideleux, Communism and Development: Kahan,
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Russian Economic History; Gregory, "Grain Marketings and Peasant » 
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pp. 120-121, 64-65, 42-43, 104-5, 84-85, 168-69, 152-53, 72-73,
50-51, 110-11, 92-93, 170-71, 158-59. The crop yields for maize
are calculated from Ibid., pp. 114-15, 120-21. The gross
production for Russia includes the 9 Asian provinces, but the 
crop yields refer just to European Russia.
(11) The subject was the focus of the Special Commission on the 
Needs of Agriculture. Among the scholarly works published at the 
time were Chuprov, Vlianie Urozhaev i, Khlebnykh Tsen and Melkoe 
Zemledelie v Rossii i. Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy; Dolgorukov, Agrarnvi 
Vopros; Ermolov, Nash Zemelnyi Vopros; Kaufman, Agrarnvi Vopros 
v Rossii; Lenin, The Agrarian Question in Russia; Maslov, 
Agrarnyi Vopros v Rossii; Oganovsky, Individualizatsia
Zemlevladenia: Peshekhonov, Agrarnaia Problema; Prokopovich,
Agrarnyi Krizis; Rittikh, Krestianskoe Zemlepolzovanie; Sharapov, 
Zemlia i Volia; Shcherbatov, Gosudarstvo .i Zemlia; Snezhkov,
B1izhaishia Zadacha Pravitelstva.
(12) GUZZ, Statisticheskie Svedenia po Zemelnomu Voprosu. p. 23; 
Mozzhukhin, Agrarnyi Vopros v Tsyfrakh _i Faktakh, p. 9. The GUZZ 
statistics refer to landownership per male peasant, which 
declined from 5.1 desiatins to 2.6 desiatins; I have cut these 
figures in half to get a per capita figure.
(13) Mozzhukhin, Agrarnvi Vopros v Tsvfrakh i Faktakh, pp. 12-13.
(14) Chayanov, Chto Takoe Agrarnyi Vopros?. p. 33; Brutskus, 
Agrarnyi Vopros i. Agrarnaia Politika, pp. 101-8; Peshekhonov, 
Agrarnaia Problema, p. 72; Mozzhukhin, Agrarnyi Vopros v Tsyfrakh 
i. Kaktakh. pp. 12-18.
(15) Kaufman, Zemlia i. Kultura. pp. 10-11.
(16) Chuprov, Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii i. Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy.
p. 11 .
(17) Mozzhukhin, Agrarnvi Vopros v Tsvf rakh i Faktakh, p. 21.
(18) Chayanov, Osnovnye Ideii... Obshestvennoi Agronomii. pp. 
28-29; Gerlakh, "Znachenie Molochnogo Dela dlia SSSR", pp. 125; 
Fabrikant, Osnovy Agronomicheskoi Pomoshchi. p. 150.
(19) Gerlakh, "Znachenie Molochnogo Dela dlia SSSR", p. 126.
(20) As Ashin pointed out, the level of animal husbandry was the 
product of several factors: the size of farm capital, the state 
of livestock breeding, the production of fodder crops and the 
level of grain production (see Ashin, Qbshestvenno- 
Agronomicheskie Etudy, p. 105).
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(21) Chuprov, Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii i Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy, 
p, 11. The problem is that livestock figures for this period are 
unreliable even by 19th century Russian standards. Between 1895 
and 1896, for instance, the number of cows jumped by 20%, sheep 
by 22%, pigs by 45% and horses 11% —  almost certainly because of 
a different method of accounting (see Goldsmith, "The Economic 
Growth of Tsarist Russia", p. 452; and Mitchell, European 
Historical Statistics. p. 303). If one adds back this increment, 
as Goldsmith suggests, the number of cows declined from 32.3 
million heads in 1877 to 31.2 million heads in 1905,- while the 
number of horses rose from 19.4 million heads to 20.8 million 
heads (see Mitchell, European Historical Statistics. p. 303).
The decline in the number of cows was a bad sign for both 
dairy production and for manure production, while the rise in 
horse numbers was no consolation, since horse manure was more 
difficult to collect than cow manure (horses spent less time in 
stalls) and according to some estimates, Russia already had too 
many horses, with the existing animals being grossly under­
utilized (see NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana 
Razvitia", p. 17; Makarov, "Kapital i Kapitalonakoplenie", pp. 
42-43; Mozzhukhin, Agrarnvi Vopros v Tsyfrakh i Faktakh. p. 20).
(22) The vital significance of livestock in the agriculture of 
the time is discussed in virtually all the agronomic literature. 
See for example, Fabrikant, Osnovy Agronomicheskoi Pomoshchi. pp. 
131-32; Gerlakh, "Znachenie Molochnogo Dela dlia SSSR", pp. 100, 
118; Brunst, "Zemskaia Agronomia".
(23) Chuprov, Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii i Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy,
p . 10 .
(24) Lubny-Gertsyk, "Ob Agrarnom Perenaselenii Rossii", pp. 10- 
1 1 .
(25) Brutskus, Agrarnyi Vopros i. Agrarnaia Politika, p. 188.
(26) This is the argument in both Maslov, Agrarnvi Vopros v
Rossii and Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia.
(27) Oganovsky, Individualizatsia Zemlevladenia. p. 21.
(28) Ibid., pp. 18-25, 93-94; Makarov, "Kapital i
Kapitalonakoplenie", pp. 29-33.
(29) Chuprov, Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii i Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy;
Kaufman, Agrarnyi Vopros v Rossii and Zemlia i Kultura; Chayanov, 
Optimalnye Razmery Selskokhoziaistvennykh Predpriatii and "On the 
Theory of Non-Capitalist Economic Systems"; and Makarov
Krestianskoe Khoziaistvo.
(30) This is most emphatically argued in Kaufman, Agrarnyi Vopros
v Rossii and Zemlia jl Kultura.
(31) See for example Oganovsky, Individualizatsia Zemlevladenia.
pp. 22-23; Makarov, Krestianskoe Khoziaistvo. pp. 40-66.
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(32) Makarov, Krestianskoe Khoziaistvo. p. 48.
(33) Ashin, Obshestvenno-Agronomicheskie Etudv. pp. xiv-xv.
(34) Ibid., pp. xvii, 202; Brutskus, Agrarnvi Vopros jl Agrarnaia 
Politika. p. 78.
(35) Oganovsky, Individualizatsia Zemlevladenia. pp. 22-23.
(36) Ashin, Obshestvenno-Agronomicheskie Etudv. pp. xx-xxi.
(37) Ibid., pp. xi-xiii.
(38) Ibid., p . xiii.
(39) Chayanov, Osnovnye Ideii... Obshestvennoi Agronomii. p. 101.
(40) Chayanov, Qptimalnve Razmerv Selskokhoziaistvennvkh 
Predpriatii. pp. 3-4.
(41) Fabrikant, Osnovy Agronomicheskoi Pomoshchi. p. 46.
(42) This is the underlying theme in Chelintsev, Russkoe Selkoe 
Khoziaistvo Pered Revoliutsii.
(43) Chuprov, Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii i. Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy, 
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land in 1916, they provided 22% of agricultural marketings. (See 
NKZ (Zemplan), ’’Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana” , p. 11).
(3) Ibid., p. 11.
(4) This is a rough calculation based on the 1901-5 crop yield 
averages for the 50 provinces of European Russia as reproduced in 
GUZZ, Sbornik Statistiko-Ekonomicheskikh Svedenii.
(5) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", pp. 11-12.
(6) The figures for the 1905-8 or the 1906-10 periods show 
stagnation or decline in the production and yields for most crops 
in European Russia (see IIA, Annuaire Internationale de 
Statistique Agricole 1910): this was a reflection of both the 
social upheaval and probably a certain degree of land exhaustion.
(7) Compiled from IIA, Annuaire Internationale de Statistique 
Agricole. 1910, 1913 and 1914; the figures for barley production 
1901-5 in 9 out of the 72 provinces (the Asian provinces) are for 
the years 1906-10; the figures for maize 1909-13 are actually 
figures for the years 1910-14.
(8) See the figures reproduced in Kahan, Russian Economic 
History. pp. 14-15.
(9) Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy, p. 730.
(10) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 8.
(11) The data is taken from IIA, Annuaire Internationale de 
Statistique Agricole for the years 1910, 1913 and 1914.
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(12) Shestakov, Kapitalizatsia Selskogo Khoziaistva. pp. 70-78; 
Lyaschenko, History of the National Economy, p. 732.
(13) Seleznev, "Mashina v Russkom Selskom Khoziaistve", p. 222;
Grai, "Oktiabr i Mashina v Derevne", p. 48. Shestakov quotes
figures which are comparable, though not exactly the same (see 
Shestakov, Kapitalizatsia Selskogo Khoziaistva. p. 46).
(14) Seleznev, "Mashina v Russkom Selskom Khoziaistve", p. 222;
Grai, "Oktiabr i Mashina v Derevne", p. 48; Shestakov, 
Kapitalizatsia Selskogo Khoziaistva. p. 46. Already in 1908, 
Russian domestic manufacturers were producing annually 350,000 
plows, 29,000 seed drills, 53,000 reapers and 20,000 threshing
machines. (See Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1911 p. 272). 
With the opening of the International Harvester plant in 
Liubertsy outside of Moscow in 1911, the capacity of Russian 
domestic manufacture increased significantly.
(15) Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1914. pp. 345-47.
(16) Polferov, Selskokhoziaistvennye Rabochie, pp. 25-46; 
Brutskus, Agrarnvi Vopros i. Agrarnaia Politika. pp. 128-29.
(17) Antsiferov, Russian Agriculture. p. 61; that the vast
majority of Russia’s fertilizers were imported is confirmed in 
Khachaturov, "Promyshlenost i Rynok Iskustvennykh Udobrenii",
P . 28.
(18) The figures for 1905, 1909 and 1914 are calculated from 
GUZZ, Sbornik Statistiko-Ekonomicheskikh Svedenii; the figures 
for 1916 are from, the 1916 census as reproduced in Kennard, The 
Russian Year-Book for 1919. pp. 84-87.
(19) Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1914. p. 158.
(20) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana" p. 9.
(21) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 9. The fact
that the proportion of grain marketings was rising has recently 
been disputed by Gregory (see Gregory, "Grain Marketings and 
Peasant Consumption").
(22) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 9.
(23) Ibid., p . 10.
(24) Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy. p. 736.
(25) Shestakov, Kapitalizatsia Selskogo Khoziaistva. pp. 73-74.
(26) Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1914. p. 336; The Russian 
Year-Book for 1916. pp. 182-84,
(27) Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1914. pp. 125-26, and The 
Russian Year-Book for 1911. pp. 235-37.
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(28) Calculated from IIA, Annuaire Internationale de Statistique 
Agricole 1927. pp. 230-35, 240-43, 248-61, 270-75, 382-85, 406- 
11. The world total net exports of rye are evidently understated 
on p. 243; it is probable that the statisticians forgot to add in 
rye flour. I have done so, taking the commensurate figure from 
IIA, Annuaire Internationale de Statistique Agricole 1924. p. 
336.
(29) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 8. These 
Zemplan figures seem to be based on Prokopovich’s calculation of 
GNP (see Lyashchenko, Russkoe Zernovoe Khoziaistvo. pp. 290-91), 
which is considered by most historians to be overly conservative.
(30) Kahan, Russian Economic History, p. 69.
(31) Goldsmith, for instance, calculated that in terms of volume 
of crop production, the figures for 1913 were 63% above the 
average for 1896-1900. This, of course, does not include 
commercial dairy farming which was both growing very rapidly 
during this time and was lucrative in terms of market prices.(see 
Goldsmith, "The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia", p. 450)
(32!) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 11. I ’ve 
corrected an obvious mistake in the total: 2,180 million puds 
should be 1,180 million, judging by the ruble value of total 
marketings and the gentry’s share in it (see Ibid., pp. 9-11).
(33) Prokopovich, Kreditnaia Koooeratsia v Rossii. Appendix 1. 
The reader should note that the figures for peasant estate banks 
in 1895, 1899 and 1916 are estimates, as are the zemstvo figures 
for 1916.
(34) Kheisin, Ocherki po Istorii Kreditnoi Kooperatsii. p. 155.
(35) Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, pp. 131-2; Gatrell, 
The Tsarist Economy, p. 202.
(36) I am taking Zemplan’s estimate that the peasantry accounted 
for 78% of (grain) marketings and that total marketings (local, 
national and international) from all (both peasant and gentry) 
farming in 1913 equalled 4.5 billion rubles. See NKZ (Zemplan), 
"Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 9.
(37) After peaking in 1907, per capita consumption of alcohol 
declined during the Stolypin Reform; during the war, alcohol 
consumption was prohibited by law. See Kennard, The Russian 
Year-Book for 1911 pp. 262-63; The Russian Year-Book for 1916 p. 
647.
(38) NKZ (Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 8.
(39) The two censi of 1897 and 1916 are reproduced in Oganovsky 
and Kondratiev, Selskoe Khoziaistvo Rossii. pp. 18-21.
i. ■
(40) Bairoch, "Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975";
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Maddison, "Growth and Fluctuation in the World Economy, 1870- 
1960". With respect to Russian GNP statistics, the first study 
was Prokopovich’s; his figures were revised upward by Gosplan in 
the 1920s, then by Goldsmith (see "The Economic Growth of Tsarist 
Russia"), Falkus (see "Russia’s National Income in 1913") and 
Gregory (see Russian National Income).
(41) Bairoch’s estimate for the growth of Russia’s GNP between 
1900 and j 1913 (3.88% compounded annual rate) falls in between 
Goldsmith’s estimate of a 3.0% annual rate from 1883 and 1913 
(Goldsmith, "The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia", p. 443) and 
,Gregory’s 4.3% annual growth between 1904-8 and 1909-13 (Gregory,
;Russian National Income, p . 148).
• !
;(42) Bairoch, "Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975", p.
! 281,. Bairoch does not include the United States in his 
I comparisons, but he does mention that in 1913 per capita U.S. GNP 
was 40% higher than Britain’s $965 (Ibid., pp. 285-86), in other 
!words, $1,351. If we multiply this figure by the 1913 U.S. 
population, which I have estimated at 95,200,000, we get a total 
I GNP figure of $128,615 million. The 1913 population is estimated 
by taking 30% of the increment between the 1910 census —
91,972,000 —  and the 1920 census —  105,711,000 —  (see Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. p. 
17). Going backwards, the size of the U.S. GNP in 1900 is 
estimated on the basis of Maddison*s estimate that the U.S. GNP 
in 1900 in constant dollars was 60.2% of the GNP for 1913 (see 
Maddison, "Growth and Fluctuation of the World Economy", p. 193).
i (43) Calculated from Bairoch, "Europe’s Gross National Product: 
1800-1975", pp. 279, 281, 286.
(44) Bairoch, for instance, compared the great powers in terms of 
"industrial potential" (a series of manufacturing production
, indices). He found that Russia had overtaken France in the late 
19th century. But even by 1913, Russia’s industrial potential was 
. still 60% of Britain’s, 56% of Germany’s and 26% of the United 
States’ (see Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels 
from 1750 to 1980", p. 292.).
(45) These are based on the GNP table presented above and on 
Bairoch, "Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975", p. 286. 
Also see Goldsmith, "The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia", p. 
475; Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, p. 5.
(46) Polferov, Selskokhoziaistvenye Rabochie. pp. 25-46; Chuprov, 
Melkoe Zemledelie v Rossii _i Ego Osnovnye Nuzhdy. pp. 23-24; 
Brutskus,iAgrarnyi Vopros i Agrarnaia Politika. pp. 22, 128-29.
(47) Brutskus, Agranyi Vopros i. Agrarnaia Politika. p. 115; also 
Kennard, The Russian Year-Book for 1911. p. 39.
(48) Figures for the resettlement beyond the Urals are in 
Brutskus. Agrarnyi Vopros .i Agrarnaia Politika. p. 84; concerning 
emigration statistics, one can consult Kennard, The Russian
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Year-Book for 1911j_ p_£_ 39: Gatrell XThe Tsarist Economy^ iLi. 69) 
estimates the average annual emigration in 1909-13 to have been 
300.000. The rate of urbanization in Russia at this time is
discussed below.
(49)The data for 1897 is reprinted in Oganovsky and Kondratiev, 
pp. 18-19; the 1913 data can be found in The Russian Yearbook
:1916 pp. 55-58.
(50) The census is reprinted in Oganovsky and Kondratiev, 
Selskoe Khoziaistvo Rossii. pp. 20-21.
(51) That’s 10 million minus 2.5 million (for those males who 
could normally be expected to be working in the towns, circa 
1897). The mobilization of 7.5 million out of a rural population 
of of 88.5 million squares with the estimates that by 1916, about 
15 million men had been mobilized from the country as a whole.
(52) Compare this with the urbanization rates in 1914, according 
to : the unadjusted figures mentioned by Thalheim (13.3%) in
!"Russia’s Economic Development", p. 90, or the adjusted 18%
figure estimated by both Crisp in Studies in the Russian Economy, 
p. 5, and Falkus in The Industrialization of Russia, p. 11.
(53) The Zemplan study noted a 19% growth in the rural labor 
force between 1900 and 1913, or a 1.35% annual growth rate; with 
population growth slowing down, the population was aging —  hence 
the difference between my 1.24% rural population growth estimate 
and Zemplan's estimate of 1.35% rural labor force growth. Zemplan 
also noted that in 1916, urban population accounted for 20% of 
the total, whereas the TsSK revisions basically left the urban 
population at 13%, the same as it had been in 1897.(See NKZ 
(Zemplan), "Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana", p. 8, and Kennard, The 
Russian Year-Book for 1916. pp. 55-58.) Bairoch, with his 
calculations of GNP and GNP per capita implicitly uses a 1.71% 
population growth rate between 1900 and 1913 (see Bairoch, 
"Europe's Gross National Product: 1800-1975"); Goldsmith records 
a 1.5% population growth rate between 1860 and 1916 (see
Goldsmith, "The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia", p. 441); 
Gregory estimates a 1.6% population growth rate between 1897-1901 
and 1909-13 (see Gregory, Russian National Income, p. 148).
(54) The figures for the Empire as a whole as estimated by 
several Western historians match quite closely our figures for
the 42 provinces,! as can be seen in the preceding footnote.
!
(55) Bairbch, "Europe's Gross National Product: 1800-1975",
p. 286.
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